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Society is Sustained and 
Revealed through Action 
This section shifts the focus of interest from potentials to action, as it looks from 
two angles at society as a going concern. In Chapter Twelve attention is directed 
to how human interaction both depends upon and maintains a society with its 
own social structure in a dynamic existence. Instead of focusing on structure as 
though it were an inert product, as in a building, it describes the process of 
structuring, which both makes possible and results from human action. As a 
corollary to this, Chapter Thirteen examines how a society comes to be a unity, at 
least in some degree, depending upon members identifying themselves with it. 
The image of their society that members sustain comes in turn to sustain their 
own sense of self. These chapters take a break from looking specifically at the 
workings of evil in society. 
The justification for this, however, is provided in Chapter Eleven, which shows 
how evil does not have a dynamism all its own. Nevertheless, it can spread 
because it as it were uses the dynamism inherent in whatever it corrupts. This 
chapter is really a transitional one from the last section as it asks what kind of 
actuality can we accord to such terms as 'structure' and 'evil,' and to their 
combination 'structural eviY. 
Chapter Fourteen draws together the views put forward in the previous three 
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chapters especially to show how structural evil may be conceived and where it is 
be located. The characterization offered in terms of distorted rules, deficient 
resources and misleading images appears abstract. That is because it is not an 
isolatable entity, one item among others that could be speedily dealt with. 
Instead, it may pervade any or all of the interactions between people, whether 
they are aware of it or not. 
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Chapter Eleven 
A Semantic Approach to 
IStructure' and IEvil' 
"People sometimes make a slip, without meaning what they say; 
and which of us has never sinned by speech?" (Sirach 19: 16) 
Speaking may sometimes be deceptively easy, as we too quickly presume that 
some definite entity corresponds to each thing we mention. It is easy to think 
that when, for instance, Freud discourses on the ego, id and superego or Parsons 
explains the functional and structural properties of society, they are referring to 
objects that could be identified in much the same way as the furniture in a room. 
If we do that, however, we are treating words as labels rather than as tools or 
signals which can be put to use in many different ways. This is one of the central 
lessons of linguistic analysis. 
This chapter is devoted to examining some of the conceptual problems associated 
with speaking of 'structural evil.' Attention will be directed first to the concept of 
'structure,' how it is used generally and then by Giddens and Kohut in particular. 
Then, after considering how 'structure' may be a value-laded term, attention will 
be given to 'evil.' Thomas, together with Augustine and many others before 
him, had found it necessary to examine closely what we are doing when we 
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speak of some action, person or situation as evil. Then, by combining Th?mas' 
analysis of evil with Kohut's and Giddens' uses of 'structure,' we should be able 
to arrive at a preliminary view of 'structural eviL' 
11.1 Rhetoric and Analysis 
Mention has already been made of how terms, even technical terms, are used 
loosely but often more imaginatively in rhetoric. ('Rhetoric' is not meant in any 
pejorative sense, but as the art of drawing upon a particular audience's feelings, 
perceptions and presumptions to persuade them to accept a new view and/ or 
undertake some action.) The urgency of revealing a situation and pressing 
people into action gives rhetoric its dynamism, but it is possible to become so 
caught up in its dynamism that one partially loses contact with reality. Words 
and images when pressed too far in one direction become ineffective tools. This 
is why analysis has to complement rhetoric. 
Reference has already been made to apocalyptic literature (Part One: Introduc-
tion) and its use by Walter Wink and Albert Nolan (3.2.2.1). Chapter Five dealt 
with the rhetorical incorporation of 'experience distant' terms from social 
analysis into an 'experience near' cry of defiance and call for action. This was an 
instance of what Giddens terms the 'double hermeneutic' (NRSM: 146 and 
CMOD, 15f). Attention was then given to why 'structure,' 'system,' and similar 
terms had a genuine rhetorical appeal, now further attention must be directed to 
their use in analyzing first society and then the self. 
11.2 The Metaphor of Structure 
Many writers have used the notion of 'structure' (or similar terms) to pick out 
some feature or explain the workings of society, and to a lesser extent to reveal 
the self. It after all fits the mechanistic root metaphor well. Not all writers, 
however, use this notion in the same way; it is incorporated into various 
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theories. So, for instance, neither Talcott Parsons' understanding of social 
structure nor Alfred Schutz's 'structures of the life-world' are the same as 
Giddens' view of structure (NRSM: 24££); nor does Freud's structural model 
explain Kohut's concern to build up the self-structure of his clients (SS IV: 690). 
Consequently, the two elucidations of 'structure' are restricted to Giddens' and 
Kohut's uses of the term, and cannot without further investigation be applied to 
other authors. 
11.2.1 Structure on a Societal Level (Giddens) 
Giddens regards it as a common mistake to set the notion of 'structure' over 
against that of free agents, as though structures only set limits to free activity. 
This misconception is evident in the assumption "that 'structure' must refer to 
something 'outside' the activities of social agents if it is to have any sense at all in 
social science" (CS: 141). Instead, in Giddens' view structure both enables and in a 
wide sense directs human activity; but because its enabling power only offers a 
limited scope for action, it does also have a constraining effect. 
In order to present his own understanding of social structures, Giddens distin-
guishes himself from two prevailing notions, one prevalent in the 
English-speaking world, the other central to structuralism. Each of these notions 
induces in its own way a too constraining notion of social structure. 
When they [English speaking social scientists] talk of structure, or of 'the structural 
properties of institutions', they have in mind a sort of visual analogy. They see the 
structural properties of institutions as like the girders of a building, or the anatomy 
of a body. Structure consists of patterns or relationships observable in a diversity of 
social contexts. (STMS: 60) 
Such a notion overlooks time, and tends to give the impression that social 
structures are there irrespective of whether anyone is doing anything or not. It 
also 
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implies too static or unchanging an image of what societies are like: because it does 
not indicate that the patterning of social systems only exists in so far as individuals 
actively repeat particular forms of conduct from one time and place to another. 1£ we 
were to use this sort of imagery at all, we should have to say that social systems are 
like buildings that are at every moment constantly being reconstructed by the very bricks 
that compose them. (1987b: 12) 
This image is hardly a helpful one. If one wants a visual image, it is perhaps 
more helpful to think of society in terms of a cascading fountain, where the 
constant movement of the many drops of water both keeps it in existence and 
results in its overall form. A very different notion of structure, however, is 
proposed by structuralism, particularly in structural linguistics. 
Structural features of language do not exist as patterns situated in time and space, 
like patterns of social relationships; they consist of relations of absences and 
presences embedded in the instantiation of language, in speech or in texts. Structure 
here presumes the idea of an absent totality. (STMS: 61) 
Thus a speech act or text has to be understood in contrast to and against a 
background of what was not said, what words were not employed, what tenses, 
moods, or other verbal configurations were not invoked. While not rejecting 
this notion entirely, Giddens does not consider that people's actions and interac-
tions can be totally assimilated to an understanding of speech and texts. liThe 
problem with conceptualizing structure as a set of 'presences', is that structure 
then appears as a constraint which is 'external' to action" (SIMS: 61). 
Both the mainly-French structuralist and the English-speaking structural-
functionalist approaches propose in their different ways a notion of structure as a 
set of external constraints to action. Neither manages to overcome fully the 
division between objective social structures and subjective intentional action. 
Instead of this dualism, Giddens speaks of the duality of structure: structure both 
enables people to act and results from their action. This insight lies at the heart of 
I 
his theory of structuration, which will be examined in the next chapter (12.1). 
It should, however, be mentioned here that Giddens - unlike Parsons and other 
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sociologists - does not identify the evident arrangement of an organization -
for instance, a church hierarchy, the ranking system in the military or the ladder 
of advancement ranging from the lowest to the highest position in a corporation 
- as a structure. These institutions appear to have a certain fixed existence, 
which remains just about unaffected by the varying day-to-day activities of their 
members, who over a period of time will themselves be replaced by others. 
Giddens, however, contends: liThe fixity of institutional forms does not exist in 
spite of, or outside, the encounters of day-to-day life but is implicated in those 
very encounters" (CS: 69). These encounters, although freely undertaken, are 
neither completely haphazard nor with results that could not be somewhat 
anticipated knowing the character, abilities and social position of the actors. In 
other words, they are not devoid of all rules nor inexplicable in terms of the 
resou rces available to the actors. (This does not imply that the course of the 
encounter is completely predictable or determined.) Giddens identifies social 
structures with the rules and resources which are not usually averted to but 
nevertheless guide and enable day-to-day interaction between people to take 
place. Here he is taking over from linguistics the notion of I deep structure,' as 
distinct from the surface structure that is evident in a statement. Social structures 
understood as sets of generative rules and resources have, like deep structures in 
linguistics, to be inferred from surface manifestations (CS: 16). 
The importance of Giddens' explanation of social structures is that it shows what 
is involved in changing a society; for instance, in dismantling apartheid, 
overcoming sexism or giving capitalism a human face. Tinkering around with 
surface manifestations may be necessary but is not sufficient; one has to bring 
people as far as possible to operate spontaneously according to different rules and 
drawing on an altered distribution of resources. For this to happen successfully, 
however, the new rules and revised resources cannot remain wholly external to 
them, but have to become part of themselves too. In short, restructuring 
involves not only society but the self as well. 
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11.2.2 Structure on a Personal Level (Kohut) 
Unlike Giddens, Kohut does not reflect at any length on his own use of the term 
'structure' in connection with the self. Mention (7.3.2) has already been made 
that he envisages the self as a bi-polar structure, a pole of ambitions and one of 
ideals, joined by a tension arc of abilities and skills. In Kohut's words: 
A firm self, resulting from the optimal interactions between the child and his 
selfobjects is made up of three constituents: (1) one pole from which emanate the 
basic strivings for power and success; (2) another pole that harbors the basic 
idealized goals; and (3) an intermediate area of basic talents and skills that are 
activated by the tension arc that establishes itself between ambitions and ideals. (55 
III: 362) 
He recognizes that personal development may be uneven, centred only around 
one pole or upon the intermediate area. Mention (9.5) has also been made of 
'splitting' or how a section of one pole may become split off and disavowed; it 
continues to operate (as a behaviourial disorder) or shape someone's attitude (as 
a personality disorder) though the person does not truly recognize and accept 
that it is having an influence. Besides this fragmentation of the self, Kohut also 
speaks of the self-structure in his patients, and more generally of people in the 
modern world, as lacking resilience or cohesion, being enfeebled or disharmoni-
ous. His concern is that a weakened self will through 'transmuting internaliza-
tion,' that is by drawing upon the strengths and ideals it has or will gain as 
selfobjects from others, build up its own structure (55 II: 432). In this connection 
he speaks of 'compensatory structures,' ones built up late in life that enable a 
person to cope with earlier deficiencies. Then, with a firm structure, the self is 
capable of facing and dealing with reality. 
For Kohut, speaking of the self in terms of structure is a fairly loose but service-
able metaphor. It is useful as it provides a way of linking various phenomena, 
but is only a metaphor and so its details should not be taken too seriously. 
Occasionally he offers a diagram to illustrate some aspect of structure, but does 
not think that the overall structure of the self could be visually displayed. In 
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words that could almost have been written by Thomas Aquinas (see 7.2 above), 
Kohut says: "The self ... is, like all reality ... not knowable in its essence. We 
cannot, by introspection and empathy, penetrate to the self per se; only its 
introspectively or empathically perceived psychological manifestations are open 
to us" (RESS: 310-11). 
Kohut's notion of self-structure is somewhat akin to Giddens' understanding of 
social structure. Its actual configuration is hidden or deep, but various aspects of 
the self are nearer the surface; these are apparent both to the person concerned 
and to others. Empathy makes it possible for an other to be understood as a self. 
So, for instance, both in ourselves and in others we can sense the self as the 
centre for organizing our activities (see ANSE: 120; RESS: xv). Linked to this is a 
sense of freedom and capacity for taking initiatives that arises from being a self 
(HDAC: 99). Hence, having a firm self-structure conveys a sense of stability and 
resourcefulness, the ability to put available resources to good use. In this respect, 
Kohut's understanding of the self complements Giddens' view of social structure 
as rules and resources. A resourceful self endowed with stability and freedom can 
work creatively with the generative rules and make the most of the resources 
that society offers. 
11.2.3 Legal Constructions and Second Nature" (Thomas) 
Thomas Aquinas makes no mention of 'structures' considered as relations that 
have come about historically and whose configurations could not be deduced 
from nature. The nearest he comes to this idea is in his treatment of law, where 
he says certain human laws cannot be deduced from natural law as conclusions 
from principles. Instead, they "are based like constructions (per modum 
determinationis, Iallae 95, 3) on naturallaw/' An instance of the latter would be 
the highway code; a coherent set of regulations must be made to prevent loss of 
life, but their exact content is a human construction that varies somewhat from 
one jurisdiction to another. It is interesting that the metaphor of structure is 
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invoked by Thomas Gilby when he uses the legal term 'construction' in his 
translation. He points out, however, that "no abrupt break should be made 
between the impetus of nature, and the industria and adinventio of reason. 
There is a continuatio between sense and spirit" (1966: 107). 
Another precursor to the idea of 'structure' is Thomas' treatment of a habits or 
dispositions (habitus, IaIIae 49). These include skills, mental proficiencies and 
moral (or immoral) inclinations that are built up through repeated practice. Once 
acquired they are like a second nature directing us to and making it easier to 
perform a particular activity; though, unlike nature, if not exercised they can be 
lost. Thomas recognizes that not everyone has the same combination of innate 
predispositions or acquired dispositions; people are not all the same. He does not, 
however, look into how the prevailing culture, social circumstances or family 
influences may shape (or misshape) the cultivation of dispositions. This he 
would regard as due to contingency, about which no reliable judgment (scientia) 
can be made (Ia 86 3). Perhaps he was fortunate enough not to have to contend 
with unstructured meetings, and so overlooked the role structure played! 
Despite its being used for various purposes, the notion of 'structure' can be briefly 
summed up. It is set between the more traditional terms 'nature' and' contin-
gency.' While it is necessary (a requirement of nature) for human activities to 
proceed that they be structured, no necessity impels them to be structured just so 
rather than otherwise. Particular structures result from freely undertaken 
activities, but in turn give an enabling bent to further activities without however 
fully determining them. This basic understanding is shared by both Kohut and 
Giddens. 
11.3 Value Depicted in the Root Metaphor of Structure 
Is it good to be structured? Or, to reverse the question, is evil due to a. lack of 
structure? Sometimes, or always? These are questions about root metaphors. 
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There is no intrinsic reason why good should be thought of as struc~ured. 
Structures - at least, surface structures - can after all be experienced as oppress-
ive (see 5.1). Gaining freedom or salvation, both goods to be sought, may have 
the sense of escaping from whatever is confining. Nevertheless, it might be 
argued, that one gains freedom from externally confining structures so that the 
internal or more personally authentic structures of the self or community can be 
brought into play. Human freedom, after all, does not mean being blown this 
way and that by the wind, but depends upon having the resilience to set and 
change one's own course oneself. 
Thomas gives some hints of structure as a value - even if he does not use these 
terms - that are worth examining briefly. He takes over from Aristotle (981a27) 
the view that the task of the wise person, one who knows the highest causes, is 
to bring order into affairs. The architect, who practices the principal (apxoa) craft 
("tE'XVY1), arranges the work of lesser craftworkers into a unity. The ability of the 
wise person is to relate one thing to another. Thomas, however, points out at the 
beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics that this can 
be done in two ways: parts may be related to each other to form one whole as in 
the building of a house (partes domus alicuius ad invicem ordinantur); but even 
more fundamental is the ordering of activities towards a common end (ordo 
rerum in finem, in D'Entreves 1965: 188). In other words, he sets a higher value 
on the ordering of activities than the static structure that may result. It must be 
questioned later (20.6), however, in what sense does society - as distinct from 
particular organizations - have a single end. 
The importance of understanding as the discovery of the dynamic order in 
creation guides Thomas' writings. Discovering how all things relate or are 
implicated in one another leads to wisdom, knowledge of the highest causes. He 
speaks at the beginning of several of his works of the value of searching for 
wisdom, as it leads even now to our partial sharing in beatitude - (verae 
beatitudinis iam aliquam partem habet), and to our becoming godlike (ad 
338 
divinam similitudinem accedit), is useful for attaining the kingdo~ (ad 
immortalitatis regnum pervenitur, SCG I, 2) and brings joy because of the 
support (firmitas) it gives. The best testimony to t1;le high premium that Thomas 
places on wisely bringing order into affairs is the care with which he carries it out 
in the architectonic arrangement of his works. But in laying down his pen, he 
also affirmed his works were still a metaphor. 
11.4 The Reality of Good and Evil 
Throughout Christian theology there have been basically two explanations of 
evil: the Irenaean one that views it as an inevitable occurrence on the path from 
immaturity to maturity and the Augustinian one that sees evil as a privation of 
the good stemming from the abuse of freedom. The theological variations on 
these basic themes, as well as their interconnections, have been charted by John 
Hick (1966). It should be added, however, that while Irenaeus takes a narrative 
approach using an extensive time-frame, Augustine uses a substantialist 
approach within a confined time-frame. (These two approaches are akin to 
regarding the self as a narrative and as a substance; see 7.6 above.) 
In this chapter use will be made of the Augustinian view, as it was expounded by 
Thomas, since it shows well how evil is found in individual things and actions. 
Nonetheless, that is not the whole story; rather, evil still has to be placed within 
the whole story of divine providence and human history. Some reflections on 
that from a more Irenaean point of view are reserved till later (Chapter Twenty). 
11.4.1 Everything is Created Good 
Thomas is very clear that the creation, all that is, is the doing of God. God's act of 
creating out of nothing is not in order to get something but to communicate his 
own perfection and goodness. Creatures in striving for their own perfection seek 
to reflect the perfection and goodness of God. So whatever good anything seeks, 
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be it in a rational, animal or natural and unconscious way, God is the ult~mate 
goal sought, for nothing is good or desirable except by having some likeness to 
God (see Ia 44.4). 
In speaking of creation as good, Thomas bring$ out its dynamism; the goodness 
of created entities does not lie in their static ornamental value, but in each 
attaining the perfection or fulfilment proper to it. This they do not in isolation, 
but within a suitable setting or environment, where lesser entities serve the 
needs of greater ones. The environment providing for the running of all 
creation is the providence of God. 
The diversity of creatures helps express the goodness of God, for what is lacking 
in one expression of his goodness can be exemplified in another. There is order, 
however, throughout the immense diversity of creation, for things are ordered 
to one another. Not only that, their ordering lies in their issuing from God and 
each in its own way being directed towards God. 
The question inevitably arises: how is evil to be accounted for in such a well 
ordered creation in which everything in seeking to attain its own perfection 
exemplifies in some degree the uncreated goodness of God? From whence does 
evil derive its force, its ability to war against good by preventing things attaining 
the perfection appropriate to them? 
11.4.2 Evil as Privation 
Thomas gives his answer to the first question when he says: 
Hence I state that there is no such thing as an evil [existing on its own], but there are 
things that happen to be evil but only to the extent that evil deprives them of a 
particular aspect of their good (in quantum maLum privat nonnisi aliquod particulare 
bonum). In this way blindness does not exist as something [on its own]" but the 
person who happens to be blind is something. (QD de Malo, I, 1) 
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In short, evil is a deficiency in something's being, the lack of some good: This 
lack may either be a complete deprivation such as death is to life or blindness to 
sight, or on the way towards it as sickness leads towards death or cataracts to 
blindness. This latter kind of evil does not take away all good but detracts from it 
(non privat tatum bonum, sed aliquid de bono removet, QD de Malo, 1, I ad 2). 
In explaining evil, Thomas has in mind a world that is dynamic, not a static one 
nor only a snapshot view of it. In his view, things move or act because they are 
attracted to the good ( bonum est omne id quod est appetibile); they tend in its 
direction. 'Good' is an analogical term; it does not always apply in the same way. 
Thus, an apple is good because it comes up to the standards of an apple, whereas 
a good car, a good party or a good artist have each met a different set of standards. 
There may be some similarity or 'family resemblance' between various set of 
standards, but they are not interchangeable. After experiencing what is good in 
fairly simple instances, one learns to discern it in more complicated and ambigu-
ous ones. In Thomas' admittedly optimistic view, things and people naturally 
strive towards some good. Evil, however, upsets or prevents this tendency 
because it is the absence of some good (quaedam absentia bani, Ia 48. 1) which 
ought to be there for the apple, car, party or artist to come up to expectations. 
Evil is neither a form that rounds something off, nor an ability, as abilities are 
directed towards realizing some good, nor again is it found as an entity on its 
own. Hence it must be located in something good (subjectum mali sit bonum,Ia 
48 3). Nor can anything exist that is totally evil, for if evil totally corrupts 
something that thing ceases to exist and then it is no longer there to meet with 
any lack. For instance, a totally rotten apple has ceased to be an apple; the 
decomposed remains are no longer a bad apple, but good fertilizer. Likewise, a 
totally evil society would break up so completely that it would no longer be a 
society at all. If a few survivors were left, there is always the possibility that they 
would still get together and put their society on a new basis; as long as someone 
remains, then good is not totally extinguished. 
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This is in outline Thomas' analysis of evil. While it may seem a sleight of hand 
or linguistic trick to relegate evil to the mere absence of a good that should be 
there, experience does corroborate this. At first sight an evil life may appear 
glamorous or enticing, but when taken seriously it reveals no depth. 
The life of the evil man has meaning only at a fairly superficial level. ... Bad, cheap 
behaviour devalues the structures of human meaning in the way that bad cheap 
prose devalues the language ... , The point of evil is that it is a deprivation of reality. 
(McCabe, 1968: 100) 
Hannah Arendt (1965) made this clear in her study of Eichmann, the organizer of 
Hitler's extermination camps, when she found only the banality of evil. 
11.5 Evil in Actions and Persons 
Thomas applies the same analysis in regard to evil to human actions as he does 
to things. In so far as an action la~ks anything that it should have, then to that 
degree it lacks goodness and is termed bad (inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de 
plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, 
et sic dicitur mala, Iallae 18 1). Whether it is morally good or bad depends first of 
all on what it is directed to, as this makes it the kind of action it is. Certain kinds 
of act, such as stealing someone else's property or murdering your neighbour, 
have mis-direction built into their very existence as an action; this is the prime 
kind of lack. Their mis-direction lies in substituting a lesser and transitory good 
for the all embracing good. Further deficiencies may also render an action bad, 
such as it not being appropriate for the circumstances, or done with an unworthy 
goal in mind (IaIIae 18, 4). 
The understanding of will that guides Thomas' discussion of morality, of good 
and evil in human of actions, is not that of someone facing a fork in the road 
with one signposted 'good' and the other 'evil.' In his view, one does not choose 
evil directly, but for the sake of some lesser and perhaps eventually spurious 
good that it holds out. Instead, he has in mind (see Iallae 6 prologue) the person 
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'trying to get it all together,' who is attracted in various and even contradictory 
way by his or her feelings, who is trying to work out what is .possible and really 
worthwhile, who has higher and lower motives to take into account, who 
examines the circumsta~ces and weighs one possible outcome against another. A 
good decision will be suitable for the here and now situation as well as fitting for 
one's whole life; it will both be appropriate for others and oneself. Reaching such 
a decision (including following it through in action) depends upon skill, the 
steady ability or virtue that one acquires through practice. 
Even though' getting it altogether' may sound like cookery, virtue or moral skill 
(recta ratio agibilium) differs from the productive skills (recta ratio factibilium, 
Iallae 57, 4) exercised in cooking. The cook's skill enables her to produce a tasty 
meal, not a dog's breakfast. But underlying and permeating that exercise of 
culinary skill is the moral decision to cook. Usually this presents no moral 
dilemma in a hungry household, but it might if someone sick also had to be 
attended to or the uncooked food should be given to a starving neighbour. She 
exercises moral skill in deciding whether to undertake this, that, or another 
action. Moral skill, particularly the virtue of practical wisdom (prudentia), is 
concerned with whether one should cook, whereas knowing how or being able 
to cook supper depends upon her culinary skill. 
Sin (peccatum) results when a person does not bring it all together, not because 
he lacks culinary skill, but primarily because his action has some inherent mis-
direction within it. In other words, his action is of a type where pursuing a lesser 
good inevitably blocks the realization of a greater and more demanding good. It 
might also be deficient due to wrong motivation, insufficient attention being 
paid to circumstances, being so overwrought by emotion that one loses control, 
or due to ignorance either about what is going on or of one's obligations. In each 
of these instances some good that ought to be there is lacking. The person has 
failed to bring together all the appropriate elements that would have issued in an 
action that was thoroughly worthwhile. 
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In naming this failure 'sin,' Thomas is not immediately imputing blame (culpa). 
A person may so overwrought by emotion, drugged or insufficiently awake so 
that he is not in control of what he does; the action is then not a human action 
(actus humanus) but rather something that happens to him. Similarly, he may 
misguidedly be doing his best, but misread the situation or not know what he 
should be doing (Iallae 19, 6). In these instances, the action may still be evil and 
inflict disastrous repercussions (poenae) on the person performing and possibly 
others, even though he is not personally blameworthy. 
Matters, however, may not be all that straightforward. Thomas goes on to ask 
why is a person misguided or not in control of her behaviour. Should the person 
have known better or more about what she is dealing with, but has been 
negligent in finding out or not bothered to train properly? Likewise, has the 
person so frequently given in to her immediate impulses instead of checking 
them when they result in harm that she has by now lost control over them? 
Going further, how freely has she brou&ht on her drugged state? Was that 
deliberate so she would have less awareness and decreased control over her 
actions? In each of these inquiries, one is trying to identify what deficiency there 
was in the person's action and where did it stem from. Doing good or ill does not 
simply result from one's decision at the present moment, but also from previous 
actions - mainly but not entirely one's own - that have either rendered one 
now capable of reaching a good decision or have incapacitated one. In the case of 
the latter, McDermott avers that Thomas considers "that in most cases what 
affects the will in this way has been voluntarily consented to" (1989: 170). Kohut 
rather corroborates this (see 16.6.1 below). 
This brief overview of what is implicit in a human act (not that it is all averted 
to every time someone executes a decision) shows that it is feasible to speak of it 
as 'structured.' A good action, one that is well structured, has brought together in 
a coherent fashion all the morally relevant elements. A bad or evil action, one 
that has a deficient structure, results from a failure to bring together all the 
344 
requisite elements. This failure may admit of varying degrees of blame. 
It should be added that Thomas in his extensive treatment of how in general 
human beings as originators of their own actions, using their own free wills and 
power to act (suorum operwn principum, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et 
suorum operum potestatem, lalla Prologus), journey towards beatitude concen-
trates his attention on establishing good operative habits (virtutes). His theology 
is one of virtues rather than actions, though he is well aware that good habits are 
steadily built up through good actions and themselves facilitate good actions in 
turn. Virtues strengthen basic human abilities and give them a bent towards 
their fullest activity (O'Brien, 1965: 170); they are thus strengths in a person's 
character making that person a power for good both for him- or herself and 
towards others. Again, it is feasible to speak of a virtuous person as someone 
whose character is strong and well structured; his or her life is all of a piece. 
The opposite of this is the person beset by vices, whose various powers and 
inclinations are bent, some in contradictory directions, towards evil. Although 
his basic abilities may be strong, we may deduce that his character is morally 
weak because of his tendency to take the line of least resistance. This may be 
apparent in several ways: in usually going along with his immediate inclinations 
such as anger or a desire for sex, food, drink or money; in adopting a thoughtless 
or escapist lifestyle regardless of its consequences; in the relentless pursuit of 
some ambition that stops at nothing in order to attain it. In these instances it is 
also feasible to speak, after the fact, of a weakness in or lack of structure, though 
not in exactly the same sense as Kohut uses the term. 
The morally weak person described above has in effect refused or declined to 
build up structure, or let it fall into disrepair, by not striving for the good he 
could do. Saying "he could do" presumes that he already had sufficient psycho-
logical self-structu~e to take charge of his own actions and strive for some good. 
The psychologically weak person, on the other hand, either totally or 'in some 
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areas of life lacks sufficient sound self-structure to take charge of his own actions. 
It is easy enough in theory to distinguish between moral and psychological 
weakness, but, except in extreme cases, next to impossible to draw a dividing line 
in practice. It is not always easy, for instance, for a court to judge whether 
someone charged with a crime was acting freely or with psychologically dimin-
ished responsibility. How much, for instance, might a person's acting irrespon-
sibly in the past - for instance, a culpable refusal to shoulder the obligations of 
growing up - have led to (psychological) fragmentation in the self (see 9.5 
above) so that certain activities are split off and disavowed? Fortunately, while it 
only sensible to be aware of these various possibilities, we do not have to make 
any final judgment on one another. 
From Thomas' point of view, one based on his insight that insofar as something 
actually exists then it is good (bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, Ia 5, 1), 
evil in things, actions and ultimately in people is due to some deficiency in 
being. They are lacking a capacity and/ or ordering that they should have. Can 
the same be said of social structures? 
11.6 Evil in Structures and Syst-ems 
Can the grammar of evil as a deprivation of a good that ought to be present also 
be applied to structures? My suggestion is that it can, though only after a more 
extensive examination of structures (or structuring) and their relation to systems 
(Chapter Twelve) will it be possible to say more dearly what this implies. In this 
view, the persistent recurrence of harmful or evil activities in a society is 
ascribed to a deficiency or lack in its social structure. The corollary of this is that 
insofar as a society exists as a structured entity it is good; its structure links its 
members, enables them to undertake various activities and gives those activities 
a certain bent. 1£ that were not at least minimally present, there would simply be 
no society and no capacity for people to interact at all. 
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The persistent occurrence of evil is due, not to a whim or bad will on the part of 
an individual member or two, but to a deficiency in its overall structure. More 
particularly, remembering that Giddens speaks of social structure as rules and 
resources, structural evil can then be traced to distorted rules and a lack (or 
imbalance) of resources. Members, though in a position to act because of the 
sound existing social structure, cannot entirely do good due to deficient resources 
reducing their abilities and/ or distorted rules misdirecting their thoughts, 
assessments and actions. 
Take sexism as an example: that men and women can relate meaningfully at all 
derives from the existence of a reasonably sound social structure. But that male-
female relations so often fall into a machismo-nympho pattern derives in part 
from a social distortion in the rules by which men and women understand, 
assess and treat one another. It also stems from a lack of personal resources in the 
self, and from an imbalance or struggle over resources in society. When exam-
ined in terms of rules and resources, it is easier to see that sexism as a prevalent 
social evil should at root be seen as a deficiency, not as positive entity. It does not 
have a power all its own, but gains its power from the same sources as do 
normal, mutually enhancing relations between the sexes. But that power, which 
will in any case stir people's feelings, aspirations and interactions, when not 
satisfactorily directed turns into a destructive force. 
At first sight, pointing out that structural evil is a lack rather than a real thing 
may seem only a semantic quibble, but it has important consequences for how 
one conducts the struggle against evil. Once structural evil is conceived as 
something with a real social existence of it ow~, then one identifies it either with 
a particular aspect or section of society or with the social structure as a whole. 
One then concludes that overcoming evil is simply a matter of eliminating or 
fighting against that part of society. A crass example of this kind of thinking runs 
as follows: 
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It is right to fight against evil. 
The system (that upholds injustice) is evil. 
The police and government officials are agents of the system. 
Therefore it is right to fight against the police and government officials. 
This overlooks the important work that police and government officials can do 
in maintaining the fabric of society. If that is halted, then society is in danger of 
further collapse. A more searching analysis is called for. One has to enquire into 
the particular situated practices they regularly carry out to find out where there 
are deficiencies in their attitudes, activities, training, orders, organization, and 
system of accountability, and then find ways of overcoming them. 
Likewise in some marxist theory, socio-economic evils might be identified with 
class division or with the existence and interests of the middle class (bour-
geoisie), or with capitalist society as a whole. Once this identification is made it 
becomes easy to think that structural evil will be overcome by abolishing all class 
division, eliminating whatever behaviour appears to be middle class (if not the 
middle class themselves), or doing away with the prevailing social system 
because it is capitalist. Reifying evil in this way can be disastrous, as it can obscure 
how evil may have a hold on other aspects of society or even one's own efforts 
to eliminate it. 
No doubt exists that morally and politically speaking apartheid in South Africa, 
the caste system in India, or the exploitation of labour, have done tremendous 
damage to people and hence are clearly evil. Alternatives to racial discrimina-
tion, economic exploitation, ritual uncleanness, faction fights, systematic 
campaigns of disinformation and a high degree of mindless violence should be 
sought. Yet these long-standing evils can only operate and become so pervasive 
because to a considerable extent these societies actually work; their cohesion and 
coordination make communication possible and supply a number of its mem-
bers - though not everyone - with a livelihood. 
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11.6.1 Do 'Structures of Sin' actually Exist? 
An objection can be made to Pope John Paul's speaking of 'structures of sin' (see 
2.6.3 above), on the ground that he reifies sin, treating it as a positive entity and 
not seeing it as a deprivation. For instance, in his encyclical on the value and 
inviolability of human life, he says: 
... we are confronted by an even larger reality, which can be described as a veritable 
structure of sin. This reality is characterized by the emergence of a culture which 
denies solidarity and in many cases takes the form of a veritable 'culture of death'. 
This culture is actively fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political currents 
which encourage an idea of society excessively concerned with efficiency. 
(Evangelium Vitae, 12) 
Later in the same document he speaks of the (presumably deficient) moral 
conscience of society "because it encourages the 'culture of death', creating and 
consolidating actual 'structures of sin' which go against life (EV, 24). The use of 
the terms 'veritable,' 'reality,' 'creating' and 'actual' could simply be rhetorical 
polish. Or it could be a reference to actual organizations whose aim is to promote 
the spread of euthanasia and abortion. But if the 'of' in 'structures of sin' is taken 
objectively and they are thought to have their own dynamism stemming from 
sin as such, then it runs contrary to Thomas' view that "evil as such neither has 
an active principle nor can it be an active principle, but follows from a defect of 
some agent" (De Substantiis Separatis, XVI, 87). 
For similar reasons Hugues Puel (1991) criticizes Vincent Cosmao for speaking of 
"the present world as a sinful world, as a world structured in sin" (Cosmao, 1984: 
81). He accuses him of 
demonizing the industrial revolution, which was a remarkable achievement of human 
intelligence .... Many of its aspects are of a mixed quality: certainly there is an 
excessively narrow pursuit of self-interest. and its excessive desires for power and 
possession, but there is also in its project of mastering nature and its efforts to 
transform society a wonderful manifestation of the creative power of human reason. 
Overall there certainly was sin, but to speak of I a world structured in sin (un monde 
structure dans Ie pecheY appears very excessive. (1991: 130). 
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Cosmao, however, is in good company as he uses 'world' in a similar ambiguous 
fashion to the writer of the Fourth GospeL Both are stressing the importance of 
making a choice, of deciding between good and evil, not asserting a metaphysical 
dualism. 
11.6.2 Whence does Evil Derive its Force? 
These soundings into the nature of 'structures' and of 'sin' and 'evil' have 
already begun to give an answer to the second question posed above (11.4.1): 
whence does evil derive its force? Or to rephrase it: why do evils embedded in a 
social structure have such power to thwart people in their efforts to act well? A 
partial answer can be given now, though a fuller explanation must await a closer 
examination of how structures and systems actually work. 
To begin, an obvious point must be made: not everything happens because we 
decide - rightly or wrongly - that it should. The cosmos is going to go on 
despite whatever good or evil we may do. Its dynamism neither starts nor stops 
with human activities, though our wise or foolish decisions do influence the 
outworking of that dynamism. Human damage to the environment is making 
this evident. The same applies to the human world and its history, which again 
we can influence and contribute to but not halt. At no point can people's striving 
for life and growth in all its many aspects ranging from survival to scientific 
inquiry and prayerful celebration be completely turned off: It has a pre-personal 
dynamism; for instance, before we decide whether to eat meat or fish, we want to 
satisfy our hunger. Likewise, we want to participate with others, assert ourselves, 
gain understanding and enjoy living. This wanting (voluntas ut natura) arises 
prior to plans and decisions (voluntas ut ratio) on our part as to how we might 
satisfy these basic needs built into our being as humans. All through life we have 
no choice but to respond to the demands that arise from the conjuncture of 
ourselves (Eigenwelt) with others (Mitwelt) in relation to the environment 
(Umwelt). We may take up or miss the opportunities presented at each conjunc-
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ture, but even doing nothing or being passive is itself a kind of response. 
Thomas locates sin within this schema; instead of seeking what would finally 
and completely satisfy us, beatitude with God, together with various lesser 
satisfactions as and when they would assist us along the way towards beatitude, 
we fix our sights on lesser satisfactions. Sin is thus the introduction of dis-order 
into the dynamism of living. It does not have a special force all its own, but turns 
the natural dynamism of people wanting their pre-personal needs satisfied in 
directions that can only lead to frustration and even destruction. Perhaps the 
experience in a mis-directed life of never being content, of having no assurance 
that one was on the right path, of facing continual let-downs or frustrations, may 
drive a person out of panic or despair more forcefully down his or her ill-chosen 
path. Even then, this drive draws on the normal dynamism inherent in any 
human being and most animals to respond forcefully when threatened. It may be 
intensified because of extreme circumstances, and so appear more dramatic, but 
is not a special drive that stems from sin as such. 
11.6.3 The Unjust, the Bad and the Evil person 
The above analysis is in line with Thomas' analysis of sin not being initially 
caused by evil, but deriving from the absence of some good (peccati primi non est 
causa ali quod malum; sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni, 
Iallae 75, 1 ad 3). But, as was shown by John Langan (see 8.5.3 above), Thomas 
does not fully account for deliberate malice, where a person deliberately seeks 
evil. In this vein Rawls distinguishes between the unjust, the bad and the evil 
person . 
... the unjust man seeks dominion for the sake of aims such as wealth and security 
which when appropriately limited are legitimate. The bad man seeks arbitrary power 
because he enjoys the sense of mastery which its exercise gives to him and he seeks 
social acclaim. He too has an inordinate desire for things which when duly circum-
scribed are good, namely, the esteem of others and the sense of self-command. It is 
his way of satisfying these ambitions that makes him dangerous. By contrast, the evil 
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man aspires to unjust rule ... [in order to] manifest his superiority and affront the 
self-respect of others. It is this display and affront which is sought after. What 
moves the evil man is the love of injustice: he delights in the impotence and 
humiliation of those subject to him and relishes being recognized by them as the 
willful author of their degradation. (Rawls, 1972: 439) 
Thomas' analysis accounts well for the unjust person, satisfactorily for the bad 
person, but hardly for the evil person. Thomas is rather mild in his depiction of 
evil people. He admitted that a feeling of hatred might arise when someone 
threatens you; he knew about heretics, tyrants, and murderers, but apparently 
not about those who would cheerfully will the degradation of those whom they 
could victimize. Rawls speaks of the bad person being moved by love of injus-
tice; such an assertion would find no place in Thomas' view. 
Otto Kernberg - rather than Heinz Kohut - offers an insight into what is 
taking place with Rawls' 'bad person,' when he speaks of patients with severe 
pathological narcissism. 
They need to devalue whatever they receive in order to prevent themselves from 
experiencing envy .... they need so much from others while being unable to acknowl-
edge what they are receiving because it would stir up envy; in consequence, they 
always wind up empty. (in Morrison, 1986: 221f) 
This combination of envy and the need to devalue others helps explain why the 
bad person turns the love and support he demands from others against them 
and uses it for their degradation. How far this condition is acted out freely or is 
beyond a person's control will doubtless vary. But either way it again shows, not 
the existence of an intrinsically evil power, but the extreme perversion of the 
ordinary dynamics of needing and expressing love. Kernberg describes this 
condition as "the simultaneous development of pathological forms of self-love 
and of pathological forms of object love" (in Morrison, 1986: 216). 
In each of these instances, while evil can certainly spread and take on the aspects 
of a force, it neither exists nor acts on its own. One defect may through the 
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normal positive dynamism of life, society and human development induce 
defects elsewhere. This applies from the replication of disorders in minor 
matters - for instance, one person copying another's spelling mistake -
through to major derangements in a person's capacity to receive and give love. 
Deficient social structures can accentuate this process; that issue, however, will be 
taken up later (14.8). 
11.7 Conclusion: Some Thoughtful Affinities 
Though there is no exact fit between the ways that Thomas, Kohut and Giddens 
speak about 'structure' in relation to both society and the self, there is certainly a 
semantic affinity. They are using a similar grammar. In some respects, too, their 
different contributions complement one another. 
Each of them recognizes the limitations of visual imagery. Giddens mentions 
explicitly that social structures cannot be envisaged as building structures; 
Thomas likewise contrasts the order of parts to wholes evident in a building, 
with the more fundamental order brought about when many activities are 
directed to a common end; Kohut simply says he does not think the self or its 
structure can be displayed in diagrammatic form. Connected with this is the 
realization that not everything can be displayed on the surface: for Giddens, 
evident social activities and systems depend upon' deep' structures; Thomas and 
Kohut agree that while people can directly apprehend that they have a mind or 
are a self, its essence or structure cannot be directly comprehended. 
Giddens' analysis of structure into generative rules and resources is somewhat 
akin to Thomas' view of dispositions as well ordered capacities for actiolL. Both 
social structures and, at least, good dispositions or virtues enable and guide 
people's activity. Both virtues and social structures, while they do to some extent 
constrain, make free action possible; they facilitate free choice without determin-
ing its direction. Kohut's positive treatment of 'structure' completes the picture, 
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as a person with a firm self-structure is creative, able to put available resources to 
good use. 
A lack or weakness in self-structure for Kohut, on the other hand, shows itself in 
various pathologies. Similarly, for Thomas, morally evil action results from a 
lack or defjciency in the good that ought to be present. Although their effects may 
resemble one another somewhat, there is a difference between a pathology 
beyond a person's control and a sin willingly committed. It frequently takes time 
to judge, for instance, whether a person is deliberately lying or is incapable of 
recognizing that reality might be different from the account of it he prefers. 
Morality, carrying out good or well-ordered actions, generally presupposes and 
builds upon sound psychological functioning. Morally good action freely and 




System, Agency and Structure 
"Sons will be yours in place of our fathers" (Ps 45: 16). 
Giddens says that lithe dualism between objectivism and subjectivism is deeply 
embedded in social analysis" (STMS: 60). This dualism, however, is no! limited 
to social analysis; it is also found in theology, ethics and in many people/s general 
outlook. It may take various forms, such as the division between the facts that 
can be known by science and the values, whether ethical or religious, that 
individuals personally accept. Frequently, too, their holding to a set of definite 
beliefs and rigid moral injunctions comes all of a piece with their acceptance of a 
religious authority. Its teachings, whether derived from a holy book or living 
authority, are often taken in a fundamentalist fashion. As they are not part of the 
ubjective world, they calUlot be questioned by the criteria of science, literary 
criticism, psychology ot sociology. A similar dualism is found within the church 
between those concentrating on personal spirituality and those concerned with 
service and liberation; the former (charisma ticals) want to transform hearts and 
the latter (politicals) seek to transform social conditions. Yet both may overlook 
the intimate connection between the two tasks that Deutero-Isaiah presupposes 
in the first servant song: "I have put my spirit upon him; he will bring forth 
justice to the nations" (42: 1). This chapter draws on Giddens' theory of 
'structuration' to question the widely held dualism that sets objective social 
structures over against subjective human agents. In his view "this seeming 
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opposition of perspectives actually disguises a complementarity" (SIMS: 60). But 
to bring out that complementarity the notions of both 'structure' and 'ac"tion' 
have to be reexamined. 
A key to grasping Giddens' contribution is found in his statement that tithe 
fundamental question of social theory ... is to explicate how the limitations of 
individual 'presence' are transcended by the 'stretching' of social relations across 
time and space" (CS: 35). Both the activities by which individuals are co-present 
to one another and by which social relations or systems endure are implicated in 
each other. "The fixity of institutional forms does not exist in spite of, or outside, 
the encounters of day-to-day life but is implicated in those very encounters" (CS: 
69). In other words, interaction between people is only possible because they draw 
upon enduring social structures which are themselves maintained through 
those same interactions. Thus, in Giddens' view 
Structure is both the medium and the outcome of the human activities which it 
recursively organizes. Institutions, or large-scale societies, have structural properties 
in virtue of the continuity of the actions of their component members. But those 
members of society are only able to carry out their day-to-day activities in virtue of 
their capability of instantiating those structural properties. (STMS: 61) 
Society is thus not something irrespective of people, but is found in people doing 
something together; it both makes human interaction possible and results from 
it. The insight is central to Giddens' theory of structuration; its basis and implica-
tions will be drawn out in this chapter. 
12.1 The Theory of Structuration 
What structuration theory offers is a revision of our whole way of looking at, 
investigating and ultimately of participating in society. How each item is to be 
grasped depends upon seeing its relation to other items and its place in the 
whole conception; this is why it has provoked some many varied responses. 17 At 
17 The most substantial and help£U1 critiques are in Held & Thompson (1989) and Bryant & Jary (1991). 
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· the risk of over-simplifying, it might be said that this theory endeavours to 
explain society as a fountain rather than as set of boxes. 
12.1.1 Structures bind Space and Time 
Considerable attention has already been given (see 10.3 above) to the stretching of 
time-space as one of the facilitating conditions of modernity. Correlative to this 
is the binding of time-space that is necessary for the organization of modern 
society. Without the general culture of 'clock time' and the timing and spacing of 
activities both within organizations and across society as a whole, modern society 
would fall apart (see STMS: 160). The importance of time-space binding is 
apparent in the dependence of modern society on calendars, timetables, pro-
grammes and schedules, which fix the time and place for various interactions. 
The bigger an organization, and the more extensive its linkage with other 
organizations, the greater the need for coordinating the siting and scheduling of 
activities; timetables link the activities of various individuals, offices, depart-
ments and even whole regions. Time-space geography goes into the details of 
how this takes place, but the point to note here is that time and space are not just 
a neutral environment in which social practices take place and structures exist. 
Action structures time and space. 
Intrinsic to social interaction is the organization of time and the coordination of 
space. This is why Hagerstrand speaks of social activity as 'a weaving dance 
through time-space'. The "general importance [of this conception] is that it 
emphasises the co-ordination of movement in time and space in social activity, 
as the coupling of a multiplicity of paths or trajectories" (CPST: 205). This leads to 
the obvious but important point that patterns of social interaction or social 
structures only exist over time. They are not static entities that could be revealed 
by a snapshot at one moment of time. Like a dance, "only when examined over 
time do they form patterns at all" (CPST: 202). 
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12.1.2 The Duality of Structure 
In order to grasp what Giddens means by 'duality of structure' it is necessary to 
realize how his "use of the term 'structure' differs from most previous usage in 
sociology" (Bryant & Jary, 1991: 7). Also crucial is Giddens' distinction between 
'systems' and 'structures': basically the former refer to the surface pattern of 
interactions, while the latter refer to an underlying order (see 11.2.1 and 12.2 
below). 
By the duality of structure, I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as 
constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the 
reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the 
agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitu-
tion. (CPST: 5; see also SSPT 121ff; CCHM: 27; CS: 25; STMS: 61 & 220f) 
In this view, structures are not something external to action, but are both 
required to carry out social interactions and perpetuated through them. A 
parallel to the notion of the duality of structure can be found in the saying, 
attributed to the 19th century economist Alfred Marshall: "Good institutions 
make good men, and good men make good institutions." What both institutions 
and the men concerned produce in each other is good structure, but this is not 
found apart from either. "Structure forms 'personality' and 'society' simulta-
neously - but in neither case exhaustively" (epST: 70). 
Structures themselves may be analyzed into generative rules and resources, 
which actors draw on and reproduce in the course of their activities. Both rules 
and resources are presupposed by the notion of agency. There is no agency 
without the capability of acting otherwise and making a difference, however 
great or minimal that might be; i~ other words, agents must be able to draw on 
some resources. Furthermore, si? ce agency issues, not just in an erratic jerk, but 
in some recognizable action~t must be carried out in accordance with some rule. 
This brings a certain consistency into people's actions. 
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12.2 Structures and Systems 
A crucial point of Giddens' structuration theory is the distinction between 
structures and systems. It has to be admitted that in this area, there are a number 
of shifts in formulation as Giddens has endeavoured through different publica-
tions to specify more clearly and correctly the distinction and the interrelation-
ship between them (see Cohen, 1989: 85). These will not be investigated here, but 
a best reading will be taken of his works. 
An initial point to notice is that what most people refer to as social 'structures', 
whether sociologists in the structural-functionalist tradition or lay people 
(including most of the theologians cited in Chapters Three and Four), Giddens 
calls social 'systems'. But there is an important proviso; people conceive of 
structures as relatively static entities to which various dynamic functions are 
annexed; an idea roughly parallel to the division between anatomy and physiol-
ogy in the study of the human body (or corpse). Giddens offers a different 
conception: systems are patterns existing through the longue duree of time; as 
with a dance the pattern is only revealed over time, but the steps must be taken 
one at a time. "Duality of structure connects the production of social interaction, 
as always and everywhere a contingent accomplishment of knowledgeable social 
actors, to the reproduction of social systems across time-space" (CCHM: 27). Social 
systems are patterns of relationships reproduced by actors across space and time; 
structures have a "virtual" existence only in the production and reproduction of 
social systems. 
12.2.1 Systems and Societies 
Giddens makes the tantalizing remark that "all societies are both social systems 
and also consist of social systems (structured in time-space)" (CCHM: 45). To 
grasp what this entails, one might think of, say, a particular university, business 
firm, or city, being a society. In each case, the members have "an · over-all 
awareness, discursive and practical, of belonging to an inclusive community [or 
359 
collectivity] with a certain identity" (CCHM: 45f) . Each has a fairly definite 
'territory of occupation', which it is entitled to lay claim to. Also, each in its ·own 
way draws together and depends upon a cluster of practices: teaching and 
research in the case of the university; manufacturing and trading in the firm; 
and myriad practices ranging from public health services to festivals in a city. 
From one point of view, each of these societies [or social totalities] can be viewed 
as a social system. The university, the firm, and the city has its own distinctive 
pattern of relationships reproduced by actors across space and time. Individual 
actors come and go, but with various modifications along the way the system 
carries on. 
But from another point of view, each of these societies consists of many regular-
ized social practices; teaching, research, manufacturing, trading, maintaining 
public health and running festivals have already been mentioned. Each of these 
forms a system, but not one that can be limited either in theory or practice to a 
particular society. Each of these regularized social practices is carried on else-
where too; in fact, if it were not, it would hardly make sense or even be possible 
to engage in it in any single university, firm or city. Research is part of a whole 
world of learning, which teaching is meant to open up for students. Manufactur-
ing and trading form part of and depend upon the world economic order. Health 
services should fit into and uphold national and international schemes. Even 
entertainment and festivities, although more localized and dependent upon the 
talents of individuals, draw upon and speak to a wider culture than 
Pietermaritzburg. In this respect, systems are inter-societal, yet instantiated in 
various locales by different groups or collectivities. 
'Societies' ... are social systems which 'stand out' in bas-relief from a background of 
a range of other systemic relationships in which they are embedded. They stand out 
because definite structural principles serve to produce a specifiable overall 'cluster-
ing of institutions' across time and space. (CS: 164) 
It should be added, however, that each instantiation of an inter-societal system 
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may be accomplished with more or less adequacy. Universities, firms or cities 
mayor may not be up to standard. But, then, the determination of standards is 
itself influenced in practice by the capabilities and actual performance of the 
various collectivities. One of them can set a new standard for the rest, or drag 
down the whole system. 
12.3 Social and System Integration 
An understanding of time-space distanciation and of presence-availability (see 
10.3.1 above) makes it possible to grasp Giddens' important distinction between 
social and system (or societal) integration. 
Social integration means systemness on the level of face-to-face interaction. System 
integration refers to connections with those who are physically absent in time or 
space. The mechanisms of system integration certainly presuppose those of social 
integration, but such mechanisms are also distinct in some key respects from those 
involved in relation of co-presence. (CS: 28) 
When, for instance, a driver has his car filled up with petrol by the garage 
attendant at the pumps without any alarming incidents, social integration is 
effected. The driver and attendants are co-present to one another for a period of 
time. But there is much more involved in supplying cars with petrol than a 
successful transaction between two or three people for five minutes on a garage 
forecourt. Supplying petrol involves drilling wells, pumping oil, transporting · 
and refining it, and distributing it to filling stations around vast areas of t,he 
world. In order to carry on there must be integration throughout this whole 
system. 
Social integration is founded upon the ability of members to interact and relate 
meaningfully to one another. As long as people in face to face interactions know 
'how to go on' so that they fit in with one another, negotiate differences and 
even engage at times in limited conflict, social integration is maintained. If 
someone does not or cannot make any attempt to fit in, he or she ceases to be (or 
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never was) a member of the same society. 
Societal or system integration involves the continued patterning of social 
relations between actors (or collectivities through the actors that represent them) 
across time-space, though in the modem world with its low presence-~vailability 
few of the actors involved are actually co-present to one another. Societal 
integration includes much more than people being 'sociable' to one another; it 
can also involve economic transactions, law, political arrangements, communi-
cations and transport, as well as military, police and criminal activity. These are 
all part of the binding of human activities over space and time into a system. 
12.3.1 Tight and Loose Systems 
Giddens does add that systems are not always very tight; they "should be 
regarded as widely variable in terms of the degree of 'systemness' they display 
and rarely have the sort of internal unity which may be found in physical and 
biological systems" (CS: 377). So, for instance, when considered as systems, the 
petroleum industry is likely to be more 'systematized' than the manufacturing of 
toys; Germany is a tighter system than Italy; and in times of crisis a system will 
become very fluid. 
The lower the presence-availability, the greater is likely to be the differentiation 
between social and system integration. Whereas "in societies of high presence-
availability," such as tribal bands, "social integration is obviously largely cotermi-
nous with societal integration as a whole" (CCHM: 100). The tribal band holds 
together because its members continually manage to live and work together in 
the same locality. In bodies where a majority of members are able to gather 
together periodically, social and system integration are not so far apart. 
But where presence-availability is continually low, and hence tin:te-space 
distanciation high, there emerges a clear distinction between social and system 
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(or societal) integration. So, for instance, keeping an economic system in running 
order depends upon much more than individual buyers and sellers, or suppliers 
and manufacturers, or management and labour, relating satisfactorily to one 
another when they come together to effect a transaction. If these modes of social 
integration are to continue they have to be meshed into systems of far great time-
space distanciation. In this instance, system integration rather than breakdown 
depends upon continuity in the practices of production, consumption and 
distribution that link the activities of many absent others across the world. For 
the economy not to collapse, the system as a whole must be sound, not just the 
face to face interactions of its members. Though also unless social integration is 
satisfactorily accomplished in many face to face interactions at various times and 
many locales, the wider system will be weakened and may even collapse. 
The high level of time-space distanciation in modern society does not leave 
everyone isolated. As long a person 'knows the way around' or 'how the system 
works', as well as having a point of access to it, he or she can both contribute to 
and benefit from - to a greater or lesser extent - the overall system of modern-
ity. Those either ignorant of how modern society works or - for whatever 
reason - denied effective access to it are the 'marginalized.' 
12.3.2 The Compatibility of Integration with Conflict 
In speaking of 'integration', Giddens makes it clear that lias empioyed here at any 
rate, integration is not synonymous with 'cohesion', and certainly not with 
, consensus'" (CPST: 76). There can even be considerable conflict in society, for 
instance, between consumers and suppliers, debtors and creditors, or various 
religious groups. So long as it does not lead to a total breakdown of the social 
order, integration is maintained. "'Integration' can be defined ... as regularised 
ties, interchanges or reciprocity of practices [involving relations of autonomy and 
dependence] between either actors or collectivities" (CPST: 76). 
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Social integration is found in the ability of actors co-present to one another to 
carry an interaction through; they do not necessarily agree, but are not totally 
baffled by the words, actions, gestures and movements of others. Each participant 
draws on rules and resources to structure his or her behaviour towards the 
others. But the rules and resources they draw upon, partly knowingly and partly 
not, are not exclusive to the participants; they have been produced by others 
before them, and can also be drawn upon by other agents in similar situations. 
The structuring that agents do in their interaction thus both depends upon and 
contributes to the overall social system. 
12.3.3 The Intermeshing of Structures and Systems 
The interconnection between system and structure can also be put negatively. If 
there were no social system, every situation would be totally new and people 
would each time have to work out from scratch their relations to one another 
and how to interact. But social systems do not exist on their own apart from what 
people are doing with some regularity. If groups of people co-present to one 
another do not carry out some regular practices in similar situations, that social 
system (or aspect of one) would fall into oblivion. Thus when people stopped 
using ox-wagons between Cape Town and Pretoria, a social system (or aspect of 
one) which included the rearing of oxen, building of wagons, training of drivers, 
maintaining places for outspanning, and the traversing of space at 20 km per day, 
all ceased to exist. 
Giddens sums up how systems and structures are meshed together when he 
states: 
Social systems are composed of relationships between actors or collectivities 
reproduced across time and space. Social systems are hence constituted of situated 
practices. Structures exist in time-space only as moments recursively involved in the 
production and reproduction of social systems. Structures have only a 'virtual' 
existence. (CCHM: 26) 
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But this leads to the question about how knowledgeable do actors need to be 
about their society for it to be sustained as a viable social system. Only through 
examining how human agency operates will an answer to this be forthcoming. 
12.4 Human Agency 
In giving an account of agency or action, Giddens does not start by considering 
intentions and free-will, but with agency in general. He begins with what people 
do, whether they intended, wished or foresaw it or not. In this his approach is 
different from most ethicists, who concentrate attention on those individual 
human actions for which a person might be praised or blamed. 
The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of 
structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of 
any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. (CS: 2) 
Drawing upon his analysis of time, Giddens speaks of agency or action not as a 
series of particular acts. "Human action occurs as a duree, a continuous flow of 
conduct, as does cognition. Purposive action is not composed of an aggregate or 
series of separate intentions, reasons and motives" (CS: 3). Although sometimes 
it important to single out a particular action or act. For instance, tripping over 
the kerb, signing a cheque or greeting an acquaintance could have special 
significance or serious consequences. But it has to be seen against the background 
of a continuous flow of conduct. Such III acts' are constituted only by a discursive 
moment of attention to the du reeof lived-through experience" (CS: 3). 
Giddens, however, does insist that "the notion of action has reference to the 
activities of an agent, and cannot be examined apart from a broader theory of the 
acting self" (CPST: 55). Agency does not produce just any sort of movement, but 
"concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the 
individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted 
differently" (CS: 9). Giddens admits that the phrase 'could have acted differently' 
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is a difficult one, and needs to be understood in "the context of historically 
located modes of activity" (CPST: 55). It refers to what is possible for someone in 
a particular socio-historical context, even if the agent did not realize all those 
possibilities were open at the time. 
12.4.1 The Stratification of Action and Personality 
Central to Giddens' understanding of social structure is his 'stratification model 




reflexive monitoring of action 
rationalization of action 
motivation of action 
- ..... ~ unintended 
consequences of 
of action 
Fig 12.1 The stratification model of consciousness and action 
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These three strata cannot be distinguished as states of mind; rather, they are 
"subjective processes which are sustained by the agent on an ongoing basis" 
(Cohen, 1989: 48). They can, however, be distinguished as sub-processes, but are 
not separable. 
Giddens also proposes "a 'stratification model' of personality, organised in terms 
of three sets of relations: the unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive 
consciousness" (CPST: 2). Discursive consciousness is evident in a person's 
ability to give reasons for her conduct. Practical consciousness is shown in a 
person's social proficiency, "knowing how to go on", even if he found it difficult 
to explain what he was doing and why. The unconscious refers to the sources of a 
person's cognition and motivation which they are unaware of. Giddens offers 
"these concepts in place of the traditional psychoanalytic triad of ego, super-ego 
and id" (CS:7). 
discursive consciousness 
1 practical consciousness 
unconscious motives/ cognition 
repression barrier 
Fig 12.2 The Stratification of Consciousness 
There is no rigid distinction between practical and discursive consciousness. Just 
where the division between the two lies in a person, and with respe~t to what 
types of activity, depends considerably on a person's socialization and learning 
experiences. Some cultures, or sub-cultures, require their members to attain a 
greater degree of self-awareness than others. 
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Even though there is considerable coincidence between the three strata of action 
and the three of personality, there is no exact fit. Although the reflexive moni-
toring of action will usually be a matter of discursive consciousness, it may also 
be carried out at the level of practical consciousness. Likewise, although the 
underlying motivation of action often remains unconscious, it can also at least 
in part be brought to full discursive consciousness.18 
\ 
12.4.2 Motivation and Ontological Security 
The bottom level Imotivation of action' refers primarily to the wants, the 
attractions and the aversions, that prompt action. These usually arise prior to any 
thoughts or decisions about them; in fact people are not always fully aware of all 
that is impelling them into action. "Motivation refers · to potential for action 
rather than the mode in which action is chronically carried on by the agent" (CS: 
5). 
/ 
Giddens links the motivation of action with the need people have to maintain 
their basic sense of ontological security; they want to uphold their sense of 
self-esteem and guard against whatever provokes shame, doubt, guilt, mistrust 
and other anxieties (see CS: 51-60). Such anxieties are usually kept at bay so long 
as there is a basic continuity in the social fabric, the object-world and human 
relationships. Giddens here draws on the works of Erik Erikson to explain how 
the basic security system develops in the infant through reliable interaction with 
the mothering agent. The adult finds a similar reassuring continuity in the 
socially accepted situated practices or routines of society. Familiarity with the 
routines of society, knowing what is expected and taken for granted by others, 
enables the adult to negotiate many situations without undue embarrassment or 
tension. 
Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she 
18 In not allowing for this possibility, Bryant and Jary (1991: 9) are mistaken in combining Figures 12.1 and 
12.2. 
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moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institutions of society, which are 
such only through their continued reproduction. An examination of routinization ... 
provides us with a master key to explicating the characteristic forms of relation 
between the basic security system on the one hand and the reflexively constituted 
processes inherent in the episodic character of encounters on the other. (CS: 60) 
The person who is able to fit in with the accepted routines of society, for the most 
part unconsciously or without having to dwell upon them, not only upholds his 
or her self-esteem but contributes to maintaining these routines as acceptable 
social practices. Since people accept and follow out many such routines, for 
instance, conventions of dress, eating, looking at others, conversation and 
posture, without averting to what they are doing, such conduct is not directly 
motivated. 
"Motives tend to have a direct purchase on action only in relatively unusual 
circumstances, situations which in some way break with routines" (CS: 6). At 
these junctures, especially when the normal course of life is disturbed and hence 
ontological security threatened, regression is likely to occur. Instead of action 
being consciously monitored, assessed and adjusted, it begins to take its direction 
more from unconscious motives. Then, especially if the self is not cohesive 
enough to cope with insecurity, either untamed drives or other split off ambi-
tions that can be realized through merger with a powerful, reassuring figure take 
over. But their dominant influence goes unchecked since, being below the 
repression barrier, it is not consciously averted to or avowed (see also 14.7 & 
16.6). 
12.4.3 Routine and Reflexivity 
People can make sense of life, themselves and one another, because their actions 
and interactions are repeated at regular enough intervals. They develop a 
routine. This is not to say that every meal, train journey, lecture, shopping trip 
or holiday is exactly the same. For instance, although something new may be on 
369 
the menu, guests mayor may not be present, the hour might vary somewhat, 
having dinner is recognizably the same social practice repeated from day to ' day. 
People operate out of a reflexive awareness of what they and others are doing; 
this enables them to instantiate from one day to the next the social institution 19 
of having dinner. 
Continuity of practices presumes reflexivity, but reflexivity in tum is possible only 
because of the continuity of practices that makes them distinctively 'the same' across 
space and time. 'Reflexivity' here should be understood not merely as 
'self-consciousness' but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life. 
(CS: 3) 
Monitoring or checking out whatever is going on is a continuous process; people 
expect it of each other as without it they could not carry on a conversation, effect 
a business transaction, drive a car in traffic or run a meeting. To bring off any 
social interaction the participants must be fairly well aware of what is going on, 
know how to go on themselves and able to moderate their conduct according to 
how things are going. Exploring all that is involved in face-to-face interactions is 
the province of ethnomethodology. What is important to note, however, is how 
reliant people's sense of ontological security is on their being able to interact 
successfully with others. Many people, if they cannot establish some routine, 
begin to fall apart. 
It should also be noted that in situations where routines break down, or are 
deliberately abrogated, people often go to pieces. Giddens cites Bettelheim's 
account of the psychological regression experienced by inmates of concentration 
camps as the ordinary routines of life were stripped away (see 14.8 below). 
19 To av~id any possible confu~ion it should be pointed out that 'institutions' are what Radcliffe-Brown 
~aIls '.st~nd,ard!sed mod~s ~f behaVIOur' (see. epST: 96). 'I.n.stitution' is a more abstract term than either 
. asso~latt?n .or orgamzatIon . Both of the latter Involv~ a speclfia~l~ group o~ persons. So, for instance, marriage 
IS an Ins.tttutJon bu~ th.e household of Mr & Mrs Jone~ IS an aSSociatIOn; owning property is an institution while 
Rand !"1Ine Properties IS one of many property managmg organizations. The distinction between associations and 
orgamzatlOns hinges upon the degree to which they conSCiously collect and use information to control their future. 
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12.4.4 Security versus Autonomy: An Amendment to Giddens 
But outside such extreme situations, "when security needs · are no t in serious 
jeopardy, ... other types of motives come into play" Doyle Paul Johnson (1990: 
117) notes in his amendment to Giddens. Besides seeking security, Johnson 
continues 
human beings often seem motivated (consciously or unconsciously) to seek to 
expand their knowledge and skill. ... [This] reflects a need for growth, understand-
ing, challenge, and achievement. But even if the underlying motivation is the need for 
a higher level of security in the long run, the short-term effects may be disruption of 
routines and resulting anxiety. (1990: 115) 
People wish to gain autonomy, and so are likely to depart from routines. This is 
especially true of those whose security "is provided more by their internal ego 
strength than by the routinization of their everyday practices" (Johnson, 1990: 
122). While satisfying security needs explains the reproduction of the conditions 
of social life, people's seeking to express their autonomy gives a better explana-
tion of how society is modified. 
12.4.5 The Rationalization of Action 
Distinguishing the second level of action as a process of 'rationalization' is 
somewhat unfortunate. It does not refer to misleading 'rationalizations' or the 
fabrication of plausible excuses to hide one's real motives. It refers primarily to 
people's competence to carry an action through in a sensible and coherent 
fashion; the action is rational from a practical point of view. Practical conscious-
ness is rather a matter of 'knowing how' than 'knowing that'. In many instances, 
actors will be able to negotiate a social encounter successfully, but could not give 
a full account of how they did so. Their practical consciousness will be more 
extensive than their discursive consciousness. In this way they will draw on 
stocks of mutual knowledge about their society and its members, but that 
knowledge will not usually be available in any codified form. "The accounts 
actors are able to provide for their reasons are bounded, or subject to various 
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degrees of possible articulation, in respect of tacitly employed mutual knowl-
edge" (CPST: 58). 
12.4.6 The Reflexive Monitoring of Action 
This third level of action is an agent's ability to take continual account not only 
of his or her own actions and what is resulting from them, but also of others' 
actions and their implications. Also "the reflexive monitoring of action includes 
the monitoring of the setting of interaction, and not just the behaviour of the 
particular actors taken separately" (CPST: 57). An agent will also be monitoring 
how others are monitoring his or her own monitoring of what is going on. 
Taken altogether this forms a complex process, where each person's conduct 
makes a difference to the doings of others. 
For instance, during a discussion each speaker will continually be making some 
assessment of both his own and others' words, gestures and bearing, and the 
effect all this is having upon not only himself but all the others involved. It is 
this skill of attending to whatever is going on that enables a disparate set of actors 
to produce a coherent discussion, even though no one knew beforehand -
unlike in a play - just what would transpire. 
The reflexive monitoring of action will also be to a great extent a matter of 
practical rather than discursive consciousness. People may adjust their conduct 
to the conduct of others without either party averting to the fact that they are 
doing so. Though at times, agents will spell out for themselves or ask questions 
of others as to what is going on. Cohen explains that "discursive moments of 
attention generally occur only when queries are made to clarify the meaning 
(both semantic and normative) of events and/ or circumstances which are not 
well und~rstood" (1989: 49f). 
But the reflexive monitoring of actions IS not confined to such moments; 
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monitoring, like the rationalization and motivation of action, takes place within 
a continuous flow of conduct. 
12.4.7 Doings and Intentions 
Ethicists are mainly concerned about specifically intended action and do look at 
the outcome of action "in terms of phenomena the agent has more or less within 
his or her control" (CS: 11). Thomas Aquinas, for instance, says that actions 
should be differentiated by what they are aiming to accomplish, not by what is 
incidental (per accidens); otherwise, all circumstances (occasiones circumstantes) 
would have to be taken into account in specifying any action (see IaIlae 71, 5 & 72, 
1). His main aim in discussing voluntary and involuntary actions is to single out 
those aspects of human activity which people do not have in common with 
animals, because these are the ones that lead towards beatitude (propinquius se 
habent ad beatitudinem actus qui sunt proprie humani, Iallae 6 Prologus). He 
recognizes that voluntary human actions (actus humanus) neither are nor 
should always be devoid of the passions that stir both people and animals into 
action. Thomas, however, does not go further and inquire into their reper-
cussions; there may be two reasons for this: one theoretical and the other 
sociological. 
As a matter of theory, Thomas thoroughly and consistently adopts Aristotle's 
teleological analysis of action: every agent necessarily acts to gain an end (0 m n i a 
agentia necesse est agere propter jinem, IaI~ae 1, 2). This end may be either one 
they have in view themselves, as in the case of human actions, or one that is 
embedded in their nature. While this proved a powerful analytic principle, it 
rather implied that human actions terminated when their end was attained and 
so any inquiry into their further repercussions simply did not arise. 
From a sociological point of view, medieval society in Thomas' time had a far 
greater presence-availability and less of a distance between social and system 
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integration than modern society. This meant that there was little difference 
between what a clearly intended, appropriately planned and properly executed 
action was aimed at and what it in fact accomplished. Deeds did not regularly 
ripple through a vast social system, causing many repercussions which could 
neither be foreseen or intended. They did not extend far beyond the conscious 
thought and willed decision that inspired them. This is not to say that everyone 
always acted admirably, or that problems did not occur, but that the personal 
origins of faults and failures were much more readily apparent than today. 
In contrast, speaking of modern society, Giddens explains that "from the point of 
view of the social sciences, it is Jlard to exaggerate the importance of the unin-
tended consequences of intentional conduct" (CS 11£). It should also be noted that 
Thomas is concentrating attention on discrete human actions, while Giddens is 
primarily concerned with the overall flow of intentional activity from which 
particular acts may discursively be singled out. 
Giddens defines 'intentional' 
as characterizing an act which its perpetrator knows, or believes, will have a 
particular quality or outcome and where such knowledge is utilized by the author of 
the act to achieve this quality or outcome. If the characterization of agency given 
above is correct, we have to separate out the question of what an agent' does' from 
what is 'intended' or the intentional aspects of what is done. Agency refers to doing 
[not to the agent's intentions but primarily to his or her capability]. (CS: 10) 
Every action is likely to produce various unintended consequences, many of 
which could not be foreseen, and others which evert though foreseen could not 
be avoided as long as the original intention is pursued. In other words, agents in 
putting their own stamp on the ongoing flow of events in which they are caught 
up inevitably do more than they originally intended. Rarely, if ever, does an 
agent's action accomplish precisely what was intended, no more and no less. 
These unintended consequences will vary with circumstances and also ' depend 
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upon how well the circumstances are known and the agent's capability of 
moderating action to suit the given circumstances. Unacknowledged condItions 
of action, including the agent's lack of self-knowledge, will lead to the action 
having various unintended consequences. Though these can if necessary be 
corrected or minimized ovet time. People learn by experience. Through moni-
toring the consequences of their conduct over a period of time, agents can 
become aware of previously unacknowledged conditions that were influencing 
the outcome of what they were doing. Through a process of feedback they can 
lessen, if necessary, any discrepancy between what they intended and what 
actually resulted. On the other hand, they might find the discrepancy beneficial 
and alter their intention to take advantage of it. 
For instance, in the course of a discussion a speaker might find that his words 
were being taken up in a way he never intended. Through monitoring how 
others react to what he is saying, he discovers that their assumptions and 
presuppositions are considerably different from his. Realizing this, he might 
then reformulate what he wants to say to get his point across better. The other 
participants in the discussion would presumably be making similar adjustments. 
The overall effect is that through the ongoing process of monitoring, rationaliz-
ation and motivation the unintended consequences are taken up as unacknowl-
edged conditions of action. This may occur on several levels. Discursively, in the 
instance of the discussion mentioned above, where participants adapt their 
speech and arguments according to the effects their earlier words have had on 
the other participants. Often less consciously, when people draw back from 
pursuing an encounter with others that is becoming too embarrassing or 
threatening for them; their overall motivation then may be to maintain their 
self-esteem or keep a sense of ontological security intact. Structurally, where the 
unintended consequences of action 1/ are systematically incorporated within the 
process of reproduction of institutions" (epST: 59). For instance, when buying 
goods agents reproduce the properties of money as an institutionalized resource; 
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or in attending school pupils and teachers reproduce the institution of formal 
education; or through celebrating a birthday people reinforce the cultural 
tradition of dating years as they pass. In each of these instances, none of the 
people involved might have any idea of how their action is contributing to the 
reproduction of social institutions. As Cohen comments: 
Indeed, lay agents, unlike social scientists, may have no conception whatsoever that 
their participation in social routines contributes to social reproduction in the duality 
of structure by re-enforcing their awareness, and the awareness of others, that this is 
how social life in given circumstances is actually carried out. (1989: 54) 
It is worth pointing out here that although an agent may accomplish an intended 
action successfully, one cannot say that that is all he or she is doing. The person 
driving to work is presumably doing what she consciously intends, but in the 
process is likely to be maintaining her sense of self worth by doing what is 
expected of her, upholding courtesy at the wheel, adding pollution to the 
atmosphere, and re-enforcing the social practice of commuting. Intentional 
action is always implicated in a broader flow of events, whose breadth can be 
somewhat gauged by examining how the consequences of what is now taking 
place set the scene for the future. 
12.4.8 Do You ever Really Know what you are Doing? 
Having looked in outline at Giddens' analysis of human agency, it is now 
possible to tackle the question posed above (12.3.3): how knowledgeable must the 
members of a society be for it to be sustained as a viable social system. His 
analysis has shown that although a person may be aware of his or her situation, 
sensibly assess it and act accordingly, there is always more going on than meets 
the eye. This applies to properly human actions, ones in which people freely and 
knowingly gear into the reality with which they are involved, even more than it 
does to those activities in which people do not fully know or cannot control 
what they are doing. Although the latter may result in strange accidents or 
terrible incidents, being unfree they lack social significance. An insane killer 
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from a foreign state will not trigger the political repercussions that an assassin 
specifically trained and sent on his mission would. 
The typical human agent is neither a dupe nor an omniscient sociologist. People 
usually know quite a bit about their society, how it works, and what kind of 
behaviour, contribution and responses are expected of them. But even though 
their own actions are reasonably clear, still their actions always emerge from 
some unacknowledged conditions and result in some unintended consequences 
(see 12.4.7 above). 
These unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action are 
likely to include various facts about other people; for instance, someone in 
shaping her action, say, arranging flowers around the house, unknowingly draws 
on the example of her mother and sets a further example for her neighbour's 
daughter to follow, even though she did not realize her action was being 
observed and offering a modeL Unlike concepts or items of information, actions 
do not have clear cut starting and finishing points. 
Taking this line of thought a stage further (see 12.4.7 above), Gidden 
s postulates that a usually unintended consequence of action is the reproduction 
of the social system. Someone purchasing a newspaper, for instance, is likely to 
consider only whether he has the change handy, has time to read it, or if it will 
be of interest. But in buying it he is reproducing the properties of money as an 
institutional resource; though neither the buyer nor the vendor usually averts to 
this. Both are taking for granted, as an unacknowledged condition of action, the 
social institution of monetary exchange for goods. Yet if both had to think about 
all the conditions and possible consequences of each action, few newspapers 
would be bought. 
The next diagram (based on Bryant & Jary, 1991: 123) sets out the dynamic 
relationship between social integration, resulting from agents structuring their 
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interaction, and system integration, which reproduces a pattern of relationships 
between actors and collectivities across time and space. 
This diagram must, however, be criticized as it gives the impression that the 
connection between social and system integration is effected only through the 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action. That is not 
the whole story, as through the double hermeneutic (see 4.2 above) knowledge 
about social and economic systems may be incorporated into the structuring of 
action. Thus Cohen points out that 
what may be for agents unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of 
action over a given historical period, may thereafter become discursively acknowl-
edged by agents as ongoing outcomes of and conditions for their own social conduct. 
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Fig 12.3 Social and System Integration 
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This in turn opens up possibilities for social change, since 
agents who come to realise that their activities contribute to the maintenance of an 
oppressive or otherwise undesirable set of social institutions may thereafter begin to 
initiate measures to alter their previous forms of conduct, depending upon available 
opportunities in situ. (Cohen, 1989: 55) 
For instance, people may grasp that always buying from the cheapest suppliers 
without asking any further questions both depends upon and helps maintain a 
system of worker exploitation. 
12.5 Structure as Rules & Resources 
Mention has already been made (11.2.1) that the social structures an actor both 
draws upon and reproduces are conceived by Giddens as generative rules and 
resources. Now, after having examined agency, it is possible to see more closely 
what kind of rules and resources are implicated in human activities. They not 
only are called upon when action is consciously monitored, but are operative in 
both the rationalization and the motivation of action, even if the actor is barely 
conscious of the latter. Likewise, rules are to some extent affirmed or negated and 
resources strengthened, shifted or weakened as a result of action, whether or not 
the actors concerned know, foresee, intend or maybe even deplore and wish to 
avoid these results. 
12.5.1 Generative Rules 
In speaking of social structures embodying generative rules, several points need 
to be borne in mind. Giddens is drawing upon Wittgenstein's understanding of 
human activity as a skill, as a capability of carrying out actions that are normal 
and sensible for the context. liTo know a rule is to know ... what one is supposed 
to do, and others are supposed to do, in all situations to which that rule applies, 
or potentially applies" (SSPT: 131). Without the ability to embody such rules in 
379 
one's conduct, one's action would simply appear bizarre and no one would know 
how to respond. 
Such generative rules cannot all be formulated in words, still less codified as 
laws, as one would still need further rules to say how and when they apply. 
Formulated rules - those that are given verbal expression as canons of law, 
bureaucratic rules, rules of games and so on - are thus codified interpretations of 
rules rather then rules as such. They should be taken not as exemplifying rules in 
general but as specific types of formulated rule, which, by virtue of their overt 
formulation, take on various specific qualities. (CS: 21) 
Following a rule, or knowing how to go on, is not the same as being able to 
formulate the rule one is following. So in speaking of social structures as rules, 
Giddens is certainly not proposing that they can be construed as a collection of 
regulations or a code of laws. Generative rules can be likened lito formulae, not 
because they can be expressed in a quasi-mathematical way, but because they 
specify 'generalizable procedures' or if one prefers, conventions, which agents 
follow" (RMC: 255). 
12.5.2 Two Aspects of Rules 
Giddens rejects any rigid Kantian distinction between purely 'constitutive' and 
'regulative' rules. Instead there 
two aspects of rules ... are implicated in the production of social practices; that related to 
the constitution of meaning, and that relating to sanctions involved in social conduct. ... 
Although it is important to sep~rate them out conceptually, these two senses of right 
and wrong always intersect in the actual constitution of social practices. (CPST: 82) 
Thus if one presses in any given instance rules about demarcating goods as 
private property one ends up with rules about owners' rights and the prohibition 
of stealing, or vice versa. 
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12.5.3 Resources 
In understanding social structures, attention must be given to resources and the 
power they deliver as well as to rules. It is not enough to depict social life in 
terms of rules, both semantic and normative, as that would leave out of account 
agents' capabilities of engaging in social interaction and bringing about intended 
or unintended outcomes. Rules alone are insufficient as 
the notion of human action logically implies that of power, understood as 
transformative capacity: 'action' only exists when an agent has the capability of 
intervening, or refraining from intervening, in a series of events so as to be able to 
influence their course. The introduction of a theory of action into sociology thus 
entails regarding power as just as essential and integral to social interaction as 
conventions are. (CPST: 256) 
Nevertheless, Giddens contends that most social thinkers, such as Schutz, 
Winch, Durkheim and Parsons, "either treat power as secondary to the meaning-
ful or normative character of social life, or ignore it altogether" (CPST: 69). This 
criticism also holds for Marx, for in connecting power directly to class interests, 
the inference can be made "that when class divisions disappear, relations of 
power do also" (CPST: 69). On the other hand 
those who have recognised the importance of power, like Nietzsche and Weber, have 
usually done so only on the basis of a normative irrationalism .. . If there is no 
rational mode of adjudging 'ultimate value' claims, as Weber held, then the only 
recourse open is that of power or might: the strongest are able to make their values 
count by crushing others. (CPST: 68) 
Mention has been made of these criticisms as the absence of a sound understand-
ing of power, one that would recognize its extensive role but would also be able 
to differentiate between its rightful use and its abuse, has weakened the efforts of 
social movements to bring about a better ordering of life. In this vein, suggesting 
that greater democratization will provide a ready solution to all problems seems 
to be a way of evading difficult moral, administrative and security issues (see CS: 
256£). 
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To return to Giddens, he distinguishes two types of resources - allocative and 
authoritative - able when mobilized by agents to effect change or exercise 
domination in society. ('Domination' here is not necessarily a pejorative term; it 
mayor may not be legitimate.) 
Allocative resources refer to capabilities - or, more accurately, to forms of 
trans formative capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material 
phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to types of transformative capacity 
generating command over persons or actors. (CS: 33) 
Although allocative resources are often 'materially' evident in land, goods, tools 
and machinery, these only become resources as such, imbued with 
transformative capacity, "when incorporated within processes of structuration" 
(CS: 33). When the authoritative resources of society break down, access to a 
telephone receiver is not much use. "Authoritative resources are every bit as 
'infrastructural' as allocative resources are" (CS: 258). 
12.6 Structures and Freedom 
The conception of social structure that Giddens proposes, one that combines 
constraint and enablement, undercuts several misleading ideas. 
The first is the assumption "that 'structure' must refer to something 'outside' the 
activities of social agents" (CS: 141). Whereas, in Giddens' view, "the same 
structural characteristics participate in the subject (the actor) and in the object 
(society)" (CPST: 70). 
A second prevalent mistake is to suppose that "micro sociology is taken to be 
concerned with the activities of the 'free agent', ... while the province of 
macro sociology is presumed to be that of analysing the structural constraints 
which set limits to free activity" (CS: 139). This overlooks how the structural 
properties of macro-systems have to be continually reproduced across time and 
space, and that that only comes about through free agents, whose activities bring 
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about a range of intended and unintended consequences (see CS: 212). 
A third mistake is the identification of structures only with constraints. Instead 
both the resources enabling action and the rules inherent within it are enabling 
as well as constraining. Rules, whether semantic or normative, do not just limit 
action but guide actors in bringing their actions off. Likewise, when resources are 
used to exercise power this both presupposes and results in relations of both 
autonomy and dependence. 
The notion of a fully integrated person being someone free from all external 
social structure is in Giddens' terms a fanciful one, as it places the agent in a 
social vacuum and overlooks the enabling aspects of structure. 
Structure thus is not to be conceptualised as a barrier to action, but as essentially involved in 
its production: even in the most radical processes of social change which, like any 
others, occur in time. The most disruptive modes of social change, like the most 
rigidly stable forms, involve structuration. (CPST: 70) 
In other words, free from all social structure, an agent would lack the capacity to 
act meaningfully, and hence could neither develop him- or herself nor effect any 
change in society. 
Giddens' view of structure therefore undercuts any notion of gaining freedom by 
a process of de-structuration, as Gurvitch and Sartre suggest (see CS: 70). It also 
deflates the prevalent idea of a mature and free person being someone who can 
be independent of social structure entirely. Though what these proponents of 
destructuration are presumably seeking is an alteration in the rules and a 
shifting of the resources governing the reproduction of society. 
12.7 Justice as Action and Structure 
The interrelationship outlined above between agency and structure as rilles and 
resources throws light on how, for instance, justice is (or is not) maintained in 
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society. Thomas looks first at justice or social responsibility (justitia) as a strength 
of character (virtus) inhering in a person. He descripes it as the disposition to 
render to anyone with a reliable and lasting willingness what is justly his or her's 
(habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum 
unicuique tribuit, IIaIIae 58, 1). This presupposes the ability to put personal 
concerns aside, listen and observe carefully, weigh evidence, assess arguments, 
grasp implications and settle on a definite decision. Whether done slowly and 
methodically or as a quick response to bl?-tant injustice, the same strength of 
character with its concern for the good of others is brought into operation. 
Thomas goes on to speak of judging as the act of doing justice, and asks whether 
it is allowable to judge others. 
Rendering judgment in a full judicial sense is reserved to an officially appointed 
judge acting within his authority who as a third party decides impartially 
between contending parties. The activity of judges provides a paramount 
example of human agency both drawing upon rules and resources and in turn 
reproducing them. Judges not only have to follow substantive and procedural 
law, but must take accouIit of cultural norms as well. Their judgments uphold 
the law, and may give a further interpretation (or construction) of it, as well as 
influencing the prevailing cultural norms about acceptable behaviour. Likewise, 
their position as judges is an authoritative resource giving power to command 
people; in rendering sound judgments they uphold their position of power. On 
the other hand, bad laws and poor judgments bring the authority of the whole 
legal system into disrepute. Law and judgments might be bad, either because they 
are intrinsically unjust or due to their being contradictory or administered 
incompetently. The combination of sound judgments and well formulated laws 
- for instance, encompassing and balancing all human rights - with clear 
authority and effective procedures is an important step in bringing about a 
society permeated by justice. 
There is a difference of emphasis between Thomas' approach and contemporary 
384 
ones. His prime concern was that people, especially those in positions of author-
ity, be capable, willing and constant in rendering justice. Today emphasis has 
shifted to the legal system: upholding human rights, due process, access to the 
courts, equitable and workable legislation. Unless the system is sufficiently 
sound, even the best of judges cannot render justice. Though it is also recognized 
that in view of constantly changing conditions it is the responsibility of judges, 
especially in higher courts, to adjust (ad justitiam) the system through their 
rulings and interpretation of the law. There is no point in arguing the merits of 
judges as agents over against the integrity of the legal system; both require each 
other. Furthermore, if social interactions are on the whole to be just, then the 
responsibility for bringing justice into the structuring of society devolves upon 
many others besides judges and the police. 
When either the state or an individual takes a matter to court to be judged by a 
third party they are turning to the last resort for securing justice. Prior to that, 
however, if a society is not going to be marked by 'structural/ institutional 
injustice,' then both the generative rules that guide interactions between people 
and the distribution of resources need to embody a modicum of justice. The 
phrase 'a modicum of justice' is used, because societies can tolerate a certain level 
of unjust activities without these becoming the norm. There will, for instance, 
always be some swindlers in society; we just have to be wary and cope with that. 
But should financial corruption affect more than around 30% of business 
transactions, then the overall stability of the economy is threatened. Around that 
point, everyone in order to survive has to operate by a set of rules at variance 
with those of fair trade. Similar considerations holds for such interactions as 
rendering services, spreading information, protecting life and limb, working for 
and renumerating others. It also holds 'for the administrative arm of govern-
ment, which now regulates nearly every sphere of life and frequently runs 
systems of health, education, welfare, housing, transport and sometimes 
industries too. In all these areas unless people are in fact operating out of a set of 
generative rules that are passably fair and sound, then they will feel thieatened 
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by a system of structural injustice. The same applies to the distribution of 
resources, including who has the power to make the rules and enforce them. 
That, however, is only half the story. The modern phenomenon of structural 
injustice differs significantly from the injustices perpetrated by a tyrant or unjust 
judge in medieval tiII}es. Then, people could be unjustly threatened, coerced and 
enslaved, but in an obvious manner. Now, when injustice is structural, not only 
are people subjected to its effects but their deeds may be helping to perpetuate it. 
The latter is to a considerable degree unavoidable, because of the duality of 
structure, its being both drawn upon and reproduced through action. In order to 
survive or improve their lot in life they cannot but draw upon the prevailing 
social structure, with its distorted rules and deficient resources, but their activ-
ities help perpetuate the structure. It is not that everyone wants to perpetuate 
injustice, or even realizes they are doing so, but it is an unforeseen consequence 
of their ordinary activities. (Some instances of this will be briefly portrayed in 
Chapter Fifteen.) This in outline is the crucial difference between injustice in 
modern and medieval times, and explains the importance today of continually 
examining how the system works and challenging its deficiencies. (This account 
of structural injustice still has to be complemented by some examination of how 
defective structures thwart charity; see 18.5 below.) 
12.8 Conclusion: The Participative Acomplishment of Structuring Society 
The theory of structuration transcends the dualism of (mechanically predictable) 
objectivity set over against (whimsically free) subjectivity. It shows that the 
structuring of a society is a continual acomplishment that results - in ways that 
can never be fully intended or predicted - from the creative interplay of its 
members' actions. Besides offering continuity, the seeds of both personal and 
social change, are - for better or worse - present in each action. The distinction 
between social and system integration shows how actions effect a double 
accomplishment: actions in varying degrees both produce the social interactions 
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that the agents intended and reproduce the wider social system that binds space 
and time. This occurs because the underlying social structure of rules and 
resources makes possible both face-to-face social interaction and the widespread 
binding of space and time. But, although both result from human activity, the 
latter is much more an unintended consequence of action than a consciously 
willed achievement. 
Both Thomas and Giddens have intricate analyses of human action, though they 
approach it from different directions. Thomas focuses on the individual agent, 
looking at what makes action voluntary and what determines whether it is good 
or bad. Giddens examines more the effect of social conditions, whose influence 
agents mayor may not acknowledge, on the outcome of their actions. He shows, 
using the notion of the duality of structure, how society makes action possible, 
shapes it to some extent, and how in turn action comes to sustain and re-shape 
society. The recursive effect of action produces social systems and reproduces 
(deep) social structures, but in ways agents do not always intend or realize. 
Giddens' theory of structuration thus extends Thomas' analysis of human action 
so it can take into account its unacknowledged conditions of action and its 
unintended consequences. Structural evil persists because an unacknowledged 
(or if acknowledged, inescapable) limitation on action is reproduced as an 
unintended (or at least unwelcome) consequence, which in turn limits further 
action. 
12.9 Reflection: What does the Theory of Structuration accomplish? 
Standing back from the admittedly complicated details of the theory of 
structuration, it must be asked: What does it do? More particularly, what aspect 
of human existence does it elucidate? What role does it play in the history of 
thought about human conduct? One answer is that it re-instates ~emory 
(memoria) alongside intellect and will in the process of minding. (The term 
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Jminding' is used as covers activity as well as thought, involvement as well as 
distance, and affectivity as well as detachment, better than the English 'mind.') 
Augustine in his De Trinitate (X, Ch 4 & XIV, Chs 2-4) used the triad of memory, 
understanding and will in humans to throw light on the mystery of the Trinity. 
The term 'memory,' as he uses it, is wider than actively recalled memories 
(reminiscentia); it refers to "the mind's perpetually actual potential [for recall], 
which is only intermittently activated" (Hill, 1991: 266). By the time Thomas 
Aquinas was writing, eight centuries later, memory had faded into the back-
ground, where it largely remained until the advent of psychoanalysis. In Kant's 
philosophy the gap left by memory is filled by the schematism which gives the 
categories a temporal dimension. The memory's rediscovery in psychoanalysis 
showed that free will and conscious understanding were insufficient to explain 
much human conduct. The past left its residues, which influenced present 
conduct in ways not entirely amenable to intellect and will. Memory has its own 
range of operation; though will and intellect both draw upon it, its sphere of 
influence extends beyond what is consciously thought or deliberately willed. 
To put this very briefly in another idiom: minding does not just involve 
intellect and will. Their operations are elements within a more encompassing 
process, the making of a story which both takes up elements from the past and 
transforms them. Furthermore, the story that each person makes of her or his 
own life is intertwined with other stories; in fact the very ability to makes one's 
life into a unique story depends upon its being intertwined with other stories. 
This intertwining, however, takes place not only through conscious agreement 
or disagreement (intellect) and freely chosen conflict or cooperation (will), but 
also through appropriating the residues of a common past as resources for action 
in the present. That action in turn leaves its residue as a possible resource for 
future action. 
Whilst psychoanalysis concentrates on individual stories, Giddens' theory of 
structuration looks at their intertwining, and how this can take place without the 
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actors being copresent to one another. It examines how the residue from the 
intertwining of previous stories, conceived as a legacy of generative rules and 
resources, is drawn upon in fashioning further stories. This legacy, however, can 
never be isolated; social structures have a 'virtual' existence, in that they are both 
hidden yet capable of being effective. 
Giddens also refers to structures as 'memory traces'. This should not be taken to 
mean that a person carries social structures 'in the head'. Rather, it points to how 
people's perceptions and expectations of what is before them are in part activated 
and shaped by past experience. "Perception is organized via anticipatory 
schemata whereby the individual anticipates new incoming information while 
simultaneously mentally digesting the old" (CS: 46). While memories shape 
expectations, they are also reshaped as those expectations are met. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
The Bondings of Society 
"How very good and pleasant it is when kindred live together in unity!" (Ps 133: 1). 
Attention was directed in the last chapter to the social processes which through 
the more or less routine interactions of people bind time and space. That analysis 
brought out ways in which people are linked across extensive social systems 
without their fully being aware of it. It showed how systems are reproduced as 
the often unforeseen consequences of people's actions, but it did not deal with 
the sense of inclusiveness that people may have through belonging to a particu-
lar society, be it their family, business, local community, political party, specialist 
organization, or nation. The underlying aim of this chapter is to investigate what 
makes the difference between a heterogenous assortment and a society. What 
makes society possible and what contributes to its realization in practice? From 
where do the bonds that members recognize as holding them together arise? 
13.1 The Ambiguity of Society 
Although not a topic he pursues at any length, Thomas Aquinas puts unity or 
being one (u n u m), that is lacking division, on a par with being (ens); hence, you 
can only claim that any particular thing actually is, if its being is not divided (esse 
cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione). Hence at some point a broken family or a 
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tribe rent by faction fighting no longer exists as a unit. He remarks that just as 
things seek to preserve their being, so they preserve their unity (unumquodque, 
sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem, la 11, 1). When he was 
writing Prima Pars he only spoke of unity as the absence of division, but five or 
six years later in Tertia Pars he puts a more positive value on it. Unity implies 
completion, the drawing together into an integrated whole of everything 
required for something to fulfil its purpose (unum perfectionis ad cuius 
integritatem concurrunt omnia quae requiruntur ad finem eiusdem, IlIa 73, 2). 
On the other hand, not every kind of unity or concord is of value (laIlae 29, 1); an 
alliance between thieves or an agreement made under duress does not promote 
the true purpose of anyone. This point is mentioned as it brings out the import-
ance of examining the level of unity that pertains among members of a society or 
the kind of order that directs their activities. It is quite possible for an apparently 
united and well ordered society to hide, even from some of its members, a more 
fundamental and humanly devastating disorder. 
Admittedly, many problems are associated with speaking about 'society,' as 
societies may range from a handful of people to a widespread international 
organization. Although for a society to exist there must be some unity and 
cohesion, these will not take the same form in every case. A family is different 
from a business; a chess club unlike a rugby club; tribal accord contrasts with a 
democracy whose members are united by being locked together in civil argu-
ment. 
Various degrees of difference, contradiction and even conflict can be tolerated 
within each of these societies before they break up. Hence it would be a mistake 
to think either that all societies are identical or that belonging has the same 
meaning for every member. Yet, as Giddens briefly and guardedly mentions, 
there is 
the prevalence, among members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of 
common identity, however that might be manifested or revealed. Such feelings may 
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be manifest in both practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a 
'value consensus'. Individuals may be aware of belonging toa definite collectivity 
without agreeing that this is necessarily right and proper. (CS: 165) 
Although Giddens does not pursue this issue further, Kohut offers a careful 
analysis of the basic human characteristics that make interaction possible 
between people and imparts a sense of belonging to one or other society. In 
Norton's terms (see 1.4.3.4 above), Kohut examines the ways in which a person 
may respond to 'antecedent sociality' in view of attaining a satisfactory 'conse-
quent sociality.' This would be impossible without empathy; it makes human 
communication and a sense of belonging possible. Nonetheless, empathy is not 
magic; approaches and responses may go wrong and produce disastrous results 
not solely for the individuals concerned but for society as a whole. 
13.2 Empathy 
All that has previously been said (see 7.3 above) about the emergence and 
structuring of the self presumes the presence of empathy. Although at each stage 
in life its form and intensity will vary, empathy is never an incidental adjunct to 
the self but its normally required state. The rudiments of a human self only 
begin to be laid down in the infant through the empathic acceptance and support 
that others provide for it. Without such human contact, no human self would 
emerge. Likewise, if the human contact provided by the mother and others is 
lacking or defective in empathy, that will lead to weaknesses and defects in the 
emerging nuclear self. Kohut, like any other analyst concerned with treating 
patients with a weak or defective self, looks in great detail at the consequences of 
various failures in empathy. 
13.2.1 The Pervasiveness of Empathy 
The unfolding of empathy in all its dimensions is the central tenet of Kohut's 
psychology. Empathy is not easily defined, but may initially be characterized as 
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"the resonance of essential human likeness" (55 II: 713) that enables one "to 
think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person" (HDAC: 82). 
Without it human life could not be sustained. It suffuses the whole of life from 
"the baby's first instinctive enmeshment with his human surroundings" (II: 677) 
to the highest achievements of human creativity and wisdom . 
... empathy is not a sex-linked capacity. It is a broad, autonomous mental function, 
present in all human beings, present at every level of development - from the baby's 
first instinctive enmeshment with his human surroundings to those rigorously 
controlled mental processes that supply the primary data of observation to any 
science of complex psychological states. (55 II: 676£) 
Psychoanalysis is, for Kohut, above all the science of empathy; not only does the 
analyst require empathy for understanding the analysand, but much of his task 
lies in building up the latter's undeveloped or stunted capacity for empathy. 
Even then, empathy is not always used positively, as it can be employed to 
discover others' weaknesses and play on them. Kohut cites the case of the 
Luftwaffe fitting sirens to their dive-bombers in order to strike terror into the 
population they attacked. They knew by fiendish empathy that its wail would 
frighten helpless people (55 IV: 529). Likewise, the interrogator intent on 
breaking down a suspect uses empathy to probe the prisoner's weak points and 
exploit them. These instances go to show that empathy is not the same as love. It 
"can be used in the service of either compassionate, inimical, or dispassionate-
neutral purposes" (HDAC: 175). 
Nevertheless, empathy is to some extent a precondition for personal and social 
compassion. Having had some vicarious experience of what others are going 
through puts one in a better position to serve them appropriately. This is the 
principle underlying various programmes of 'exposure' or 'immersion' into an 
alien, and usually deprived, social context. The point of such programmes is, not 
just learning about different social conditions, but gaining some resonar:tce with 
those who have to contend with those conditions regularly. Not surprisingly, 
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this can be threatening to the self, and so arouse all kinds of resistances and 
defenses. 
13.2.2 Empathy as a mode of understanding 
While Kohut continually reiterates the importance of empathy for psychoanaly-
sis, and indeed for normal human living, he warns against 
mythologizing empathy, this irreplaceable but by no means infallible depth-
psychological tool. Empathy is not God's gift bestowed only on an elect few. For the 
average individual, training and learning make the difference, rather than the fact of 
endowment. (HDAC: 83) 
Nevertheless, certain individuals may have a greater than average innate ability 
to learn to think and feel themselves into the inner lives of others. 
Empathy "can be employed either rapidly and outside awareness" as is often the 
case in everyday life; for instance, when one responds appropriately to another's 
feelings or state of mind without stopping to think about it. Or it may be 
employed "slowly and deliberately, with focused conscious attention." Through 
such "vicarious inspection" the psychoanalyst (also the isangoma, counsellor 
and confessor) attempts to "experience the inner life of another while simulta-
neously retaining the stance of an objective ob$erver" (HDAC: 175). Only by 
keeping her or his distance and not being overwhelmed by the other's inner 
experience can the analyst grasp what the other is going through, even though it 
is not open to direct observation (55 IT: 451ff). 
Empathy operates only within a limited range; its use becomes less apt 
as the observed becomes more and more dissimilar to the observer. There is therefore 
a high degree of empathy when we observe people of our own culture, lesser 
empathy with people from a different background, still less with animals, hardly 
existing with plants, and nonexisting with inanimate objects. (55 III: 86) . 
394 
The fact that empathy is to some extent culture-bound makes it easy for misun-
derstandings, suspicions and antagonisms to arise between diverse groups. Not 
knowing a people's cultural background makes it difficult to interpret the 
psychological import and intent of their words and actions. 
This problem is accentuated when empathy is employed beyond the face to face 
experience of individuals and small groups. The "use of empathy in the observa-
tion of the non psychological field leads to a faulty, prerational, animistic 
perception of reality and is, in general, the manifestation of a perceptual and 
cognitive infantilism" (ANSE: 300). It is easy enough to recognize the misappre-
hension that goes into conceiving every physical object, ranging from rocks to 
thunderstorms, as having a spirit of its own akin to one's own self. 
Sometimes a similar mistake is made in thinking of societies, particularly 
national groups or states, as having an enduring spirit of their own. Romantic 
idealism from Herder to Hegel conceived of each society having its own peculiar 
Geist, which is embodied in its own distinctive culture, traditions and institu-
tions. If no more is being claimed than that the culture, traditions and institu-
tions of a society all tend to hold together, no problem arises. But, if it is claimed 
that a nation or its Volksgeist has a life and destiny of it own, then that can lead 
to suppression of its own members and conflict with other peoples and nations. 
A fine line has to be drawn between acquiring an empathic understanding of 
people as they continually constitute and reconstitute social groups, and project-
ing an animistic perception on to a social group or culture. 
13.2.3 The Genesis of Empathy 
In Kohut's view of the self, empathy and narcissism have the same origins. Both 
derive from the same proto-experience. 
The groundwork for our ability to obtain access to another person's mind is laid by 
the fact that in our earliest mental organization the feelings, actions, and behavior of 
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the mother had been included in the self. This primary empathy with the mother 
prepares us for the recognition that to a large extent the basic inner experiences of 
other people remain similar to our own. (55 I: 451) 
Caution, however, is demanded in understanding the connection between 
empathy and narcissism, because the latter especially is such a slippery notion. It 
has been conceived and evaluated differently by various writers from Ovid 
onwards. In many instances, they appear to be exact opposites; narcissism closes 
oneself off from the other, while empathy opens one to the other. But if narciss-
ism is viewed in a more positive and dynamic fashion, then not all narcissism is 
pathological per se, but its defects are due to its thwarted or defective develop-
ment. These are brought about by failures in empathy. 
13.2.4 The Development of Empathy 
The developmental line from primary narcissism to mature empathy begins 
with its expression and evocation in a body-close form, in holding and touching 
and smelling. Next empathy is expressed in facial expressions and later in words. 
Later still empathy is more subtle and complex; it involves words and silence, 
memories and expectations; it encompasses shared feelings and understandings, 
and the sense of a common culture (see 55 IV: 533f). Kohut once summed up 
most of what he understood by 'empathy' in three propositions: 
(1) Empathy, the recognition of the self in the other, is an indispensable tool of 
observation, without which vast areas of human life, including man's behavior in the 
social field, remain unintelligible. (2) Empathy, the expansion of the self to include 
the other, constitutes a powerful psychological bond between individuals which -
more perhaps even than love, the expression and sublimation of the sexual drive-
counteracts man's destructiveness against his fellows. And (3), empathy, the 
accepting, confirming, and understanding human echo evoked by the self, is a 
psychological nutriment without which human life as we know and cherish it could 
not be sustained. (55 II: 705) 
He has been criticized (Gay 1988: 766) for giving such an all encompassing 
meaning to one word; the result is that I empathy' comes to mean almost 
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anything. This criticism is in part justified, but what Kohut has put his finger on 
is the realization that human life is not simply made up of a number of compo-
nents, however excellent they may be. Nor is empathy just another component; 
it is the field within which particular components become humanly effective. 
No governmental system of regulations, no social apparatus providing for reasonable 
economic equality, no international unions of nations maintaining world peace, 
however noble their aims and however efficient their technology can, on the basis of 
their technological perfection alone, give the fundamental emotional sustenance to 
man that he needs for his psychological survival .... Institutions alone [however well 
designed] carmot sustain man any better than sufficient calories, optimal tempera-
ture, and bacteria-free cleanliness can sustain the psychological and biological 
survival of our babies. (55 II: 715) 
All these components are necessary for human life in society, but unless they are 
provided within a matrix or atmosphere of empathic human responsiveness, no 
one will flourish. 
13.3 The Other as Oneself 
When Kohut's account of empathy is compared with Thomas' treatment of love, 
several similarities and differences occur. The latter holds that in order that an 
entity really exist, and not merely be an adjunct of something more real, it needs 
in itself to be a unity (see 13.1 above). When this principle is allied to a society, 
we may ask: from where does its unity derive? What makes many different 
people into members of a single society? Thomas' answer is twofold: good 
government and sociability. 
The most important task of government, which he sees as best exercised by one 
ruler, is to direct the affairs of all the governed so as to bring about a peaceful 
unity (ut pacis unitatem procuret, RP II). The good of society towards which 
everyone is inclined cannot be attained without their seeking unity among 
themselves (sicut omnia desiderant bonum ita desiderant unitatem sine qua esse 
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non possunt, Ia 103, 3). This, however, is not to be equated with unanimity, as 
fellow citizens may hold variant opinions about what best serves the common 
good (ITaIIae 37, 1). 
Sociability (amicitia), however, must underlie their differences of opinion, in 
that each wills the good of the other. The root of sociability is found in the power 
of love to draw people together (amor est vis unitiva et concretiva). If genuine, 
love always seeks someone's good to someone. So when one loves oneself, then 
one strives to be united as far as possible with the good one seeks. But when one 
loves another, then one seeks his good, wanting him to be united with his good 
as one would with one's own good (referens bonum ad illum sicut ad seipsum). 
Love thus draws the other to oneself, for one relates to or treats him as one does 
oneself (amor ... quia alium aggregat sibi, habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum,Ia 
20,1 ad 3). 
Thomas also points out when discussing love or affection as a passion that it not 
only culminates in unity when one attains what one desires, but that prior to any 
movement of desire we already participate in an affective unity (unio affectiva) 
that is found in our having an affinity for and being inclined towards the other 
(habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, Iallae 25, 2 ad 2). His thought 
here parallels Kohut's views on empathy. Thomas would agree that empathy, as 
an affinity for and inclination towards others, makes social bonds possible, but 
that possibility still has to be actualized by going beyond oneself to others. 
Without a movement of love, where members are in some manner united in 
seeking good for each other, no society would gel as an existent unity. The phrase 
"in some manner" is used, not because everyone has to be explicitly loving and 
even off-puttingly kind, but that their interactions evidence a concern for one 
another and not merely gaining their own ends. 
Thomas does not give an answer to the modern question of whether narcissism 
should develop into object love, as Freud held, or they both have their own 
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development lines, as Kohut contends. But Thomas' positive view of self-love 
(see 7.9 above), unlike Augustine's, does back Kohut's insistence on the import-
ance of narcissism, suitably matured, throughout life. 
Kohut is, however, criticized for concentrating such attention on narcissism, 
almost to the exclusion of object love. It is not that love for others, going beyond 
oneself or self-giving, is excluded, but that it is simply presumed. Without 
others' love and care for me, I could not experience their affirmative mirroring 
or uplifting support and so never draw on such selfobjects at various stages later 
in life. Kohut focuses on the abiding effect of love rather than its initial express-
ion in an action. He also seems to presume that a firm and cohesive self struc-
ture will offer sufficient self-esteem for a person then to relate meaningfully and 
generously to others. His concern is with building up this capability in general, 
not with directing its exercise in particular. As long as this is understood, Kohut's 
attention to narcissism and its flowering in empathy and creativity presents no 
problem. It would become problematic, however, if his restricted aims as a 
psychanalyst were taken as a whole programme for life. 
13.4 Self Flourishing 
Kohut gives some idea of what he considers a full human life should include, 
when he speaks of the wholesome transformations of narcissism as empathy, 
creativity, humour and wisdom (see 9.3 above). These are signs of maturity in 
the self and among the basic requirements for maintaining the health of society. 
13.4.1 Creativity 
A society whose members are without creativity - artistically, musically, in 
dance, drama and cuisine, or scientifically - lacks after a while a basis for going 
forward. At one end of the scale, there would be no great artists to interpret and 
display the newly emerging psychological or social issues people have to face (see 
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7.3.1 above). 
What moves society toward health is that of creative individuals in religion, 
philosophy, art, and in the sciences concerned with man (sociology, political science, 
history, psychology). These "leaders" are in empathic contact with the illness of the 
group self and, through their work and thought, mobilize the unfulfilled narcissistic 
needs and point the way toward vital internal change. It follows that during crisis 
and periods of regressive identification of the group self with pathological leaders 
there is an absence of creativity ... There is no one in empathic touch with the 
diseased group self. (SPHU: 83f) 
So, although great art can prepare the way for regeneration and healing in 
society, it must not be so esoteric that it cannot be diffused to the population at 
large (5PHU: 239, 241, 246). 
At the other of the scale, one finds that in slum conditions the lack of any kind of 
art - of whatever taste - brings about "a world of cultural emptiness." People's 
diet may have sllfficient calories. "But the food was dreary, and that was the 
important thing. Everything was dreary. There was no artistry in the apartments 
in which they grew up" (5PHU: 225). This leaves a void, an absence of cultural 
selfobjects, so the self is undernourished and fragmented. 
The absence of all that supportive framework of language, art, music and tradition 
of all kinds leads to those disintegration problems that Freud considered the essence 
of man. Then the animal must be domesticated. In that conceptual framework 
civilization becomes something conceptualized as discontentful. Man wants to kill, 
man wants to fuck, man wants to eat ravenously. (SPHU: 254f) 
There are no creative tasks that can attract their attention or absorb their narciss-
istic energies. Yet if young people especially coming from deprived backgrounds 
can be drawn into art, music, dance or drama workshops, they many then begin 
to discover 'soul' not only in their performance but above all in themselves. 
What creative art provides is a sense of continuity and inner cohesiveness. 
Using the example of Tiffany, Kohut explains: 
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It expresses a unity that comes from the human mind in a form that hangs together . 
... [Each art form] has its own meaningful design and approach to the world. ' ... [It] 
tells you something about a whole time that was an expression of how people felt 
about themselves. And as such it is genuine. (5PHU: 243). 
But Kohut finds in his patients, in the works of many contemporary artists, and 
in modern society, no sense of continuity. In each instance, things do not hang 
together the way they would in the course of a meaningful life. 
In mass culture I find the same discontinuity expressed in the frantic need to live 
only for the moment. There is a deadness in the self. It must be stimulated, enlivened, 
even if it means going to war. Now nothing in such self-destructive behavior suggests 
internalized guilt. It is just to feel alive, even if only at the single moment of declaring 
war. That moment wipes out all fragmentation, the absent past and meaningless 
future. (5PHU: 220) 
We may regard society itself as a creative venture involving million$. So if the 
sources of its creativity are stifled, then in one way or another destruction 
ensues. 
To prevent creativity being stifled, as well as to bring forth the greatest human 
achievements in art, science and political action, calls for courage (55 IV: 573). 
This, Kohut defines, as "the ability to face death and to tolerate destruction rather 
than betray the nucleus of one's psychological being, that is, one's ideals" (55 TIl: 
130). At critical moments various heroic persons drew upon image of an all-
powerful figure for support (see also 14.8 below). Similarly, great artists and 
thinkers at the verge of a new breakthrough have drawn support from an alter-
ego figure. Speaking of Pablo Picasso and his relationship to Georges Braque, 
Kohut says: 
The presence of an ,alter ego and the narcissistic relationship to it, one might 
speculate, protected the self of the artist from the danger of irreversible fragmenta-
tion to which it felt exposed while it was drained of narcissistic energies during 
periods when the genius-artist allowed the visual universe to break into meaningless 
pieces before he reassembled them and, in so doing, gave Western m~n a new 
perception of the visible world. (55 II: 820) 
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The same holds for courageous social and political action; important figures in 
their lives as well as drawing on their own narcissistic constellation can give 
them the courage to carry through in the face of opposition and danger those 
actions required for safeguarding society and civilization (see 13.6.6 and 17.6 
below). Evil often takes hold in society, because people lack the courage to admit 
it, face up to it and counter it effectively. 
13.4.2 Humour 
Humour shows the relativity of human achievements; people and societies may 
have great values and have accomplished much, but they still have their 
inherent limitations. Humour recognizes these, and prevents people from 
taking themselves too seriously. "One needs a twinkle of humour as a protection 
against craziness. Neither the people who followed Rev. Jones into death nor 
Jones himself had a twinkle in their eye" (5PHU: 249). 
Genuine humour is neither self-belittling nor sarcastic towards others, whereas 
excessive jocularity and sarcasm, especially where jokes are continually made at 
others' expense, can have a sadistic streak (AN5E: 324). Disillusionment and 
sarcasm are prevalent in a society that lacks the goals and values that would 
make people strong. There is an absence of idealized values in the self (55 I: 459), 
and a lack of acceptance of "the realistic limitations of oneself and of those one 
admires" (55 III: 142f). Narcissistic rage may be expressed through sarcasm or 
belittling remarks, in which one attempts to minimize the emotional import of 
one's own limitations (ANSE: 263). "Hitler could be very sarcastic and make 
people laugh about his enemies ... He had that kind of humour. But not the true 
humour of wisdom that knows the limits of the self. He couldn't laugh about his 
own strut" (SPHU: 249). The lack of humour in a society thus betrays the absence 
of both ideals and acceptance of its inherent limitations; this will lead to its 
"extinction, whether the end comes dramatically or via a process of silent 
diffusion" (55 I: 389). 
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13.4.3 Wisdom 
The final transformation of narcissism is found in wisdom. This "is the victori~ 
ous outcome of the lifework of the total personality in acquiring broadly based 
knowledge and in transforming archaic modes of narcissism into ideals, 
humour, and a sense of supraindividual participation in the world" (55 I: 459). 
On the one hand wisdom "includes the emotional acceptance of the transience of 
individual existence" (AN5E: 327), but on the other unfolds in "a cosmic 
narcissism which has transcended the bounds of the individual" (55 I: 455). Not 
only does wisdom enable the individual "to contemplate his own end philo-
sophically" (55 I: 457), but it enables him or her to take a wider historical view of 
social events than a preoccupation with the immediate problems of their own 
time would allow. The wise person exhibits a more truly disinterested (not 
uninterested) concern with society. Without in any way denying death or 
disregarding danger, as those in "an upsurge of extreme, personified patriotic 
fervor" (55 I: 457) might, he or she faces events with quiet assurance and perhaps 
sadness, but without anxiety or frenzied excitement. Their overriding concern 
has been "transferred from the cherished self to the supraindividual ideals and 
to the world with which one identifies" (55 I: 458). 
To draw the perspectives of Giddens and Kohut together: in these 'wholesome 
transformations' of narcissism - creativity, humour, courage, empathy and 
wisdom - we can recognize, but this time from the side of the self, some of the 
'rules and resources' required for the production and reproduction of society. The 
resulting quality of society thus depends considerably upon the presence or 
absence of these 'wholesome transformations' in the self. However, before 
exploring this linkage between self and social structure, it is necessary to outline 
Kohut's own thoughts on social cohesion and health. 
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13.5 Facing the Horrors of Social Breakdown 
In having to face the reality of his own Austrian background, Kohut had to deal 
with the question of why Nazism had arisen and become such a destructive 
force. In a letter written in 1978 he mentions that 
my own encounter at that time [the early 1930s] with the gruesome consequences of 
man's irrationality were a strong determinant in my choice of profession and, 
especially, in the choice of my subsequent search to understand man's proneness to 
fall victim to cruel, unforgiving rage. (55 IV: 612) 
In particular, what light can psychoanalysis throw on the monstrous historical 
phenomenon of Nazism? Why did so few people have a sufficiently strong sense 
of self to resist it? Was there something deep in their nuclear selves that enabled 
the martyr-heroes to stand firm against Nazi propaganda and threats? Kohut 
returns in various ways to these issues many times, It is mainly against this 
problematic background that he provides a number of hints for grasping the 
relation between self and society. In particular, he gives some suggestions on 
how the strengths and weakness found either in the self or in society are 
reflected in each other, The words 'hints' and 'suggestions' are used here as 
Kohut admits that his self psychology does not provide a full explanation of the 
interaction between self and society (see SS II: 532££), 
Kohut cautions against looking upon "unconscious psychic factors [with their 
enormous power] as the decisive, essential, and only valid forces in the life of 
individuals and of groups" (SPHU: 62). This is a temptation the depth psychol-
ogist must above all resist. Hence he is very wary of Freud's identifying certain 
psychobiological forces in the study of the individual and then applying them to 
humanity as a whole. Likewise, he mentions, but does not espouse Eissler's view 
that groups can be studied as though they had a psychohistory like individuals; 
as though nations could suffer traumata in their early history, which led to 
repression, and then a bursting forth of pent up aggression (see SPHU: 60-63). 
Human society is not simply an individual writ large. 
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13.6 Kohut's Postulate of a 'Group Self 
To overcome these problems Kohut postulates the idea of a 'group self.' Admit-
tedly, the status of this postulate is never properly clarified. To begin with, Kohut 
speaks of it in terms analogous to that of the nuclear self in the individual. 
... the group self - the sum total of those clusters of interconnected experiences of 
each individual that prevail in consequence of his temporary or continuous submer-
sion into the group - can be conceived of, like the self of the individual, as being 
laid down and formed in the energic arc between mirrored selfobject greatness 
(ambitions) and admired selfobject perfection (ideals). (SPHU: 82) 
Such an idea corresponds with everyday speaking about teams having energy, 
organizations living up to their ideals, firms having ambitions and goals, and 
individuals taking on the ethos - the values and aims - of groups they join. If 
there were no common bond of experience among its members, no group would 
exist. 
At one point Kohut had hoped that the concept of a 'group self' would explain 
how groups formed and were held together, sometimes oscillating between 
fragmentation and reintegration, and why they showed regressive behaviour as 
they moved towards fragmentation. In his own words: 
I am now suggesting that these considerations concerning the influence of the basic 
unconscious narcissistic configurations in individual existence are valid also with 
regard to the life of the group, i.e., that the basic patterns of a nuclear group-self (the 
group's central ambitions and ideals) not only account for the continuity and 
cohesion of the group, but also determine its most important actions. (SPHU: 
206n21) 
By the time of his interviews with Strozier, five years later, Kohut's ideas about 
the group self appear much more tentative. Asked then whether one should 
think of the group self existing for decades or centuries, Kohut explains that 
although its beginning cannot be exactly pinned down, it must at some or other 
time gel. Once, such a group as a nation, has gelled, "it then points into the 
future and has its own unrolling destiny" (SPHU: 218). The moment when a 
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group gels is, I take it, when the members become aware of themselves as a 
group which they wish to sustain. It is not that the members by a deliberate act, 
such as negotiating a social contract, prior to their being a group, actually create 
their group; rather they accept they have come to be a group and so go on to 
formalize and strengthen it (see SPHU: 238). 
Light from a different angle is shed on Kohut's understanding of the group self 
when he explains: 
When we talk about the group self, what we mean is a number of individuals who 
~r~ not n~~~ss~rily th~ m~jorHy PMt who q~t~rmjn~ hlstorj~~l ~~tion, Th~t strjk~s MS 
then as the group. It may be only 30 percent or even only 20 percent of the whole 
population. But they are the verbal ones; they initiate action and the other follow 
sujt, (SPHU; 227) 
In answer to Strozier's question: "Are those 'spokesmen' representative or do 
they determine the actions of the group?" Kohut hazards a guess that they are 
representative, in that to some extent they meet all members' varied expecta-
tions. 
In the final analysis, Kohut rather admits that the idea of a group self is a 
heuristic concept; it "is no more than a vantage point from which to examine 
historical phenomena." (SPHU: 219) He is trying to provide "a framework for 
research, rather than answers to particular research problems" (SPHU: 218). For 
the moment, however, we will stay close to Kohut's own formulations in our 
inquiry into how social groups act and maintain themselves. 
13.6.1 Social Cohesion on the Basis of Shared Ideals . , 
Ambitions, Skills and Talents 
Freud held that group cohesion was maintained by its members holding an ego 
ideal in common; a group could continue in existence because its members 
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shared a similar set of values and ideals. 2o Thanks to his bi-polar conception of 
the self, Kohut is able to add that 
group cohesion is brought about and maintained ... also by their [its members'] 
subject-bound grandiosity, i.e., by a shared grandiose self. Indeed, there are groups 
that are characterized by the fact that they are held together by this latter bond -
crudely stated by their ambitions rather than their shared ideals. (SPHU: 159f) 
Not taking a pejorative view of ambitions because of their narcissistic origins, 
Kohut - writing in 1972 - emphasized the importance of a shared grandiosity 
for group cohesion. Four years later, however, he puts more emphasis on shared 
ideals as a safeguard against envy, jealousy and rage being felt or breaking out 
against other members of one's group, in this case the psychoanalytic profession 
(SPHU: 178). But by 1977 Kohut had come to see "the relationship between the 
group self shared idealized imago and its grandiose self not as an either / or choice 
but in terms of the 'tension gradient' between the various constituents of the 
group self" (Strozier in Goldberg, ed 1980: 404). 
A group or society whose cohesion derives from common ambitions is not 
necessarily worse than one based on shared ideals and values. Kohut disputes 
the idea that groups which "have coalesced by dint of the magnetism of a shared 
grandiose self" are always destructive. He adds 
Constructive groups may well hold certain ambitions in common and the heightened 
self-esteem which the individual derives from feeling himself at one with a group 
with whose sense of power and pleasurable display of self-confidence he identifies 
is by no means incompatible with self control, civilized behavior, and creative 
purpose. (SPHU: 55) 
In each case the content of the group's ideals and ambitions would need to be 
examined. In any case a well functioning group is likely both to be drawn 
20 This view was taken over by Talcott Parsons and made a central tenet of his structural-functionalist 
approach to socio!o~y. F.rom there Berg~r a~d Luckmann adopted it; their phenomenological approach explained 
how t~rough ~oclafi.zahon the prevailtng Ideals and values were internalized, and then later externafized in 
SOCIal Inter~chon. GIddens sho~s the i~a~equacy of this approach from a sociological point of view; after all 
many socletJe.s have members wIth .confhcting se.ts of values.-reople do not always agree with the disvalues of the 
structur~l eVIl, they are reprodUCIng. as a~ UnIntended, and often unforeseen, consequence of their actions. 
Meanwhile Kohut has shown the defiCIency In Freud's vIew from a psychological standpoint. 
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towards its common ideals and pushed by its shared goals. Mediating on a 
tension gradient between the two poles lies the intermediate area of talents and 
skills. Here again members of society, or a group within it, recognize their 
likeness to each other in carrying out similar and complementary tasks. 
These processes that bring about group cohesion operate largely on a 
preconscious level. They are somewhat akin to the mirror, idealizing and alter 
ego transferences that can be identified in the clinical situation. In each case, 
there is "the amalgamation of currently present remnants of the past with 
currently active experience" (55 IV: 593). For instance, at the pole of ideals, 
people find a certain pride in their group or society by upholding its historically 
given values and standards as their own and vice versa (idealizing transference). 
They uphold the group and it upholds them. At the pole of ambitions, their 
mature grandiosity receives approval and support from the group whose goals 
they echo and seek to realize (mirror transference). Members thus find their own 
personal goals reflected in and confirmed by their society. Moreover, in the 
tension arc between these poles lies the area of skills and talents; so in perform-
ing similar tasks, members are reassured of their essential alikeness (twinship or 
alter-ego transference).21 
13.6.2 The Mediation of Cultural Selfobjects in Society 
It should not be thought that these transferences take place between the individ-
ual and society as a whole; they are mediated by cultural selfobjects. These may be 
persons, familiar places or objects, works of art, emblems, activities or events, 
which symbolize a particular group or society. For instance, our affinity is not 
with Pietermaritzburg en masse, but grows upon us through acquaintance with 
some of its inhabitants and personalities, its one way streets and city hall, the 
historical associations of its elephant emblem, its mix of activities ranging from 
21 In regenerating Christian life, community a.nd service, great emphasis is placed on instilling Christian 
:-rall:'es, or the yalu.es of th~ Gospel. Nolan (1982), f~r.mstanc~, stresses the Importance of sharing, human dignity, 
JustICe and sohdarlty. But In view of goals and ambItions, skIlls and talents, bemg as psychologically important as 
values, one must aSK whether they are given due place in preaching, counselling and pastoral practice. 
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supreme court appeals to the Comrades marathon. From a sociological point of 
view, these are social symbols that express and help make that rather intangible 
entity 'Pietermaritzburg' present in its particularity. From the point of view of 
self psychology, these are cultural selfobjects that provide a supportive frame-
work for the growth and maintenance of the self. 
You hear the familiar sounds of one's language. You hear the familiar sounds of 
national music. You hear the voices of those you know. You recognize the habits of 
those you see. You are nourished by the art, the philosophy, by the political 
leadership of those you idealize. (SPHU: 254) 
Without that supportive framework of language, art, music and traditions of all 
kinds, people tend to disintegrate; then civilization is reduced to being a curb on 
their drives for food, sex, aggression and oblivion (see 14.7 below). 
13.6.3 Archaic and Mature Transferences 
The group self may be built upon in two main ways depending upon the kind of 
transferences members make. Basically, people either identify with their group 
or society in an archaic (infantile) or in mature fashion. Attempting to merge 
psychologically or lose the self in the group characterizes the former, while the 
latter is evident in empathic resonance. In any given group there will be a 
mixture, so which predominates is crucial for the quality of the group self. 
The processes that create and sustain the group may be of two types: on the one 
hand, sudden gross, archaic, essentially unstable identifications that, for example, 
require the presence of the leader in order to be maintained and disappear in toto 
when he disappears (or becomes unidealizable via a failure); and, on the other hand, 
slowly acquired, increasingly mature internal changes ... that will ultimately remain, 
even when the leader disappears, physically or psychologically. (SPHU: 82f) 
In the first case, people may look to a leader, especially one promising 'total 
liberation,' or another selfobject such as an ideology, economic plan, the attain-
ment of independence, or other (national) symbol, as the solution to all their 
problems. They quickly turn to a group selfobject as though it would immediate-
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ly satisfy all their needs and aspirations. That kind of group identification is 
archaic, akin to that of an infant expecting total reassurance from a parent 
selfobject. 
In the second case, people basically accept that no quick or easy solutions to their 
problems are forthcoming. Instead, group cohesion is gradually built up through 
a saga of continuing dedication, disappointment and rededication. At some 
moments people experience "self-strength through empathic merger" with the 
group. Then various let-downs and disappointments, break the empathic bonds 
of the group and its members are liable to experience self-weakness. Yet at these 
times by reviewing their actions and renewing their dedication, members work 
through the group's problems, which they accept as their problems. By feeling 
the issues that confront others, and tackling them realistically structure is built 
up in both the group self and the nuclear self of members. This process is akin to 
the transmuting internalization effected in psychoanalys.is. 
But unlike in psychoanalysis, building a cohesive group self depends not on one 
person, but upon many people with a variety of selfobjects. Whereas 
archaic and unstable gross identifications in the historical field take place in relation 
to a single dominant figure who by his presence is able to give instant relief to the 
diseased group self, while the slow process of working-through that leads to a stable 
firming of a diseased group self requires the interpretative presence of many active 
and influential minds. (SPHU: 83) 
In the latter situation, the leader will draw out others who can contribute to 
firming the group self. Kohut thus makes it clear that there are no short cuts in 
structuring a healthy group self. 
13.6.4 Types of Group Self 
By taking Kohut's thought a step further than he did himself, four types of group 
self can be delineated (see next page). Any group whose cohesion depends upon 
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archaic identification with a set of ideals (type 1) is not likely to last for long. The 
ideals may be fine, but totally utopian, and disappointments are liable to occur. 
How are these narcissistic blows to be dealt with? Either people may turn to a 
driving leader or party, who still promises them the fulfilment of their ideals but 
Transferences 
Identifications Idealizing Mirror 
1. Unrealistic 2. Pretentious 
Archaic Utopian cover for 
Dreams A deficiencies 
BI 
3. Corporate 4. Mobilized 
Mature realization around 
of values common goals 
Fig 13 Types of Group Self 
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is forced to adopt more and more extreme measures in dealing with the intrac-
table realities of society. In other words, they tend to move from type 1 to type 2 
(line A); examples may be found in social movements that attract adherents by 
their apparently youthful high ideals and yet end up completely intolerant or 
even totalitarian. For instance 
Hitler's programs, though clearly promising the fulfilment of the crudest narcissistic 
aims of power and domination, were yet disguised, however thinly, as a system of 
ideals .... Nazi propagandists ... claimed they were motivated by the highest ideals. 
The very frenzy, however, with which the leader was extolled, the emphasis on his 
absolute power and his omniscience, betrayed that he was not a symbol for values 
but that he represented a concretization of the grandiose self of the masses. (SPHU: 
67) 
Nazi Germany thus became a prime example of a society with a type 2 group self. 
There as values declined, people regressed. 
The traumatically rapid devaluation of both Christian and traditional tribal values 
(as embodied in and held by the aristocratic officer caste) contributed strongly to the 
narcissistic regressions, in particular toward archaic forms of the grandiose self and 
toward archaic forms of rage. (SPHU: 64) 
The alternative is that people may keep their ideals intact while acquiring more 
realistic expectations of their implementation (line B). This leads towards a type 3 
group self. Instead of one leader promising everything, many active and influen-
tial minds ranging from artists to statesmen, from community workers to those 
framing constitutions, are required. Disappointments and disagreements have to 
be worked through constructively, always keeping in mind the common ideals 
to which the group is committed. At t.rese times, leaders of all kinds need to be 
"in empathic contact with the illness of the group self and, through their work 
and thought, mobilize the unfulfilled narcissistic needs and point the way 
forward toward vital internal change" (SPHU: 83). 
At certain historical junctures, it is crucial that a society takes on a type 4 group 
self. To meet some threat or deal with a disaster, society must not dither and 
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hesitate. Its energies must not be spent on internal squabbles, but channelled so 
they become an effective counter to the threat it faces. "In a moment of crisis and 
profound anxiety, the nation will tum to ... [a leader who] will satisfy its need to 
identify with his unquestioned rightness or with his firmness and security" 
(SPHU: 198). Needless to say, the requisite leader will neither flee from tough 
realities himself nor hide them from society. With a type 4 group self, social 
cohesion will be build upon common agreement about accomplishing one 
central objective and all other considerations are subordinated to that. 
13.6.5 The Importance of Alterego Transferences (Detrick) 
Instead of seeing the group self as analogous with the individual nuclear self, 
Douglas Detrick suggests the relation is one of reciprocity. In keeping with this, 
Detrick claims more attention should be paid to the alterego transferences that 
take place in the intermediate area of skills and talents. 
Whereas the individual nuclear self is bipolar and is constructed of the ambitions at 
one pole and the ideals as the other pole with the skills and talents mediating 
between these two, producing the nuclear program, the group nuclear self is unipolar 
with the alterego dimension of experience central and essential to group cohesiveness 
and the group boundary. The motivational core of the group is the experience of 
sameness as a function of the group process as it realizes (is directed by) the 
ambitions or ideals of the leader. (Detrick in Goldberg, 1985: 254) 
This insight might account for the social cohesion or solidarity that is generated 
by people working together, using their skills and talents in a common project 
(see HDAC: 203). Those engaged in a different or strange set of tasks are beyond 
the group "boundary" (Detrick in Goldberg, 1985: 255). Unfortunately, Detrick's 
article does not elaborate further, so it is unclear whether he is talking about 
reciprocity between the individual nuclear self and the group self, or between 
various meinbers of the group. 
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13.6.6 The Continual Task of Sustaining a Healthy Group Self 
While a healthy group self may, as it were, gel at some point, it cannot then 
simply be preserved from then on. 
A healthy group self ... is continuously sustained in its course throughout time ... by 
ongoing psychological work that provides the cohesion and vigor of its changing yet 
continuous structure with a matrix of selfobjects who are in empathic contact with 
its changing needs. (SPHU: 88) 
Such ongoing work is undertaken by all those who form and develop the group's 
culture; that may range from generating an accommodating political climate 
through dramatic and musical performances to the production of fine art works. 
But artists and other creative leaders can only sustain society so long as they can 
through empathy discern what is taking place within its members (see 1.5 above, 
and 14.7££ below). An idea of how a strong cohesive group comes across is given 
by Kohut when he says: 
... from the realm of group psychology, sabre-rattling pronouncements of strength, 
loud protestations of how strong we are and how different we are, more often betray 
insecurity than strength. The groups that feel most secure don't need so much overt 
talking about it. They just are. (SPHU: 238) 
In the next chapter attention will be given to the factors that weaken healthy 
group cohesion and lead to cruel, unforgiving rage. The remainder of this one 
will try to move beyond Kohut's formulation of a 'group self,' so as to bring out 
how self and society are interrelating. 
13.7 Society becomes a Selfobject 
Mention has already been made (see 7.3.1 above) of the importance of selfobjects 
for developing and maintaining a firm, cohesive self-structure. These are not 
strictly speaking other persons, but the effect or imago left by another person in 
someone's experience. In a person's early years selfobject experiences are brought 
about by other persons, usually a child's parents and other caregivers. Through 
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the particular combination of transferences that the growing child receives it 
comes to acquire its own unique self-structure. The emerging self imparts a sense 
of self-worth to the growing child. If, on the contrary, parents and caregivers do 
not provide a sufficiently responsive and welcoming environment, the self will 
be marked by a sense of emptiness. All in all, a nuclear self is formed early on in 
life from their transferences. It gives each person a basic orientation for life, but 
one that will always require sustenance from suitable selfobjects. 
Initially that sustenance is provided through the experience of other persons as 
they respond, care for and train the growing infant. As life unfolds, a healthy self 
gains sustenance from other sources, and is not so directly dependent upon the 
continued presence and attention of others. A person learns to draw self susten-
ance from - what may broadly be termed - cultural sources, such as games, 
dancing, reading, enjoying art and music, outings, drama and celebrations. Later 
in life these may widen out to society as a whole and include scientific 
endeavours, philosophical insights, economic interests and political ideals. 
Nevertheless, their connection with the nuclear self still remains. 
When the adult experiences the self-sustaining effects of a maturely chosen 
selfobject, the selfobject experiences of all the preceding stages of his life reverberate 
unconsciously. When we feel uplifted by our admiration for a great cultural ideal, 
for example, the old uplifting experience of being picked up by our strong and 
admired mother and having been allowed to merge with her greatness, calmness, and 
security may be said to form the unconscious undertones of the joy we are experienc-
ing as adults. (HDAC: 49f) 
Exactly how this works out will vary from one person to another, depending in 
each instance upon the configuration of ambitions, ideals and skills in the 
nuclear self. In all this, not only are there variations from one individual to 
another, but also between cultures in the forms that creativity, ideals and 
expectations of similarity take. The preferred selfobjects of one culture or social 
stratum are not usually found sustaining by members of other cultures or strata; 
this factor is not always recognized when they come together. 
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Taking Kohut's line of thought a little further, we see a shift from personally 
significant people providing a selfobject experience to cultural activities and 
even to culture as a whole. This, however, does not mean that persons are 
forgotten or that culture only makes its appearance later. Right from the start 
those attending to an infant's needs are mediating their culture. As development 
occurs, culture moves from background to foreground. This shift is necessary, 
otherwise people would remain fixated on individuals and not develop a wider 
interest in life. Life becomes more than a matter of relating to those in one's 
immediate vicinity; culture brings new types of demands and opportunities. Its 
demands are not idiosyncratic, as might be those of a household, but have been 
sedimented and refined through tradition. Yet in measuring up to demands 
sanctioned by historical usage, new opportunities are opened up. Copying can 
lead on to improvisation and invention. In mastering an area of culture, albeit to 
a degree as not everyone will become a virtuoso, a person comes to master him-
or herself. In other words, only when culture becomes a selfobject does a person 
acquire a certain maturity and ability to make his or her own way in life. 
Even then it is not culture in the abstract, but culture as displayed by various 
performers, writers, artists and public figures that sustains people's cohesion and 
self-esteem. Although Kohut speaks of 'cultural selfobjects' and culture as a 
selfobject, this should not be understood in a too restrictive sense. Although 
'culture' and 'society' can be differentiated analytically, one cannot experience 
one without the other. He has in mind culture as it 'actually embodied in a 
particular society, displayed through its various artifacts, ceremonies, traditions, 
and projects. This wide sense of culture is evident, when Kohut observes how 
slum conditions leave their inhabitants empty and dreary. In these instances, 
although the emphasis varies, cultural and social deprivation amount to the 
same thing. Likewise, no special distinction should be made between 'cultural' 
and 'social' selfobjects; both mediate a sense of being part of an encompassing 
whole. 
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Overall, the manner in which culture or society comes to be experience~ as a 
selfobject will be as various as people are. This is especially true in the modern 
world, which offers so many forms of cultural expression and possibilities for 
engaging in society. No two individuals will appropriate their culture or relate to 
their society in exactly the same way. Different people's appropriations of it will 
share something in common, yet there will never be complete coincidence in 
their views, assessments and interpretations. Previous views will always be open 
to review, and past assessments to re-assessment. This does not mean that any 
interpretation goes, but none is final. 
Because society and culture is inherently ambiguous, being open to so many 
interpretations and emphases, having to relate to it puts one on the spot; as I 
determine what it means to me I am also determining myself in response to it. 
Even taking the stance of a detached observer is an existential response. How I 
portray and treat society - as a field of opportunities, a sick joke, a beautiful 
tapestry, a rip off, a vale of tears, a jumble of loose ends, or whatever - shapes 
my own self. Yet in each person's life making his or her appropriation of the 
milieu is a risky step indispensable to self-development. Each person through 
their various activities has over time to take their own stand vis-a.-vis society. 
Doing this involves drawing upon their selfobjects, selecting which experiences 
they will let shape their views and attitudes and direct their actions. It involves, 
Kohut suggests in his example of Tiffany (see 13.4.1 above), finding satisfactory 
images that enable one to bring one's own life and involvement with others 
together. 
At first sight there seems nothing remarkable about this, until it is grasped that 
relating to society and building self-structure are but two aspects of the same 
process. Each aspect in practice emerges in . its actual correlation to the other. 
What makes one group or nation (itself a unity of selves in society) different 
from others is that they carry out this correlation in their own unique ways; they 
have different images of themselves to live up to. If such particularities are left 
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aside, it is possible to theorize about an ideal society, a utopia, but then be ~able 
to find real selves capable of inhabiting it. Conversely, one may advocate a fully 
mature self devoid of all imbalances, repression and splitting, but still be unable 
to suggest first steps for improving life in present society. Kohut, however, bring 
us back to muddled reality. 
His notion of selfobjects brings out that just as self-structure is built up (or 
deteriorates) through experience of society (a self-selJobject relationship) so the 
capacity (or lack of it) to build and maintain society is found in its members' self-
structure (a selJ-selfobject relationship). While neither self nor society is devoid 
of defects, life still goes on. But what is vital is lithe quality of the self's relation-
ships, particularly whether its selfobject transferences are archaic or mature" 
(Alford, 1991: 176). The effects of archaic transferences and their link with 




liThe beast was once alive and is alive no longer, and is still to corne" (Rev 17:8). 
The two previous chapters dealt mainly with the normal workings of society. 
The first showed how social structures enable both the production of social 
interaction and the reproduction of social systems across time and space. The 
second examined the main qualities required in the self for sustaining a healthy 
society with which its members can identify. In this chapter attention will be 
given to how society can degenerate or even breakdown altogether. Even though 
total collapse is rare, a society may continue to function in such a way that the 
activities that sustain its existence also perpetuate conditions that weaken 
people's potential for relating to each other on a human basis or treating one 
another with justice. 
First, a brief description is given of the possibilities for disaster in modern society, 
and how these are manifested in people's lives. The remainder of the chapter 
examines in general terms how these possibilities may become enmeshed in the 
rules and resources that make up social structures. It looks in particular at the 
ways rules can be distorted and resources be skewed. When this begins to occur it 
is easy for psychological regression and social degeneration to reinfOJ;ce one 
another. This chapter only offers an overall explanation of how this might 
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happen; it looks in general terms at what might make for disaster. Subse9.uent 
chapters will be more specific, showing the various kinds of system degeneration 
and personal regression that may result. 
14.1 Possibilities of System Degeneration 
A continual thread running through Giddens' writings is the realization that 
system degeneration is possible. The high-consequence risks of modernity affect 
not only individuals, but could lead to breakdowns across the globe that affect 
millions of people. While there is the prospect of living harmoniously with the 
environment in a post-scarcity era, there is no guarantee that this will come 
about. Nor are there evolutionary forces that will automatically banish violence 
and vindicate human rights universally, yet these are objectives worth organiz-
ing around and struggling to attain. What Giddens' works show is that once "we 
accept in full the contingency of history, we have to accept the possibility that 
contradiction can underlie or stimulate retrograde movements of historical 
change" (epST: 143, author's italics). Both individuals and groups find them-
selves faced with "a dialectic of powerlessness and empowerment" (CMOD: 150). 
"Such a runaway world" or juggernaut is not the one anticipated by the 
Enlightenment thinkers; "the generalising of 'sweet reason' [has] not produced a 
world subject to our prediction and control" (CMOD: 151). Writing after the fall 
of the Soviet bloc, Giddens remarks: 
The world we live in today is not one subject to tight human mastery - the stuff of 
the ambitions of the left and, one could say, the nightmares of the right. Almost to 
the contrary, it is one of dislocation and uncertainty, a 'runaway world'. And, 
disturbingly, what was supposed to create greater and greater certainty - the 
advance of human knowledge and 'controlled intervention' into society and nature 
- is actually deeply involved in this unpredictability. (BLR: 3) 
Kohut too picks out some of the negative features of modern life. He speaks of 
"finding oneself in a predominantly nonhuman environment" (SPHU: 222). A 
leading feature of modern life is to be cut off from others and lacking support 
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from a matrix of caring selfobjects. If the availability of selfobjects is minimal, the 
effects of that will show before too long. 
The environment which used to be experienced [in the Victorian family] as threaten-
ingly close, is now experienced more and more as threateningly distant; where 
children were formerly overstimulated by the emotional (including the erotic) life of 
their parent, they are now often understimulated. (RE55: 271) 
Factors contributing to the emotional void that many children find themselves 
in are "industrialization, ... the increasing employment of women, ... or the 
father's employment away from home" (RESS: 270), as well as the absence now 
of servants in the more wealthy families (RESS: 276). All this brings about a 
dearth of adult selfobjects, particularly idealizable parents or parental figures, 
who could be a responsive target for the idealizing need of their children. The 
result is that: "Man of our time is the man of the precariously cohesive self, the 
man who craves the presence, the interest, the availability of the self-cohesion-
maintaining selfobject" (HDAC: 61). 
Modern society itself poses new threats and challenges for people to maintain 
their psychological health. Kohut points out that 
... in a world of stabilized populations, of increasing uniformity, of lessened space to 
roam in, of mass movements and efficient totalitarianism, the individual will be 
confronted by new problems of psychological survival. A shift from the joys of 
action to the enriching potentialities of the hmer life may well be one of his avenues 
of escape. (55 II: 681) 
Writing in 1977 with considerable prescience, Kohut admits that his reflections 
are confined to the more or less highly industrialized democracies of the 
Western world. But he adds his impression that the psychological problems of 
the West will soon "be felt by populations under totalitarian regimes and in 
undeveloped areas whose social organizations differ from ours" (RESS: 271n1). 
It should, however, be added that sectors of industrialized society have also come 
to experience similar problems to those of undeveloped areas. 
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The last few decades have shown how intractable are many of the pro~lems. 
Development decades begun with high hopes have failed; the gap between rich 
and poor has increased; family breakdown, neglect and abuse of children have 
spread; genocide has not been banished; political leaders find themselves either 
without solutions or power to implement them. Even though in a few areas 
positive developments are evident, the list could be continued. Although blame 
for these social ills and breakdowns may in some instances be laid directly at the 
feet of particular individuals, in most cases the fault lies in the whole structuring 
of world society. Even when corrupt or incompetent individuals can be ident-
ified, one still has to ask about the system which gave them so much unchecked 
power and influence. 
14.2 Distorted Rules and Deficient Resources 
An explanation of how various widespread evils become enmeshed in social 
systems lies in combining Thomas Aquinas' view of evil as a privation (see 
11.4.2) with Giddens' view of social structures as composed of generative rules 
and resources (see 12.5). Social evils become embedded in systems ~ whether 
local, national or global - through human agents drawing upon rules that are 
distorted and making use of resources that are ' either inherently deficient or 
unjustly distributed. When people's actions are guided by distorted rules and 
constrained by deficiencies in the resources they can call upon, then not only are 
their actions likely to bring harm to themselves and others, but they will also 
reproduce the same defective social systems. 
Knowing a generative rule does not necessarily mean that one can formulate it, 
but that one knows what to do at each juncture or 'how to go on'; one's behav-
iour is consistent and socially appropriate. When, however, rules are distorted, 
people are misguided in their thinking and/ or their ability to distinguish good 
from evil is blurred; lacking in their grasp of reality, inevitably they are misled in 
their actions. People may quite sensibly follow the accepted conventions of their 
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society or group without being fully aware of the rules they actually are follow-
ing, or that these rules are in some way distorted. Their actions will inevitably 
result in various consequences that they could neither foresee nor intend. 
Resources may be deficient either because they have not been built up sufficient-
ly or their unequal distribution results in people being unable to develop their 
lives and relations as full human beings. The lack of resources, whether 
material, economic, educational or socio-political, curtails people's life chances 
and can provoke every kind of animosity in its train. Not only that, a superfluity 
of resources can also bring harm. 
Many people are not fully aware of the distortions in the rules directing their 
thoughts, perceptions and actions; though they may have an uneasy feeling that 
something is wrong, yet be unable to explain what. They are likely to be more 
aware of a lack of resources, but may still be unable to pinpoint exactly why. 
Resources may have been denied to some section of society or never been built 
up there, or some combination of both. It is important to know precisely what 
social resources are lacking, otherwise wrong action may be taken in trying to 
overcome the lack, and conditions be made worse. For instance, in Ruanda 
where social organization - itself an authoritative resource in Giddens' terms 
- has collapsed, much more is required than providing food and medicines, if 
normal life is to be restored. 
The example of Ruanda is obvious enough, but many other social evils are 
considerably more diffuse. Since social relations are disembedded or lifted out 
from local contexts of interaction and restructured across indefinite spans of 
time-space, it is difficult to grasp, even if one wants to, the full implications of 
one's involvement with anonymous others across the modern world. Buying a 
hamburger appears to be innocuous enough, but in some instances it is one facet 
of a global system that has also driven peasants off their land so it may be used 
for cattle raising. While the harmful and debilitating effects of structural ~vils are 
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readily apparent to those who suffer them, any analysis of what makes them so 
persistent must look into the sets of both rules and resources actually and often 
globally operative in people's interactions. 
14.3 The Modalities of Structuration 
Speaking of sets of rules and resources, which people draw upon and reproduce 
through their actions, is to take an 'experience distc;mt' approach. Normally one 
pursues one's various aims and interests, adjusting to the prevailing situation, 
without being aware of all the possible rules involved. Likewise, one makes 
some assessment of what one can accomplish in the given circumstances, but 
without tabulating all the resources required and how they are distributed. At 
times it might be useful to isolate a particular social rule or convention for 
discussion and clarification, but that presumes there is still a shared but tacit 
understanding of other rules. 
Taking a more 'experience near' approach, we find ourselves having to deal with 
various kinds of social institutions: legal, cultural, economic and political. The 
term 'institution' does not refer to an identifiable organization, but to the 
sedimented practices that ordinarily prevail in a particular society. Thus, for 
instance, owning freehold property, marriage, voting democratically and being a 
teenager are all social institutions. These institutions set out 'parameters of 
expectation' defining what a person can, may and sometimes should do. Actual 
organizations, such as law courts, political parties or music companies, on the 
one hand operate according to the institutional practices inherited from the past, 
yet on the other hand endeavour to reshape those practices as they see fit. Other 
organizations or individuals, however, may for their own reasons contest efforts 
to reshape social practices. There is never a complete consensus either about 
what 'is' going on or what 'ought' to be happening. 
Each social institution, or bed of sedirnented practices, has its own "interlacing of 
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meamng, normative elements and power," which actors draw upon in. their 
interactions and in turn reconstitute. Different features of both social structures 
and people's interaction can be distinguished according to the rule or resource 
involved. Giddens thus distinguishes three 'modalities of structuration', namely, 
signification, legitimation and domination. These correspond respectively to the 
semantic and moral aspects of rules and to the mobilization of resources. 
"Actors draw upon the modalities of structuration in the reproduction of 
systems of interaction, by the same token reconstituting their structural prop-
erties" (CS: 28). 
In other words, every social structure embodies elements of signification, 
domination and legitimation. Each of these modalities or dimensions of the 
duality of structure is found in every action, and hence in the sedimented 
practices that form institutions. But both actions and institutions can be classified 
according to which modality is predominant. The following differentiation can 
be made: 








where S = signification, D = domination, either authoritative or allocative, L = legitimation 
(see CCHM:47; CS: 33; CPST: 107). 
The usefulness of this scheme lies in its showing that a critique of any institution 
must pay attention to all three modes of interaction that structure society, 
though not accord them the same importance. 
Again, the term 'political institutions' should not be exclusively identified with 
the apparatus of government, or 'economic institutions' with banks and busi-
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ness. It is one of the marks of modern, capitalist society - particularlY.in its 
British-American form - to separate these, but that is only one possibility. 
Organizational separation is less in both the social market countries of Europe 
and many developing countries today, as it was in the class-divided society of 
medieval times. 
The fact that all three modalities of structuration are involved at least to some 
degree in any social interaction warns against over-compartmentalizing society. 
Yet in order to get to grips with any issue, it is necessary to make some distinc-
tions. 
14.3.1 Signification 
To some extent every human action involves communication; this may vary 
from a carefully worded and persuasively delivered speech to the look of ( 
satisfaction, glee, malevolence or whatever that an actor does not realize he is 
expressing. Being able to communicate and to pick up what is being communi-
cated depends upon actors drawing on an interpretative scheme appropriate for 
their culture. This may take place tacitly or unconsciously, where the manner-
isms, gestures, tone of voice, postures, dress and hesitations of actors co-present 
to one another influence the attitudes people have to each other without anyone 
averting to what is happening. (It is often the task of a psychological counsellor 
to lead a client to accept that he or she is responding to such indirect communica-
tion in inappropriate or exaggerated ways, and to then to grasp why this is 
happening.) Meanwhile, at the level of discursive consciousness, human actors 
can not only monitor their own and others' activities, but are also able monitor 
that monitoring. They can check out their way of taking up what others are 
expressing against an appropriate interpretative scheme. Their stock of cultural 
knowledge is usually sufficient for this, but in cases of doubt dictionaries, 
encyclopedias, video or sound recordings, or special experts may be consulted. 
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Any act of communication, when looked at from the point of view of the d?ality 
of structure, both draws upon and reinforces the rules of signification or mean-
ing. Or rather, communication is effected through instantiating the constitutive 
aspect of the rules that structure social interaction and praxis. This same point 
was made from a different angle by Wittgenstein (1958) when be observed that 
explanations end in a social practice; language is founded in convention. 
Nevertheless, the whole of life in society cannot be equated with linguistic and 
symbolic codes, or with signification. liThe structures of signification are separ-
able only analytically either from domination and legitimation" (CS: 33). 
14.3.2 Legitimation 
The intersection of the structures of signification and of legitimation is evident 
when one asks of an action "ls it correctly described?" and "Was it rightly done?" 
If someone has been killed, describing it as an act of murder implies that it was 
not rightly done. Whereas, describing it as a pure accident implies that no one 
did wrong. But this presumes that no one was obliged to act in any way that 
might have prevented the accident, that no negligence was involved. Establish-
ing the facts involves a judgment about what ought to have been done, and vice 
versa. 
This is most evident in the not infrequent contexts of social life where what social 
phenomena 'are', how they are aptly described, is contested. Awareness of such 
contestation, of divergent and overlapping characterizations of activity, is an 
essential part of 'knowing a form of life'. (CS: 29; see ePST: 82) 
When Giddens speaks of 'norms' as the modality appealed to in sanctioning -
or not sanctioning - particular interactions, he is not referring to ultimate 
moral values. Norms here refers to what is found acceptable or unacceptable, and 
hence is enforced in a particular society. Selecting which norms will be enforced 
and in what manner will depend considerably upon how power is distributed in 
any given society. 
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This understanding of norms leaves open the degree to which the structll!es of 
legitimation in any society find consensual support among the members of that 
society. "The mass of the population does not necessarily have to have 'confi-
dence' in the system of rule, only pragmatic acceptance of their obligations in 
relation to it" (NSV: 202). Those members with allegiance to alternative norms 
may simply not be in a position of sufficient power to make their norms count. 
Giddens thus leaves open 
a range of possible 'shadings' between acceptance of normative obligations as a 
moral commitment, the type case of Durkheim, and conformity based on the 
acknowledgement of sanctions that apply to the transgression of normative 
prescriptions. (CPST: 87) 
The constraints that sanctions impose vary from a raising of the eyebrows, 
through being publicly exposed or imprisoned, as well as boycotts and stayaways, 
to violence or the threat of it. But the heavier the sanction, the more it depends 
upon the exercise of dominative power. 
14.3.3 Domination 
Structures of domination involving the exercise of power are neither necessarily 
noxious nor can they ever "be I transcended' in some kind of putative society of 
the future" (CS: 32). Domination refers to the ability to mobilize allocative and 
authoritative resources. If this ability were entirely absent, even the most casual 
social encounter would be impossible, let alone running a country, managing a 
firm, or settling a civil dispute. Anything said or done would be devoid of lasting 
consequences. 
Power is not, as such, an obstacle to freedom or emancipation but is their very 
medium - although it would be foolish, of course, to ignore its constraining 
properties. The existence of power presumes structures of domination whereby 
power that' flows smoothly' in processes of social reproduction (and is, as it were, 
'unseen') operates. (CS: 257) 
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This positive aspect of power is brought out in the term 'facilitator', someone 
who has the 'facility' of enabling conduct to reach an intended outcome. Giddens 
thus speaks of 'facility' as a modality of structuration; meaning by that either 
access to structural resources or the capability of reaching a desired outcome in 
the course of conduct. But, as Cohen comments: 
... even where decision-making comes into play in the activities of rulers and others 
in the higher echelons of power ... actors are not capable of opting for all courses of 
action .... [Their] opportunities also are shaped by the limits of resource-based 
facilities agents do or do not possess to implement decisions. One need only 
consider the parallel failure of US intervention in Vietnam and Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan to illustrate these decision-making limits on a grand scale. (1989: 241) 
These examples, as well as the failures of revolutionary governments and newly 
independent nations to sort out their affairs satisfactorily, bring home how 
intractable social evils can be. 
14.4 Inadequate approaches to change 
The immensity of social change that is sometimes sought is brought out by 
Herbert McCabe, who says of the revolutionary that he 
... proposes to change not merely this or that detail within society, but the structure, 
and hence the values of the society itself. The revolutionary does not propose 
something that in terms of this society is better; he wants to change t~e terms. He 
wants history to advance not simply further along established lines, but along new 
lines. Now such lines extend into the past as well as into the future. I mean that each 
society interprets its history as leading up to itself, as well as leading forward into 
the future. (1968: 28) 
Put in Giddens' terms, the revolutionary (who need not be violent) is seeking a 
complete transformation of the generative rules and resources by which society 
is structured. In view of the deep seated character of social structures, as well as 
human waywardness to which any individual can give in, it is doubtful how 
complete a transformation can ever take place. In addition, set-backs may occur 
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due to accidents, diseases, weather, technical breakdown or a lack of basic 
materials. 
Transforming an unjust society to a just one and providing a new basis on which 
people can relate to one another requires much more than simply changing the 
laws or even assuming power. While these may be required, by themselves they 
are insufficient. It is instructive to examine why. 
14.4.1 Legislation comes up against Social Durability 
Among the generative rules that direct an society, legislation is the most explicit, 
but not the only kind. It is usually fairly rigid, in some cases very rigid, and any 
transgression may incur definite penalties. However, no great penalties are 
attached to many of the unwritten rules, which are usually fairly flexible. In the 
latter case "the operations of practical consciousness enmesh rules and the 
'methodological' interpretation of rules in the continuity of practices" (epST: 68). 
Somewhat surprisingly the more abstract rules, such as codified legislation, are 
less influential in shaping social activity than the seemingly trivial procedures 
that are generally accepted. Most civil law, after all, deals with specialized areas of 
life, for example, business, property, marriage and labour law. Criminal law 
really comes into play only when there is a significant and threatening departure 
from the generally accepted routines of society. 
The rules that govern the embedded routines of day-to-day life, although rarely 
written down, are much more durable and persistent than written ones (see 
STMS: 221). Such rules often only become apparent when a clash occurs in 
cross-cultural situations. For example, depending upon whether one's culture is 
Western or African, one does or does not look in the eye the person speaking to 
you. Likewise, in one culture silence means consent, whereas in another it 
signifies non-acceptance of a proposal. Neither of these rules are written in law 
books, though perhaps by now in anthropology books, but they are likely to be 
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held much more intensively than a piece of legislation, which can after ~ll be 
amended or scrapped at the next session of the legislature. 
14.4.2 Power 
Some new members of South Africa's Government of National Unity (GNU) 
said after a short while in parliament that they had gained a 'position', but found 
they had not come into 'power'. Things were not happening the way they wanted 
them to happen. It appears that their conception of power treated it "as a 
phenomenon of willed or intended action. Here power is defined in terms of the 
capacity or likelihood of actors to achieve desired or intended outcomes" (CPST: 
88). This the members of the GNU found they were unable to accomplish. Their 
conception of power was expressed by Max Weber. Giddens criticizes this 
conception, from a theoretical point of view, since it cannot explain the enduring 
realities of domination when those in positions of power are not busy making 
decisions. 
An alternative conception of power, expounded by Hannah Arendt and Talcott 
Parsons, treats it as "specifically a property of the social community, a medium 
whereby common interests or class interests are realized" (CPST: 89). Here, social 
domination is treated as "an institutional phenomenon, either disregarding 
power as relative to the active accomplishments of actors, or treating it as in 
some way determined by institutions" (CPST: 89). This is akin to what members 
of the GNU called gaining position. The limitation of this view "is that power is 
seen as determined by, or emanating from structures, rather than as operating in 
and through human action" (CCHM: 50). 
In Giddens' view, both these conceptions of power are inadequate, but when 
examined in the light of the duality of structure, they are complementary. 
Exercising power is not a special type of action, but is "just as essential and 
integral to [all] social interaction as conventions are" (CPST: 256). Power is both a 
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condition for action and results from action; "neither aspect of power is .more 
'basic' than the other" (CPST: 257). Agents are able to obtain the out~omes they 
want to the extent that they can draw upon allocative and authoritative 
resources, but their exercising power, in which they obtain the outcomes they 
want, in turn reproduces the relations of autonomy and dependence found in 
the social structure. In practjce this means for GNU members that they have to 
build up the authoritative or allocative resources, or find the ways and means, to 
accomplish the ends they want. 
Power, in a highly generalized sense, refers to " 'transformative capacity', the 
capability to intervene in a given course of events so as in some way to alter 
them" (NSV: 7). Intervention may be intended or not. Not only is there an 
immediate outcome, but resources are maintained and built up for further 
action. In this sense, power underlies all action, including that - if it were 
possible - of an individual operating alone or the activities within a group 
where there is complete equality of power. 
But, unlike well matched games, there is no society with complete equality in 
power; some are parents and others children; some members have had more 
training and experience than others, some have come to possess greater 
allocative resources, some have acquired or been appointed to authoritative 
positions. Thus some actots have "sway over others, and over the material 
world they inhabit" (CCHM: 50), others much less. Their relations are marked by 
various degrees of autonomy and dependence. "Power relations are relations of 
autonomy and dependence, but even the most autonomous agent is in some 
degree dependent, and the most dependent actor or party in a relationship 
retains some autonomy" (CPSR: 93). 
Here, however, power is being understood in a more specialized sense; it refers 
not just to an agent's capacity to effect the outcome of events, but 
to refer to interaction where transformative capacity is harnessed to actors' attempts to 
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get others to comply with their wants. Power, in this relational sense, concerns the 
capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes 
depends upon the agency of others. (CPST: 93) 
Getting others to comply with one's wants is not necessarily exploitative. 
Presumably, the wants of leaders and their followers generally coincide; the 
leader's task is to make realizing them more possible. Others' wants may coincide 
with, be in direct conflict with, at cross purposes with, or indifferent to one's 
own; or, most likely, combine all four positions. Domination as an aspect of the 
social structure thus encompasses both coercion and willing compliance, conflict 
and cooperation. "Power may be at its most alarming, and quite often its most 
horrifying, when applied as a sanction of force. But it is typically at its most 
intense and durable When running silently through the repetition of institu-
tionalized practices" (NSV: 9). 
The exercise of power, besides drawing upon resources to effect a desired 
outcome, also reproduces the structures of domination in society. Thus when an 
order is given and obeyed, authority - not simply one person's position, but 
throughout society - is both drawn upon and upheld. If it were not obeyed, 
various sanctions would come into play legitimising the further application of 
power to ensure compliance. As far as the overall social system is concerned, it 
does not matter too much whether the order is agreed with or not, willingly 
accepted or resented, so long as it is complied with. Likewise, when someone 
takes out a loan, the structured asymmetry of resources, in this case between 
debtors and creditors is both drawn upon and reconstituted in the deal that they 
strike. In an honest and competitive society, all power is not in the creditor's 
hands, as would-be borrowers can look around for better terms elsewhere. Both 
examples, that of obeying an order and taking out a loan bring out the close 
conceptual links between power, agency and structure. 
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14.5 Convergence of Generative Rules and Natural Law 
There is a considerable convergence between the Giddens' conception of rules 
and Thomas Aquinas' understanding of law and reason. Each of them recognizes 
the "double meaning (and origin) of 'law' as both precept of action and generaliz-
ation about action" (CPST: 244) or that law is a rule and measure of action 
(quaedam regula et mensura actuum, IaIIae 90, 1) fostering certain actions and 
deterring others. Coming from an empirical approach, which investigates what 
is taking place, Giddens comes to admit that as far as human society is concerned, 
account has to be taken, too, of what ought to be happening. "I would want to 
claim not just a few especially contentious concepts such as these [power, class, 
ideology, and interests] but the whole conceptual apparatus of social theory is in 
some sense 'ineradicably evaluative' " (CPST: 90). Coming from the other 
direction, Thomas, concerned with expounding the way of life people ought to 
lead, stresses that serious attention must be paid to what people are actually 
doing. He notes how the repetition of actions establishes customs that have the 
force of law, since what people regularly do must derive from a well reasoned 
judgment. This is why custom has the force of law, overrides a law and is the 
interpreter of laws (consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum 
interpretatrix, laIIae 97, 3). His reference to 'the force of law' covers both moral 
suasion and judicial enforcement. 
Thomas' flexible treatment of custom and law (laIIae 90-97), which is also an 
outline of political theory, parallels that of Giddens' on the modalities of 
structuration. In seeing law as primarily addressed to the mind and requiring 
promulgation (IaIIae 90, 1 & 4), Thomas underlines its role in signification. Its 
participation in and, as far as its particularities are concerned, its derivation from 
Eternal Law by which God in his providence rules all things underscores its 
legitimacy. Finally, domination is present in the law, because it has to be 
enforced; transgressors must bear the consequences, but may only be punished by 
authorized ministers of the law (punire non pertinet nisi ad ministrum legis, 
cuius auctoritate pama infertur, IalIae 92, 2 ad 3). 
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In the contemporary world it is not possible to be as sanguine about the ru~g 
of society as Thomas was in his times. He certainly recognized that people may 
commit crimes, that tyrants may oppress, sedition may split a city or kingdom. 
Though underlying these contingent failures was an enduring order of truth 
(verurn), goodness (bonum) and unifying power (unum). (These three 
transcendentals, ways in which being (esse) was manifested, are respectively 
echoed in Giddens' speaking about signification, legitimation and domination as 
modalities of structure.) Today, however, instead of finding in society this 
enduring order, we find its structuring flawed at an institutional level. 
14.6 Flawed Institutions 
An institutional analysis places the awareness, moral integrity and skills of social 
actors in suspension; it treats a social institution as a set of chronically repro-
duced rules and resourc~s (CS: 375). The reason why a social institution is flawed 
is because it goes on reproducing rules that are distorted and resources that are in 
one or other way inadequate for living as full human beings. This kind of 
analysis does not rule out the activities of individuals who once they become 
aware of flaws in their society, silently disagree, demonstrably object or work for 
systemic change. What it does bring out is how difficult it is to change defective 
social structures, as they are deeply entrenched in the regular running of society. 
There are many ways in which social institutions may be flawed. Any particular 
society would require its own institutional and historical analysis, where details 
could be looked at and differences from other societies noted. All that can be 
indicated here are some general possibilities about how defects may occur in each 
of the modalities of structuration. In other words, how language and culture may 
mislead, how accepted standards of behaviour may be insufficient, and how 
intractable problems arise over political and economic resources. 
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14.6.1 Distorted Communication and Understanding 
In modern society, quite apart from attempts to deceive on the part of individ-
uals, communication is sometimes inherently misleading because it relies on a 
distorted process of signification. Language never reveals reality fully, since 
about any situation or event more can always be said. Well chosen words, 
however, can give an adequate account of what is happening, so that nothing of 
importance is overlooked, at least for the time being. III chosen words, on the 
other hand, will conceal crucial aspects of reality, lead to wrong conclusions and 
nlisdirect actions. Choosing the right words is not just a matter of selecting the 
correct terms, but also of finding a satisfactory framework in which to approach 
the situation under discussion. Furthermore, a too narrow approach will 
invariably screen out crucial considerations; for instance, a purely economic 
analysis will disregard medical, environmental and aesthetic issues. The type of 
approach adopted often enough depends upon the individual or sectional 
interests that are being pursued. This point is summed up by Schillebeeckx, who 
writes: "What we experience as objective - what happens to us - is also 
dependent on our concepts and frames of reference, dependent even on our 
projects and the interests which are served thereby" (1977: 27, translated by 
Fergus Kerr). Communication may be distorted beqmse of a failure on any of 
these counts, though if it is still to be communication it must at least impart 
some information. Distortions may have various causes, for example: ignorance 
from poor education; not troubling to check facts or understand; new predica-
ments that no one yet fully grasps; bias giving slanted reports; concealing 
evidence; deliberate lies and their repetition by others who take them for the 
truth. Various organizations from churches to military commands, from show 
business to academic centres of learning, develop their own language and 
communicative style. That is only to be expected, but it can lead to various issues 
or points of view being ruled out from the start as irrelevant or unworthy of a 
hearing. Furthermore, a telling sign that awkward issues are being glossed over 
is when an organization continually revises its terminology. It tries as it were to 
deal with problems by declaring them non-existent. 
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Explaining this further would require a whole treatise on communicatio~, but 
these few examples should show how easy it is for misleading information, 
views and outlooks to be perpetuated in society, and people be taken in by them. 
14.6.2 The Canonization of Illegitimacy 
Closely linked to distortions in communication is a warped sense of good and 
evil. Not only individuals, but societies may invert values. Max Scheler exposed 
this phenomenon in his treatment of ressentiment. But even when people act 
without malice and harbour good intentions, their actions do not produce all the 
good fruit they expect. This is due in part to deficiencies in the social process of 
legitimation, so that moral issues are overlooked or approached without the 
requisite sensitivity and discernment. On the one hand, what is of genuine value 
may be overlooked, because nothing effectively brings it to people's attention. On 
the other hand, worthless or harmful activities may be given an appeal and 
sanctioned as acceptable behaviour. Once that occurs it is difficult to overcome, as 
present actions draw upon the social structures reproduced from past actions. 
14.6.3 Inadequacies over Resources 
The processes of domination, both over goods and people, are even more 
problematic in a system with high space-time distanciation. Resources are not 
fixed quantities; a society can build them up or run them down. An increase in 
effective time-space distanciation together with increased acquisition and 
handling of information, builds up the resources available to any organization, 
be it a government, a bank, a business or a church. This is largely a matter of 
efficiency, of being able to coordinate activities over space and time. It is litt1~ use 
having raw materials or machinery, appointed officials or many records, unless 
they can be accessed. 
Yet the larger and more widespread an organization becomes, the more diffi-
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culties it runs into on a human level. Even when people genuinely want to. be of 
service, their actions may have unintended, yet harmful repercussions on others 
of whom they are hardly aware. The more efficient and wide-ranging their 
organization, the more this is likely. Yet, if they refrained from action, they 
would let down those dependent upon them. Even bad government or 
organization may be better than none. 
Since resources should both enable and constrain, if they are weak or their 
distribution is too skewed, the resultant failure is twofold. A total or relative lack 
of resources makes it impossible for people to direct their lives in a satisfactory 
manner and to constrain others from harming them. In short, deficient social 
structures constrain people from doing what is right and enable them to do 
wrong more easily. This is especially true when distorted rules - both norms 
and those regulating meaning - further encourage it. 
Working out in any given society what allocative and authoritative resources 
should be built up, how they should be better distributed with requisite checks 
and balances, how existing inequalities should be limited or reversed, how 
redress should be made, and how tightly resources should be organized, leads 
into the basic questions of politics and economics. Such an inquiry, however, 
will be dealing not with domination alone, but signification and legitimation as 
well. 
Giddens does not spell out what resources are necessary for satisfactory human 
life. His attention is directed mainly to economic and political resources. This, 
however, should not be taken in too narrow a sense. More is necessary for a 
satisfactory human life and community than can be quantified in economic 
terms or be subjected to political negotiation. Basic human needs are more 
extensive. They include, according to Manfred Max-Neef (1992), subsistence, 
protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity and 
freedom. The resources required to satisfy the need for subsistence and protection 
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are limited and diminish with use, whereas those that satisfy the other needs 
increase or intensify with use. Although much more might be said about Max-
Neef's scheme, the point to note here is that distress in society may not have a 
strictly economic or political origin. Strikes, for instance, may ostensibly be about 
wage rates, but there may be an underlying dissatisfaction about the lack of 
mutual understanding, of opportunities for creation, or a feeling that one's 
identity is not recognized. These are not issues that can be treated in terms of 
power, and so may easily go unrecognized. 
14.6.4 A Note on Ideology 
In some social analyses 'ideology' is treated in its own right as another special 
feature of society. Giddens' approach shows that this is not necessary, since he 
does not consider it as consisting of 'invalid knowledge claims', whereas science 
makes 'valid knowledge claims' . In his view, "the chief usefulness of the concept 
of ideology concerns the critique of domination" (CPST: 187). It is thus "not a 
particular 'type' of symbolic order or form of discourse" (CS: 33). Instead, com-
munication has become ideological when "dominant groups or classes ... make 
their own sectional interests appear to others as universal ones" (CPST: 6). In this 
way, asymmetries of domination are expressed in such a way as to legitimate 
sectional interests. In this way the privileged may attempt to justify the inequal-
ities inherent in a racially divided society, the class division in capitalism, or the 
advantages enjoyed by party members in a communist society. 
14.6.5 Contradiction and Conflict 
In making a distinction between contradiction and conflict, Giddens helps 
explain how a society can still hold together even though its members may 
disagree profoundly and their interests clash. A group of people have an interest 
in courses of action or states of affairs that make it easier for them to gain what 
they want. "To be aware of one's interests, therefore, is more than to be aware of 
439 
a want or wants; it is to know how to set about trying to realise them" (epST: 
189). Sectional interests arise, not simply from people's own needs and wants, but 
"by virtue of their membership of particular groups, communities, classes, etc" 
(epST: 189). So, for instance, unemployed people share certain interests in 
common, but their interests may be in contradiction with those employed who 
ate seeking an increase in their wages. Yet by itself this contradiction does not pit 
the two groups in conflict. 
Giddens speaks of structural contradiction lias an opposition or disjunction of 
structural principles of social systems, where those principles operate in terms of 
each other but at the same time contravene one another" (epST: 141). For 
instance, management, shareholders, wage earners, pensioners and the unem-
ployed are all part of the same economic system, but have different interests and 
seek not quite compatible outcomes from it. Another instance is the relation 
between nation-states and multinational companies. To maintain and build up 
their position both internally and among other states, each nation states seeks to 
strengthen its position in the world economy. This requires access to finance, 
technology, information and markets, which is mainly in the hands of multi-
national companies. So a nation-state has to allow or even invite them to 
operate in its territory, even though many of their operations escape its controL 
Yet multinationals in turn depend upon the climate of stability that the 
nation-state provides. 
Many secondary structural contradictions occur when the results of implement-
ing a policy are diametrically opposed to what the policy was designed to bring 
about. For instance, the high standards of the building code for urban areas were 
meant to prevent the proliferation of substandard housing in South Africa. But 
since many people could not afford to put up such high standard houses, they 
were unable to build permanent homes at all, and so were forced to remain in 
shacks with no security of tenure. 
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Although contradiction and conflict may in fact be closely related, they a~e not 
identical. Conflict can be understood in two senses: as the opposition of interests 
between individuals or collectivities or as active struggle between them (see 
CCHM: 232). Usually conflicts of interest occur along the fault-lines in a society, 
where various contradictions are clustered. Such fault-lines are likely to occur, 
for instance, where contradictions regarding economic, political, racial and 
religious matters coincide. On the other hand, 
the tendency of contradiction to involve conflict is weakened to the degree to which 
contradictions are kept separate from one another. Conversely, the more there is a 
fusion or 'overlap' of contradictions, the greater the likelihood of conflict, and the 
greater the likelihood that 'such conflict will be intense. (CPST: 144-5) 
But even then conflict may be kept in check by direct repression; on this Giddens, 
writing in 1984, observes: 
The use of force may normally be taken precisely as one of the expressions of the 
occurrence of conflict, but the threat of its use, or certain tactical shows of force, may 
also equally well serve to prevent sources of dissension from emerging as overt 
struggle. Anyone who is prone to argue that control of the means of violence cannot 
be used to dampen conflicts of a profound and deep-lying kind should ponder cases 
such as that o~ South Africa. (CS: 319; see also CPST: 145) 
The absence of overt struggle, resulting from the enforcement of 'law and order', 
should not be mistaken for genuine peace where duties are fulfilled and rights 
are upheld. 
14.6.6 The Production and Reproduction of Defects 
Giddens' analysis of social structures in terms of rules and resources, taken 
together with his further analysis of the modalities of structuration, offers a 
highly abstract picture of social systems. It brings out that there are various entry-
points, as it were, by which social evil can enter society. A deficiency in any of the 
modes of structuration - signification, legitimation or domination '- can, 
unless corrected, permeate society having its deleterious effect on both the rules 
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and resources that people draw upon for action and which they repr~duce 
through their actions. Any deficiency in one mode of structuration is soon likely, 
perhaps because of people's desire for consistency or for an ideological justifica-
tion for their actions, to result in deficiencies in the other two modes too. 
The importance of Giddens' scheme may be appreciated when one considers the 
various proposals made for overcoming persistent social evils. For instance, 
some advocate better education, some stress a return to traditional morality (or 
the adoption of new values), some press for a redistribution of wealth, while 
others pin their hopes on democratization. None of these is a panacea. At best 
they are partial solutions, answering respectively to failures in signification, 
faulty legitimation, disparities in economic and political domination. But, unless 
all four areas are continually watched and attention given to their 
interconnections, little progress will be made in combatting social evils. 
Speaking on this abstract level, this is as far as Giddens' theory of structuration 
takes us. It shows how human agents may through their activities reproduce the 
various flaws in their society and produce harmful effects in each others' lives. 
But, since the distorted rules and deficient resources they are drawing upon are 
often among the unacknowledged conditions of action, the resulting harmful 
effects are usually unintentional and sometimes completely unforeseen. 
The usefulness of Giddens' scheme is that it shows the importance in each 
instance of probing - in terms of signification, legitimation and domination -
into how rules are distorted and resources deficient. Although there will be 
similarities from one society to another, this scheme allows significant differ-
ences to appear. The openness of the theory to various historical possibilities 
enables it to be used as a basis for examining various societies and cultures. 
Structuration theory, however, does not generate a particular research method; 
"its concepts should be regarded as sensitizing devices, to be used in a selective 
way in thinking about research questions or interpreting findings" (ST: 213). 
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14.7 Misleading Social Images 
Although structuration theory explains well the working and reproduction of 
society through human agency, it does not examine how people identify with 
and have a sense of belonging to a particular society. Not only is society struc-
tured by rules and resources, but people resonate with it through images. People 
are in varying degrees integrated into their society (or societies) by the images 
they have of themselves, of one another and society (or various societies) as a 
whole. The positive effects of this were examined in the previous chapter, now 
its negative aspects must be mentioned. 
Mention has already been made of the interplay between self and society, and 
how this may be mediated by various images, through which people gain a view 
of who they are, what they can do and might become. The term 'image' is used in 
a wide sense to include all kinds of cultural products including literary, artistic, 
musical, architectural as well as dress and design. Some images may be fairly 
superficial and pass quickly out of fashion, while other more enduring ones 
provide a basic model or root metaphor for people to place themselves in society 
and relate to their predecessors, contemporaries and successors. 
A healthy group self, as is the case for the healthy self of the individual, is continu-
ously sustained in its course ... by ongoing psychological work that provides the 
cohesion and vigor of its changing yet continuous structure within a matrix of 
selfobjects who are in emphatic contact with its changing needs. The sum total of the 
results of this work that must affect all layers of a people ... we call 'culture.' (55 III: 
253) 
This, however, does not always work out as well as it might. Two examples 
might illustrate this. 
14.7.1 When the Artists left a Void 
In the first Kohut gives an account of how the artists of the Weimar period in 
Germany 
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failed to understand their [a broad sector ofthe population's] needs and had failed 
to portray them with any degree of sensitivity .... Somehow art needed to express the 
empty, devitalized, fragmented state of those who had formerly felt alive, strong, 
and cohesive ... That kind of art did not exist. The great works of the German past 
could not fill that void" (SS III: 254£). 
Nazi-supported art stepped into the void, at least as a pseudocure. 
It helped deny the persisting self-defect via sudden and wholesale identifications 
with symbols of strength and failed to deal with the depressive, devitalized, and 
fragmented state of Germany. Nazi art fostered regression to archaic symbols of 
power and unity. (SS III: 256) 
At the same time political thinkers "failed to provide the German group self 
with the needed resonance that would have encouraged development toward a 
new self-image" (SS III: 256). The people felt their pain and deprivation was 
meaningless; no image or symbol that the artists, newspaper editors, or political 
thinkers presented as a possible sel£object brought them a promise of wholeness. 
14.7.2 'Guilty Man' and 'Tragic Man'22 
In a second example, Kohut puts into question the whole intergenerational 
image of humanity that Freud brought to the fore in his theory of the Oedipus 
complex. He does not agree that Sophocles' King Oedipus "portrays the deepest 
and most central experience of the individual, man's wish to sleep with his 
mother and to kill his father." Sophocles was "an archconservative ... [who] held 
the ingrained view that law and discipline came first and that the individual 
with his aspirations and experiences came second and last" (SS IV: 561). Freud 
combined the presuppositions of this "rigidly predetermined" Greek tragedy 
with "the qt,tasi-biological conception of primary drives which are seen as being 
processed (discharged, neutralized, put Ion hold,' as it were, etc.) by a mental 
apparatus" (55 IV: 556). This results in the picture of 
22 No attempt has been I~ade to use inclusive language for the titles 'Guilty Man' and Tragic Man.' First, 
because they are direct quotatIOns from Kohut. Second, they are dealing by and large with the psychological 
development of males, rather than females This also puts their universality Into question. 
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'Guilty Man,' a psychological and moral view of man, ... reluctant to give up his old 
pleasure aims, however nonadaptive, ... unwilling to allow his aggressive-destructive 
aims to be tamed, and thus engaging in wars and / or prone to self-destruction. (SS 
IV: 556) 
This, in brief, is the powerful image of humanity portrayed by Freud 23, which to 
a considerable degree shaped the outlook and behaviour of an epoch, including 
its educational systems, social and correctional services. It was "his great ability to 
mythologize the key concepts of his scientific system and thus plant them firmly, 
via name and ingrained cultural association, into the minds of the ever-
broadening circle of his followers" (55 IV: 559). 
Kohut does not deny that oedipal conflicts may sometimes occur, but claims that 
intergenerational strife and mutual killing wishes "refer not to the essence of 
man" but are "deviations from the normal." Normally at the oedipal stage, 
which is not a pathological complex but a step in development, "the parental 
generation responds with pride, with self-expanding empathy, with joyful 
mirroring, to the next generation, thus affirming the younger generation's right 
to unfold and to be different" (55 IV: 558£). 5elf psychology instead presents a 
picture of 'Tragic Man' who attempts, yet never quite succeeds, to realize the 
programme laid down in his nuclear self during the span of his life. 
Instead of Oedipus, Kohut proposes the story of Odysseus, lithe first would-be 
draft evader in literature" (55 IV: 562), as an appealing model. His action of 
turning his plough to avoid injuring his son, even though that gives away the 
madness he had feigned to escape the Trojan war, provides "a fitting symbol of 
the fact that healthy man experiences, and with the deepest joy, the next gener-
ation as an extension of his own self" (55 IV: 563). 
The relation between 'Guilty Man' and 'Tragic Man,' between classical Freudian 
and self psychology, could be discussed at length. Which is normal? How far are 
23 Gay's Freud (1988) shows how family life at that time, and particularly in Freud's own childhood 
household, would have given him a predilection for choosing Oedipus as a model. 
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they complementary? Does one supersede the other? But the main point t~ note 
here is the shift from a mechanistic root metaphor to an artistic one. The 
Freudian view of directing and keeping quasi-biological drives in check draws its 
inspiration from nineteenth century machinery. Self psychology on the other 
hand adopts a basically artistic metaphor in its description of Tragic Man. 
Man's self, once it has been established, is, in its essence, an energized pattern for 
the future that, lying in the area of free will and initiative, has a significance all its 
own ... It is this aspect of man, man's self struggling to fulfill its creative-productive 
destiny, failing or succeeding, hurt and raging or fulfilled and ge,nerous, which has 
been neglected by analysis heretofore. (55 III: 280) 
It is not difficult to see that a home, school, business or social service that takes 
much of its guiding inspiration from self psychology will be very different from 
one governed by mechanistic images. 
14.7.3 Deceptive images 
These two cases illustrate how influential various images, or the dearth of them, 
may be in shaping people's assessment of themselves, individually and collec-
tively, and their aspirations for the future. Other influential images or root 
metaphors are those of the competitive market over against the cybernetic 
model, the [South African] struggle, and plastic sexuality. They each help explain 
what is happening, as well as point out and justify what should be happening. 
But just as rules may be distorted, resources deficient, so too may images be 
deceptive. 
Although no image or root metaphor reveals every facet of reality without 
concealing anything, some fail because they are not relatively adequate for 
dealing with the social situation, the culture or personalities involved. They may 
once have had summed up a situation well, given a sense of immediacy and 
appealed dramatically to the people of an earlier period. But after a while they are 
overtaken by events, cultural changes, differences in personality, and new 
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problems, so they now more mask than reveal reality. They no longer prov~de, at 
least without considerable retrieval and re-interpretation, a worthwhile guide for 
discerning what action should be taken. 
Other basic images are deceptive because they fail to illuminate relevant or 
crucial aspects of life. Lutz and Lux (1988) show, for instance, the inadequacy of 
both the economic picture of 'rational man' intent on maximizing self-interest 
and the legal picture of 'reasonable man' who is also concerned about others' 
welfare. Taken on their own, both these two basic images of humanity are too 
simplistic. The former, although it speaks of choice, really reduces choosing to 
arithmetic, the calculation of what is of highest value for me, or self-interest. The 
latter, however, is prepared to transcend self-interest in the pursuit of higher 
values and aspirations. Instead of opting for one model, Lutz and Lux propose a 
concept of the dual-self, who, being both self-interested and caring for values 
beyond self, has to make real qualitative choices. The dual-self concept "takes in 
the complete compass of human nature and the human condition" (1988: 126). It 
paves the way for a new approach to work, economic and human welfare, that 
goes beyond purely mathematical conceptions. 
Images that are subtly misleading are much more dangerous, than those that are 
patently horrific, grotesque or overexaggerated. The latter's defects are quickly 
discovered and their appeal falls away. But when an image is only slightly 
defective, yet still offering a plausible view of both society and self, as well as 
opening avenues for action, its appeal is likely to re~ain much stronger. It will 
then be much more difficult to spot its deficiency, negate its appeal and over-
come its harmful effects. 
Since basic images both reveal and conceal, no single image or even related set of 
images is entirely adequate. In the course of life we, both individually and in 
various collectivities, work with a variety of images or root metaphors. The art is 
to spot or generate one that is most appropriate for a particular situation or 
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occasion, but not press it beyond the limits of its applicability. When it . is no 
longer relatively adequate, it is put on hold and alternative conceptions sought. 
This approach ties in with Fowler's fifth stage of "Conjunctive Faith." At that 
point a person recognizes the relativity of symbols and stories, not just from one 
tradition or point of view to another, but "their relativity to the reality to which 
they mediate relation" (1981: 186). It may also be the basis for the Eastern Ortho-
dox practice of OLKOV0f..tLU, when church authorities recognize that a particular 
case falls outside accepted teaching and practice, and so must be dealt with 
separately. 
14.7.4 When Images turn to Idols 
Accepting the inadequacy in any image, yet without dismissing it entirely, and 
having - especially in a pluralist society - to work with or at least allow for 
various basic images, can be disconcerting. It goes against the grain of those who 
seek clarity, cohesion and certainty. It also clashes with the Cartesian inheritance 
of modernity. The desire for a totally adequate master image or root metaphor, 
that gives rise to a fully comprehensive theory, programme or social system 
remains strong. In psychological terms, people continue to seek, what Bollas and 
Jones (see 7.4 above) call, the transforming object relation that will bring about a 
fully satisfying metamorphosis of the self. Bollas points out that in secular 
society 
we see how hope invested in various objects (a new job, a move to another country, 
a vacation, a change of relationship) may both represent a request for a 
transformational experience and, at the same time, continue the 'relationship' to an 
object that signifies the experience of transformation. We know that the advertising 
world makes its living on the trace of this object. (1987: 16 quoted in Jones 1991: 123) 
Because the drive towards transformation must go somewhere, relatively 
adequate images are totalized or allowed to become idols. Any object becomes an 
idol when it "claims to be transformative but is only partially so or is destructive-
ly transformative. It evokes and plays on our longing for transformations but 
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cannot deliver on the promise" (Jones, 1991: 124). Too much may be looked for 
in an image that may have initially provided a sound basis for a personal ideal or 
collective programme. If its relativity is never seen or accepted, if no re-assess-
ments are ever made in the light of experience and human needs, or if it is 
expected to offer salvation in full, then it is turned into an idol. Instead of 
serving human life and endeavour, it takes control. 
Even before the advent of modem theology or psychology, Friedrich Nietzsche noted 
that, though God is dead, men must have gods and so will make gods of the state, 
the party, or whatever suits them . ... this drive will latch onto one object or another 
without regard to whether the object can bear the full weight and range of the 
experience of the holy or fulfill all social and psychological functions of the sacred. 
(Jones, 1991: 123) 
When this takes place, such goals as national identity, state security, economic 
growth, party hegemony, religious domination or racial purity are turned into 
absolutes. Their defence and pursuit is put above all other moral considerations. 
14.8 Social Decline and Psychological Regression 
What characterizes the decline of a social system? What signs show that a society, 
be it a nation-state or a significant portion of one, is degenerating? In many 
particular instances, this is likely to be a highly contested issue as various people 
and parties have different interests and expectations. Much will depend upon 
people's scale of value. For instance, in South Africa today is a highly participa-
tory but not very efficient society better than a highly efficient government 
running a minimal democracy? Likewise, how is individual freedom in a 
meritocracy to be weighed against the support given by ties of family, tribe and 
locality? Would a shift from the latter towards the former be an instance of 
progress or decline? There are no clear-cut answers; in dealing with these issues 
many other factors would also have to be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, if the question of social decline is examined at a general level, then 
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it may be said that a society begins to degenerate when its social struc~uring 
begins to break down. As rules become inoperative and resources dissipated, the 
social structure binds a decreasing span of space and time. If communication 
breaks down so that people have little idea who to believe or trust, and the lj.ne 
between what is commended as worthwhile and abhorred as despicable becomes 
purely random or arbitrary, then the rules governing signification and 
legitimation have ceased to operate. What was right (meaningful and moral) at 
one moment might not be at the next. This disrupts a person's sense of ontol-
ogical security (see 9.6.1 especially). At this point too authoritative resources, 
particularly the power to direct people's activities and efforts in a coordinated 
fashion, will be reduced. Reliable information will not be available to make 
more than ad hoc responses to immediate crises. As a result of the general lack of 
reliability, but also in turn contributing to it, allocative resources or the control 
over goods (raw materials, tools and products) will be run down. As the rules 
governing possession, fair trade and remuneration break down, combined with a 
lack of reliable economic indicators, production and distribution cannot be 
planned. With diminishing resources, both allocative and authoritative, the 
means for settling conflicts peacefully will be reduced. As violence breaks out, 
the already precarious social structure is further threatened. Added to the 
deterioration of rules and resources will be a dearth of appropriate images that 
could give meaning to life and direct people's efforts in a promising direction. 
Structural breakdown is not the same the splitting of a society or organization 
into smaller units, such as might occur in decolonization, unbundling in 
business, or reducing the global reach of multinationals. Admittedly, the arm of 
those individuals in power may be shortened; they no longer control allocative 
and authoritative resources over such a wide span of space and time. When a 
society or organization is split into smaller units, its underlying structure may 
still remain intact as each unit continues to draw on the same generative rules 
and to access sufficient resources to sustain it. In fact instituting more local 
control may increase the resources, as each unit can concentrate more and still 
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gain from links with one another. 
However, not every split within countries or organizations is well managed. If it 
comes through long or violent conflict, not only may resources (both goods and 
the system of administration) be dissipated but the generative rules required for 
ensuring clarity, direction, safety and cooperation may be in abeyance. In this case 
the underlying social structures, which normally sustain a reasonable pattern of 
life, have begun to fragment. 
What people in a society whose social structure is breaking down will experience 
- again expressed in rather general terms - is the inability to make sense of 
what has taken place or to put together some plan for managing their future. 
There is next to nothing they can rely upon. The lack of allocative resources will 
bring impoverishment, not just the normal hardships of living in a poor region, 
but one compounded by insecurity, lack of trust and a widespread uncertainty 
about what to believe or hold on to. 
How do people cope with such a state of anomie? Even though few nation-states 
or regions within them have in recent years declined, like Ruanda or parts of the 
former eastern Europe and southern Africa, to this state of anomie, in many 
other areas too the social structure is severely impaired. It is not just that people's 
expectations of each other in society change, but people know and feel that 
society holds out no or few expectations for them at all. Giddens, drawing ,upon 
Bettelheim's account of his experiences in Dachau, speaks of the unpredictability 
of life there, but in terms that are applicable to many another disintegrating 
society: 
The feeling of autonomy of action that individuals have in the ordinary routines of 
day-to-day life in orthodox social settings was almost completely dissolved. The 
'futural' sense in which the duree of social life ordinarily occurs was destroyed by the 
manifestly contingent character of even the hope that the next day would arrive. (CS: 
62) 
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Under these conditions each person is thrown back on whatever pe~sonal 
resources he or she may have. 
In this situation self-structure is paramount. It is one of the central points of 
Kohut's work that a firm nuclear self, built up from seU-selfobject relations, may 
provide a person with the ability not to be swept along by the breakdown of 
understanding and loss of values that mark a declining society. In his essay "On 
Courage" (55 III & 5PHU) Kohut examines how certain individuals have "the 
ability to brave death and to tolerate destruction rather than to betray the nucleus 
of one's psychological being" (55 III: 130). He shows how in moments of testing 
they have created i~agery that has supported them in their resolve. He cites the 
cases of anti-Nazi martyr heroes, who first went through a severe narcissistic 
equilibrium until they had achieved the complete unification of their personal-
ities under the leadership of the nuclear self, then they experienced a sense of 
relief and of inner peacefulness and serenity (55 lIT: 145). 
But, besides those who in situations of social decline stand out courageously for 
their ideals, or even for their ambitions derived from the grandiose self, many 
people are swept along by events. They take no stand against the social disinte-
gration engulfing them. Instead, faced with uncertainty from without and with 
no selfobjects to sustain them from within, they may easily regress to an archaic 
state. Although no single factor explains why this happens, Kohut does outline 
the kind of social conditions that tend to break people's normal healthy assert-
iveness and lead them to embrace misleading and even idolatrous imagery. 
14.8.1 Social Deprivation leads to Psychological Regression 
A particular set of social conditions neither directly nor inevitably produces the 
same psychological effects. For instance, one group when faced with economic 
impoverishment or political domination may respond by redoubling their 
efforts, while another group slides into apathetic resignation. What accounts for 
452 
such different responses and reactions? In this line, Kohut states 
... man, as an individual and as a member of a group - perhaps even more 
empathic ally when he functions as a member of a group in history - reacts not to 
raw facts but to the meaning that these facts have for him, i.e., to facts embedded in 
an emotional matrix. (SPHU: 87) 
Thus one group with a healthy selfobject milieu will rise up to fight construc-
tively against deprivation and all the hardships entailed; while another group 
lacking such a supportive milieu will alternate between outbreaks of rage and 
lethargic inaction. (Although a 'selfobject milieu,' or a sustaining set of symbols 
and images, could be categorized under the heading of 'rules and resources,' 
designating it separately help bring out how people do not just run their society 
but are bonded with it.) 
To illustrate this, Kohut conducts a case study, as it were, of what led Germany 
under the Nazis "to undertake a supra-individual, nationally organized vendetta 
or merciless persecution, war, and destruction ... [in its pursuit] of total control 
over the world" (SPHU: 63). In seeking an explanation for this, he passes over 
without much comment, but a clear unease, Wangh's suggestion that the youth 
of Hitler's time were suffering from their fathers' absence during their early years 
at the time of World War I. Instead, Kohut relies upon his clinical observations 
regarding regression, where "a specific, well-circumscribed psychological chain of 
events" occurs. 
The frustration of a patient's higher forms of narcissistic satisfaction leads to 
regression along both axes of the grandiose self and the omnipotent selfobject. But 
there is also regressive development in aggression from higher levels of controlled 
aggression that are mobilized in support of a person's ambitions and of his wish for 
acclaim and success to that specific form of regression experienced in a specifically 
regressive perception of the environment which I have called narcissistic rage. This 
regression, especially when it is prolonged, leads to a variety of untoward and 
potentially dangerous consequences in the life of the individual. (SPHU: 620 
Kohut is here pointing to the effects of continual blows upon one's self esteem, 
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especially when they are combined with the persistent weakening of the support-
ive matrix of selfobjects. Admittedly, no one can escape various narcissistic blows 
in the course of life's ups and downs, and "the propensity to respond to them 
with rage is ubiquitous" (SPHU: 63). What makes the difference between rising 
above blows to one's self esteem with humour and wisdom, and narcissistic 
regression is the support obtained from self-selfobject relationships. Each 
selfobject is an imago in the self derived from the experience of other persons, 
especially a marriage partner and friends, as well as those derived from the 
artists, writers and other creators of culture. If this selfobject milieu is persistently 
undermined over a period of time, then regression to archaic state is almost 
inevitable. The impact of such regression is heightened when this it takes place 
in a group. 
This is especially true in one of history's most destructive agents - the nation. The 
malignant human propensities are mobilized in support of nationalistic narcissistic 
rage. Nothing satisfied this fury, neither the achievement of limited advantages nor 
the negotiation of comprolJlises, however favorable - not even victory itself is 
enough. (SPHU: 63) 
Since the unfolding of the higher forms of narcissism - empathy, humour, 
creativity and wisdom - was interfered with in Germany, this led to group 
regression and its consequent rage. "In the area of the grandiose self ... acceptable 
outlets for national prestige [were blocked]; in the area of the idealized parent 
imago ... group values, e.g. religious values [were destroyed]" (SPHU: 160). As the 
development of the nation's shared ambitions and its shared values and ideals 
was frustrated, regression resulted . 
... the loss of national prestige after the defeat in the First World War deprived many 
individual Germans of a great deal of pride in their self-group (the group established 
on the basis of a grandiose self held in common). There was in addition the loss of 
self-esteem for untold millions from unemployment, currency inflation, and 
decreased social standing for the civil service and for other large parts of the middle 
class. Like the individual patient whose need for acclaim is not responded to, the 
potential for regression in the area of the grandiose self must have increased strongly 
for many Germans in the years after the First World War. (SPHU: 64) 
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Although some sections of the population, organized labour and certain 
intellectuals, did improve their social position and gained new pride in them-
selves, most were psychologically depleted. Added to that was 
the traumatically rapid devaluation of both Christian and traditional tribal values 
(as embodied in and held by the aristocratic officer caste)[, which] contributed 
strongly to the narcissistic regressions, in particular toward archaic forms of the 
grandiose self and toward archaic forms of rage. (SPHU: 64) 
Another very significant factor contributing to widespread narcissistic regression 
was the lack of a gifted non-pathological leader in the 1930s who might have led 
Germany on a different path (see Chapter Seventeen below). 
Such regressions become manifest particularly with regard to group aggression, which 
then takes on, overtly or covertly, the flavor of narcissistic rage in either its acute or, 
even more ominously, in its chronic form. (SPHU: 160) 
Acute rage is shown in sporadic outbreaks of mindless aggression. Whereas 
chronic narcissistic rage is not mindless, because all the powers of the mind, for 
instance, the ability to set goals and work out tactics, are utilized to bring about 
the greatest terror and destruction possible (see 9.2.6 above). Examples of this 
were all too common. 
The Nazis clearly exploited German sensibilities [over their defeat in World War I 
and having to pay reparations] in order to harness the ensuing narcissistic rage in the 
service of their vengeful atrocities and a vengeful war. (SPHU: 86) 
Kohut, however, pushes his analysis further. These manifestations of rage, he 
argues, are only secondary symptoms of a more deep seated disorder. Just as an 
isolated aggressive drive results from the fragmentation of the self, so the 
atrocities and violence of the Nazi era stems from lithe abysmal failure of 
constructive empathy in Germany and in its European surroundings" (SPHU: 
93). Kohut puts his finger on the underlying disorder when he explains: 
The disease itself, as would be the case with an individual patient, was silent. What 
the skilled psychohistorian must look for now, in retrospect, is evidence of a sense of 
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depression, a lack of vitality, and a sense of discontinuity in time and fragmentation 
in space .... the psychological illness of the pre-Hitler Germany was not caused by 
the external adversities to which Germany was exposed at the time. Of course they 
mattered ... But the real issue was the absence of an empathic matrix that would 
have recognized and acknowledged the emotional needs of the German group self 
exposed to such external adversities. (SPHU: 86) 
In the absence of selfobjects appropriate for that time, there was nothing to check 
the regression taking place in the German group self. 
Kohut grants tha t many historical factors, especially political setbacks and 
economic hardships, converged to bring about Germany's decline into Nazi 
hands. These he in no way downplays, but his concern is to show that a people's 
ability to respond creatively or react destructively to hardship and political 
setbacks depends upon their degree of narcissistic vulnerability. Once a people's 
shared ideals and values are lost, and the avenues for attaining their group 
ambitions are blocked, they then become a psychologically vulnerable group. 
With nothing to sustain them empathically, many Germans (as would any other 
people in a similar predicament) fell prey to a leader and political party that 
seemed to offer them a quick and easy way of dealing with the problems that 
arose from the disturl:>ances deep in their group self (see SPHU: 83). 
Not very instance of social evil leads to the complete collapse of society, as was 
the case in Nazi Germany, or more recently in Yugoslavia and Ruanda. So, 
although the case presented by Kohut is in one way extreme, it is instructive as 
in other societies the same disturbing elements may be present. A similar 
combination of social deprivation and psychological regression can take hold in 
any society when a number of structural contradictions overlap. 
14.9 Conclusion: The Potentiality for Decline 
What has been offered in this chapter is a description of how past actions can 
structure an agent's potentiality for future action. People's potential as agents 
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depends upon what they notice and care about, upon their own ideals, skills and 
ambitions, upon their inner resourcefulness and courage, upon their capacity for 
empathic communication, upon the channels available for regulating human 
affairs and meeting material needs. All of these potentialities, however, will 
have been built up and strengthened, or neglected and run down, as a result of 
past actions; these will include not only actions of the persons now concerned 
but of many others too, not only what they each foresaw or intended, but also to 
a large extent the unforeseen consequences of their actions. 
Particular attention has been given to the ways in which defects, or limitations in 
potentiality, may be replicated. If these do take hold and spread they usually 
narrow the scope of what a person or group can accomplish, sometimes reducing 
their own capacity to think, judge and act freely, and in extreme cases negating it 
completely. 
Since human potentialities - both individual and social - mayor may not be 
actualized, and if actualized then in various creative or destructive ways, the 
course of human development (or degeneration) cannot be predicted. People 
may at any time throw a surprise or respond out of character. Though, knowing 
that human. potentialities are shaped by previous activity and example, the 
repercussions of past actions can be assessed and conjectures made for the future. 
This is especially so with defective action, whether its defectiveness stems from a 
lack of resources, sense or morality, as defects narrow the scope for future action. 
Understanding how a society and its members might flourish, or degenerate, 
only really makes sense in terms of an artistic root metaphor. The variety among 
human cultures has shown that there is more than one way of arranging how 
people might live together in society. Likewise, there is more than one course 
which social decline may take. The resulting flaws in society, however, cannot 
readily be compared to faulty parts in a machine, or diseased organs in a living 
organism. They are not parts that can be isolated, excised and replaced. Instead, 
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they are continually generated and spread within the very processes that keep a 
society in being. But exactly in what form they might be generated and the extent 
of their spread depends upon the more or less free interplay of human agents 
going about many of their regular activities. In the course of these, and in ways 
which may only gradually become apparent, they may increasingly fragment 
their own selves and weaken the structures of their society. 
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Part III - Recapitulation 
The discussion in the last four chapters has focussed on two of the four issues 
central to this study, namely: the interrelation of self and society and how 
structure accounts for it; and how evil comes to have a persisting effect in society. 
Regarding the first issue, these chapters have not provided a single picture of 
how society works and the place or role of the self (or selves) within it. Instead, 
they have shown a certain complementarity between the approaches of 
structuration theory and self psychology. Giddens' words that "actors are at the 
same time the creators of social systems yet created by them" (ST: 204) is matched 
by Kohut saying that "wholesome psychological development [which is derived 
from empathic contact with others] ... lays down functional patterns which, in 
adulthood, lead to actions that benefit the social environment and will, sooner 
or later, be accepted by it" (55 III: 267). Though Kohut's words "sooner or later" 
are important, as at any given moment there may well be tension as well as a 
sense of identity between self and society. 
Thus there is no one model for explaining the fit between self and society. The fit 
is neither that of parts in a machine nor of organs is a living body. In fact, to a 
certain degree, a person may reassess and contest the prevailing model of how 
the self should and does fit into society. As Cohen points out: "Social agents, not 
social theorists, produce, sustain, and alter whatever degree of 'systemness' exists 
in social life" (1989: 18). How, for instance, a tax collector sorts out society differs 
from that of a tourist, a miner or farmer. Each in his efforts to make sense of 
social life, and in some degree alter it, still has to draw upon the social structure 
of rules and resources. 
Neither self nor society are discrete and fully determined entities, but an~ always 
co-related and over time mutually shaped by their manifold interrelations. This 
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mutual shaping, however, is neither fully determined by social forces to ~hich 
the self as agent must respond automatically, nor is it the subject of unqualified 
freedom on the agent's part. Activities and interactions can only take place by 
drawing upon self and social structure. Both these structures are constitutive 
potentials that have been built up, shaped and thereby also limited as a result of 
previous action and interaction. They will also be reproduced, sometimes with 
minor and occasionally with major variations, as a result of present action and 
interaction. Every action carries within it the possibility of change both for self 
and society. 
Social structures exhibit a duality: they are drawn upon in the production of 
action and in turn reproduced through action. Their reproduction, however, is 
usually more an unintended consequence of action than an intended result. The 
person spending money wishes to buy an ice cream; her action results in 
upholding the social system of buying and selling, but that was not her intention. 
Even when deliberate effort is made to change society, this rarely works out fully 
as intended, because not all the conditions of action are foreseen and 
consequently allowed for in the action. Also other actors are likely in some 
measure to see what is happening and adjust their actions accordingly. In 
relation to society, no one is the position of a mechanic or surgeon dealing with 
an entity separate from himself. 
The method of institutional analysis given in Giddens' structuration theory will 
show what an individual faces in society, but neither his or her capability of 
dealing with it, nor what he or she will decide to do. As Cohen remarks: the 
concepts of structuration theory 1/ allow the widest possible latitude for the 
diversity and contingencies that may occur in different settings" (1989: 17). These 
concepts allow for an openness to play between self and society, and between self 
and others, even to a certain extent of their each being reconstituted in the 
process. The approaches of both structural theory and self psychology oll:ly make 
sense when they are viewed in terms of an artistic root-metaphor, in which in 
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their various ways self and society work on each other. 
The self, likewise, may be described as a structured potential. Its basic structure of 
ambitions, skills and ideals, is laid down respectively by the mirroring, alter-ego 
support and merger with others that it received early in life. Its continued 
vitality depends upon support from its selfobjects, which are derived from 
empathic contact with others and the overall cultural milieu. A person's ability 
to respond to and deal with the particularities of each social situation generally 
depends upon the coherence of its self structure. Nevertheless, certain individ-
uals who ordinarily appear rather abnormal may be better equipped to deal with 
extreme situations. There is no single standard of adjustment of self to society. 
When it comes to action, no predictions can be made about whether, when or 
how the potentials inherent in self and social structures will be actualized. 
Agents - either intentionally or not - could have acted otherwise or refrained 
from a particular course of action. Nevertheless, their potential for action is still 
finite; it depends both upon their own personal congery of capabilities, the 
prevailing understanding and moral expectations of their society, as well as the 
assymetrical access to the resources it offers them. 
Turning to the question of how evil comes to persist in society, an answer may 
be given at two levels. First and very simply, since evil, as expounded by 
Augustine and Thomas, is the lack of some good that ought to be present, then 
evil persists in a social system because of some deficiency in the structures which 
are drawn upon for the reproduction of that system. Deficient social structures 
may take the form of distorted rules and/ or a deficiency in the resources, or their 
distribution, so that a just social system cannot be brought about or upheld. More 
specifically, there are flaws in how signification, legitimation and domination 
are incor.{'orated into various social institutions or sets of sedimented practices. 
It should be noted that social evil is here located primarily in the structures of 
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society, not on a more obvious organizational level. The way in which a social 
system may be organized can be changed, but social evil will still remain unless 
there is a more deep seated change in people's perceptions and understanding, a 
better appreciation of what is worthwhile and despicable, an improvement in 
material resources (goods, equipment and the skills to use them), and a shift in 
the exercise of authority towards the common good. Unless there is change for 
the better in the rules and resources operative in people's activity, altering how 
an organization is run will only reproduce the same social evils in another form. 
Added to defective structures may be failures in how people identify with their 
society. If its representatives, leaders, artists, philosophers, religious figures and 
entertainers offer no images and symbols to appeal to people's ideals, engage 
their skills and mobilize the best of their ideals, then they will feel lost and 
become prone to follow self-assured leaders offering grandiose symbols that hide 
the emptiness of their promises. Instead of being sustained and acting out of a 
mature selfobject transference, there is a reversion to archaic mergers. The 
danger of this becoming widespread increases with a breakdown in the social 
structures. The deterioration of social conditions and widespread psychological 
regression can reinforce each other in an overall decline. 
Since evil is basically a lack, it does not have a dynamism all its own. It is 
perpetuated and gains its force, however, from the inherent dynamism in people 
to strive to develop their lives, living conditions, and relationships. But when 
the rules and resources that both ell-able them to strive and give their strivings a 
, 
particular direction are defective, then the implementation of the ideals that 
draw them and the ambitions that push them become misdirected and even 
destructive. This does not always happen consciously or deliberately, as people 
are not always fully aware of the defects in the rules, resource,s or imagery that 
they are drawing upon. The defects may be part of the unforeseen, or at least 
unavoidable, conditions of action. So, although people's intention may often be 
directed elsewhere, these defects are nevertheless reproduced as the unintended 
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consequences of action. 
The above gives an answer on a general, and hence experience distant, level to 
how evil comes to persist in a social system. How in any particular social system, 
for instance in South Africa, the former Yugoslavia or Ruanda, it came to have 
such a hold would require detailed socio-historical inquiry. Such an investiga-
tion would be more experience near. There is, however, no single scenario that 
predicts how social decline and system degeneration will take place. It may begin 
with determined efforts by a few bad or evil persons to gain their objectives at 
everyone else's expense. It may stem from those in positions of responsibility 
failing to take timely action. It may be due to a general self-seeking indifference 
on the part of the population as a whole. Or decline may result from a combina-
tion of all these and other factors. 
Even though there is no single scenario that will predict the course of social evil 
in each and every society, certain typical forms can be pointe<;l out that<a_J;:.~ 
prevalent in the modern world. Since evil corrupts the institutional order of 
society, an examination of main features of that order will reveal some of the 
typical ways in which persistent defects may occur within it. This will be pursued 
in Part Four, in the hope of typifying the potential for good and evil existing 
within contemporary society. 
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Part Four 
Personal and Institutional 
Clusterings of Evil 
Part Three looked in general at the underlying principles by which the potential 
for producing persisting evil in self and society may be structured. It showed that 
this negative potential could be analyzed in the form of distorted rules, deficient 
resources, misleading images in society and a lack of personal resourcefulness in 
the self for surmounting them. The following three chapters depict some of the 
typical ways these structural evils may actually occur in contemporary life. They 
look at some disquieting features of the contemporary world, which may in 
whole or part, and in various combinations, pertain in various societies and 
among their members. 
Instead of leaving 'structural evil' as a general concept, the point of these 
chapters is to show the kinds of structural evils that may occur today. They do 
not give an exhaustive description, but demarcate areas where widespread 
institutional evils are likely to build up (Chapter Fifteen) and to show how they 
both affect and are affected by the self (Chapter Sixteen). Attention is also given to 
the mediating work done by leaders - for good or ill - between self and 
society. Although several noteworthy persons are mentioned (Chapter Seven-
teen), mainly to illustrate ways in which leadership may be abused, this study 
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does not offer a full psycho-history of them. Nevertheless, through their .ideas 
and deeds, they have had a pervasive influence on history, making them - for 
better or worse - what Hegel termed 'world historical figures.' 
Each area in which persistent evils are likely to occur could be studied on its 
own. For instance, economic exploitation or sexism, as well as their dependence 
and effects upon personality, could be - and in most cases has been - the 
subject of in-depth study. The aim here, however, is to show that these are not 
isolated problems, but arise from a range of related issues that arise out of the 
overall structuring of modern society and societies. 
This study, nevertheless, does not analyze any particular society. There local 
conditions as well as its own history, including both the intended and unfore-
seen consequences of millions of human agents, will all have imparted their 
own twists to the structuring of evil. The purpose of these chapters is more 




Structural Evil in the Institutional 
Clusterings of Modernity 
"They have idols of silver and gold, made by human hands. 
Their makers will end up like them, everyone who relies on them" (Ps 115:4 & 8). 
This chapter outlines typical ways in which persistent social evil may occur in 
the modern world. It might be termed a study in the institutional afflictions 
(poenae) that result from evil actions and lead to further evil activities. The 
institutions considered in themselves are ambiguou,s; they are necessary for life 
in the modem world and so serve a good purpose but may also be warped by 
evil. Since this warping results from sin and leads to further sin (quia ex peccato 
est et ad peccatum inciinat: this is the formula used about concupiscientia in the 
Decree on Original Sin of the Council of Trent; D 792; DS 1515) it is the institu-
tional counterpart to concupiscence in the case of individuals (see 3.3.3 above 
and 1B.1 below). 
How problems appear largely depends upon the approach brought to them. The 
attitude in which Giddens approaches the problems of modernity is neither one 
of sustained optimism nor cynical pessimism, nor again simply one of pragmatic 
acceptance, but rather one of radical engagement. It accepts that" although we are 
beset by major problems, we can and should mobilise [through social move-
ments] either to reduce their impact or to transcend them" (CMOD: 137). A social 
movement can be - and in most cases already is - engaged in contesting each 
area of risk and exploitation. 
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Giddens encapsulates his view of the darker sides of modernity, when he st?tes: 
there are three main types of exploitative relationships in modem systems besides 
that of class: exploitation associated with the use of political power, including 
military domination; with relationships between ethnic groups; and that associated 
with gender relationships .... Class relationships are associated with one of the main 
institutional orderings of modernity, capitalistic institutions. Industrialism, another 
major institutional clustering of modernity concerns above all the exploitative 
relationships between human beings and nature, rather than social relationships as 
such. Exploitative relationships on the political level here group together govern-
mental power and control of the means of violence. (RMC: 265) 
Apart from gender and ethnic conflict, the other four types of exploitative 
relationships he mentions are each associated with one of the institutional 
clusterings of modernity. Each of these is a necessary but morally ambiguous 
feature of the modern world as it is presently constituted. While offering a basic 
support for a just, workable and humane life together, they can also embody 
activities that are destructive of human life. 
15.1 The Institutional Clusters of Modernity 
Leaving aside how Giddens arrived at this position, he sums up his overall view 
of modern society by pointing out: 
The dissolution of the traditional world under the impact of modernity is not the 
result of capitalism, or of industrialism, or even of the concentration of administra-
tive resources in modern states. It is the result of all these in co-ordination with 
modern means of using military strength and making war. (STMS: 28) 
Since all four influences both work in concert and continually modify one 
another, they are only analytically distinct. Their interrelations are depicted in 
Figure 15.1 below. The control of the means of violence, for instance, takes on 
new forms with increased surveillance; something that is made possible by 
technical improvements in industry and the ability of capitalism to generate 
funds to pay for it. So in analyzing any given society, it would be important both 
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to examine each of these four institutional axes separately and to look into the 
interplay between them. 
Each of these institutional axes or clusters has a pervasive and largely imper-
sonal hold over society. Mention has already been made of the facilitating 
conditions of modernity, namely: its wide time-space distanciation (see 10.3 
above), the dis-embedding and te-embedding of social practices (lOA), its high 
level of reflexivity (10.5) and the prevalence of risk (10.6). The overall result is a 
vast abstract system, which millions of human agents both draw upon so they 
can act and reproduce as a result of their interactions. But, although the system 
can in some instances be influenced, it is not directly under human control. This 
makes many social and moral issues so intractable. 
Surveillance 
Capitalism 
(Control of information I and social supervision) \ 
(Capital accumulation in the 
context of competitive labour 
and product markets) 
\ InduslriaHsm ~ (Transformation of 
nature: development of 
the created environment) 
Military power 
(Control of the means of 
violence in the context of 
the industrialisation of war) 
/ 




A study of how Giddens traces the historical rise, development and workings of 
capitalism today, noting the shifts in his views, could occupy a whole treatise. 
Taken overall, Giddens describes capitalism as 
a system of commodity production, centred upon the relation between private 
ownership of capital and propertyless wage labour, this relation forming the main 
axis of a class system. Capitalist enterprise depends upon production for competi-
tive markets, prices being signals for investors, producers, and consumers alike. 
(CMOD: 55) 
On closer inspection, the main features of capitalism become apparent, namely: 
the insulation of the economic from the political, the convertibility generated by 
money operating as the universal standard of exchange value, the capitalist 
labour contract, its universalizing tendencies, and the dominating effect of 
financial institutions. Each of these has its shadow side. 
15.2.1 Economic Affairs become Insulated from Political Control 
Looked at historically, the rise of capitalism in Western Europe depended upon a 
number of factors. Two of the most crucial were the rise of the absolutist state 
and the aspirations of the bourgeoisie towards civil and particularly economic 
liberty. Both of these helped break down the restrictive network of allocative and 
authoritative relations inherent in feudal society. Although many other factors 
geographical, religious, technological - played their part. 
The monopolisation of the means of violence in the hands of the state went along 
with the extrusion of control of violent sanctions from the exploitative class relations in 
emergent capitalism. Commitment to freedom of contract, which was both part of a 
broader set of ideological claims to human liberties for which the bourgeoisie fought, 
and an actual reality which they sought to further in economic organisation, meant 
the expulsion of sanctions of violence from the newly expanding labour market. 
(CCHM: 180) 
The newly emergent nation-state through its monopolisation of the means of 
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violence made provision for purely economic exchanges based on the possessive 
individualism of the contracting parties. The separation of economic from 
political institutions "is best described as one of insulation, whereby relations 
between capital and wage-labour are kept 'non-political', by the severance of 
industrial conflict from party struggles within the state" (CCHM: 128). Although 
insulated in their operations, both the nation-state and the capitalist economy 
depend upon each other for their operations. 
Taken overall, such insulation can prove detrimental to people and the environ-
ment. If a state does not provide sufficient direction, whether directly by legisla-
tion and supervision or indirectly through fiscal measures, then companies in 
competition with each other can hardly avoid pressing ahead regardless of 
externalities in pursuit of profit. When no economic, legal or social penalties are 
imposed against companies damaging the environment, undermining their 
workers' health, or producing goods that take vital resources away from the poor, 
then those companies cannot afford to attend to such concerns. Paying attention 
to them would push up their prices and make them less competitive. 
The involvement of the state in the economy is an issue that provokes continu-
ing debate. Some kind of dynamic balance between free markets and state 
direction is called for, but it is beyond the scope of this study to even suggest 
where the balance, or series of balances, might be attained. But what is clear is 
that whenever that balance is upset for any length of time, widespread depriva-
tion ensues; no matter whether the upset stems from unchecked greed or a 
hankering after political power, or from a rigid adherence to ideology. 
15.2.2 Capitalism turns Everything into a Commodity 
A necessary prerequisite for capitalism to operate is the commodification of not 
only raw materials and the goods produced from them, but also of hmd and 
labour power. When a monetary price can be set upon each of them, they become 
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commodities that can be brought and sold; monetary exchange enables each of 
them effectively to be converted into the other. 
Prior to the rise of capitalism "those who owned land, and profited from the 
labour of others on that land, were subject to limitations on how far it could be 
either legally transferred or sold on a market" (CCHM: 114). Under feudalism, 
control of land and those who resided upon it were tied down by family inherit-
ance. A feudal lord might be removed by superior force, but he could not be 
bought out. That society was characterized by a low level alienability (correspon-
ding to the top left-hand corner of Figure 15.2 below); whereas a capitalist society 
depends upon a high level alienability both of land and people (corresponding to 
the bottom right corner). 
Low alienability 
High alienability 
Figure 15.2 The alienability of land and capital 
(CCHM: 114) 
In feudal and other traditional societies, the local community had high 
presence-availability; in other words, social activity took place in local contexts 
where the main agents, or their deputies, were present to one another. But under 
capitalism, money as lithe medium of 'pure exchange-value' ... expresses and 
makes possible the disembedding of social relationships from communities of 
high presence-availability" (CCHM: 115). When the exchange-value of every-
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thing can be expressed in monetary terms, very low presence-availability is 
required to keep "the cycle of investment-profit-reinvestment characteristic of 
capitalist enterprise" (NSV: 134) in motion. Investing on the stock market or 
financing foreign trade, for instance, hardly bring one into immediate contact 
with those running the business or carrying out its operations. Yet one's activ-
ities can have far reaching ramifications. 
The commodification of land and labour can readily lead to both of them being 
viewed, and subsequently treated, as no more than commodities. When the land 
on which people dwell and which provides them with a measure of continuity is 
treated as just another raw material, not only may environmental damage result 
but also its inhabitants can be psychologically undermined. Furthermore, when 
people are cos ted as units of labour-power, in monetary terms they become 
comparable to inputs of capital, energy and raw materials. 
The commodification of labour-power not only permits but demands its consolida-
tion as 'abstract labour' ... [which makes] possible the 'design' of work processes in 
ways which integrate labour-power with the technological organization of produc-
tion. (NSV: 144) 
This abstract outlook, which derives from industrialism as well as capitalism 
(CMOD: 61), makes it all too easy to overlook the humanity of workers, especially 
when they are located on the far side of the world. 
15.2.3 Survival Depends upon a Labour Contract 
A corollary to the commodification of goods, and especially land, is the 
commodification of labour power. 
For the first time in history, large segments (eventually the vast majority) of the 
working population do not directly produce the means of their own subsistence, but 
contract out their labour to others who, in the form of money wages, provide the 
wherewithal for them to survive. (NSV: 133) . 
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Arrangements for paying wages do vary, but in each case "there is a purely 
economic connection of mutual dependency established between employer and 
worker" (CCHM: 179). Once the work is done and payment made, employer and 
employee have no further obligations towards one another. 
The only sanction, possessed by employers as a whole rather than by individual 
employers, is the need of expropriated workers to have some form of paid work -
der stumme Zwang, the 'dull compulsion' of economic relations, as Marx described it. 
(CCHM: 124) 
The capitalistic labour contract differs from slavery, a press gang, serfdom and 
feudal ties as workers are at liberty to sell their labour to whoever agrees to buy it. 
It must, however, be added that violence was used extensively to bring about 
situations where people needed to sell their labour in order to survive. The 
enclosures in England, or the Land Act and the imposition of poll and hut taxes 
in South Africa, could only pe accomplished by the ruling class or the state 
having control of the means of violence. 
All this raises the question of whether capitalism is inherently exploitative. 
There is no clear cut answer; opponents of capitalism generally point to the 
widespread deprivation and gross inequalities that occur in capitalist countries, 
whereas its exponents extol an ideal and then blame evident social ills on factors 
extrinsic to capitalism. Without directly stating that capitalism is inherently 
exploitative, Giddens' treatment of the capitalist labour contract does disclose a 
weakness at its centre. Unless definite measures are taken to obviate that 
weakness, then the inherent 'logic' of capitalism will drive it in an exploitative 
direction. 
Its central weakness from a moral point of view is not that various employers 
are mean, out for high profits, and seeking ever-new ways of exploiting their 
employees. That may be true, but it overlooks the central exploitative feature of 
capitalism, namely that lithe 'free' exchange of labour-power and capital in the 
context of the capitalist market in fact allows the capitalist class coercive power 
473 
over wage-labour" (CCHM: 111). Individual capitalists may be mean and 
rapacious or not, but what is crucial is that 
property becomes the organising principle of production at the same time as it is the 
source of class division. ... Ownership of private property is both the means of 
appropriating a surplus product .. and simultaneously the means whereby the 
economic system is mobilised. This is why Marx's stress upon the process whereby 
labour power itself becomes a commodity is so important; for it is in the labour 
contract that contradiction and class conflict, in the capitalist mode of production, 
coincide. (epST: 163f) 
Especially when allowed to run without the restraint of a social compact, 
capitalism simultaneously makes members of society more and more interde-
pendent while increasing the divisions in wealth and power between them. Also 
the global character of industrialism along with the expansion of capitalism gives 
rise to the international division of labour. In the modern world "the industrial 
and political transformations of nineteenth-century Europe have become 
transferred to the international plane in the confrontation of rich and poor 
nations" (PCST: 59f). 
15.2.4 Capitalism tends to take Everything Before it 
In pre-capitalist societies a healthy economy could remain in a state of equilib-
rium, with no overall expansion or contraction. liThe capitalist economy, both 
internally and externally, is intrinsically unstable and restless" (CMOD: 61). To 
flourish it must continually expand. 
The pursuit of profit, which is convertible into all kinds of advantages, gives 
capitalism its inner dynamism. For profit brings not just a wide range of goods 
and services, but opens the doors to educational advantages, improved medical 
treatment, better living conditions, and an improved occupational position (see 
CPST: 104f). Due to convertibility arid the capitalist economy being i~sulated 
against political interference, all these advantages can be purchased. So striving 
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for profit becomes almost synonymous with striving for them. This helps 
explain why 
The economic exchanges involved in capitalislll tend to 'strip away' other aspects of 
the relationships they engender. In other words, in its 'purer' forms at least, 
capitalism has no place for moral conceptions, social justice or patriotism. In so far 
as governments legitimate their rule by reference to such ideals, their objectives and 
interests may clash with those of business leaders .... In the contemporary word, the 
global capitalist economy, and what has now become a world-wide nation-state 
system, stand in continuing tension with one another. (RMC: 273) 
This tension probably reaches its highest in the relation, not so much between 
governments and industrial companies, even transnational ones, but between 
governments and financial institutions. 
The inherent imperative of capitalism to grow so as to avoid economic stagna-
tion also has its effects on the population as a whole. Growth, or the expansion 
of monetary exchange relations, is promoted by the shaping of consumption 
patterns and penetration of new market areas. 
The spread of capitalism places large sectors (although by no means all) of social 
reproduction in the hands of markets for products and labour. Markets operate 
without regard to pre-established forms of behaviour, which for the most part 
represent obstacles to the creation of unfettered exchange. (MSI: 197) 
So, when people are subjected to and fall under the sway of advertised consump-
tion patterns, 
the consumption of ever-novel goods becomes in part a substitute for the genuine 
development of self; appearance replaces essence as the visible signs of successful 
consumption comes actually to outweigh the use-values of the goods and services in 
question themselves. (MSI: 198) 
New market areas are often sought across national boundaries, especially where 
it is easier to persuade a less wary population that a novel consumption package 
will enhance their success or satisfaction. 
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The overall social effect of marketing is not limited to "the reordering of existing 
behaviour patterns" (MSI: 199), the sale of more goods, that leave people much 
the same. Ivlarketing can alter people through its presentation of new life-styles 
(usually affluent ones) and/ or its portrayal of alternative narratives with which 
the public at large, and consumers in particular, may identify. Instead of actually 
enhancing the person, providing him or her with greater self-definition, 
marketing often leads to "momentary assuagement of desires and lasting 
frustration of needs" (Bauman quoted in MSI: 198). So, although the economic 
turnover increases, this may be because "the market feeds on the unhappiness it 
generates: the fears, anxieties and the sufferings of personal inadequacy it induces 
release the consumer behaviour indispensable to its continuation" (Bauman, 
1989 quoted in MSI: 198). 
Taken overall, then, the expansion of production and consumption - often 
hailed as the success of capitalism - may at least in part be accomplished 
through the undermining of people's humanity. Fortunately, however, people 
do learn to be critical, consequently "commodification does not carry the day 
unopposed on either an individual or collective level" (MSI: 199). 
14.2.5 Power is Concentrated in Financial Institutions 
The role that banks and other financial institutions play in shaping society is 
often overlooked. Capitalism includes money markets, as well as the trading of 
goods and services (see CMOD: 71£) .24 The operations of financial centres such as 
the World Bank, the City [of London], New York, Zurich and Tokyo or at times 
the lack of their interest, often determine whether industry (mining, manufac-
turing and commerce) will grow in certain areas or not. Particular industries may 
help shape a society, but whether that industry is to operate at all frequently 
24 It is es~mated that only ab? ut.2% o~ the trading in the world money markets is concerned with actual 
goods and services. The other 98.% IS fmanCial speculatIOn in currencies and derivatives, such as futures. The 
sums mv?lved dwarf the ec~nOlnJes of many smaller countries. Losses can sink banks before. their management 
even realizes what IS happenll1g. 
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depends upon decisions made in financial institutions. Industry has to operate 
within the conditions laid down for credit, mortgages, loans, overdrafts, and 
interest rates; the margin for operation that these allow is often a predominant 
influence in determining whether a particular firm can operate, expand or must 
close down. 
If modern industry is considered as a way of stretching time-space distanciation 
through linking particular locales of interaction in an abstract system, then the 
activities of financial institutions - banks, brokers, stock exchanges, IMF and 
provisions worked out by the World Trade Organization (formerly GATT), G-7, 
EEe, Lome, and various customs unions - form overarching abstract systems 
within which the former can operate. They are abstract in that their provisions 
are very general, opening up and closing off possibilities for trade, industry, 
commerce, and manufacturing, to operate, but very real in their effects, for 
instance, in increasing or decreasing employment opportunities, rates of pay, 
costs of commodities and credit. These changes in turn promote or threaten the 
life-chances of millions of people, invariably those far removed from the 
decision making circles of banks and international financial institutions. 
The above discussion shows the difficulty of assessing capitalism as a whole, 
taking account of both the benefits it brings and the harm it wreaks. But it is 
evident that exploitative relations are easily taken into its overall operation. 
Each of its main features, unless rigorously checked, can have a deleterious effect 
upon people's lives. 
15.3 Industrialism 
Industrialism is not a strictly technological phenomenon. The Industrial 
Revolution was brought about not just by the introduction of machinery, but by 
building up the propensity for disciplined work. People became industrious in all 
areas of life. Only in the nineteenth century when the use of machinery became 
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much more widespread did 'industry' take on a more restricted meaning. So 
today in speaking of 'light or heavy industry', one refers to the amount of 
machinery involved in a particular productive process. This restriction of 
meaning went along with people in the industrialized countries coming 
generally to accept organized labour as the norm. Industrial production depends 
upon regularity at work, the coordination of activities and the organization of 
social relationships. Once people had acquired industrial habits, most attention 
then shifted to the development and running of industrial plant. The human 
factors were simply presumed, and at times came to be overlooked. 
The chief characteristic of industriaLism is the use of inanimate sources of material 
power in the production of goods, coupled to the central role of machinery in the 
production process ... .Industrialism presupposes the regularised social organisation 
of production in order to coordinate human activity, machines, and the inputs and 
outputs of raw materials and goods ... No less than to such situations [coal powered 
heavy machinery], the notion of industrialism applies to high technology settings 
where electricity is the only power ,source, and where electronic microcircuits are the 
only mechanised devices. Industrialism, moreover, affects not only the workplace but 
transportation, communication, and domestic life. (CMOD: 55f; see also NSV: 138f) 
Industrialism should not however be simply equated with factories employing 
many workers. Production can also be broken down into particular pieces of 
work that can be 'let out' to individuals working at home or subcontracted to 
small backyard enterprises. This is taken a step further when manufacturing is 
broken down to a set of straightforward tasks that can be performed by relatively 
unskilled labour. It is then feasible, so long as transport and communications are 
available, to locate manufacturing anywhere in the world; in a capitalist world 
order this inevitably results in manufacturing moving to those countries, or 
areas within a country, where labour is cheapest. 
15.3.1 Nature under the Threat from Technology 
While capitalism, especially its exploitative aspects, is contested by la~our and 
other class-based movements, the excesses of industrialism are now contested by 
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'green' movements. Although Giddens does not examme at any length the 
harmful effects of industrialism, he brings out how the relation between nature 
and humanity has changed. 
In conditions of modernity; people live in artificial environments in a double sense. 
First, because of the spread of the built environment, in which the vast majority of 
the population dwell, human habitats become separate from nature, now repre-
sented only in the form of the 'countryside' or 'wilderness'. Second, in a profound 
sense, nature literally ceases to exist as naturally occurring events become more and 
more pulled into systems determined by socialised influences. (MSI: 165f) 
At one time nature was a separate domain from human society, but "today we 
can speak of the 'end of nature' " (MSI: 137). Consequently, nowadays, "the site of 
struggle of ecological movements is the created environment" (CMOD: 161). 
Nature, as the provider both of raw materials and of human effort, has as it were 
to fit into the time discipline imposed by the spread of industrialism across the 
globe. For this reason, the 'end of nature' should be seen not just as the extension 
of 'instrumental reason' but the "emergence of an internally referential system of 
knowledge and power" (MSI: 144). So, whilst preindustrial society was formed 
within the ambit of what nature offered, modern society increasingly puts its 
demands on nature to supply materials and energy for it to carryon its own 
purposes. For instance, vast industries are organized to produce, package and 
transport consumer goods across the world to satisfy socially induced wants. 
These "humanly structured systems" derive their "motive power and dynamics 
from socially organised knowledge-claims" (MSI: 144). But they do not always 
work out as planned. 
Accidents occur; nonrenewable resources become exhausted; waste products 
cause pollution; renewable resources are destroyed; and overall the earth's 
capacity to sustain life is diminished. Giddens puts these damaging effects down 
to two main factors: "design faults" in the processes used and to "operator 
failure" . Regarding the first, he sees no reason why in principle "design faults 
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should not be eradicated" in dealing with socialised nature. But "unlike design 
faults, operator failure appears to be ineradicable." After all, Giddens contends, 
"the root cause of the disaster [at Chernobyl] was a mistake made in the operating 
of the emergency shutdown systems" (CMOD: 152). 
Is this analysis of the damaging effect of industrialism upon the environment 
sufficient? Does the central problem lie in human knowledge being limited, and 
people sometimes failing to apply it correctly? Would more knowledge, better 
system design, and increased backup in case of operator failure, come close to 
meeting human needs and minimize unwanted end results? Giddens gives a 
hint that something more is at issue, when he admits that 
the logic of unfettered scientific and technological development will have to be 
confronted if serious and irreversible harm [to the environment] is to be avoided. The 
humanising of technology is likely to involve the increasing introduction of moral 
issues into the now largely 'instrumental' relation between human beings and the 
created environment. (CMOD: 170) 
A central moral issue is, not the adequacy of particular technologies, but the 
overall adequacy of the technological approach for understanding reality and 
shaping human endeavour at all. 25 It is not just technology that has failed and 
needs improvement, but human attitudes need to be altered and new lifestyle 
patterns adopted. 
By far the greatest amount of ecological damage derives from the modes of life 
followed in the modernised sectors or world society. Ecological problems highlight 
the new and accelerating interdependence of global systems and bring home to 
everyone the depth of the connections between personal activity and planetary 
problems. (MSI: 221) 
This becomes evident when it realized that consumerism is the other side of 
expanding industrialism, which in turn has both immediate and long range 
effects upon the environment. Many environmental problems are caused by the 
24 I have found the w~rk~ of Davi~ B?hn: offer a promising new approach to such issues. They show the 
value of technology but also Its mherent hnutahons. If the latter are not attended to people fall into fragmentary 
thinking, ultimately reducing reality to a pile of fragments (see Connor, 1991). 
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expansion of industrialism to keep up with the ever increasing demands of 
consumerism. Its demands are in turn stimulated to some extent by the wi·sh to 
offset the harmful effects of environmental damage. This vicious circle in turn 
feeds capitalism's inherent tendency to penetrate into more and more areas of 
living. 
Industrialisation, then, is part of the juggernaut of modernity. It is indispensable 
for sustaining human life for large populations across the globe, but in so doing 
it poses various threats to the life sustaining capacities of the earth. These threats 
derive not solely from technological mistakes; they are also due to the imposi-
tion of socially induced expectations and practices that treat the whole environ-
ment (humankind included) predominantly in an instrumental fashion. 
The model for the establishment of factories where hundreds and even thou-
sands of workers were concentr~ted together was the military. Factories were 
built, not because they were the only way of harnessing new technology, but 
because of "a perceived need to discipline wage-labour by submitting workers to 
direct means of surveillance" (CCHM: 124). This leads us, however, to consider 
the next institutional clustering of modernity. 
15.4 Surveillance 
Another characteristic of modern society, more particularly the nation-state, is 
the ability to exercise administrative control over the population as a whole. 
This depends upon the state's surveillance capacity, its ability to collect, analyze, 
store, and disseminate information, and use it in supervising people's activities. 
Modern states, and the modern world system as a whole, involves a tremendous 
acceleration in the production and orgai1ization of information. Although it is 
commonly supposed that we are only now in the late twentieth century entering the 
era of information, modern societies have been 'information societies' since their 
beginnings. (STMS: 27) 
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Not only is information, gained through one or other kind of surveill~nce, 
required for administrative purposes by the government, it is also important for 
running the industrial workplace and for the workings of modern capitalism. 
"Surveillance is a medium of power which, whatever its ties to the ownership of 
private property, does not derive directly from it. The same comment applies to 
control of the means of violence" (NSV:147). 
Surveillance refers to the supervision of the activities of subject populations in 
the political sphere - although its importance as a basis of administrative 
power is by no means confined to that sphere. Supervision may be direct (as in 
many of the instances discussed by Foucault, such as prisons, schools, and open 
workplaces), but more characteristically it is indirect and based upon the control 
of information (see CMOD: 58). 
Surveillance involves "the collation of information relevant to state control of 
the conduct of its subject population, and the direct supervision of that conduct" 
(CCHM: 5). Although this sounds sinister, it is not necessarily so. For instance, a 
register of births and deaths may be used in planning to meet housing, health 
and educational needs in the future. On the other hand, surveillance may lead to 
tapping people's phone calls, recording all their meetings and threatening them 
against expressing opinions considered detrimental to state security. 
The state is not the only body in modern society interested in surveillance. For 
benign or other reasons, firms employing large numbers or workers adopt 
various surveillance procedures, which may range from punch cards for clocking 
on and off to bugging workers' conversations in the toilets. Other forms of 
surveillance include opinion polls and market research. The latter plays a fairly 
crucial role in the design, manufacture and marketing of new products. 
A number of transnational corporations have taken the gathering and analysis of 
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information a stage further. Their surveillance extends to examining not. only 
the market, but to the socio-political conditions and economic trends of the 
countries in which they operate. For instance, Anglo-American Corporation was 
reputed to have better intelligence on the neighbouring states of Southern Africa 
than the South African government. Working out projections based on the 
collation and analysis of information is not a state monopoly. 
15.4.1 Surveillance can turn into Subjugation 
Without a considerable measure of surveillance no modern society could be 
effectively administered; essential services - housing, transport, health, 
welfare, education and protection - would be nonexistent or break down. 
Nevertheless, surveillance is another site of struggle. Excesses in the gathering 
and use of personal information, too much supervision and disciplining of 
people, and restrictive controls are contested by movements for human rights, 
free speech and democracy. But without some measure of surveillance there 
would be no informed public opinion, a prerequisite for democracy. 
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when surveillance increases to such an extent 
that it becomes excessive, Giddens does however provide a suggestion. Some-
thing is clearly wrong when the demands of keeping an administration running 
take precedence over all other considerations. This occurs when the internal 
maintenance of the system overrules all the other aims and values that people 
might hold. 
Surveillance plus reflexivity means a 'smoothing of the rough edges' such that 
behaviour which is not integrated into a system - that is, not knowledgeably built 
into the mechanisms of system reproduction - becomes alien and discrete. To the 
degree to which such externalities become reduced to point zero, the systeln becomes 
wholly an internally referential one. (MSI: 150) 
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Those who do no t fit in are "categorized by the central authorities an.d by 
professional specialists" (NSV: 184), and - one might add - by public opinion 
too as deviant. Horowitz (1972) argues that behaviour which an administration 
might see as a breach of law and order, and classify, as deviance in need of 
correction, can also be viewed as the rightful upholding of a moral standpoint or 
an expression of political opposition. For instance, acts of civil disobedience are 
purposely designed to challenge and show up the moral shortcomings of the 
prevailing system of surveillance and control. Each side claims that its view of 
the ensuing conflict is the legitimate one. 
A blatant example of an administration endeavouring to uphold its own system 
as sensible and legitimate, and at the same time to render the political opposition 
ineffective, was the practice in USSR of putting I dissidents' in mental asylums. 
The message is that anyone who questions the system must be insane, and hence 
there is no point in even listening to them. 
The con~entrated supervision imposed by various total institutions may be so 
intense that nearly all freedom and personal initiative are suppressed. Asylums, 
hospitals, nursing and old age homes may treat their inmates like prisoners, 
keeping them under constant surveillance and controlling their activities 
completely. Restrictions, or the manner in which they are applied, go beyond 
what is necessary for protecting the inmates from harm. Instead they come to be 
imposed mainly to keep the system running as smoothly as possible regardless of 
their effect upon the inmates themselves. Such conditions, especially when 
people are subjected to them for a long period, can be contested as an effective 
denial of human rights. 
In business firms, schools and other modern organizations, where "the individ-
ual only spends part of the day within their walls" (NSV: 186) surveillance is 
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more diffuse. But these less than total institutions do enhance the "int~rnal 
pacification [of society as a whole] through promoting the discipline of poten-
tially recalcitrant groups at major points of tension, especially in the sphere of 
production" (NSV: 187). Regularized supervision is applied "in order either to 
inculcate or to attempt to maintain certain traits of behaviour in those subject to 
it" (NSV: 184£). To what extent such discipline promotes healthy self-growth in 
those subject to it, and to what extent it merely keeps an organization running or 
consolidates the power of those in change, is frequently a contested issue. But the 
greater the time-space distanciation there is in an organization, the more likely 
will surveillance tend towards mere system reproduction. 
Giddens' diagnosis of modernity, however, goes further; he says that "much 
more fundamental is the intensifying of administrative control more generally, 
a phenomenon not wholly directed by anyone precisely because it affects 
everyone's activities" (MSI: 149). When "information-keeping, especially in the 
form of personal records of life-histories held by the administrative authorities" 
(NSV: 184) is widespread, everyone is placed under a subtle pressure to conform. 
People do not want to have a bad record not only with government departments 
or the courts, but also with their school or college, their bank or insurance 
company, their doctor or psychiatrist. While this pressure may check crime to 
some extent, it also can subtly discourage people from speaking out or protesting 
about issues that should be contested. Nevertheless, there is a counter trend, as 
mass democracy "is the 'price' ruling groups pay for the compliance they seek to 
secure from those subject to their administrative dominance" (RMC: 274). 
Surveillance, as both the gathering of information and its use in controlling 
people, becomes most sinister when it is undertaken by agencies not subject to 
any form of democratic or judicial control. This occurs when those char~ed with 
"policing the routine activities of the mass of the population" (NSV: 187) are 
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accorded the almost unlimited power to counter any activity they consider . to be 
deviant, or against state security, or even detrimental to their own organisation. 
Here surveillance becomes a feature of totalitarian rule (see 15.5.1 below). 
In modern society surveillance is indispensable for the effective use of adminis-
trative resources, but it remains morally ambiguous. 
The intensifying of surveillance operations provides many avenues of democratic 
involvement, but also makes possible the sectional control of political power, 
bolstered by the monopolistic access to the means of violence, as an instrument of 
terror. (CMOD: 172) 
This brings us to the fourth institutional clustering, access to the means of 
violence in society, which now remains to be examined. 
15.5 Control of the Means of Violence 
Sociologists have paid scant attention to how "the successful monopoly of the 
means of violence is distinctive to the modern state" (CMOD: 58). The role of 
police and the military in shaping society has been largely overlooked. It was 
"supposed that economic exchange transactions, leading to economic interdepen-
dence, would replace the militaristic societies of the past" (SIMS: 28). But matters 
have not worked out that way. 
War and violence is nothing new to human history, but "the successful monop-
oly of the means of violence within territorially precise borders is distinctive to 
the modern state" (CMOD: 58). When this monopoly breaks down, civil war is 
liable to break out, but this is itself a modern phenomenon; "the very existence 
of 'civil war' presumes a norm of monopolistic state authority" (NSV: 1~1). Prior 
to the modern nation-state "the military strength of the ruling authorities 
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depended upon alliances with local princes or warlords, who were always ~iable 
either to break away or directly to challenge the ruling groups" (CMOD: 58). This 
contrasts with the modern nation-state, where usually the police have the 
monopoly on legitimate internal violence, and the military on external violence 
directed against other nation-states. 
In certain respects, South Africa is an anomaly because the central government 
did in some degree let go its monopoly of the means of violence. It misguidedly 
established homeland armies and police forces, allowed vigilante groups to 
operate, permitted the widespread carrying of lethal weapons, and set up covert 
operations with a dubious system of command. Reversing this has not proved 
easy. 
The surveillance capacity of the nation-state has made universal conscription of 
citizens possible; citizenship "implies acceptance of the obligations of military 
service" (NSV: 233). Conscription is used not solely for military reasons, but also 
as a means of imbuing each new generation of citizens with the requisite sense of 
loyalty to the state. 
Industrialism has contributed immensely to the growth of military power. The 
ability of a nation-state to wage war successfully in modern times depends in 
large measure on its industrial capacity. Besides armaments, industry has to 
supply food, clothing, transport, communications instruments and all the other 
equipment needed to maintain military installations and keep forces in the field. 
The demands of the military, both for more sophisticated weapons and for 
general supplies, have in turn stimulated industry. 
This raises the question of "how far industrialized countries should really be 
regarded as 'military-industrial' societies" (NSV: 246). Giddens grants that "both 
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military leaders and manufacturers are often able to wield considerable ~nflu­
ence, directly and indirectly, over certain policies [of government]" and that 
"military expenditure can help generate favourable conditions of production 
both for manufacturers and for an overall national economy" (NSV: 248). Or it 
can cripple it. Industry in the former USSR was so geared to military research 
and production that once military imperatives fell away many industries 
collapsed. Writing in 1990 - after the collapse of communist rule and before the 
breakup of USSR - Sergei Blagovolin states: "The total number of people 
employed in the manufacturing and mining industries in the Soviet Union in 
38,2 million. One-third of them are employed in the military industry" (1990: 62). 
A nation-state's might as a military power depends also on the ability to pay for it 
(see NSV: 102). Modern conventional wars, and hardly even a guerrilla war, 
cannot be sustained by the expropriation of products - not usually surplus ones 
- from the local population. Sufficient surplus value has to be generated to 
cover military expenditures. Without that, as in the poorer nations of the world, 
high military expenditures deprive citizens of basic needs and so generate 
political instability. Today not only the former USSR, but also USA and RSA are 
in economic decline due at least in part to high military expenditures. 
Recognition of the 'security apparatus' as a distinct organisational cluster allows 
one to perceive the effect on society of low intensity warfare, of being subject to 
total onslaught and total strategy. These appear above all in that modern 
phenomenon 'the national security state,' which cannot be merely regarded as a 
capitalist accessory. 
15.5.1 Totalitarian Rule 
The worst of features of all four institutional axes are combined when rule 
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becomes totalitarian. Giddens remarks that "there is no type of nation-st~te in 
the contemporary world which is completely immune from the potentiality of 
being subject to totalitarian rule" (NSV: 302). Any country can move to a greater 
or lesser extent in this direction, so long as "the state can successfully penetrate 
the day-to-day activities of most of its subject population" (NSV: 302). "Totalitar-
ian" refers not to a type of state, but "rather to a type of rule, unstable in major 
aspects, yet capable of bringing about the most horrendous consequences for the 
populations that suffer the brunt of its concentrated power" (NSV: 301). 
Prior to modernity many rulers and regimes were despotic and brutal, but their 
surveillance capability was insufficient for them to control the activities of the 
population as a whole. 
The [despotic] ruler may have command over the lives of his subjects in the sense 
that if they do not obey, or actively rebel, he can put them to death. But the 'power 
of life and death' in this sense is not the same as the capability of controlling the 
day-to-day lives of the mass of the population, which the ruler is not able to do. 
(CCHM: 104; see STMS: 175) 
Generally they lacked the facilities to collect, codify and communicate informa-
tion about everyone. 
Totalitarianism is, first of all, an extreme focusing of surveillance, devoted to the 
securing of political ends deemed by the state authorities to demand urgent political 
mobilization. Surveillance tends to become concentrated (a) in respect of a multipli-
cation of mode of the documenting of the subject population by the state - identity 
cards, permits of all sorts, and other kinds of official papers, have to be held by all 
members of the population and used to follow even the most ordinary of activities; 
and (b) this is the basis of an expanded supervision of those activities, carried out 
by the police and their agents. (NSV: 303) 
Several characteristics, besides surveillance, are evident in a society held in the 
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grip of totalitarian controL There is a totalist ideology, which may be progr~ssive 
or conservative and may have a nationalist, racist or economic basis, or combine 
several of these elements. The ideology is then enforced" by a single political party 
led by a dictator. This does not however preclude arbitrary and erratic decisions 
that run counter to former policy. The dictates of the party are enforced by a 
secret police force and an extensive network of informers. Under totalitarian 
rule, no autonomous bodies or alternative power bases are permitted; all 
organisations, businesses and the communications media are subjected to strict 
control. 
To these characteristics must be added "a reign of terror, using the concerted 
application of force in pursuit of its designated objectives", though this "is 
implicit perhaps in the mention of the role of the secret police" (NSV: 298). 
The widespread use of terror, according to Arendt, tends to be integrated with strict 
control over cultural production, because the point of the threat of violence is not so 
much to instil fear as to create a climate in which acceptance of propaganda will be 
facilitated. (NSV: 300) 
Totalitarian rulers expect people not just conform but actually to believe in 
them, and this is why the population is subjected to constant propaganda. Unlike 
professional military rulers, whose regime may be extremely harsh, the leader 
figure attempts to generate through a mixture of appealing to people's pride, 
making grandiose promises and instilling uncertainty through selective terror 
tactics, to generate mass support. To accomplish this the leader must echo in 
some way the people's aspirations or embody their historical fate (see NSV: 303f). 
Especially in times of uncertainty "the mass of the population is likely to become 
vulnerable to the influence of symbols propagated by the leader figure", who is 
"trusted because of his very authoritarianism not in spite of it" (NSV: 305). 
Giddens sums up the resulting moral effect of totalitarian rule, when he says that 
490 
"regressive identification with a leader figure leads to a partial suspensi?n of 
independent moral judgements that individuals in other circumstances might 
make" (NSV: 305). Coupled with this affective reliance upon the leader figure is 
"a strong psychological affiliation to an 'in-group', which the leader symbolizes, 
together with an extreme rejection of lout-groups', which fail to possess the 
special qualities that bind leader and followership together" (NSV: 305). Those 
depicted as out-groups this century have included fascists, capitalists, commu-
nists, Jews, blacks and imperialists. 
What Giddens brings out as the main characteristic of totalitarian rule is not the 
application of violence, brutal though that is, but the heightening of surveil-
lance. This entails that whatever anybody says or does is perceived, evaluated 
and judged from the point of view of the agency conducting the surveillance; no 
other viewpoint or contribution is permissible (see STMS: 30). 
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15.5.2 Modernity's Problems are Interlocked 
Many of the socio-moral problems mentioned above afflict every society, even 
though not all decline so far that they become totalitarian. "The 'menacing 
appearance' of the circumstances in which we live today" (CMOD: 125) which 
Giddens depicts is corroborated by other analyses. Ekins, for instance, speaks of 
four interlocking crises - militarisation, poverty, environmental destruction, 
human repression - "all of which have the potential for the destruction of 
whole peoples and some of which threaten the extinction of the human race 
itself" (1992: 1). He adds 
taken singly they would be difficult enough to ameliorate, let alone solve. The 
situation is made far more intractable by the fact that each of the problems actually 
reinforces the others .... these interactions [between them] turn the four separately 
described problems into a single, systemic global problematique of great complexity. 
(Ekins, 1992: 13) 
None of the four institutional clusterings operate on their own; there are 
various affinities and conjunctions, as well as tensions and conflicts, between 
them. Their overall effect gives modernity, both within each nation-state and 
across the globe, its juggernaut quality. Yet even this metaphor has its limits, 
because "the juggernaut of modernity is not all of one piece" (CMOD: 139) nor 
does it run along a single path. 
15.6 Social Antagonisms Based on Ethnicity and Race 
Not all social antagonisms or forms of exploitation can be encompassed within 
the four institutional clusterings of modernity. Conflict between ethnic groups, 
nations and races can also become endemic in society, though not all such 
conflicts follow a similar pattern, nor can they be explained in terms ' of class 
antagonisms. "Other modes of domination may cut across class domination; or 
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alternatively they may have the effect of accentuating rather than diminis~g or 
weakening it" (CPST: 115). So, for instance, people of all classes may find a 
common cause in anti-semitism, whereas colonial racial prejudice runs fairly 
closely to the division between ruling and subservient classes. Considerably 
different again is the ever changing kaleidoscope of divisions and alliances in 
South Africa; to understand them account has to be taken of not only racial and 
ethnic divisions, but also class differences based on wealth, as well as various 
ideological conflicts and a differential access to the means of violence. Giddens 
makes no reference to apartheid as such and certainly does not attempt to 
analyze South African society. He merely remarks generally that 
on the level of international relations, the associations between capitalism, the 
nation-state and nationalism help to explain some of the most virulent forms of 
racism witnessed in our times. (Do not make the mistake of supposing that racism is 
an artifact of capitalism, however. There are clear evidences of its pervasiveness in 
ancient Sumer.) (CCHM: 243) 
Giddens recognizes that social divisions based on ethnic (and also gender) 
differences predate modernity, though they have been somewhat restructured by 
some modern institutions. He adds, however, that racism "an outlook based on 
erroneous interpretations of biological inheritance, is in some substantial part a 
modern phenomenon" (RMC: 265). 
Within many modern states "ethnic discrimination serves to create minority 
ethnic 'underclasses', whose economic circumstances are markedly inferior to 
those of the majority of the population" (CCHM: 243). New immigrants often 
can only find unskilled work and so form "a new working class" beneath 
semiskilled and skilled workers who constitute "the old working class" (See 
CSAS: 216-9). Trade unions are sometimes responsible for maintaining ethnic 
and racial barriers to protect their members from competition. 
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Thus ethnic discrimination in many contemporary countries has the consequet:tce of 
driving those subject to that discrimination into segmented labour markets, helping 
to consolidate the fomlation of distinct underclasses. This is hence a kind of 'double 
discrimination' . (CPST: 115) 
In these instances ethnic 'outsiders' are denied access to certain privileges and 
opportunities; this Giddens terms 'exclusionary closure'. But the idea of 'social 
closure' [a term of ,,y eber' s] can also be applied to the strategies the' outsiders' or 
subordinated groups adopt. Those excluded can also exclude others in 
an attempt to break down the exclusion, or otherwise gain a greater share of the 
resources monopolised by the dominant group or groups. The objective of the 
underprivileged is to usurp the prerogatives of those to whom they are subordinated. 
Thus we can refer to two generic types or strategies of social closure: exclusion and 
usurpation. (PCST: 187£) 
Not only black power, but Indian or Italian clannishness would be examples of 
social closure undertaken with the aim of usurpation. 
15.7 Gender Conflicts 
Gender issues are not new, as "there seems to be no known society, ... in which 
men do not in some key spheres hold more power than women" (RMC: 265). 
Nevertheless 
the creation of 'everyday life' in capitalist time-space, with its characteristic 
separation of home and workplace, together with other aspects of the 
commodification of social relations, have decisively influenced the relations between 
the sexes, and at least in certain respects served to intensify the exploitation of 
women. (CCHM: 243) 
Furthermore, "for women of ethnic backgrounds subject to discrimination, there 
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may exist a 'triple discrimination' " (CPST: 115) due to class, ethnic and s~xual 
domination. 
Giddens remarks that: "Gender divisions and ethnic schisms are more deeply 
engraved in human social organization, and human psychology, than are the 
other forms of exploitative domination" (RMC: 265). They run deeper, because 
they are primarily concerned with relations between people rather than the 
interrelating of their actions. They are concerned with what people are, rather 
than what they do, and hence are more matters of basic sociability (amicitia) than 
justice (see 8.4.3). 
Some men "turn directly to violence against women as a means of shoring up 
disintegrating systems of patriarchal power" (BLR: 239). The partial successes of 
women's challenge to patriarchy "have provoked violent reactions; but they 
have also brought a great deal into the open that was previously hidden, and 
enforced an interrogation of much that was carried by tradition" (BLR: 239f). 
15.8 Interreligious Conflict 
For completeness, religion must be mentioned as a factor that at times heightens 
social conflict. Giddens however barely mentions it in his works, though he 
proposes "at some point to write a book on religion" (ST: 212). He notes in 
passing the varied influences that religion had in the class divided societies of 
ancient China, Asoka's India and pre-conquest Mexico. He decisively rejects the 
Marxist view "that religious belief is no more than the non-material aspect of 
class domination" (NSV: 72). 
To acknowledge that religious beliefs have an 'authenticity' that eludes such a 
reduction is again to emphasize that religion is not simply ideology - a cloak for 
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asymmetrical domination - but stands in complex relation to the distribu~ion of 
power. (NSV: 74) 
Only under certain conditions is there an elective affinity between religion and 
the pursuit of power by violent means. 
The modes of behaviour of the warrior have little affinity with the notions of 
humility, sin and salvation characteristic of Christianity, for example, any more than 
with the self-negating ideals of the major religions of the East. It is where a belief in 
an exclusive, universal god is combined with the notion of the moral degeneracy of 
unbelievers - Weber concentrates particularly on Islam - that religious enthusiasm 
can be put directly to work in the cause of territorial aggrandizement. (NSV: 72) 
A contemporary example of this is the holy war (jihad) in Sudan, which the 
fanatics of the Muslim Brotherhood are waging against religious and ethnic 
outsiders. 
Not only may differences between religions exacerbate class, social and national 
conflicts, but so can religious excesses within a common religious tradition 
deepen social divisions. Thomas mentions how superstitious idolatry can take 
the form of a worship of nature, of humanity or the state, displacing worship of 
the one true God (IIaIIae 94. 1). Today he would have to turn attention to 
fundamentalism, which mistakes the humanly conditioned medium for the 
divine message. In overlooking history and how God may work within and 
through it "seeks to defend tradition in the traditional way - in circumstances 
where that defence has become intrinsically problematic" (BLR: 84). What both 
fundamentalism and superstitious idolatry have in common is the attempt to 
solve human problems, not in a human way by examination and negotiation, 
but by invoking a time-bound rule or procedure as though it were an eternal 
answer. 
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15.9 Time-space Edges divide the First and Third Worlds 
From the many books and articles by Giddens and others, on 'modernity' it 
would be easy to gain the impression that the whole world has become, or 
shortly will develop into, an advanced industrial and late capitalist society. On 
this view, all tribal, feudal, despotic and other pre-capitalist societies would just 
about have ceased to exist. Or if they still existed, they would be by a process of 
social evolution well on the way to becoming fully modernized societies. When 
the world is viewed in this perspective, the presumption is made that undevel-
oped and developing (Fourth and Third World) countries will inevitably by an 
endogenous process become developed (First World) countries, even if the 
process is held up for a while due to various exogenous obstacles along the way. 
Giddens rejects such a view and the evolutionary theory underlying it, which 
mistakes "the political/ economic/ military triumph of Western industrial 
capitalism over the rest of the world for the high point of an evolutionary 
scheme" (CCHM: 24). There is however no point in examining here the debate 
that Giddens' rejection of social evolution, of functionalism and its notion of a 
society 'adapting' itself, has provoked. But the notion of 'time-space edges', which 
Giddens introduces instead, is important for understanding how certain social 
inequalities are generated. 
Time-space edges refer to the forms of contact - and often of interdependence -
between different structural types of society. These are edges of potential or actual 
social transformation, the often unstable intersections between different modes of 
societal organisation. (CCHM: 23) 
No society exists entirely in isolation; each society is part of an intersocietal 
system encompassing other societies. Giddens, writing in 1981, says 
The contemporary world inter-societal system is not a wholly' capitalist' one, even if 
it is true that capitalist mechanisms operating on an international scale have a 
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dominant part to play - for the advanced capitalist societies exist along a ~hole 
series of time-space edges with other types of societal organisation, including now 
the state-socialist societies. (CCHM: 168f) 
Other types of society Giddens mentions are developing countries, as well as 
class-divided societies and tribal societies, though he expects the impending 
demise of the latter two (CCHM: 169). But the important question is: Why does 
capitalism dominate? Why does it have such "a strong tendency to corrode or 
absorb" (CCHM: 23) other societies? In any encounter between two societies, the 
one that in which there is a greater stretching of time and space is likely to 
dominate. It has far more resources - economic, technical, military and 
supervisory - to call upon, as well as offering various attractions to those who 
wish to stretch their sphere of influence and experience. 
The reorganising of time and space, disembedding mechanisms and the reflexivity of 
modernity all presume universalising properties that explain the expansionist, 
coruscating nature of modern social life in its encounters with traditionally estab-
lished practices. (MSI: 21) 
The time-space edge, along which the two societies meet, is likely to be a zone of 
social inequality (see CS: 164). Furthermore, the extent to which people coming, 
whether as individuals or groups, from a class-divided or traditional society 
flourish when they move to an industrial-capitalist one depends upon their 
ability to cope with and enter into the latter's stretching of time and space.26 
Yet even the most underprivileged today live in situations permeated by institutional 
components of modernity. Possibilities denied by economic deprivation are different, 
and experienced differently - that is, as possibilities - from those excluded by the 
frameworks of tradition. Moreover, in some circumstances of poverty, the hold of 
26 . This is a hypothesi.s; it could perh~rs be test.ed by examining the e~~e and di~ficu~ty with which people 
comJng from various tra~lt1onal or class-dIVIded societies ad.apt t.o life In Clt1~S or as Irntnlgrants in Europe and 
North Ame~lc~. Why, for lI~ stance, dosome natIOnal groups of unmlgrants remaIn an underclass and others quickly 
become ~sslmllated to their new society? Are there some facets of their cultural background which enable some 
more easIly than others to cope with the facilitating conditions of modernity? 
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tradition has perhaps become even more thoroughly disintegrated than else~here. 
(MSI: 86) 
For better or worse, modernity affects everyone; the poor often more than the 
affluent. It permeates not just the conditions under which people life or their 
life-chances, but even people's self-identity. Giddens gives the following telling 
example: 
In such situations [of discrimination and deprivation], the reflexive constitution of 
self-identity may be every bit as important as among more affluent strata, and as 
strongly affected by globalizing tendencies. A black woman heading a single-parent 
household, however constricted and arduous her life, will nevertheless know about 
factors altering the position of women in general, and her own activities will almost 
certainly be modified by that knowledge. Given the inchoate nature of her social 
circumstances, she is virtually obliged to explore novel modes of activity, with regard 
to her children, sexual relations and friendships. Such an exploration, although it 
might not be discursively articulated as such, implies a reflexive shaping of identity. 
The deprivations to which she is subject, however, might make these tasks become 
an almost insupportable burden, a source of despair rather than self-enrichment. 
(MSI: 86) 
In such situations, it is not just that nature in the form of an hospitable land-
scape, with its infertility and harsh climate or the prevalence of disease is hard, 
but society arranges that hardships continue to fall disproportionately on 
deprived people; even worse that their socio-economic position denies them the 
opportunity of meeting the hardships that nature imposes. 
15.10 The Failures of Social Engineering 
This century has seen several ambitious schemes of social engineering, including 
various attempts (Russian, Chinese and Yugoslavian) to construct a new society 
under communism, and the Verwoerdian plan of grand apartheid. These were 
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attempts to force the juggernaut along a definite path, or to eliminate the· risks 
and uncertainties of modernity. Yet all of these attempts at shaping the future 
through social engineering failed. 
It is possible to ask: What went wrong? What were the flaws in the original 
design? Or was failure due to the plan not being executed properly? Questions of 
this type, however, presume that society can in principle be made an object of 
large scale engineering. But due to the high degree of reflexivity inherent in 
modern society (see 10.5 above) "we cannot 'seize' history and bend it readily to 
our collective purposes. Even though we ourselves produce and reproduce it in 
our actions, we cannot control social life completely" (CMOD: 153). Because of 
the circularity of social knowledge, any attempt to bend history in a particular 
direction increases the possibilities of it taking a somewhat different route. Once 
any plan for the future is announced, even if it is a practical one, people respond 
by circumventing as much as possible the hardships it threatens and taking 
advantage of the opportunities it offers them. Even prior to that, the collection of 
information for use in drawing up a social policy is fed back into the environ-
ment of action that is being investigated and so contributes towards its 
reorganisation. 
Not only did scientific socialism not take account of institutional reflexivity or 
the self-involvement of those designing the new society, it was also based on an 
erroneous assumption about human nature. "Human social life neither begins 
nor ends in production" since human beings are "mind-making, self-mastering 
and self-designing animals" engaged in "a search for meaning" (CCHM: 155f). 
Whilst communism failed to take account of national and ethnic issues , 
reckoning they would vanish in a classless society, the architects of apartheid 
overlooked economic realities. Also due to their very static view of culture and 
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ethnicity, they made no allowance for the effect that exposure to ind~strial 
capitalism would have in reshaping the outlook, aspirations and self-identity of 
black people. 
The root metaphor for communism was the machine; society was to be designed 
anew as one might a massive industrial process. My impression is that the root 
metaphor for grand apartheid was of society as an extensive farm.27 This ties in 
with the assumption that people could be trained and corralled like domestic 
animals, and that it was best to keep the cows, horse, poultry and sheep in 
separate fields. Any idea that others might have ideas, interests and aspirations 
that they wanted to undertake themselves simply did not enter the picture. 
The only way both of these massive social experiments were kept going for so 
long was through the massive injections of funds, and the widespread deploy-
ment of police and military repression as opposition to them grew. Common to 
them both was the false assumption that our knowledge about human society is 
sufficient to control its workings. It is important instead to recognize 
both what might be called the theorem of 'knowledgeability' - we are all purpose-
ful, knowledgeable agents who have reasons for what we do - and that social 
processes at the same time work 'behind our backs', affecting what we do in ways of 
which we are unaware. (CCHM: 16) 
People are not dupes, not knowing what they are doing or why they are doing it. 
Nevertheless, the overall society that results from human action goes beyond in 
_ various unpredictable ways what we had intended. This can result in an oppress-
ive system becoming established which people have over time brought about 
through their actions, but no single person or group actually designed. 
27 This il"!1pression was gained after spendin& a fascinating evening in Hammanskraal in 1974 with 
Professor Tomlinson. He was a fOrl"!1er professor agriculture, who producea the massive report detailing the 
Infrastructure and expendIture reqUIred for setting up the homelands as viable economic entities. Planning the 
grand design of apartheid was basically for him a matter of good land management. 
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Chapter Sixteen 
The Defective Self 
"He sees himself with too flattering an eye to detect and detest his guilt; 
all he says is malicious and harmful, he has turned his back on wisdom" (Psalm 36:2). 
The chapter looks at some of the problematic repercussions that the institutional 
clusters and conditions of modernity (described in the last chapter) have on the 
self. Many questions could be raised about the effects of capitalism and industrial 
technology on the self. These are most evident in consumerism, under which 
"the project of the self becomes translated into one of the possession of desired 
goods and the pursuit of artificially framed styles of life" (MSI: 198; see also 15.2.4 
above). Other questions could be raised about the trauma resulting from expo-
sure to violence, or the effects on the self of living within one or other humanly 
contrived environment and being cut off from raw nature. All these issues could 
be investigated at length, and would show many of the intricate interlacings of 
self and society. Instead of pursuing them here, attention will be given to the 
ways people cope - or fail to cope - with the risks and dilemmas of living in a 
world shorn of its traditional supports. While life in the modern world offers 
many advantages, they do not come without a human price. 
This chapter begins by examining (16.1 - 16.2) two related aspects of modern 
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society, namely, its narcissism and heightened reflexivity. It goes on (16.3) tq look 
at how people screen themselves off from aspects of reality in order to cope with 
life. Added to this (16.3.1) are a number of dilemmas that arise from having on 
many issues only an indirect experience, often through the mass media, of 
events that bear upon their lives. There is much about one's society that is not 
evident at first sight, and only becomes apparent through reviewing the outcome 
of one's actions (16.3.2). These considerations prompt the question (16.4) about 
what kind of morality is required in and for a post-traditional society; not one 
based on in-group conformity, but a more provisional and reflexive ethic that is 
sensitive to structure is suggested. Mention is then made (16.5) of a further way 
in which certain existential issues are repressed in the tight organization of 
modern society. It should be pointed out that these dilemmas and tribulations of 
the self are not in themselves wrong, sinful or instances of evil, but for the most 
part challenges to be addressed. Yet if they are evaded or not adequately 
addressed, then social and psychological distress is perpetuated; evading them 
may be a moral fault. 
Attention is next drawn (16.6) to the complementarity between Giddens' analysis 
of how certain aspects of life do not cease but are left out of account in modern 
society and Kohut's explanation of repression and particularly splitting and 
disavowal. Through many and various human interactions, but particularly 
those that shape the nuclear self, these two trends are likely to reinforce each 
other. A final section {16.7} looks at the repercussions in the self and people's 
behaviour, not just of modernity, but of a society in serious decline. It examines 
some of the most horrific and abrasive aspects of human relations, which may 
both derive from and contribute to the breakdown of social relations. 
Although this and the previous chapter trace the repercussions of modern 
society upon the self, they could have been written the other way around. The 
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modern self with its particular dilemmas, tribulations and in some instances 
very abrasive character in its turn contributes to, upholds and may even seek out 
or generate the problematic institutions described in the previous chapter. The 
influence is mutual. Although there is a complementarity between self and 
society, there is also a mutual incommensurability; neither can be completely 
subsumed under the other, nor can they be fully synthesized without loss of 
understanding. 
16.1 The Self in the Modern World 
At first sight the overall effect on the self of living in a global society may be one 
of overwhelming anxiety. Everything appears so vast, complex and even 
meaningless, that one wonders who one is and what one can do. "The level of 
time-space distanciation introduced by high modernity is so extensive that, for 
the first time in human history, 'self' and 'society' are interrelated in a global 
milieu" (MSI: 32). But neither the identity of self nor the nature of global society 
are themselves very clear; they are no longer simply given. " 'The world' ... is not 
a seamless order of time and space stretching away from the individual; it 
intrudes into presence via an array of varying channels and sources" (MSI: 189). 
Each of these sources opens up not just options about lifestyle and behaviour, 
but, more fundamentally, discloses variant ways of being open to the world. In 
short, one no longer fits into a traditionally defined setting, but is as it were 
summoned not just to take but make one's own stance. In this way self-identity 
comes to be constructed as "a trajectory across the different institutional settings 
of modernity .... Each of us not only 'has', but lives a biography reflexively 
organised in terms of flows of social and psychological information about 
possible ways of life" (MSI: 14). Finding one's way around depends upon the 
ability to access and use such information, whether it be financial, technical, 
psychological, managerial or whatever. "The autonomy which human beings 
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acquire derives from their capacity to expand the range of mediated experience: 
to be familiar with properties of objects and events outside immediate settings of 
sensory involvement" (MSI: 47). 
When looked at through pre-modern eyes and abilities, "the world 'out there' " 
may easily appear "intrinsically alienating and oppressive to the degree to which 
social systems are either large in scale or spatially distant from the individual" 
(MSI: 189). But that is not the whole story, as modernity - particularly its system 
of communications - unifies as well as fragments. "Distant events may become 
as familiar, or more so, than proximate influences, and integrated into the 
frameworks of personal experience" (MSI: 189). Nevertheless, the price to be paid 
for this is a certain sequestration of experience (see 16.5 below). 
A more fundamental characteristic of modernity than its size and baffling 
complexity, that Giddens singles out, lies its being continually organized, re-
organized and in the process altered by knowledge about its own processes. This 
is known as reflexivity, and it applies both to society and the self. Its implications, 
as well as its close relation to the modern concern about narcissism, need to be 
examined. 
16.2 Narcissism and Reflexivity 
The theme of narcissism is central to Kohut's thought, while for Giddens 
reflexivity (see 10.5 above) is one of the facilitating conditions of life in modern 
society. Without claiming that the two are exactly equivalent, both concepts do 
however point to the same problematic area. In Giddens' thought the notion of 
reflexivity has gradually been expanded and differentiated. Originally depicted as 
an aspect of life common to all human agency, he has shown how it has' become 
a key feature of life in modern society, particularly importance for grasping the 
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place of the self and the self-regulation of organizations (CS: 205). 
Mention has already been made (see 12.4.1 & 12.4.3 above) of the reflexive 
monitoring of action. In this sense of reflexivity, "all human beings routinely 
'keep in touch' with the grounds of what they do as an integral element of doing 
it" (CMOD 36). Thus "actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their 
activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely 
monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move" (CS: 5). 
Carrying out this never-to-be-relaxed monitoring draws on "a bewildering range 
of skills which agents deploy in the production and reproduction of interaction" 
(CS: 78). Being tactful, and hence putting others at ease, requires proficiency in 
these skills. In cross-cultural situations this can be especially demanding as one 
has to recognize different sets of cues. Giddens draws on the work of Goffman to 
point out that regular failure to accomplish this, for instance by mental patients 
not caring about their posture, is a sign that they are not fully present. Its 
successful accomplishment, however, engenders trust and a sense of ontological 
security; people are at ease and know where they are with one another. 
There is nothing particularly modern about this accomplishment. Aristotle in 
The Nicomachean Ethics (1126b10 - 1128b9) spoke of the need in social inter-
course to aim at the mean between excess and paucity: in friendship this lies 
between being obsequious and quarrelsome; the truthful person avoids the 
extremes of boastfulness or being mock-modest; the tactful person is neither a 
buffoon nor a boor. But there is no exact rule laying down the mean; finding the 
right balance is difficult and must be perceived as one goes along. In a similar 
vein, Thomas locates in prudence the ability through relying upon precedent 
and experience to deal with particular situations as they occur (per memoriam et 
per experimentum ad prompte judicandum de particularibus expertis, IIaIIae 47, 
3 ad 3). The occasion may vary from one where tact is demanded to the firm 
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handling of a life-threatening situation. The former might only entail a ~light 
adjustment in one's approach as one goes along, while the latter will perhaps call 
for long and deliberate reflection. 
In a remark that applies to Aristotle and Thomas, Giddens points out that "in 
pre-modern civilizations reflexivity is still largely limited to the reinterpretation 
and clarification of tradition, such that in the scale of time the side of the 'past' is 
much more heavily weighed down than that of the 'future' " (CMOD: 37f). The 
reflexive monitoring of action, common to all human interaction, provides the 
basis for the constant review of social practices and their being reformed in the 
light of what that reveals (see CMOD: 38). However, the reflexivity characteristic 
of modern social life goes further than the ubiquitous monitoring of action done 
by all human agents in charge of their lives. Examples of the former were 
examined in Chapter Five, which showed how the experience distant concepts of 
the social sciences were reincorporated into experience near perceptions of social 
reality. These were instances of the double hermeneutic, where terminology 
from meta-languages re-entered ordinary language and so reconstituted the 
experiences they had originally been formulated to describe. 
Modernity's reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, 
and material relations with nature, to chronic revision in the light of new information 
or knowledge. Such information or knowledge is not incidental to modern institu-
tions, but constitutive of them - a complicated phenomenon, because many 
possibilities of reflection about reflexivity exist in modern social conditions. (MSI: 20) 
In pre-modern society experience was measured against accepted tradition. It 
might over time modify that tradition, but did so by drawing to a large extent by 
drawing upon that same tradition. In modern or post-traditional society, 
experience comes to be grasped in terms of an interpretative theory, which feeds 
back to mould that experience. This occurs on both a social and personal level. 
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On a social level, Giddens gives the example of Keynesian economics, 'Yhich 
worked in the 1940s and 1950s to regulate growth, inflation and unemployment, 
but began to fail by the 1960s. 
Detraditionalization means an acceleration of the reflexivity of lay [that is, non-
expert] populations. Keynesianism worked tolerably well in a world of simple 
modernization; but it could not survive in a world of reflexive modernization - a world 
of intensified social reflexivity. Reflexive citizens, responding to a new social 
universe of global uncertainties, become aware of, and may subvert, the economic 
incentives that are supposed to mobilize their behaviour. Keynesianism, like some 
forms of policy which helped structure the welfare state, presumes a citizenry with 
more stable lifestyle habits than are characteristic of a globalized universe of high 
reflexivity. (BLR: 42) 
A domestic example of this double hermeneutic in action was the effect of Dr 
Spock's book on child-rearing. While it might have given good advice, as a result 
of continually referring to it parents showed their own hesitancy and so under-
mined the assurance they should have given their children. 
16.2.1 Living with only Provisional Schemata 
On both social and personal levels, contrary to the expectation that greater 
certitude would result when reason and science replaced dogmatic tradition, the 
very certainty of knowledge came to be undermined. 
No matter how cherished, and apparently well established, a given scientific tenet 
might be, it is open to revision - or might have to be discarded altogether - in the 
light of new ideas or findings .... [This] is not only disturbing to philosophers but is 
existentially troubling for ordinary individuals. (MSI: 21) 
In a world that is open to multiple interpretations, and in which non~ can be 
reckoned as final, it becomes a problem to work out what and who one is. One 
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can reflect upon oneself in so many ways, but no approach appears to offer a 
definitive view. Not only is this a reflective problem, but depending upon my 
awareness of what I am and understanding of what I might become, so various 
possibilities for action are opened up or closed off. These in turn will feed back to 
shape who one becomes. 
It is in this setting that Giddens explains the import of various forms of psycho-
therapy and counselling. It is "frequently a crucial part of a process of self-
realisation ... but can only be successful when its involves the individual's own 
reflexivity" (MSI: 71). Thus it not like an operation 'done' to a patient, still less a 
repair to a machine. Rather, the therapist acts as catalyst to accelerate a process of 
self-therapy. He or she "can inform someone about possible modes and direc-
tions of self-change, but which must be interpretatively organised by the person 
concerned in relation to his or her life's problems" (MSI: 71). In a sense such sel£-
therapy is carried out by anyone today who, without "succumbing to the allure of 
the present, ... generates the self-understanding necessary to plan ahead and to 
construct a life trajectory which accords with the[ir] inner wishes" (MSI: 71). 
This sounds remarkably close to Kohut saying: 
The more deeply an analysis penetrates, the more clearly the analysand recognizes 
the essence of those deepest of his ambitions and ideals which make up his nuclear 
self, the narcissistic center of his personality, the more vivid and real becomes the 
analysand's experience of being able to choose and to decide, the more certain he 
feels of possessing access to the capacity of exercising his' free will' - whether he 
chooses to live in accordance with the demands of the reality-pleasure principle and, 
regretfully, curbs the expression of a part of his true self (as most of us do), or 
whether he chooses to transcend the reality-pleasure principle (i.e., to live 'beyond 
the pleasure principles') and disregarding even his cherished body self, i.e., his need 
for biological survival, strives towards that fulfillment of his nuclear self which, in 
the symbolism of religion, is celebrated as saintliness and as eternal life. (55. III: 212) 
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Three observations may be made about this long passage. First, in a traditional 
society there were certain well-beaten paths which a person might freely adopt in 
striving for fullness of life. Various leaders, heroes and saints had set an example 
which threw light on the path that others shoUld follow. Although not easy and 
always demanding perseverance, the way was clear enough. It was more import-
ant to keep one's eyes on the leading figure than be preoccupied with oneself, 
though if personal problems arose they had to be dealt with. 
The second observation is that today finding one's nuclear self and hence the 
path to one's destiny and fulfilment requires a far greater measure of self-
analysis. One has to sort through many conflicting interpretations about who 
one is and what one is meant to become. The example of earlier figures, whether 
one's ancestors, secular leaders or saints, is now weighed against alternative 
modern claims and knowledge that reveals the historical limitations of tradition. 
Inherited examples and teachings might today be justifiable, "but only in the 
light of knowledge which is not itself authenticated by tradition" (CMOD: 38). Yet 
since that knowledge is always open to revision, the task of discovering one's 
nuclear self and its destiny is even more problematic. This is the reason why 
Kohut speaking 'Western man' can say: 
The musician of disordered sound, the poet of decomposed language, the painter 
and sculptor of the fragmented visual and tactile world: they all portray the breakup 
of the self and, through the reassemblage and rearrangement of the fragments, try to 
create new structures that possess wholeness, perfection, new meaning. (RESS: 286). 
Kohut's work too should be seen as an instance of reflexivity in the modern 
sense, as it offers a language, theory and even myth with which to take apart and 
then reconstitute oneself in a more firm and coherent fashion. 
A third observation or comment is that Kohut still mainly refers to something 
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given in the past as a guide for self-development. He speaks explicitly abol;lt the 
nuclear self laid down in early childhood. If people fail to develop to develop 
fulfilling lives, it is because of a lack of suitable selfobjects in the past. Though 
Kohut does claim that self psychology has "established the actuality of the 
future," so, for instance, lithe child whose self is stunted by the selfobject's 
failures is, in his depression, mourning a not to be lived, unfulfilled future" (55 
IV: 481). (In this vein, Jane Rubin (1984) contrasts Kohut's view of the self with 
Kierkegaard's, who argued that failure results, not from what happened in the 
past, but from a person not committing him- or herself in fear and trembling to a 
future they cannot at present envisage.) Giddens talks of what one derives from 
the past and now wishes either to have done with or incorporate into the 
trajectory of the self as it moves into the future (M5I: 70ff). Even that position 
does not give full weight to the future, in particular to what Ricoeur terms "the 
mandated self" (1992: 23), which one is called by an other to become. The 
importance of this point will evident in dealing with the theology of social sin 
(see 19 below). 
16.2.2 Narcissism as a Modern Condition 
However, returning now to the main point, it becomes evident that the same 
human condition underlies both Giddens' understanding of the reflexivity of 
modernity and Kohut's view of narcissism. Both recognize that knowledge 
claims are always revisable (55 IV: 551£f) and that they are fed back to reconstitute 
and so alter the practices they to some extent explain (55 IV: 497f). Being narciss-
istic is unavoidable today, at least in the sense that each person must be reflexive-
ly concerned with the conditions, the lifestyle, the narratives and activities that 
would make for a healthy self. No longer are these simply given by the need to 
wrest a living from nature and fulfil one's obligations in accordance with 
traditions of one's society. Instead we live in a humanly-created environment 
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and a society which we realize could always have been structured otherwi~e. In 
such circumstances one is forced to question what and who one is said to be. Self-
identity is not just a given, but in part an accomplishment. 
The danger of this modern predicament is that a person might be drawn into 
tighter and tighter circles of self-preoccupation, not getting beyond his or her 
own concepts and interests. This may also happen collectively. When, for 
instance, all the aims and activities of an organization become internally 
referential (MSI: 150), then its members are wholly bound up in preserving or 
improving their organization. All external information is weighed only in terms 
of how it affects them. In the case of an individual, such intense self-preoccupa-
tion may lead especially when under threat to archaic narcissism (see 9.2.1 & 
9.2.4) or in its milder forms it turns out to be 'an ego trip.' 
In modern society there is only a , thin dividing line between acquiring self-
understanding and falling into unhealthy self-preoccupation.28 It is necessary to 
build up sufficient self-esteem necessary for coping with modern life, but not let 
that boil over into a cult of the self. Sometimes, contemporary psychology has 
been condemned for fostering the latter. Iris Murdoch too has warned against 
mistaking self-scrutiny for goodness (1970: 101). In a couple of places Kohut hints 
at how a healthy self will go beyond itself. Although, he firmly insists, the need 
for selfobjects is never relinquished, he admits that normally we "see a move-
ment from archaic to mature narcissism, side by side and intertwined with a 
movement from archaic to mature object love" (HDAC: 208). He also says that in 
the unfolding part of the life curve is the wish to become a selfobject for others. 
28 , An ;arly warning of this condition was gi~en by 1'1artin ~uther, wh~ writes in his Commentary 011 
RO,mans t~at ou~ nature has been so deeply curved In upon Itself (l1Icurvatus m se) because of the viciousness of 
ongll1~1 SIn that It not only turns the finest gi~ts of God in upon itself and enjoys them ... it even uses God Himself 
to achie.ve th~se aIms, but It also seems to be Ignoran~ of thls,very fact. '" The ~eart is {so perverse], that is, it is so 
curved 111 on Itself that no man, no matter how holy (If a testll1g IS kept fromhllTI) can understand it" (Oswald ed 
1972: 291). ' . 
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The peak values of modern man ... guide and sustain him in the attempt t~ reas-
semble his self through an increased and guilt-free ability to find appropriate 
selfobjects and in the attempt to liberate his innate ability to serve - and to serve 
joyfully - as a selfobject for others. (55 IV: 522; see also 55 IV: 498) 
In the last paper he wrote he speaks of Odysseus as "a fitting symbol of the fact 
that healthy man experiences, and with the deepest joy, the next generation as an 
extension of his own self" (55 IV: 563). In this connection, 
16.3 Cocooned against a Culture of Risk 
As far at its effects upon the self are concerned, the most pervasive influence of 
modernity is that everyone is exposed to institutionalized risks, against which 
they might reckon their chances, but over which they have minimal influence. 
These risks are institutionalized, because they are built into the operating system 
of modernity. Large scale industrial production, for instance, carries within it the 
possibility of environmental damage that may affect anyone, not just those 
engaged in a particular industry. "Institutional risk environments link individ-
ual and collective risks in many ways - individual life chances, for instance, are 
now directly tied to the global capitalistic economy" (M51: 118). What measures 
or psychological defenses does the self have for coping with the backdrop of risks 
than can never quite be calculated or still less eliminated? Or, how can people 
sustain a sense of ontological security not only amid all the possible threats to 
their physical survival and health, but also against disturbing information 
undermining their sense of self and social identity? 
The answer is to bracket out risks, unless they become so threatening that they 
are perceived as imminent dangers. As mentioned earlier (10.7.2) people spin a 
protective cocoon, which "is essentially a sense of 'unreality' rather than a firm 
conviction of security: it is a bracketing on the level of practice, of possible events 
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which could threaten the bodily or psychological integrity of the agent" (MSI: 40). 
This mantle of trust renders lithe bulk of what goes on ... 'non-consequential' so 
far as that person is concerned .... [This includes] actual and potential events in 
the physical world as well as encounters and activities in the sphere of social life" 
(MSI: 129). The outcome is an 'uneventful' world, in which routine gives the 
assurance that all is okay. 
16.3.1 The Phenomenal World poses Dilemmas for the Self 
Even though people may manage to bracket out the worst risks that modern 
systems pose, they still at times have to face dilemmas that arise from the 
ambiguity inherent in their world. The stretching of time-space, reflexivity, the 
fact that many activities one directly engages in only have meaning as part of a 
vast system, as well as the variety of second-hand experiences available through 
the media, all result in the individual living partly in his or her own 'phenom-
enal world.' "Each person reacts selectively to the diverse sources of direct and 
mediated experience which compose the Umwelt" (MSI: 188). For instance, from 
the whole bevy of information available through newspapers, radio, TV, 
Internet, as well as specialized publications and in-house communiques, each 
person imposes his own order on this diversity, selecting what to skip, read, 
follow up and attend to. To some degree, depending again upon an individual's 
resilience, lithe appropriation of mediated information follows pre-established 
habits and obeys the principle of avoiding cognitive dissonance ... [with the result 
that] routinised attitudes ... exclude, or reinterpret, potentially disturbing 
knowledge" (MSI: 188). 
Maintaining one's own phenomenal world might on the one hand be regarded 
as prejudice or stubborn narrow-mindedness, but on the other hand the ""avoid-
ance of dissonance forms part of the protective cocoon which helps maintain 
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ontological security" (MSI: 188). This should last statement should perhaps the 
qualified to read "the avoidance of excessive dissonance." It is good to be shaken 
out of a mental rut, to be disturbed and challenged about one's stance, but if that 
is excessive it can freeze all understanding and paralyze action. Again what is 
excessive will vary with the resilience of a person's self-structure and the need 
for ever-renewed selfobject affirmation. 
Living in a phenomenal world presents the self with various dilemmas, which 
people will each cope with (or perhaps fail to cope with) in diverse ways. 
Giddens, in terms which echo Kohut, speaks of the dilemma of unification 
versus fragmentation that a person experiences as he endeavours to put life 
together as a reasonably coherent self-narrative. One person may draw strength 
from "being at home in a variety of contexts," while another "constructs his 
identity around a set of fixed commitments, which act as a filter through which 
numerous different social environments are reacted to or interpreted" (MSI: 190). 
Another dilemma is that of powerlessness versus appropriation. Faced with the 
overwhelming development of capitalist production, international banking, 
mass communications, and military power, the individual finds that his life is 
dominated by massive institutions over which she has no control. Yet each of 
these institutions can also open up opportunities for her. For instance, when 
favourable they make it possible for her to travel to far-off places or trade with 
people there with relative ease. In pre-modern times this would have meant 
long and hazardous voyages. Within the individual a sense of powerlessness 
intertwines with the reappropriation of limited powers. Maturity lies in recog-
nizing and accepting the scope of each, without either falling into delusions of 
omnipotence or being "haunted by implacable forces robbing him of all auton-
omy of action" (MSI: 193). 
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In a world marked by pluralism - whether cultural, religious, or ethnic -. the 
dilemma arises of authority versus uncertainty. Although many specialists do 
offer advice, "there are no authorities which span the diverse fields within 
which expertise is claimed" (MSI: 195). Consequently, the lay individual, which 
everyone is in most fields of life, tends to take a sceptical outlook when assessing 
the claims of rival authorities. Routine carries people through in most day-to-
day situations, but at times radical doubt can break through to challenge both 
routine and more far-reaching ambitions. A number of individuals, who "find it 
psychologically difficult or impossible to accept the existence of diverse, mutually 
conflicting authorities ... seek solace in more overarching systems of authority .... 
[They show] a predilection for dogmatic authoritarianism" (MSI: 196). This may 
take "the form of a slavish adherence to an authority figure, taken to be all-
knowing" (MSI: 196). It is also shown in a turning to fundamentalism, which 
may have a religious, cultural, economic or gender base. Fundamentalists 
attempt to resist pluralism by insisting on the purity of their own tradition and 
excluding all dialogue as a form of betrayal (BLR: 84ff). 
A further dilemma, that between personalised and commodified expenence, 
arises from the extension of capitalism into so many areas of life. Does "the 
consumption of ever-novel goods ... substitute for the genuine development of 
self" (MSI: 198)? Not only goods, but also lifestyles, and even programmes of self-
development are packaged and distributed according to market criteria. While 
this makes previously unattainable services readily available, it also fosters 
'conspicuous consumption,' where appearances outweigh any benefits the 
services might bring. Judging where to draw the line would in Thomas' termi-
nology be a matter of moderation (temperantia); use of something has to be 
gauged according to time, place and the exigencies of those with whom one is in 
living contact (moderate utitur pro loco et tempore et congruentia eorun: quibus 
convivit, IIaIIae 141, 6 ad 2). Yet, when one is somewhat in touch with many 
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social contexts, it is not easy to decide exactly in which one lives. 
16.3.2 Review of an Action Reveals its Unacknowledged Conditions 
Let us relate this discussion to our earlier examination of human agency (see 12.4 
above). These various dilemmas delineate typical ways in which the perception, 
and hence the full acknowledgement of the conditions of action are limited. As 
the initial situation is ambiguous, no one can be completely sure what will result 
from any action. It will produce various unintended consequences. In fact, often 
only be seeing what is the outcome of one's action will the initial conditions be 
made apparent. For instance, when expert opinions differ, only by following the 
advice of one and seeing out it works out in practice, will one gain an insight 
into their reliability. Only by trying will one gauge the extent of one's power in 
society. Likewise, only after a while might one assess whether goods that one has 
purchased do actually enhance one's life and relationships, or that one has fallen 
for the sales talk and glossy packaging. 
This is especially important when one wants to understand and change the 
structuring of society. Since the structure is a virtual reality, its features cannot be 
wholly discerned prior to action. They may only begin to become apparent as the 
unintended consequences of action reveal the initial, yet unacknowledged, 
conditions that went into shaping the action. Only after a while does one gain a 
better insight into how allocative and authoritative resources were distributed 
and which generative rules were in fact operative. This insight is usually gained 
by reviewing one's actions, looking particularly at how their outcome and 
repercussions differed from what was originally intended. Then one may find 
out what were the initial conditions that previously went unsuspected. It is then 
sensible to take account of these findings, and their theoretical interpretation, 
when planning future action. 
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The above outline shows the logic involved in organized groups and/ or 
individuals regularly conducting reviews of their past activities. This is how the 
reflexive monitoring of action becomes accentuated in modern society. It may 
take place collectively in an organization that reassesses its overall aims, the 
goals it has set itself in the light of its performance and changing conditions. It 
may also be carried out by an individual to reflect on her own life trajectory or by 
a group seeking to influence their society. 
16.4 Shaping a Post-Traditional Morality 
Where does morality feature in the reflexivity of modern life? This question is 
raised by the increasing sophistication with which individuals and organizations 
are "able to control one's life circumstances, colonise the future with some 
degree of success and live within the parameters of internally referential 
systems." Giddens suggests that when this happens "mastery ... substitutes for 
morality" (MSI: 202). Does being able to negotiate the dilemmas of the self, as and 
when they arise, lead to the evaporation of morality? Giddens appears to think 
so when he says: "Morality is extrinsic so far as the co Ionising of the future is 
concerned" (MSI: 145). 
Giddens does not really work out how a post-traditional moral approach can be 
brought to bear on abstract systems. In several places he mentions how the 
institutional clusterings of modernity cut through or sweep morality aside 
(CMOD: 57; RMC: 273; MSI: 198); here, he presumably means one or other kind of 
traditional morality. But he also claims that "not just a few especially conten-
tious concepts such as these [power, class, ideology, and interests] but the whole 
conceptual apparatus of social theory is in some sense 'ineradicably evaluative'" 
(CPST: 90). This is why "moral critique cannot be clearly and absolutely 'severed 
from the other tasks of social science" (RMC: 292). But, as his critics rightly 
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comment, Giddens does not explore very far in this direction. Jary puts his finger 
on what is missing when he says that 
although Giddens makes plain that a theory of 'the good life' ought to be a primary 
part of social theory, and he is clearly prepared to use terms such as 'exploitation' 
and 'oppression', all this is undermined since he provides no normative theory 
capable of ordering the various goodness claims that arise. (Jary, 1991: 156; see also 
Cohen, 1989; Bernstein, 1989 and Craib, 1992) 
In response, it must be asked what kind of 'normative theory' would be adequate 
for post-traditional society. 
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between two notions of morality, one 
centred upon conformity, the other concerned with building up 'character.' The 
first sets out a number of injunctions, mostly negative ones, that regulate 
interpersonal behaviour. Their force lies in their having the backing of tradition 
and the evident harm that transgressing them will cause among one's associates. 
Such honour codes typically maintained loyalty among colleagues, to one's 
spouse and family, to one's class and country. They functioned well enough in 
settings where social and system integration were not too distant, where the line 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour could be demarcated clearly 
enough. So, for instance, cheating on one's colleagues or one's wife both upset 
personal relations and respectively weakened the bonds of association or 
undermined family ties. Likely enough if a person transgressed such mores, and 
especially if he was found out, he felt or was made to feel guilty. He was per-
sonally affected because his nuclear ideals and ambitions largely coincided with 
the prevailing mores. 
This kind of traditional in-group morality has been steadily disintegrating under 
the impact of modernization. The purer forms of capitalism have no place for 
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such moral conceptions, or even for patriotism (RMC: 273). Likewise, the 
expansion of industrialism takes place through the overcoming of social customs 
and traditional sets of values. The surveillance mechanisms of modernity too 
has a universalizing tendency. They encompass more and more people in their 
ambit, assessing them as 'normal', 'deviant', 'in need of education', 'undevel-
oped' according to 'modern' criteria rather than in traditional moral categories. 
It would be a mistake to think that morality is limited to the regulation of 
traditional in-group behaviour. Thomas Aquinas, following the Greeks, centred 
his moral teaching not on behaviour as such, but on potentialities from which 
actions spring. He elaborated on the range of character strengths (virtutes) 
required to accomplish the good to which one is called on life's journey. In the 
process he also spelt out the weaknesses of character (vitia) that will render one's 
activities self-defeating. Admittedly, in a plural world marked by the reflexivity, 
disembedding and high time-space distanciation, depicting life's journey is much 
more problematic than in medieval times. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of 
character strengths rather than conformity of actions offers a more flexible and 
searching approach. For Thomas, the virtuous person not only does a right 
action, but one that is appropriate for the circumstances and with a generous 
motivation. The ability to sense the good that is here and now required, and to 
select the most appropriate means at hand for accomplishing it, is itself a 
character strength. This will at times require daring and ingenuity, and so may be 
very non-conformist. 
Where an ethic of character links with the reflexivity of modern society is that 
both are built up over time. Character strengths are abilities acquired by repeti-
tion and corrective feedback. Likewise, reflexivity includes assessing the conse-
quences of action, discovering its unacknowledged conditions and incorporating 
those findings in plans for future action. Reflexivity could be limited to mastery, 
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to the successful colonization of the future. But it could also incorpOJ;ate a 
reflective ethical dimension, asking for instance: Are these plans humanly 
desirable? For whom, and why? Is the way of implementing them at variance 
with what we want to attain for ourselves? And for others? What human values 
does our overall aim and policy aim to realize and uphold in the methods it 
uses? What personal character and communal strengths are we striving to build 
up? What hidden agendas are at work? In this case one would question the basis 
upon which conjectures, risk calculations and the weighing costs against benefits 
are made. Besides incorporating information about how effectively an 
organization is attaining its objectives as conditions change, reflexivity would be 
extended to consider whether those objectives are basically worth pursuing at all. 
A reflexive ethic of this kind would be more a guide for mobilising groups or 
social movements (see CNIOD: 137) than a set of norms - or list of values -
addressed to individuals. It would provide a reflexive method for social move-
ments to analyze, evaluate and effectively contest the dangers inherent in 
modernity. Nevertheless, to be an ethic it would have to indicate more than 
tactics; it would have to combine tactics with a reflexive appreciation of the 
values at stake amid the risks of modernity. Through dealing with absent others, 
it would lack the immediacy and pathos of inter-personal encounters. While 
these are important they do not exhaust the domain of ethics; morality may be 
structural as well as existential. 
My suggestion is that instead of relying so heavily on tradition as Thomas -
along with his age - did, a reflexive structural ethic would be more future 
oriented. While recognizing the provisionality of all schemata, it would set out 
as clearly as possible the human ideals and values it sought to realize. It would 
also endeavour to spell out what this required both in terms of personal ~tegrity 
and organizational aims. It would be misleading to say that Thomas stressed the 
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personal rather than the social, as the tributary systems of his time did not allow 
that distinction much force. Yet his account of the virtues when read today 
seems more individualistic than relational or social. So today a reflexive 
structural ethic will have not just to look at personal moral qualities, but also at 
how groups and organizations can assist in building such qualities and spreading 
them throughout society. Here a supportive self-object milieu plays a crucial 
role. 
Those espousing a morality based on in-group conformity are likely to view 
modernity in very pessimistic terms; for them modernity is altogether too 
threatening and inherently amoral. But they overlook how modernity, opens up 
many previously absent opportunities for human cooperation, sharing and 
solidarity. It provides new opportunities for people to seek out actively their own 
self-identity through reflecting on their experience; it offers new forms of 
empowerment; and interaction with abstract systems opens up new ways of 
appropriating meaning and value in everyday life (see CMOD: 150). In any case, 
over five billion people could not thrive on this planet without the 
intermeshing linkages of modernity. Little can be gained from a moral point of 
view that condemns modernity as such. That only expresses" a nostalgia for ways 
of life that are disappearing or a negative attitude towards what is to come" 
(CMOD: 137); neither of which is helpful for engaging with the dangers and risks 
of modernity. 
16.5 The Sequestration of Experience 
A further consequences of living in a protective cocoon is what Giddens terms 
"the sequestration of experience." Various areas of life, particularly those that are 
more closely 'biological,' are for most people shunted to a siding. Many ordinary 
people, for instance, lose regular contact with sickness and death, or rather the 
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experience of it becomes repressed as it does not fit into their life-plans. The 
treatment of the sick, dying and dead is left in the hands of experts, the nursing 
and medical professions and undertakers. In comparison, everyone else is a lay 
person. Likewise, various types of disturbing behaviour, whether on the part of 
political protesters, the homeless, the mentally ill, and those with variant sexual 
proclivities, are ruled out as 'deviance.' 
None of these concerns fit in with the abstract and reflexively organized systems 
that "play an increasingly pervasive role in coordinating the various contexts of 
day-to-day life" (MSI: 149). People do not know how to relate to events and 
people that fall outside the normal systems of institutional control. Their 
ontological security is upset, and they are presented with moral and existential 
dilemmas, but with which they lack the psychic and social resources to cope. 
Such experiences occur at "faultlines, full of tensions and poorly mastered 
forces," which easily become "battlegrounds, sometimes of a directly social 
character, but often within the psychological field of the self" (MSI: 168). 
The overall result is that 
existential questions become institutionally repressed at the same time as new fields 
of opportunity are created for social activity and for personal development. The 
sequestration of experience is in some part the contrived outcome of a culture in 
which moral and aesthetic domains are held to be dissolved by the expansion of 
technical knowledge. In some considerable degree, however, it is also the unintended 
outcome of the endemic structuring processes of modernity, whose internally 
referential systems lose contact with extrinsic criteria. (MSI: 164£) 
The effect on the average individual is that · one endeavours to keep to routine, 
to do one's job and not ask too many questions, to maintain the protective 
cocoon around one. There have always been people who turn a blind eye to the 
wrong doings of others, particularly those who might make trouble for them. 
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But under conditions of modernity, a certain level of blindness is requir.ed -
you cannot know all that is going on or all the implications of one's own actions. 
Life is too complicated and depends upon trust in various expert systems. 50 to 
raise awkward moral questions about how people' lives might be adversely 
affected brings one into double trouble. 
First, it exposes one to attack and abuse from those one directly or indirectly 
criticizes. But second, it places one's own self and social position in doubt; instead 
of casting oneself in the role provided by society, one has to redefine oneself 
anew. In other words, questioning the operation of one's society also raises 
awkward issues concerning oneself, as self and society are reflexively inter-
twined. 
Such sequestration is the condition of the establishing of large tracts of relative 
security in day-to-day life in conditions of modernity. Its effect, which as we have 
seen should be regarded as an unintended consequence of the development of 
modern institutions, is to repress a cluster of basic moral and existential components of 
human Life that are, as it were, squeezed to the sidelines. (MSI: 166£) 
Capitalist expansion, along with technology and widespread surveillance, 
evident in modern communications and continuous flow of information, opens 
up many possibilities, but is combined with a impoverishment of experience in 
other areas. This has lead to what Giddens terms "the return of the repressed" 
(M5I: 202ff). This is evident when sickness, accident, death break through or 
issues connected with personal relations, sexuality, sanity and the birth of new 
life confront people. These have once again brought 'life politics' and bioethics to 
the fore in a world that, because of its being so highly self-referential, lacks the 
means for dealing with them. 
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16.6 Conditions for Splitting 
All the above discussion about reflexivity and narcissism, the dilemmas of the 
self and the sequestration of experience has been about conditions. There is no 
inevitability about how any person will experience, let alone grapple with, retreat 
from, or even thrive upon, these conditions. They are not forces, which by some 
kind of mechanical necessity will always lead to a predetermined outcome. 
Rather, each situation carries within it a combination of opportunity and 
challenge, but offers no guarantee that a person will perceive the opportunity 
and then rise to the challenge. Each dilemma reveals a way in which contempor-
ary situations are ambiguous and hence open to varied responses. What the 
response will be not only depends upon a person's capabilities - the socially 
available rules and resources which he personally is able to draw upon - but 
also results from his free decision to exercise his capability in a determining way. 
Nevertheless, inherent in the conditions of modernity is an underlying trend 
towards exclusion and disavowal. The socially induced need to maintain a 
protective cocoon to shore up ontological security, the sequestration of 'biologi-
cal' experience, and the maintenance of organizations as internally referential 
systems, all lead to leaving areas of life out of account. How far any individual 
will simply be unaware of them or explicitly judge them as non-consequential 
will doubtless vary. Either way, these excluded areas of life will still make their 
demands. But, so long as they are not avowed or accepted as part of the dyna-
mism of one's life and relations with others, they will continue to go their own 
way and cause various tensions. 
For instance, communism as an internally referential system of theory and 
practice left ethnic rivalries out of account. This did not resolve them; they 
continued; when on occasion they broke out they were not recognized 'as such 
but were interpreted in class and anti-revolutionary terms. Once, however, 
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communist control ceased the pent-up rage derived from earlier narcissistic 
injuries burst forth. It could not be controlled or calmed as there was no com-
mon vocabulary for understanding it nor channels for negotiating an end to 
rivalries. Although this account is over-simple, it goes some way to explaining 
the wars in Bosnia, Chechnya and Georgia. 
Another example, this time in capitalist society is the dubious role of 'self-help 
books.' 
[They] stand in a precarious position with regard to the commodified production of 
sel£-actualisation. In some ways such works break away from standardised, 
packaged consumption. Yet in so far as they become marketed as prepackaged 
theorems about how to I get on' in life, they become caught up in the very processes 
they nominally oppose. (MSI: 198) 
This is a telling example of how the self is structurally caught; even in attempt-
ing to escape commodification it to some extent reinforces it. 
There is a certain complementarity between Giddens' account of the social trend 
in modernity to exclude areas of life from experience and Kohut's account of 
vertical splitting. Although the latter is dealing with individual analysands each 
with their own family history, he also recognizes that lithe prevalent personality 
organization of our time is ... enfeebled, multifragmented (vertically split), and 
disharmonious" (HDAC: 60). This is explicable because lithe mores, predilections, 
and social conditions of the time will decisively influence the behavior of adults 
toward their children and thereby produce the milieu in which the personality of 
the child is formed" (HDAC: 60). Determining to what extent this holds in the 
case of any given child would require long and careful analysis; many other 
factors would have to be weighed. But taken as an overall trend, it helps explain 
the prevalence of vertical splitting and the consequent concern to become a 
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coherent self. 
If parents and other parental figures are living within a protective cocoon, and 
have life-plans that overlook significant areas of experience, it is not surprising 
that they will offer inadequate mirroring to aspects of their child's normal 
assertiveness or fail to provide a well-rounded ideal of strength and calmness 
with which the child can merge. 5uch rejection will first greatly intensify the 
need for mirroring and merging and probably distort it. Then "in this intensified 
and distorted form, [it is] either repressed or split off and disavowed" (55 II: 555) 
as it is too much to tolerate consciously. If this frustrated need or wish is hori-
zontally repressed it will lead to the personality disorders of depression, shame 
and social isolation. If it is split off vertically it remains active, but is disavowed, 
showing itself in the behavioral disorders of over-assertiveness, noisy demands 
and intense activity in the social field (see 55 III: 381£ff). Exactly how and to what 
extent these disorders of the self will appear in an individual cannot be predicted 
from the overall state of society. As in an analysis, one has to examine closely the 
accumulated experience of the individual, evident in his or her self-structure, 
and treat that in all its particularity. Nevertheless, parents and others are right 
from the start of life not simply expressing themselves to the next generation but 
are through that mediating their society. They are conveying a sense of the 
expectations, hopes, ideals and inclusive support, or lack thereof, that character-
izes their society. This is not carried out consciously and deliberately, but is 
another instance of unacknowledged conditions of action having unforeseen 
consequences. But is this the whole story? 
16.6.1 How Intentional is Splitting? 
Kohut gives an instance of another kind of splitting; this time between the desire 
for a particular outcome, yet without the acceptance of any moral responsibility 
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for this desire. 
The apparently passive tolerance in larger groups of the takeover of leadership and 
initiative by smaller groups may actually be more active than meets the eye. Thus, 
small pathological, or otherwise highly special and unusual, aberrant groups may be 
'passively' permitted to assume leadership in order to reach a goal which the 
majority may wish to disown yet also to reach. For example, people motivated by 
'normal' competitiveness and jealousy may tolerate the merciless killing of the 
competitor by a paranoid group which, after it has done its work, is itself con-
denmed and removed from the scene. (SS III: 105) 
He goes on to apply this to the situation in Germany during and after the Nazi 
regime. Yet it is also applicable to the 'tacit support' given to Third Force and hit 
squad activities in South Africa. This attitude of condemning the sinner, but not 
the sin, is maintained in order to uphold by contrast one's own moral rectitude 
·(see also 18.8ff below). 
* * * 
The above account is not meant to give the impression that everyone, due to 
modern social conditions, is seriously disturbed psychologically or half-mad. 
However, what is does bring out is that there are always limitations in people's 
grasp of reality and defects in their response; their activities are not always fully 
guided by the ideals and ambitions they consciously express; they do not always 
grasp exactly how they are affected by or affecting others; they may inexplicably fly 
into a rage or be depressed; they may be deceiving themselves. Yet at other times 
none of these limitations and defects may be apparent. People may also in 
varying degrees recognize, accept and take responsibility for overcoming or at 
least minimizing the harm brought about by this fragmentation of the self. On 
the other hand, conditions may seem so bad that they either cannot or will not. 
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Then begins the decline, where social breakdown and a regression to archaic 
narcissism reinforce one another with dreadful consequences. People's normal 
healthy assertiveness is then broken and they bring upon themselves "a lifetime 
of abrasiveness, bitterness, and sadism that cannot be discharged" (RESS: 130). 
16.7 Further Social Consequences of Archaic Narcissism 
Apart from his various reflections on Germany during Nazi times (see 14.8 
above), Kohut mentions several other instances of social pathology. Although 
none are examined in detail, he shows their correlation with archaic narcissism. 
It should be stressed at this point that not all forms of assertiveness, aggression 
and even conflict are derived from narcissistic injury or are manifestations of 
narcissistic rage. The overcoming of narcissistic injury in individuals will not 
lead to a society devoid of all differences of opinion or every clash of interests, 
where no one would ever feel threatened or challenged. Life will never be 
without its knocks, which to a greater or less degree threaten the self. "Narciss-
istic blows are unavoidable and the propensity to respond to them with rage is 
ubiquitous" (SPHU: 63). 
In responding to the knocks life brings, assertiveness often and aggression at 
times will be called for. Both need to be mobilized on occasion if one is to 
overcome obstacles preventing one reaching one's goals. Normal healthy 
aggression, however, is characterized "by the absence of the need to hurt the 
opponent unnecessarily and the subsiding of aggression when the goal in 
question in reached." Whereas narcissistic rage "is characterized by unforgiving 
hatred and cruelty" (HDAC: 53) that does not relent once one's goal is attained. 
Indeed, the original goal or cause is frequently forgotten as the vendetta is 
relentlessly pursued. 
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Besides relentless animosity and hatred, there are several other characteristics of 
narcissistic hurt and rage, which we shall now tum attention to. 
16.7.1 No Respect for Otherness 
The person weakened by narcissistic injury and regression basically perceives all 
reality as an extension of his or her self. They expect everyone else to be as 
subservient to them as their own limbs; others. are expected to be no more than 
extensions of themselves. When matters inevitably do not turn out like that, the 
defects in their own self lead them to view any difference of opinion or interest 
as an offence against them; no allowance can be made for others. 
The offender is experienced as a foreign body in an archaic world that must be 
populated only by obedient selfobjects. He regards the offender's mere otherness as 
an interference with his own omnipotent control of a narcissistically experienced 
world. (SPHU: 63) 
Often enough, whatever the other person may do, whatever gestures they make, 
whatever actions they undertake, they are perceived as a threat or offence. 
Although someone may take exception to what the other person says or does, to 
his or her particular actions, at root what enrages the archaic self is the mere 
presence of a centre of initiative independent from him or her. Yet, Kohut 
continues, 
closer scrutiny always reveals that the enraged person harbors only a vague concept 
of lithe enemy," who in the logic of primary process thinking, is replaceable. The goal 
remains the total extinction of an enemy, who is experienced as absolute at each 
moment in time. No appeal to reason or pity can interfere with this goal, because 
there is no capacity to be empathic with the enemy, to see a fellow human in him. 
(SPHU: 63) 
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This refusal to allow others to be others, or the inability to respect fellow humans 
in their otherness, has also been dealt with in the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas. He speaks of the same and the other. 
Put simply, the realm of the same is my own world with my set of ideas and 
preoccupations. This is necessary for securing an identity of one's own. But, if 
everything is interpreted as merely a moment with the realm of the same, that 
leads to totaLity, to the imposition of a comprehensive panoramic vision of 
reality upon everyone. No allowance is made for different points of view, for 
pluralism, or for dialogue. This leads ultimately to imperialism and war. In this 
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Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that conunand them unbeknown to 
themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived 
from the totality. The unicity of each present is incessantly sacrificed to a future 
appealed to to bring forth its objective meaning. For the ultimate meaning alone 
counts; the last act alone changes being into themselves. (Levinas, 1969: 21f) 
Here Levinas criticizes, amongst others, the totalizing philosophy of Hegel who 
makes individuals into moments in the unfolding of the Spirit, of Marx who 
makes individuals into factors in the eventual production of a classless society, 
and Heidegger for whom the individual (Dasein) is in its authentic existence 
only a locus for the manifestation of Being (Sein). 
Levinas says that only through lithe breach of totality" do we open up to infinity. 
The breach is accomplished above all in welcoming the Other, the Stranger. I 
would not, however, be welcoming the Stranger if I simply fitted him or her into 
my scheme of things, the realm of the same. The other is not another item to add 
to my collection. 
He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say 'you' or 'we' is not a 
plural of the 'I.' ... [He] disturbs the being at home with oneself. But the Stranger also 
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means the free one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an essential 
dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my site .... We are 
the same and the other. (Levinas, 1969: 39) 
The relation between the same and the other, a relation which respects 
otherness, is founded upon discourse. In discourse, as opposed to mere rhetoric, 
there is not just the imparting of information but self revelation, "a coinciding of 
the expressed with him who expresses" (Levinas, 1969: 66). This is most evident 
in the irreducible relation of "the direct and full face welcome of the other by me. 
This conjuncture is irreducible to totality; ... the Other continues to face me, to 
reveal himself in his face" (Levinas, 1969: 80f). For Levinas ethics is not deriva-
tive from ontology, but founds it. The primordial welcoming of the other 
through discourse is primarily an ethical relation, and it is only in this relation 
that the truth of reality is apparent. "The relationship between the same and the 
other, is the ultimate fact, and in it the things figure not as what one builds 
[science, ontology] but as what one gives [ethics]" (Levinas, 1969: 77). Without 
respect for the other, justice - the rendering what is due to the other - is imposs-
ible. 
Both Kohut and Levinas are speaking from their respective disciplines about the 
same reality. Archaic narcissism is one way of being locked in the totality of the 
same. The unrelenting character of chronic narcissistic rage is picked up by 
Levinas' insight into hatred. 
To inflict suffering is not to reduce the Other to the rank of object, but on the 
contrary to maintain him superbly in his subjectivity. In suffering the subject must 
know his reification, but in order to do so he must precisely remain a subject. Hatred 
wills both things. Whence the insatiable character of hatred; it is satisfied precisely 
when it is not satisfied, since the Other satisfies it only by becoming an object, but 
can never become object enough, since at the same time as his fall, his lucidity and 
witness are demanded. In this lies the logical absurdity of hatred. (Levinas, 1969: 239) 
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By contrast, mature self-selfobject relationships breach a totality, and open up an 
unlimited richness of culture and meaning (Kohut) that corresponds somewhat 
to the pluralism of infinity (Levinas). 
16.7.2 Inflexibility 
Another feature of archaic narcissism is the tendency to be inflexible, to hang on 
to entrenched positions even when evidence of their shortcomings is presented. 
Whenever new ideas threaten a group's social cohesion or its members' 
position, they tend to be rejected. Kohut himself suggests this as an explanation 
for the classical psychoanalytic movement's unreadiness to accept the findings of 
self psychology. In this instance 
new ideas which question the unalterability of the basic scientific tenets or set limits 
to the validity or the relevance of the idealized teacher-figure's [Freud's] scientific 
formulations will be perceived instinctively as inimical because they seem to diminish 
the sense of strength that its members derive from it. (ADVS: 548) 
This repeats the pattern set earlier by the neuropsychiatric establishment when it 
rejected the Freud's new ideas. In each instance, people are striving to achieve a 
state of psychic well-being through "the permanent espousal of a set of basic 
beliefs and an unbroken attachment - in submission or rebellion - to an 
idealized leader figure" (HDAC: 210). Their being set in this way leaves them no 
room for 'creative mobility.' Various narcissistic factors are at work including 
"threatened professional and religious prestige and power" (HDAC: 63). It is easy 
to see how this brings about or reinforces the closed mindedness of a group, 
whether it be a political party, a military unit, a religious sect (within or outside 
of an established church), or an ethnic minority. 
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16.7.3 Emptiness 
Mention has already been made (9.1.6.1) of Kafka's depiction of the future Mr. K., 
or Everyman, whom Kohut discerns as already present amongst us. He is a 
wanderer in a flat, empty world, yet yearning for empathic response. liTo the 
unreachable judges of the trial and to the unreachable rulers high up in the castle 
he has become a number, rejected without even an attempt to justify his 
rejection in individual terms" (55 II: 680f). 
Those whose lives have been undernourished as children or find themselves in 
a situation devoid of supportive selfobject are 
the easy prey of any seducer who promises to relieve their sense of emptiness, of any 
make-believe that will, even if only temporarily, given them that feeling of being 
empathically valued and accepted ... If this feeling is lacking, then any relief is 
welcome - whether it is provided by drugs and wordless touching in encounter 
groups or by nationalistic ecstasy and merger into mystical experience. (55 II: 713) 
This helps explain why social evil may get a grip on various persons or even 
large sections of a population that are deprived of empathic support by appropri-
ate sel£objects (see 10.2.1 above). 
16.7.4 Pervasive Suspicion 
Another instance of the interrelation between personal and social pathology is 
found in the effects produced by electronic bugging and wiretapping, or even in 
reports that this is taking place. 
[T]he ominous quality of the use of these devices stems from the fact that they 
constitute a replica in the social field of the dehumanized corruption of empathy 
that plagues the psychotic patient who suffers from the delusion of being observed. 
The delusion portrays the transformation of empathy into a force that coldly and 
inimically intrudes into the patient's self instead of modulating its responses to his 
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needs. (55 II: 721) 
Although such practices as wiretapping and intercepting mail may yield infor-
mation for security purposes, on another level they actually undermine people's 
sense of security. They bring about a social environment, which lIinstead of being 
benevolently responsive to the individual, ... has become a hostile force trying to 
penetrate into his most private communications and thus into his thoughts" (55 
II: 721). When security services undertake these kinds of activity, they often -
wittingly or unwittingly - bring about or increase the general insecurity in a 
country and so provoke upheaval. 
16.8 Narcissism in a Personal/Social Dialectic 
From these examples of a lack of respect for otherness, inflexibility, emptiness 
and pervasive suspicion, we see that social breakdown is both a cause and a 
consequence of archaic narcissism. The pathology of the self and of society can 
easily reinforce one another. An insufficiently empathic family and a society 
marked more by indifference than support does not allow the building up a 
cohesive self. The needs of a weak or fragmentary self then appear as crass 
arrogance and enraged demandingness. But these are IIno more than a cover, 
barring access to the legitimate demands for the empathic selfobject environ-
ment of which they were deprived as childrenll (55 IV: 577). But their rage, 
arrogance and other asocial attitudes are frequently not understood, especially by 
those who are themselves narcissistically vulnerable. Consequently, the appar-
ently asocial attitudes of others are IIrejected coldly, angrily, patronizingly, or 
contemptuously by those who cannot discern the rightful demands that have 
gone into hiding" (55 IV: 577). Their being rejected, however, only increases lithe 
helplessness and despair of those who have almost given up all hope of getting 
the response they needs for their psychological survival" (55 IV: 577). Without 
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empathy, insight and patience it is impossible to break out of this vicious circle. 
Although these examples do indicate an interplay between social and personal 
psychology, between the weakening of society and of the self of its members, they 
also underline the importance of the way society is mediated to each member. 
People do not experience society en bloc, but through various representatives 
which make society with all its qualities and deficiencies present to them. Society 
is represented to the person through various selfobjects, whether personal or 
cultural. In dealing with society, the most important selfobject transferences are 
those derived from people's experience of their leaders. This is the topic to which 




"Now Rehoboam son of Solomon reigned in Judah 
... Judah did what is displeasing to Yahweh, arousing his resentment 
more than his ancestors by all the sins which they had committed" (I Kings 14: 21-22). 
A topic that is often neglected, supposedly because it falls into the gap between 
psychology and sociology, is the influence of leaders, whether rulers or other 
'cultural figures,' on society. While psychologists look at individuals, sociologists 
at large collectivities, neither pays much attention to a prominent bridge that 
spans the two: leadership. For instance, although Giddens has examined the role 
of elites in society (1974), he says next to nothing about leadership. Kohut, by 
contrast, comes back many times in his writings to the question of why certain 
sick persons manage to lead millions of seemingly normal people astray. This 
form of structural evil is different from situations where through a combination 
of surveillance and control of the means of violence someone in command 
coerces compliance on a subject population (see 15.4 & 15.5 above). Under what 
conditions do ordinary people willingly accept and follow a ruling figure who 
can only bring them disaster? This chapter draws mainly on Kohut to examine 
that issue, but a quotation from Thomas helps layout the problem. 
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He speaks (QD de Caritate, 2) of the two kinds of love that a person may have for 
the good of his city. To love its good so that it may be held and possessed (ut 
habeatur et possideatur) does not bring about its political wellbeing. In this 
fashion a tyrant loves the good of a city in order that he may dominate it; he 
loves himself more than the city, for he desires its good for himself, not for the 
sake of the city. This contrasts with loving its good that it might be maintained 
and defended (ut conservetur et defendatur); that true kind of love brings its 
political wellbeing about. Then, in so far as the good of the city demands that it be 
defended or extended, some will expose themselves to the danger of death and 
put their own private wellbeing aside (negligant privatum bonum). 
There is no difficulty about understanding the contrast Thomas makes between 
these two kinds of love: a self-love that seeks to possess and dominate, and a 
disinterested love that will sacrifice oneself for a greater good. Our problem with 
pathological leadership is different: under what conditions can a dictator 
convince the people that his own self-interested love (or archaic narcissism) is 
love for them and hence they should trust and follow him? What type of 
transference is involved? 
This transference does not take place through rational argument in terms of 
values and norms; it may be assisted by people perceiving some practical 
advantages for themselves, but in the main it takes place unconsciously or in 
such a way that people are not really aware of what is happening to them. It 
affects people at the level of motivation, because - in Giddens' terms (see 10.7.2, 
12.4.2 and 16.3) - they are assured of their ontological security. 
17.1 Leaders and Society 
Kohut offers, not a full account of the various types of leadership, but some 
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insights into the bonding of leaders and followers on a psychological level. He 
deals mainly with cases where the bonding is more intense, rather than those 
where the leader simply functions in an official capacity or takes up an inherited 
position. In other words, he is dealing with what Max Weber terms 'charismatic 
authority,' rather than inherited 'traditional authority,' or 'the routinization of 
charisma' where officials are appointed. The latter two types are insufficient 
during times of crisis when society is threatened by an external danger or on the 
brink of breaking apart internally. At these moments the charismatic leader 
creates or demands new obligations that people recognize as obliging them. 
Kohut would endorse Weber's statement: "The corporate group which is subject 
to charismatic authority is based on an emotional form of communal relation-
ship" (1964: 360). Nevertheless, their approaches are different; Weber endeavours 
to construct an 'ideal type,' whereas Kohut seeks an indepth understanding of a 
few selected cases. Though he examines not just political leaders, but others 
influential in shaping culture and civilization. 
17.2 Reliance upon an Idealized Selfobject 
Kohut's insights into the psychological bonding between leaders and followers 
derive in large part from his study of the bond formed between a vulnerable, 
creative individual and a strong figure who provides support during the stresses 
of intense creativity. The heightened awareness required for a new discovery in 
science or a creative breakthrough in art leads the self into a frightening isola-
tion. 
During creative periods, the self is at the mercy of powerful forces it cannot control; 
and its sense of enfeeblement is increased because it feels itself helplessly exposed to 
extreme mood swings which range from severe precreative depression to dangerous 
hypomanic overstimulation, the latter occurring at the moment when the' creative 
mind stands at the threshold of creative activity. (55 II: 818) 
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A number of creative individuals have during these periods turned to a strong 
figure for support. The creative genius "feels humble toward and dependent 
upon this idealized protector, mentor, and judge, who is in essence his own 
creation" (55 III: 132). Freud, for instance, at the time he was undertaking his 
own self-analysis turned to Wilhelm Fliess. Fliess himself was something of a 
crank as a doctor, but lacked any self-doubt and possessed enormous self-
confidence. Because of his paranoid personality with his absolute conviction of 
being right, Freud experienced him as an idealized omnipotent selfobject on 
whom he could lean. There was a temporary regression "to the idealization of an 
archaic omnipotent figure" (55 II: 818). This regression in the case of Fliess was 
temporary as Freud eventually realized his limitations and broke with him (see 
Gay, 1988 for a full account). 
But it is often the Fliesses of the world, who lacking any self-doubt, set them-
selves up as leaders. When a group or society reaches a crisis point it looks for, in 
Weber's terms, charismatic authority. 
During these periods of collective narcissistic enfeeblement and tension, a desperate 
group need for merger with an idealized selfobject creates the political base from 
which the support of strong, charismatic, narcissistic leaders issues. (Strozier, 1980: 
403) 
These are the times when leaders may exert the greatest social influence, either 
for good or ilL 
17.3 Some Types of Leadership 
5peaking of the correlation between a leader and followers, Kohut distinguishes 
between charismatic and messianic types (55 II: 828n; see also Detrick in 
Goldberg, 1985: 254; both these types would be classed as "charismatic" by Weber). 
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These correspond to the two poles of the self. To a certain extent, in each case, 
there is a moulding of the group self by the leader and vice versa. The self of a 
charismatic leader largely becomes a carrier of the grandiose self of the group; so 
the group is drawn along by the direction-setting, stimulating enthusiasm of its 
leader. In this instance, the leader encapsulates the group's ambitions and boosts 
the energy of followers to strive for their realization. Messianic leadership, on 
the other hand, centres upon the goal-setting, calming certainty provided by the 
leader. The group experiences in its leader the ideals and values it wishes to 
uphold and which sustain it. 
There are other leaders who have neither a messianic nor a charismatic person-
ality, but who are chosen or followed because of their ability to carry out effec-
tively the administrative tasks the group requires. This type of leadership 
corresponds to the intermediate area of skills and talents between the two poles 
of the self. 
Finally, in groups where no definite leader is chosen or appointed - so-called 
"leaderless groups" - frequently the most disturbed member emerges as the 
person with the greatest influence. With no formal checks and balances it is 
difficult for an unorganized group to resist the paranoid self-certainty and 
assurance that he or she brings to bear. 
17.4 Qualities of Leadership 
The main determinant of whether leadership will be sound or pathological 
depends, not on whether it centres around ambitions (charismatic) or upon 
ideals and values (messianic), but upon the quality of the transference involved. 
It is a "biased value judgment [to regard] ideals as morally superior to ambitions" 
(SPHU: 55). What is crucial is the relative archaism or maturity involved in the 
541 
followers' identification with their leader and his or her way of identifying with 
them. Again by taking Kohut's ideas a little further than he did himself, the 
predominant qualities in four styles of leadership can be delineated (see figure on 
next page). 
When a group expects its present or future leader to solve all its problems and 
usher in a state of peace where the highest ideals are upheld by everyone (type 1), 
it is living an illusion. Yet by continually hoping that next time there will be a 
better ruler, a better government and a better society, it can defer action for a long 
time. So long as no major crisis occurs, this kind of leadership-cum-followership 
can continue. But when society hits a major crisis, experiencing setbacks that 
undermine its social organization as well as the psychological balance of its 
members, usually a new leader emerges who will shift attention from ideals and 
values to goals and ambitions (types 2 or 4). 
The most constructive yet the least obtrusive type of leadership is that of the 
facilitator (type 3), whose calming presence and personal embodiment of society's 
values sets the scene for everyone to make their own constructive contribution 
towards the common good. Sufficient guidance and direction is given so that 
efforts are coordinated, but not so much that initiatives are stifled. This is the 
quality of leadership Aristotle had in mind when he spoke of a ruler of free 
people requiring much more strength of character than ruling over slaves 
(1333b/25-3, and see also 1277b/8-10). Attaining leadership of this quality 
depends, however, not only upon finding a suitable person as leader, but upon 
the maturity of the members of society. Maturity here is a matter of having a 
sufficient degree of ego-dominance over narcissistic structures (SPHU: 55), or, put 
more simply, on people being able to exercise self-restraint. 





1. Expected Hero / 2. Demanding 
Archaic Saviour to solve totalizing 
(merger) all problems subservience 
3. Facilitator 4. Stirring 
Mature for constructive challenge to 
(relation) initiatives attain goals 
Fig 17 Predominant QuaLities in Leadership 
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ambitions they epitomize, and on how followers identify with them. When 
followers attempt an archaic merger of themselves with the grandiose self of an 
omnipotent leader (type 3), they are entering into a danger area . 
... most culture-destroying forms of mass behavior - e.g., of those masses under the 
sway of the dictatorships of our century - emanated from groups which were 
predominantly amalgamated by the identity with the archaic grandiose self. Even 
here there are undoubtedly exceptions. Individual members of these groups relate to 
the leader in mystical religious devotion, betraying the presence of archaic forms of 
the omnipotent object; others use overt idealization as a cover of their reactivated 
archaic power-grandiosity; and still other mobilize truly idealizing cathexes. (SPHU: 
55) 
The exceptions Kohut notes might be those instances where leaders tactically 
accept identification and adulation from their followers, but use that as a way of 
drawing them into learning and discovering things for themselves. The truly 
educative leader endeavours to build up his or her followers' ego-dominance 
over their narcissistic tendencies. He or she imposes discipline so that self-
discipline may be acquired as the self is firmed. As the followers gain experience 
and so build up their own self structure, they come to a more relational identifi-
cation with their leaders (type 3 or 4). 
This educational approach is vastly different from those mass movements that 
are formed around a shared archaic grandiosity; there discipline and restraint are 
relaxed. This takes place 
after the previously existing aim-inhibiting and ego-controlled shared form of self-
confidence (national prestige) and the previously existing aim-inhibited and ego-
controlled communal ego-ideal (religious values) have been destroyed or debased. 
(SPHU: 55f) 
In such a society (type 2), one that lacks support from selfobjects that should give 
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it meaning and value, the only kind of support many of its members can find 
derives from the grandiose ambitions of a leader convinced of his or her own 
mission, no matter how bizarre or destructive that might be. This prime example 
of this kind of sick leadership is that of Hitler (see 17.5.2 below). 
Nevertheless, not all groups and societies that coalesce around a shared grandi-
ose self are sick. They may well be sound when the leader by embodying the 
grandiose self of the group stirs its members into action to realize a common 
constructive aim (type 4). This type of leadership is especially important when it 
is a matter of firming the group's determination and mobilizing all its resources 
to triumph over adversity (see 17.6 below). 
Constructive groups may well hold certain ambitions in common and the heightened 
self-esteem which the individual derives from feeling himself at one with a group 
whose sense of power and pleasurable display of self-confidence is by no means 
incompatible with self control, civilized behavior, and creative purpose. (SPHU: 55) 
Leaders in this instance rouse, encourage and challenge followers to realize the 
ambitions of the group. This works well in times of disaster, crisis or war, where 
the overriding aims of the society are clear and the leader embodies the resolve 
to attain them. 
Any leader of whatever type may make errors of judgment or fail to live up to 
his or her responsibilities. But over and above individual faults and failures, the 
most likely recipe for social disaster is when the archaic narcissism of leader and 
followers resonate with each other (type 2). They then bring the worst out of each 
other; a scenario we need to examine in more detail. 
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17.5 The Pathological Merger of Leader and Followers 
It has been repeatedly observed (O'Dea, 1970; Stark, 1967; Wilson, 1973) that in 
times of social disintegration, which brings about considerable stress and 
uncertainty, people turn to all kinds of fringe groups and pseudo-religious cults 
to sustain or save them. In this kind of anomic situation people are also likely to 
look to or accept some strange and yet very demanding leaders (type 2). What 
Kohut offers here is a short delineation of what goes on from a psychological 
point of view. He recognizes the convergence of many factors, including non-
psychological ones, and says too that: "the presence, for example, of a gifted 
pathological leader or the absence of a gifted non-pathological leader might well 
decisively influence the course of events" (SPHU: 63). But in either case, various 
social factors such as unemployment and high inflation, cultural deprivation, a 
high rate of crime, inefficiency, and incessant political infighting, are likely to 
lead to - as well as be manifestations of - psychological regression. What 
happens to people under these conditions, when the world that formerly 
supported them is falling apart? 
There is a first state of painful increase of narcissistic tension with propensity 
toward shame, hypochondria, and depression. This is followed by a regressive 
movement in the narcissistic realm, manifested partly in the sector of the idealized 
omnipotent parent imago and partly in the sector or the grandiose self. The first line 
of regression lead to such manifestations as inclinations toward vague mystical 
religiosity (the following of sects at the fringe of true religion, for example) and the 
search for an external embodiment of the omnipotent selfobject into whom one can 
merge. (SPHU: 63f) 
Because people feel everything is getting them down and they are getting 
nowhere, there is a regression in the self from more or less mature and respon-
sible relations with others to archaic narcissism. They long for and seek a cause, a 
group, a movement, a person with whom they can merge. To begin with they 
will retain some of the ideals and values that formerly were prominent in their 
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society. This people may be initially attracted and form religious-cum-cultural 
movements which extol a past golden age. But matters do not stop there. 
The second line of regression leads to the reinforcement of archaic grandiosity, 
attitudes of intolerant certainty, arrogance, and the extolling of an external embodi-
ment of the grandiose self in the nation[, the party, the movement or some other 
grouping]. Ultimately the stage is set for the coalescence of both tendencies: The 
individual finds triumphant relief from the narcissistic tension as his grandiose self 
expands into the powerful group and as the leader becomes the omnipotent 
selfobject with whom the individual merges. (SPHU: 64) 
As the extravagant ambitions deriving from archaic grandiosity rise to the fore, 
there is a transition in such groups from cultural activities to a more militant 
stance. Organizations that began by fostering ethnic identity, for instance, become 
armed resistance movements. 
This may be somewhat baffling to outsiders, as they cannot comprehend why 
people should be so fanatical and uncritical of themselves. But what Kohut puts 
his finger on is the enormous sense of relief and exhilaration that people whose 
world was falling apart feel through their total identification with such a 
movement. 
Individuals seek to melt into the body of a powerful nation (as symbolized by a 
grandiose leader) to cure their shame and provide them with a feeling of enormous 
strength, to which they react with relief and triumph. Old fantasies of omnipotence 
seem suddenly to have become reality; all are proclaiming the invincible strength of 
the nation, and he who dares to question the omnipotence of the group and 
omniscience of its leader is an outcast, an enemy, a traitor. (SPHU: 57) 
Kohut's explanation about the effect of melting into the body a powerful 
movement or nation corresponds to Robert Jay Lifton's account of the psychol-
ogy of totalism. 
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Ideological totalism itself may offer a man an intense peak experience: a s~nse of 
transcending all that is ordinary and prosaic, of freeing him from the encumbrances 
of human ambivalence, of entering a sphere of truth, reality, trust, and sincerity 
beyond any he had ever known or even imagined .... Rather than stimulating greater 
receptivity and "openness" to the world, they [totalizing movements] encourage a 
backward step into some form of "embeddedness" - a retreat into doctrinal and 
organizational exclusiveness, and into all-or-nothing emotional patterns more 
characteristic of the child than of the individual adult. (quoted in Lynch, 1965: 283) 
Lifton adds that within such a totalizing group or movement, language become 
impoverished; it ceases to be a means for communicating with and hence 
learning from those who are different. Instead, it is reduced to cliches and 
slogans, and so only comes to mean what the movement wants it to mean. It 
ceases to open up for them a fresh view on reality or provide them with alterna-
tive lines of action from which they must choose. This tendency is evident above 
all in the rhetoric espoused by the leader of a totalizing group or movement. 
What enables someone to fill such a leadership position? Why is someone 
acceptable as leader of a totalizing group? What psychological features must he or 
she possess to embody its omnipotence and be seen as omnipotent? A special 
kind of personal pathology is required for this. While he or she is crippled in not 
being able to establish normal relations with others as a friend and companion, 
the leader "develops a heightened sensitivity to the anonymous groups and its 
motivations and is able to relate to it intensely" (SPHU: 56). Although unable to 
relate to individuals, he or she has "a heightened grasp of the unconscious and 
preconscious tension states, of the fantasies, wishes, and fears of the group" 
(SPHU: 56). 
Because the self of such a leader is formed around archaic grandiosity alone, 
there is no question of distinguishing his or her own ambitions and strivings 
from those of the movement. He or she is totally identified with its aims. Also, 
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through being devoid of mature empathy that would show respect for others and 
listen to their opinions, there is no reason to doubt the rightness of his or her 
own opinions, judgments and orders. Yet, since within limits this kind of leader 
experiences what affects others as part of the self, he or she can be very respon-
sive to what others are going through. The leader merges his personality with 
the followers, and the followers with the leader. 
The more intense such an archaic merger, the more precarious it becomes. The 
leader's empathy, after all, is limited to those who share a narcissistic injury and 
deprivation similar to his or her own. It does not extend to those of another 
culture, or whose social situation and consequently experience is different. His or 
her injury is likely to be more acute as it derives from the empathic deprivation 
experienced in their family upbringing, while that of the followers is due more 
to psychological regression resulting from social deprivation. The leader can only 
pick up the fears and fantasies of followers that are similar to his or her own. 
[This] inability to perceive and to understand human reactions beyond a certain 
range is not recognized by him as a limitation, even though it is a serious shortcoming 
that often contributes to his ultimate downfall. He declares as contemptible 
motivations and attitudes which are not identical with his own. Thus he develops 
along with his great understanding of the masses a steadily increasing contempt for 
them. (SPHU: 57) 
Due to his narcissistic fixation, as well as the inability to listen and learn from 
others through normal discourse, the pathological leader relentlessly follows an 
inflexible course. The ability to make pragmatic adjustments is absent. So when 
she or he detects that the followers are "wets" deviating from the "true doctrine" 
they are dismissed with contempt. The example of sick leadership that Kohut 
frequently turns to is that of Adolf Hitler, but it might be instructive to look first 
at the extension of Hendrik Verwoerd's personality into the grand design of 
apartheid. 
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17.5.1 Verwoerd and Apartheid 
An instance of a strong leader taking a nation on a humanly destructive course is 
that of Hendrik Verwoerd's role in the imposition of grand apartheid. Segrega-
tion and baasskap long pre-dated apartheid, but what Verwoerd and his associ-
ates did was to transform these fairly crude white ambitions into apartheid, 
which was portrayed with utmost sincerity as a moral ideal. Verwoerd especially 
was a key figure in presenting the plan of grand apartheid as the solution to 
South Africa's race problems, and as the best way of ensuring protection and 
development for every race group. In propagating apartheid and putting it into 
effect, what kind of leadership was Verwoerd successively exercising as a 
professor of sociology, newspaper editor, minister of native affairs, and then as 
prime minister? What enabled him to convince so many white South Africans, 
and some members of other races too, that rightness lay along the path of grand 
apartheid? 
There were certainly many more factors than Verwoerd's own personality, but 
the combination of great intellectual ability, complete self-assurance, a rigid set of 
ideas, a complete lack of empathy with what others - particularly non-
Afrikaners - were experiencing, and enormous energy and ambition enabled 
him to be the leader destined to put apartheid into effect. A recent assessment of 
his personal abilities and qualities has been made by Edward Higgins, who writes: 
"Friend and foe alike have testified to the fact that Dr Verwoerd came across as 
someone who never experienced even a shadow of self-doubt" (1991: 146, italics 
added). His great self assurance provided his followers with enormous support. 
Although his speeches were long-winded and full of detail, he was "nevertheless 
was a popular speaker, most probably because of his aura of omniscience and his 
impressive personality." (Higgins, 1991: 148, italics added). 
Intellectually, he stood head and shoulders above most of his parliamentary 
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supporters, while his self-assurance and his didactic manner led many to 1;>elieve 
that he could really wish into being the political objectives of his fertile imagination. 
Relatively few parliamentarians ... queried his genius (Davenport, 1977: 281, italics 
added). 
The effect of Verwoerd's personality was brought home to me on a visit to a 
farm near Stellenbosch in 1964, where it was pointed out that Afrikaners were 
not worried about their position. "They have their machine gun, and Dr 
Verwoerd." In other words, they are well armed to fight, and the prime minister 
will answer all questions arising in international politics as well as still their 
own inner doubts. A few years later Archbishop Denis Hurley, recalling his 
meetings with Dr Verwoerd, remarked to me: "He was a man who enjoyed the 
luxury of never doubting the rightness of his own judgment." 
It is beyond the scope of this study to present a psychobiography of Verwoerd. But 
all the evidence points to a self of immense, archaic grandiosity with a total 
inability to appreciate others' point of view or respond empathically to them. His 
grandiosity combined with great intellectual ability enabled him to weld together 
the various factions amongst Afrikaners and to impose the final solution to the 
complex race problems of South Africa. The integrity of his personal life and the 
sincerity with which he advanced his grand plans for social engineering is not 
doubted. But despite that, his lack of empathy and hence consideration for others 
- as they sensed themselves to be, not just as the objects of his theory - made 
him into a leader taking South Africa down a destructive path. His grand design 
was at root an attempt to make a lack of empathy and an unwillingness to 
support others, whether personally or socially, into an ideal. This, it should be 
reiterated, is not the whole story; there were many social, political and economic 
factors involved. But the way apartheid in theory and practice denied the need 
for empathy with people of another race made it, not just an unsuccessful 
political policy, but an affront to human dignity worldwide. 
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17.5.2 The Personality and Leadership of Adolf Hitler . 
Conditions in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s facilitated the rise of the Nazis; in 
particular, a combination of social factors led to widespread narcissistic regression 
amongst the population. This explains the desperate longing the German people 
had for a selfobject that would given them vitality as a nation again. What has to 
be examined now is how the formation of Hitler's personality enabled him to 
fulfil that role, but with such disastrous consequences. What enabled him, such 
an unlikely candidate for leading a sophisticated nation, to be in such "total 
resonance with the disease of the German self" (SPHU: 91)? 
The lack of empathic support in childhood left Hitler as a young adult with 
massive narcissistic injury. He tried to overcome his narcissistic tensions 
through art, but when that failed he "lapsed into a period of lonely brooding and 
hypochondriacal preoccupation, from which he emerged with the conviction 
that the Jews had invaded the body of Germany and had to be eradicated" (SPHU: 
54). This conviction was fed by his reading cheap, anti-Semitic stories. Here he 
was repeating his own cure, first worked out in his childhood, and then again in 
his adolescence and early adulthood, for overcoming the divitalization and 
fragmentation of his nuclear self. Relinquishing the selfobjects that had failed 
him, his personality came to centre around an archaic grandiose self. In Hitler's 
case 
the core of the self, except for one nucleus of infantile grandiosity, [was] lost. Thus 
the personality, however extensive its growth in the many layers that [were] acquired 
around the archaic core, [remained] cold .... it never [acquired] the capacity for 
modulated empathy with others. Such a personality is characterized by a near-total 
absence of compassion, except where total identification is concerned, when the 
'other' is totally experienced as part of the self. (SPHU: 91f) 
Hitler thus acquired a self-sufficient personality, that no longer required 
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selfobject support. But instead of being cut off and out of touch with people, he 
experienced his social surroundings as part of himself. A foreign diplomat 
around 1936 approached Hitler to warn him that the violence he was causing 
was excessive, and matters were going too far. Hitler replied that it was not him 
but the people who were pressing matters along. The fluidity of Hitler's self not 
only led him "to perceive impersonal and accidental occurrences as personal 
slights," but also made him especially sensitive to "similar motivations in 
others" (SPHU: 54). This had two consequences. 
First, if any group, nationality or race did not react as he expected them to react 
that was "a deep personal affront, a frightening, inimical disturbance of [his] 
solipsistic universe. The situation can only be remedied by wiping out those who 
dare to be different" (SPHU: 54). This was the fate of the Jews and many others, 
whom he did not recognize as fellow humans. 
Second, Hitler's perception of emotional identities was heightened. This enabled 
him to 
discover similar small or dormant motivations in others, which he [used] skilfully by 
identifying with them and bringing about an identification with him. He [melted] 
them into his personality so to speak and [brought] them and their actions under his 
control as if they [had been] his limbs, his thoughts, and his actions. (SPHU: 54) 
The overall effect was that Hitler suddenly presented himself to 
the culturally disenfranchised masses in Germany who were yearning for somebody 
who would tum to them and talk to them and talk for them ... [as a person who 
was] strong, unafraid, utterly convinced of his - and our - greatness. All of a 
sudden people were willing to die for that marvellous image they got of themselves 
via this particular person. (SPHU: 229) 
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Those who underestimated and ridiculed Hitler, whether themselves Germans 
or not, were totally out of touch with the sense of deprivation and narcissistic 
regression that many in Germany were experiencing at the time. It was not that 
everyone was in exactly the same position, as 
the followers of Hitler were originally composed of all kinds of groups: the indus-
trialists who wanted to see the economy revived; the lower middle class who wanted 
to get uplifted from their suddenly lowered status; the unemployed who wanted 
jobs; and those for whom national defeat was the major sore that needed to be 
healed. And yet, for all of that, Hitler was an unquestioned figure of inner security 
and power. (SPHU: 227) 
In other words, Hitler's archaic grandiosity drew people along for somewhat 
different reasons; or rather, his appeal did not derive from a reasoned political 
programme, but more from his invitation to the German people to participate in 
the blissful self-image he portrayed through merger with him (SPHU: 204). The 
same held true for the 800 followers of the religious cult leader, Jim Jones, in . 
Guyana who committed suicide together with him on his orders (SPHU: 249). 
Strozier, in his introduction to Kohut's work, adds that 
this bonding of leader and follower can only occur where there is complete affinity 
culturally and psychologically between the fantasies of the group and its chosen 
messianic and/ or charismatic leader. Neither party, so to speak, can diverge from 
the original pact. (SPHU: xxviii) 
To begin with there was complete affinity between Hitler's peculiar personality 
and his followers' needs, later that began to break down. Yet Hitler remained as 
relentless and inflexible as ever. When he "sensed the Germans were pulling 
back psychologically from their merger with him, he became sneeringly con-
temptuous of them. In the final debacle he even ordered Albert Speer to destroy 
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German economic life" (Strozier, SPHU: xxviii). His refusal to surrender. even 
though defeat was certain brought the fullest destruction on his own people. 
17.5.3 Where does the Faull Lay? 
Was it all Hitler's fault? To what extent were the Germans - their earlier 
leaders, the Nazis, the military and the common people - guilty? Does the guilt 
stop there, and not extend to the Allies too? These questions return us to the 
discussion of collective guilt that took place at the close of World War II (see 3.2.1 
above). They find their counterpart today in the South African discussion on 
who is guilty for apartheid. While not answering all these questions directly, 
Kohut's diagnosis bears repeating: "It was the abysmal failure of constructive 
empathy in Germany and in its European surroundings that made Hitler 
possible" (SPHU: 93). This failure in empathy was evident in the lack of empa-
thic sel£objects in the upbringing of Hitler and many of his associates. It was 
evident too in the way many of Germany's political leaders, artists and other 
public spokespeople were out of touch with the barrenness experienced by large 
sections of the population. Kohut does not excuse the psychoanalytic movement 
on this count. 
What might have happened if analytic insights, filtering through the intelligentsia 
toward men in positions of political leadership and towards artists and journalists, 
had provided at least a dawning insight into the state of the broken self of individ-
uals who were suddenly deprived of the two major constituents of their selves? We 
do not know. (SPHU: 93) 
But it is possible for ideas and insights to spread rapidly, for awareness to filter 
through (see SPHU: 241), so if the psychoanalytic movement had provided a 
better empathic understanding of the conditions that made Hitler and the Nazis 
possible, history might have been different. A similar lack of empathic support 
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was also prominent in the lack of understanding and the treatment shown to 
Germany by other nations in Europe. All in all, the failure in empathy that 
Kohut speaks of put everyone in some way at fault. In reaching this conclusion, 
Kohut concurs with Levinas, who is prepared in the last analysis to say: "I am 
responsible even for the Other's responsibility" (1985: 99). 
17.6 Grandiose yet Healthy Leadership 
Because of the massive human destruction wrought by sick leaders such as Hitler 
and Verwoerd, the very idea of leadership and authority has come in for severe 
questioning. Is all leadership and power inevitably corrupt? Is it impossible for 
someone in a position of power to combine moral integrity with political 
efficacy? Kohut does not think so. 
I think it is part and parcel of good human equipment to be able to be enthusiastic 
for the great. In some people this capacity needs to be liberated rather than curbed. 
The capacity to admire a great leader figure, even a messianic and charismatic one, is 
not pathology .... [But] there must be insight. It is like the difference between paranoia 
and normality. (SPHU: 249) 
Leaders with immense drive and embodying great ambitions for their followers 
can be great, but they must have a sense of humour to safeguard them (see 13.4.2 
above). Without humour and hence the humility not to take themselves too 
seriously, they would become dangerous fanatics. 
During those periods when a society or group is under intense pressure or its 
survival as a whole is threatened, a gifted leader may enable it to pull through, 
because he or she can rally support and give clear direction. "The gifted and 
successful leader experiences danger on a personal level but can realize and 
express that danger on the group level," (SPHU 259) because he or she has gone 
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through a similar experience beforehand. Due to a lack of selfobject sustenance as 
a child or adolescent, he or she will have undergone phases of near fragmenta-
tion in the self. But if the self has been reconstituted with ideas and ambitions 
that later coincide with those required by the group, he or she has leadership 
potential for tackling the task on hand. Such a person has gone 
through phases of near fragmentation ... [and then reassembled] himself with a set of 
creative ideas that happen to fit the overall needs of the group. He and the group 
then become each other's selfobjects. They come to form a unit that is exhilarating 
and full of vitality. They self that was fragmented clicks firmly back into place. It is 
for these experiences that people gladly will die. Biological survival is nothing by 
comparison to this experience. (5PHU: 259) 
Having him- or herself overcome fragmentation, the leader imparts the confi-
dence to followers that they too can triumph over whalever threatens them with 
disintegration. Hence their exertions and sacrifices for the group will not be in 
vain. 
17.6.1 The case of Winston Churchill 
A prime example for Kohut of leadership based on grandiosity, rather than upon 
ideals and values was that of Winston Churchill during vVorld War n. His early 
years had prepared him for the leadership task he was to perform. An incident in 
his boyhood gives a glimpse of his driving unconscious grandiose fantasy. When 
being hunted in a game with two other boys, he was running across a bridge over 
a ravine only to find his pursuers closing in on him from both ends. 
"capture seemed certain" he wrote [in his autobiography], "But in a flash there came 
across me a great project." He looked at the young fir trees below and decided to 
leap onto one of them. He computed, he meditated. "In a second, I had plu~ged," he 
continues, "throwing out my arms to embrace the summit of the fir tree." (55 I: 444) 
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It 'was several months before he recovered. At this stage his unconscious 
grandiose fantasy was not integrated with a firm grasp of reality. But "luckily, for 
him and for the forces of civilization, when he reached the peak of his responsi-
bilities the inner balance had shifted" (55 I: 444). All his life, including his 
capture by the Boers near Colenso, Churchill 
had a compelling need to be entrapped in order to prove his ability to escape, that 
is, to fly off. Furthermore, his personality appears in general much less characterized 
by devotion to lofty ideals than by the conviction that he possessed unconquerable 
power. This he communicated effectively. (SPHU: 12) 
His courage which others identified with during World War II was not centred 
upon promoting values, but on combatting the menace of Nazism. In being able 
to put his oratory, his civilized anger, and his organizing abilities into this one 
cause the pattern of his nuclear self reached narcissistic equilibrium. 
He experienced a sense of great inner calm and relief when he became Prime NIinister. 
It seems a state of narcissistic equilibrium established itself when he had the 
opportunity to live out again, in ultimate fulfilment, the deepest purposes of his self. 
He could then reenact in the arena of the whole world the apotheosis of a grandiose 
fantasy he retained from childhood: that of gaining freedom from encirclement by 
blissfully soaring into the air. (SPHU: 12f) 
He was able to place his courage and risk-taking, which were present throughout 
his life, "in the service of the goals of a nuclear self that wanted to gain fame by 
rescuing the civilization with which he identified himself" (55 IV: 639). While 
these observations give some insight into the effectiveness of Churchill's 
leadership, as well as the eventual ineffectiveness of Hitler's, many other 
personalities and factors contributed to the outcome of World 'War II. Yet how 
these other factors were experienced depended to a conSiderable extent .on "the 
climate of opinion" (see 55 IV: 559) these leaders established. 
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17.7 Political Savvy 
It is sometimes stated that followers get the leaders they deserve; while not a 
complete truth, this saying underlines the importance of people recognizing 
what kind of leadership they require at any particular time and discerning what a 
potential leader might offer. The acceptance of appropriate leaders, and rejection 
of the unsuitable ones, is of paramount importance in building up and defend-
ing civilized society. Kohut suggests that psychoanalytic historians might look 
into "the political genius of a people, i.e., its skills, its political savvy, as mani-
fested in its capacity to choose the right kind of leader in various historical 
situations" (SS II: 828n19). 
He reminds us that Churchill, whose courageous stand he obviously admires, 
was nevertheless "unacceptable before the crisis [of World War II], filled his role 
to perfection during the crisis and was the unquestioned leader of the nation. Yet 
he was discarded after the crisis had subsided" (SPHU: 198f). The British people 
were ready to rally behind him to win the war, but found in him neither the 
human ideals nor the calming assurance required for rebuilding their society 
after it. The fact that , his leadership was accepted but only for the time being, 
while the war was on, shows an archaic merger of followers with their leader did 
not predominate in British society at large. 
A group or society with political savvy will turn to a messianic or charismatic 
personality during a time of difficulty 
not primarily because it has recognized his skills and his efficiency, but because it 
realizes that he will satisfy its need to identify with his unquestioned righteousness 
or with his firnmess and security [respectively]. (SPHU: 198) 
The importance of political savvy is evident too in contemporary South Africa. 
The kind of leadership-cum-followership suitable for attacking the injustices of 
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apartheid, one that thrived on courageous denunciation, is inappropriate. for a 
post-apartheid era in which the positive yet diverse contributions of all have to 
be welded into a new society. 
17.8 When Leadership Counts 
Although not mentioned by Giddens, there are certain historical events in which 
both social systems and structures are transformed. The commonly accepted 
situated practices of the social system are not followed, as people no longer keep 
within the limits of what is expected of them. The balance between autonomy 
and dependence changes. This arises from some people involved in a given 
situation suddenly bending the rules and altering the distribution of resources. 
Admittedly, every criminal or 'way out' person tries this, but the resources 
(access to power) and rules (especially sanctions) that others draw upon do not 
usually allow their deviance to extend very far. But there are historical instances, 
where "both structural and systemic patterns are redirected, reconfigured, or 
replaced" (Cohen, 1989: 90). This may be for either better or worse. 
An example of the former is when Rosa Parks decided on December I, 1955 not 
to obey a bus driver's order to give up her seat to a white passenger who had 
boarded the bus after her. This took place in Montgomery, Alabama, where 
Martin Luther King Jr was a newly appointed pastor. Her action was taken up 
and supported by others, and so sparked the civil rights movement of the 
American South. It was an instance where a departure from the usual structur-
ing of a face-to-face situation led to change coming over the whole social system. 
A recent example was the drama being played out between President Yeltsin and 
his supporters, the conservatives in the Russian parliament, the supreme court 
and the people on the streets. It is likely that the outcome of this face-to-face 
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showdown, where rules are being stretched and resources contested, will 
considerably affect the overall social system of Russia. What is at stake is not just 
the political fortunes of a few individuals, but the country's whole political 
system. At this point, the destiny of both is intertwiried. 
This, incidentally, explains why attention to the 'founding history' is so import-
ant for understanding a social system, whether this is a political system, a 
religious denomination or order. The activities of social reformers, revolution-
aries and religious founders are continually examined and recounted, so as to 
provide guidance and justification for the present. Furthermore, insofar as the 
resulting system remains a subject of controversy, disputes will continue about 
the founding history, in particular, about what the . leading figures meant or 
intended and what were the unintended consequences of their actions. 
In each case the unintended consequences of a particular action led, not to the 
reproduction of the social system as it was more or less before, but to a very 
extensive and unforeseen realignment of it. Although the actors involved did 
not fully know it at the time, their social interaction carried the seeds of a 
different social system. 
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Part IV - Recapitulation 
These last three chapters have fleshed out the overall theory presented in Part TIL 
They have outlined the most prevalent types of social evil found in the modern 
world, and how these can reinforce one another. But, as far as explaining how 
social evils persist, they show that no single scheme accounts for them all. They 
do not all have a common structure. These chapters have also addressed the 
interrelation of self and society, and how the effects of evil persist. 
As far as justice, communal support and the enhancement of human life are 
concerned, widespread and persistent flaws may occur in any or all of the four 
institutional c1usterings of modernity - capitalism, industrialism, surveillance 
and the state control of violence. Considered abstractly, flaws are not intrinsic to 
the structuring of modern society. Though, unless trends inherent within each 
of these institutional axes are kept well in check, many people will be adversely 
affected and the development of their lives and relations curtailed. 
Although a state monopoly on the control of violence is preferable to a country 
divided among war-lords, this may lead not only to unchecked aggression on the 
part of the police and military authorities, but to their outlook and ambitions 
coming to dominate society and even direct the economy. When this is further 
combined with the use of technically sophisticated surveillance systems, then the 
whole population may be brought under totalitarian rule. Although unstable in 
many respects, as it cannot cope with all the variant demands of modern society, 
totalitarian rule may still continue as a single political party led by a dictator 
enforces it with a reign of terror. 
Under these conditions, there is no social check for the worst manifestations of 
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archaic narcissism. In fact, relentless animosity and hatred may even be openly 
encouraged. The worst effects of narcissistic hurt and rage, namely, a lack of 
respect for otherness, inflexibility, emptiness and pervasive suspicion, also 
become prevalent. A totalitarian dictatorship fosters and plays upon these 
weaknesses in the self in order to keep people's fearful allegiance. It does not 
recognize any other human qualities as socially beneficial. 
Similar manifestations of narcissistic rage will occur when a society is deeply 
divided or its economy is collapsing, as each fragmented unit will think first of 
its own physical and psychological survival. Even in more normal times a large 
number of people have suffered narcissistic injury, due to a combination of 
slights, neglect, rejection on a personal level, as well as cultural deprivation and 
living conditions that offer nothing worth aspiring to. The resulting fragmenta-
tion in the self may be capitalized upon either by a pathological leader or through 
consumerism. 
When people have no selfobject milieu to sustain them and consequently lack 
self-esteem, they long for a cause or leader with whom they can merge. They seek 
a movement that will make them feel great and important. In their regression to 
archaic narcissism, they are drawn to someone whose self is formed around 
archaic grandiosity alone. This gives him or her a heightened sensitivity to the 
wishes, fantasies and fears of people in their anonymity. While seeming to offer 
them a way forward, such a pathological leader ultimately fails them as he or she 
is completely out of touch with other aspects of reality. 
Consumerism plays particularly on the emptiness of self experienced by many. 
Their unsatisfied and largely unrecognized yearnings for autonomy, identity, 
relationships and personal maturity are presented, often through advertising 
and conspicuous consumption, as the need to acquire, possess, display and use an 
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ever-novel variety of goods and services. The gap between satisfying fundamen-
tal human needs and the momentary assuagement of desires is never closed, so 
people remain frustrated and seek relief in purchasing another round of 
attractive goodies. 
While surveillance, the collection, storage and analysis of information about 
people is necessary for normal administration in a state or province, it can 
become excessive. Especially when combined with the threat of violence or 
administrative sanction it can lead to the curtailment of free speech, democracy 
and other human rights. The tendency of surveillance is to either disregard 
needs that do not fit into its system or label and treat associated activities as 
deviant. This tendency may gain a momentum of its own, and not be directly 
under anyone's control. People continue to collect and marshall information as 
without it state administration would collapse, but no one knows quite what has 
been collected about them or how it might be used. 
Related to widespread surveillance is the feedback of information and theories 
about how a society runs into conscious direction of activities within that society. 
In this process of reflexivity, one is not just reinterpreting more or less settled 
tradition to fit new circumstances, but applying the provisional insights gained 
from science to reconstitute those same circumstances. Instead of offering more 
certainty about the workings of society, reflexivity makes it less clear what should 
be done to improve the economy and social conditions. Since people are less 
fixed in one lifestyle, their response to any proposed measure and/ or its expected 
results may easily subvert those results. This helps reveal why certain social evils 
are so intractable. 
Reflexivity also helps explain why ambitious schemes of social engineering fail. 
Because of the circularity of social knowledge or I double hermene~tic' any 
attempt to direct social progress along a pre-determined path only increases the 
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likelihood that it will follow a different route. When this is not realized and 
instead even more determined efforts are made to push people along the 
theoretically determined route, then massive repression and needless suffering 
result. 
This brings out how society works neither as a vast machine nor as massive 
organism, certainly not one which you can control from outside as an operator 
or operate on as a surgeon. Even speaking in artistic terms is only helpful, as 
long as it is remembered that the artists (and in various ways that is all of us) are 
themselves being reconstituted by their interactive involvement in the art work. 
We are not just sculpting a fresco, but are also figures being sculpted in the fresco 
ourselves, and we respond both consciously and in ways we don't always avert to 
to the changes going on both within ourselves and in others. The overall result 
is that we are all reflexively reassessing and redesigning the fresco, ourselves 
included, as we go along. Not only that, when one figure makes a slip with a 
chisel, others not knowing better may readily copy it, or they try to ignore, 
accommodate or counter it. The overall result is that one is involved not only 
with the original slip of the chisel, but reflexively with other's positive and 
negative reactions to it and one another too. This metaphor may help show that 
in society there is no end to the convoluting and looping back that can take place. 
Like art it is recursive, but open-ended. 
To a considerable extent, the same may be said of the self. As a reflexive project, it 
is not only concerned with conditions and objects, but re-incorporates knowledge 
about its past and reflections of its own dynamics into its own self-understand-
ing. In a post-traditional society, where both activities and knowledge about 
them are continually being recast, any perception of who one is remains contin-
ually open to revision. This not just an academic problem, but a tr,oubling 
personal issue. That is why in modern society, self becomes such a continual 
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concern of self. Narcissism ceases to be exceptional, as the self has always to 
reincorporate its own past narrative reflexively into a viable project. Usually the 
more it has been sustained in the past, so as to gain a firm self-selfobject relation-
ship, the more easily it can accomplish this in the present. But if weakened or 
fragmented by past experience, the less realistically can it accomplish this now. 
Instead it may readily turn to archaic identifications with leader figures and 
movements that cannot deliver the security they so grandiosely projected. 
These vicissitudes of the self take on a more than individual character in 
situations of ethnic, national and gender conflict. There one is demeaned, 
slighted, exploited or attacked, not because of what one does or has, but due to 
some inherited characteristic which is inherently part of one's self. Such narciss-
istic injuries can distort the whole way one understands oneself, one's people 
and their relation with others. Contradictions along these lines may be allied 
with the division of labour, ownership of property, occupation of territory, 
asymmetries of authoritative power, and contradictions concerning who 
legitimates what kind of behaviour. When these fault lines coalesce, instead of 
cutting across one another, then the ensuing conflict is likely to very deep-seated. 
This also occurs along time-space edges, where two societies or cultures with 
vastly different power for organizing time and space meet. The one capable of 
organizing across a wider span of time-space is likely to dominate the other 
society, which has less access to resources, more restricted sources of information, 
and if it comes to the worst less fire-power. 
The spread of industrial technology both offers opportunities for human 
development, new forms of life, travel, communication and cooperation. 
Communications technology makes us all one world, where local problems 
become inextricably intertwined with distant or global arrangements. Resulting 
566 
from this is not an increasingly transparent world, but one where ontological 
security depends upon screening out possible sources of disturbing information. 
Besides the fact that no one could assimilate the mass of information available, 
much of it of doubtful quality and relevance, it would be too disturbing to weigh 
all the alternative viewpoints, consider every risk they indicate, and assess each 
suggestion for action. Without being unduly prejudiced or narrow-minded, one 
has to limit oneself, if anything in life is going to be accomplished. This leads to 
various dilemmas for the self, where a person is neither sure what she or he 
could or should do. 
When, however, this necessary limitation of outlook is combined with social 
reflexivity, it can lead to an internally referential approach to reality. Only what 
fits in with the driving forces of society, namely, with the inherent logic of 
capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and the control of violence, is treated as 
worthy of attention. The result is that the traditional bonds of families, associ-
ations and local communities are dissolved, and the values enshrined in them 
are lost. A further result is the sequestration of experience, in which areas of life, 
such as illness, suffering, insanity, death and mourning that cannot be 
commodified are left out of account. Insofar as the poor are noticed at all, their 
problem - not ours - is taken to be lack of commodities. Oust as I am checking 
this, the doorbell rings and a young man is there hungry begging for a slice of 
bread.} This limited approach to life leaves people humanly impoverished as 
they no longer know how to cope and grow through these experiences. 
Capitalism is the most widespread and deeply penetrating institution of the 
modern world. This is only in part due to its. reliance upon spreading consumer-
ism. It also stems from its way of converting not only movable goods, but land 
and labour power too into monetary values. Land with all its human attach-
ments can then be alienated. Labour, although freed from direct coercion, is still 
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subject to the necessity of entering into a labour contract with one or. other 
employer who has much more allocative power, and in fact is usually backed by 
the authoritative power of the state. While the play of a free market might 
provide the best indicators of supply and demand, capitalism left to its own 
internal logic is totally insensitive to other indicators of human well-being, such 
as communal memories, solidarity, health, sanity, affection and celebration. 
All these points could be elaborated ad infinitum, but that would still not 
provide one comprehensive theory of modern society and its ills. In fact, the 
roots of many social evils only become apparent when social movements engage 
with society in order to assist in its transformation. Only through reviewing the 
outcome of their actions, which rarely turn out fully as intended, they then 
reveal something more of the social structure than was previously known and 
therefore unacknowledged. Only when one, or rather a group, seeks to transform 
society do they begin to understand its structuring and how firmly embedded are 
many of its flaws. They are reproduced, typically in some of the forms men-




Theology of Social Sin 
In this last section there is a return to more explicitly theological issues, but let us 
hope enriched by drawing upon insights from the human sciences. A full 
theological discussion of social sin would not limit itself to describing its origins 
and workings in the self and social process, as this study has done, but go on to 
show how it might be overcome. While the recognition of sin is integral to 
Christian faith, it does not stop there. Faith also holds out a redemptive hope for 
both self and society to be transformed. Only some hints, however, are given on 
that in this concluding section. 
The shift between this and the previous sections is from speaking of 'structural 
evil' to 'social sin.' Briefly, to speak of a 'structural evil' is to point to a persistent 
degrading on a collective scale of human life. It is a condition in which people 
cannot fully sustain the level of justice and sociability necessary for supporting 
and giving a true direction to one another's lives. Structural evil stands in 
ethical opposition to the common good. It is not simply a conjectural term 
removed from experience, but one that can be used to name and decry, for 
example, the bloody and longstanding antagonism endemic in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, the economic system . which steadily increases the gap 
between rich and poor across the world, or the way in which so many women 
and men find they can only bring the worst out of each other in th~ir inter-
relations. Abhorrence at these structural evils is not limited to members of any 
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one faith or theological school. Anyone can recognize and condemn them 
simply as anti-human, though discussion would still need to continue about the 
most appropriate terms and standards to apply. To find a clearer language in 
which to understand 'structural evil,' and not leave it as an unexamined residual 
term, this study has turned to psychology and sociology for insight. Another 
study might have drawn on contemporary literature or relied more on news 
reports, and so illuminated 'structural evil' from a different viewpoint. What-
ever viewpoint is taken, any investigation of 'structural evil' - whether it 
concentrates on particular instances or looks for an underlying theory as this 
study does - is in principle open to normal human experience, reflection and 
ethical discussion. 
A further step is being taken when one speaks of 'social sin.' Although dealing 
with the same reality, the approaches of ethics -that is ethics not exclusively 
linked to any religious belief - and Christian theology are somewhat different 
yet also complementary. This study does not take the view that the content of 
Judaeo-Christian ethics has descended from on high, as though it were imposed 
as an extra grid over the usual human experience and argument about how 
people ought to live together. However, it recognizes that Christian community 
must always critically appraise the socially accepted views on how people should 
live. This appraisal is made in the light of its tradition of faith, not in order to 
replicate the past, but so that it might discover anew the teaching and witness of 
the prophets, of Jesus and his followers. That will involve discerning closely 
what is evil in accepted structures, outlooks and activities to denounce it, 
whatever inadequate to supplement it, whatever good to ratify and extend it. In 
short, it sees the dialogue-cum-interaction among human beings as an inner 
moment within the dialogue-cum-interaction between God and humanity. Both 
these dialogues encompass every human being both personally and coll.ectively. 
Hence in working out how people should live together and what measure of 
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support they should give each another, one's response must be appropria~e for 
both these dialogues. To put this in a simple formula: our ethical obligations as 
human beings arise from our having a responsibility to God for one another. So 
in failing one another we sin against God. 
This is not the place to justify this position, but it is not one without precedent. 
Old Testament writers entered into a dialogue with the laws and ethical opinions 
of the Babylonians and Egyptians, ratifying some and correcting others in view of 
their faith in Yahweh. Paul did much the same with the mainly Stoic outlook of 
his time. Thomas continued this practice by taking over and adapting the newly 
re-discovered writings of Aristotle to give them a Christian perspective. The 
social teaching of the Catholic Church derives from examining current social 
issues and attempting to discern where within them the Holy Spirit is leading 
towards a fuller humanity. As new issues arise this process of reflection, dialogue 
and critical appraisal has to continue. Overall it comes to form a tradition of 
teaching, in which later statements and writings may clarify, but can also obscure, 
earlier positions. 
It should hardly need to be pointed out that this approach is markedly different 
from the fundamentalist one. Fundamentalist ethics - whether Jewish, 
Christian or Moslem - regards what is written as a divine injunction valid for 
all time and places. It makes no distinction between spirit and letter, content and 
ratification, immediacy and tradition. 
In speaking about sin, a proviso has to be made. Judging in any given instance 
exactly who has committed sin and their degree of guilt has to be left to God. No 
science or human authority is in a position to make that condemnation in any 
final sense. One can and at times should point out that certain activities or that 
promoting a particular policy are sinful, but the final judgment on persons is not 
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ours to make. This is one reason why speaking of sin differs from a psychol.ogical 
diagnosis of pathology, or the assessment of a social situation. The human 
sciences, useful as they are for counselling individuals and guiding social action, 
do not themselves anchor people's deepest assumptions. Nor do they inspire, 
though they might cast some light upon, people's ultimate aspirations. That 
anchoring and inspiration, which theology tries to elucidate, derives from a trust 
in God who is revealed in the Word and actively given to humanity in the 
dynamism of the Holy Spirit. 
A classical way of describing how that combination of divine revelation and 
involvement · in human affairs works itself out is in terms of faith, hope and 
charity. Many other aspects could be explored, such as the role of the Christian 
community, or the accomplishment, example and continuing influence of Jesus 
Christ. These, however, will have to remain in the background as this study 
concludes with a consideration of how social sin relates to charity, faith and 
hope. 
In Part One questions were raised about the theological propriety of speaking 
about 'social sin,' especially since only an individual human being could be a 
perpetrator of sin. This question, along with that of individual culpability for 
social sin, is tackled in relation to charity or self-giving (Chapter Eighteen). Social 
sin, besides resulting from injustice, a lack of sociability or the absence of the 
normal give and take of charity, also derives from a lack of faith. This is particu-
larly so when people out of pride set their human projects up as a way of 
developing their lives and world without God (Chapter Nineteen). However, 
this lack of faith is not simply due to the pride of individuals, it also has a social 
origin. It stems from the widely held hope of Western society that by our own 
human efforts within time paradise on earth may be regained. This optimistic 
hope, which Giddens terms a 'providential outlook,' has with the coming of 
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high- (or post-) modernity been deconstructed. This makes way for a renewed but 
less calculative understanding of God's providential care · for those called to 
become his people (Chapter Twenty). Although the prevalence of social sin 
prevents the straightforward expression of that care, it does not thwart it 
completely. By continuing to witness to God's care for all people, especially the 




Social Sin & Culpability 
"For if anyone is a hearer of the word and not a doer, 
he is like a man who observes his natural face in a mirror; 
for he observes himself and goes away and at once forgets what he was like II (James 1:23-4). 
The digest of church statements and theological documents (Part One) brought to 
light the controversy of speaking about 'social sin.' The central objection was that 
sins resulted from the free, knowing and deliberate action of individuals people 
decisively rejecting the good that led to or maintained their unity with God. 
Society, on the other hand, did not undertake actions and so was incapable of 
committing sin. Those making this objection "accuse this language of denaturing 
what is most profound in sin - that it is the fruit of a personal and responsible 
freedom;" to this Gonzalez Faus replies: 
Sin also means that which God rejects and cannot accept in any way. Therefore 
denying the notion of structural sin is equivalent to saying that the present situation 
of the world (and in particular the third-world countries) is not a situation that 
arouses God's rejection and anger. Accepting the notion of structural sin means we 
are saying that the relationship of all humanity with God has been degraded, 
precisely because of the degradation in the relationships of human beings to one 
another. (1993: 538) 
This is not just an academic question, but undergirds a political and existential 
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stance that bears upon one's personal activities and the direction of c~urch 
policies. As Faus indicates, probably the best way of clarifying whether 'social sin' 
is a legitimate term is by examining what it is opposed to. Does it throw light on 
the human rejection of God and his purpose? Before looking at that, however, 
help can also be found in the long controversy over concupiscentia, a term 
which operates with a similar logic. 
1B.1. A Parallel with the Controversy over Concupiscence 
The disputes in recent decades over whether the term 'sin' can rightfully be 
applied to the structures of society echo earlier theological disputes over the 
nature of 'concupiscence' and its relation to original sin. At root is the interpreta-
tion of Paul's letter to the Romans. These disputes began with Augustine's 
controversy with Pelagius, continued with the tussle over semi-Pelagianism and 
later in arguments between the medieval schools, reached their height with 
Luther and the Council of Trent, and lingered on in responses to the teachings of 
Baius and Jansenius. With such a long irritating history (see Vanneste 1975, 
Rahner 1961, Jedin 1961), it is not surprising that some theologians have been 
acutely sensitive about extending the notion of sin to include social structures. 
The extreme Augustinians, for instance, took the view that human freedom was 
completely destroyed by the sin of Adam; concupiscence took control because 
humans had become slaves of the devil. This was most evident in, though not 
limited to, sexual passion. At the other extreme were the Pelagians, who held 
that after the fall human freedom still remained intact. An intermediate position 
was adopted in 529 at the Council of Orange, which declared that through the sin 
of the first man human freedom is bent and diminished (per peccatum primi 
hominis ita inclinatum et attenuatum fuerit liberum arbitrium, DS 396). The 
positions are somewhat comparable to those who at one extreme see human 
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beings as completely dominated by sinful social structures, or at the other .those 
who regard people as totally free agents. In between are those who recognize the 
limitations that structures impose. 
In medieval times, Anselm of Canterbury defined original sin as the absence of 
the original justice (privatio justitiae originalis) that ought to be present in 
humanity. Taking a more Augustinian line, Peter Lombard identified original 
sin with the fiery stirrings of sin or concupiscence (Jomes peccati, scilicet 
concupiscentia vel concupisicibilitas, both quoted in Vanneste, 1975: 120n). 
Thomas Aquinas combined these views by saying that materially original sin is 
in a certain way concupiscence, but formally speaking it is truly the lack of 
original justice (peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, 
formaliter vera est defectus originalis justitiae, Iallae 82, 3). The appropriateness 
of applying Aristotle's distinction of matter and form is doubtful, but his main 
point is that a lack of order in one's relation to God results in one's human 
powers becoming disordered too. In a somewhat similar fashion, the lack of a 
right relation to God results in various persistent social disorders. 
Mention (see 3.3.3 and 15 intro above) has already been made of how the phrase 
lIarising from sin and conducing to sin" (ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat ), 
originally coined by Augustine to characterize concupiscence and then taken up 
by the Council of Trent (DS 1515) can also be applied to social sin. This formula 
anticipates what Giddens speaks of as the 'duality of structure.' (Unfortunately, 
Augustine's phrasing was not always so measured and clear, with the result that 
his rhetorical warnings against passion have sometimes been taken up too 
literally. ) 
The Council of Trent recognized that concupiscence remains after baptism as a 
form of testing, which does not harm those who by the grace of Christ do not 
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consent but resist it strongly (ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentienti~us et 
viriliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus non vaLet). It also points out that 
in those regenerated by grace concupiscence has never in a true and proper sense 
been termed 'sin' (nunquam intellexisse, peccatum appeLari, quod vere et proprie 
in renatis peccatum sit, DS 1515). Likewise, social structures cannot be called 
sinful in the full sense of the word. Nevertheless, unless a person at times 
refuses to go along with the prevalent trends in society, he or she will be led into 
sin. Being regenerated is not solely a matter of grace working internally, but of 
identifying oneself with a new community that attempts to draw upon rules and 
resources different from those of society at large. 
Many of the theological difficulties over concupiscence stem from the confusion 
between two ways of speaking: experience-near confession and admonition over 
against an experience-distant inquiry into the dynamism of human life. Karl 
Rahner comments: 
If from the first point of view concupiscientia appears as a power opposing man in 
his very depths [with all the shattering impetus attested to by 5t Paul, 5t Augustine 
and Luther], and driving him on to moral transgression, from the second point of 
view it presents itself as something immediately given with human nature, and so 
really a matter of course, 'harmless', indeed almost necessary. (1961: 348) 
The second aspect is apparent when one considers that the arising of desires, 
whether for food, affection, warmth, sexual relations or social accomplishment, 
is in itself perfectly natural and normal. Without that dynamism, life would 
hardly keep going. But the arising of desire never occurs simply 'in itself' or in 
the abstract; it always attracts us existentially to particular persons and things. 
Actual desires or experiences of concupiscence are never morally neutral; they 
are either inclining us towards what is wholesome in life and good for human 
relations or leading us away from that. In the latter instance, that of sinful 
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concupiscence, particular desires become intensified and even obs~ssive; 
satisfying them comes to preclude the wellbeing of the person as a whole and 
relations with others (see 8.5.2 above). 
Here again the discussion over concupiscence parallels the conflict of views 
between Freud and Kohut over the Oedipus complex (55 III: 334ff). In Freud's 
view this is an inevitable phase in life when it is crucial for the growing boy to 
curtail and eventually sublimate his drives of lust and aggression. Freud's whole 
mechanistic view of human beings presents these drives as having a force all 
their own. In some instances that will doubtless be close to experience. Kohut, 
however, does not leave matters there. He grants that an oedipal phase occurs, 
but says that it will only develop into a complex with all the conflicts Freud 
depicts if there is a more fundamental weakness in the structure of the self. Due 
to a lack of selfobject support, normal displays of affection and assertion are 
reduced to drives with a power all their own. In other words, such drives are not 
the normal human condition, but - no matter how prevalent - are in fact 
products of the disintegration of the self. 
Nevertheless, it must be added that sinful concupiscence is not confined to the 
dynamism of the sensitive appetites, to the disordering of affection and aggres-
sion. Nor is it limited to the rebellion of what is 'lower' in human nature against 
what is 'higher.' As Rahner warns, "there is just as much danger from the 
Luciferan heights of the spirit as from the dark depths of the purely sensitive" 
(1961: 354). Similarly, sinful social structures are not limited to those that 
promote debauchery and brawling. They may also result from and in turn 
encourage excessive pride in the high and exclusive culture of one's society, or be 
evident in a prevailing atmosphere of cynicism, despair or self-righteousness. 
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18.2 An Analogical Understanding of Sinful Structures 
Although the Council of Trent did not mention Thomas' views on analogy, it 
left room for them. This is evident in its declaring that although concupiscence 
may be spoken of as sin, following Paul in his Letter to the Romans29, this is not 
understood to be sin in the true and proper sense of the term (vere et proprie, DS 
1515). In other words, it is not the prime analogate. 
For Thomas, analogy differentiates the senses in which a term may be applied, 
but brings out the connection between the various applications (Ia 13, 6). For 
instance, the prime analogate of 'health' is a healthy persot,l, but one can mean-
ingfully speak of 'healthy exercise,' a 'healthy diet,' 'healthy urine,' a 'health 
resort,' and a 'healthy complexion'; all of which either contribute to or manifest 
the health found in a person. However, to speak of a 'healthy bank balance' 
might over-stretch the analogy. 
Regarding sin, the prime analogate is deadly sin. This results from an action 
knowingly and freely committed (or omitted) that in severing the bond of charity 
between ourselves and God cuts us off from the source and goal of our life (U nde 
quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, 
scilicet Deo, cui unimur per caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortaLe, IaIlae 72, 5). 
On the other hand, if an action is only defective in charity and stops short of 
cutting us off from God, then it is a venial or non-fatal sin (quando vero fit 
deordinatio citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniaLe, Iallae 72,5). 
Thomas makes the point that deadly and non-fatal sin, like death and a bout of 
flu, are not different species within the same genus, but are related analogously. 
The full weight of sin is not found in non-fatal sin, though it is still related to 
deadly sin (Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum secundum rationem 
29 Rahner rightly questions the adequacy ofTrent's interpretation of Paul. "Certainly it is very doubtful 
whether it is really concupi~centia as ~u~h alone which St Paul calls uf.tUp'tLU, .. . [though itJincludes concupis-
cence as an element [or partIal factor] 111 Its concrete concept ... and even stands in the foreground" (1961: 347ftn). 
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imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale, IaIIae 88, 1 ad 1). Lik~wise, 
original sin may rightly be called sin by analogy with deadly sin; although 
inherited rather than the result of one's action, it too cuts one off from God. Like 
deadly sin, original sin cannot be overcome by any purely human effort, but only 
by the power of God (reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, 
sed solum per virtutem divinam, IaIIae 88, 1). Regarding both original and 
personal deadly sin, we all stand in need of redemption. 
So long as account is taken of the difference between univocal and analogous 
ways of speaking, there is nothing wrong in speaking of 'social sin.' Care has to be 
taken to avoid giving the impression that society as such could be an active 
subject of sin, as persons can. Bertuletti (see 4.9 above), forgetting that persons 
never exist on their own without any relation to society, is therefore wrong to 
speak of it as a theological 'impertinence.' John Paul II has tradition behind him 
when he says that "situations of sin ... obviously have an analogical meaning" 
(R&P, 16; see 2.6.2 above). Though account must also be taken of the proviso 
about not taking his speaking of "a veritable structure of sin" (EV, 12; see 11.6.1 
above) in too objective a fashion. 
18.3 The Force of Speaking in Terms of ISin' 
Recognizing a dreadful situation to be the result of social sin is not a neutral 
description. It is not just an inevitable misfortune or merely a physical evil _ 
such as a tornado or earthquake - that one must cope with as best one can. 
Precisely because and insofar as it is sin, one has the duty to resist it with all the 
ability one can muster. Or rather (so as not to sound too Pelagian), one is called to 
witness effectively to the redemptive power of God and be an agent of reconcili-
ation. This will initially involve the non-acceptance of misleading images, 
distorted rules and defective resources. That in turn may lead on to active 
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measures to change the prevailing images, rules and resources that people ~raw 
upon for their actions. If, by contrast, one does not put up any resistance to what 
one recognizes as social sin then one inevitably begins to take on and align 
oneself with its destructive dynamism. Once the sinfulness inherent in social 
structures is recognized, neutrality is no longer possible. So, although one is 
usually not guilty of having brought sinful social structures about, one would 
become guilty of sin (culpa) if one simply accepted them without question. 
18.4 Sin as a Denial of Love 
Since sin is at root a lack (see 11.4 above), its true quality (or absence thereof) is 
brought out by considering its opposite, namely charity. Thomas is quite clear 
that the very character of deadly sin lies in its opposition to charity, which 
consists in loving God above all things through disposing oneself and directing 
all that is one's own towards him (actus peccati mortalis contrariatur caritati 
secundum propriam rationem, quae consistit in hoc quod Deus diLigatur super 
omnia, et quod homo totaLiter iLli se subjiciat, omnia sua referendo in ipsum, 
IIaIIae 24, 12). The attainment of perfect charity is found in reaching and dwelling 
in God without seeking anything from God for ourselves (caritas attingit ipsum 
Deum ut in ipso sistat, non ut ex eo aLiquid nobis proveniat, IIaliae 23, 6). This 
greatest of all divine gifts is not perfectly achieved all at once, but by a process of 
growth. One act of charity prepares the way for charity to grow by further 
inclining a person to act charitably next time (quiLibet actus caritatis disponit ad 
caritatis augmentum, inquantum ex uno actu caritatis homo redditur promptior 
iterum ad agendum secundum caritatem, IIaIlae 24, 6). But the full flowering of 
charity, when a person is actually drawn at all times with the whole heart into 
the love of God (totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum, lIallae 24, 
8) is impossible in this life due to human finitude; a person also has at . times to 
attend to the necessities of maintaining life and health. 
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In English a difficulty arises as soon as one speaks about 'charity,' as it eyokes 
images of fund raising, handouts, soup kitchens and jumble sales. 'Recipients of 
charity' may feel held at a distance and protest that their impersonal treatment is 
'as cold as charity.' The original richness of aymtll and caritas has been lost and 
now needs to be reclaimed. How best can these terms be translated? The word 
'love' has its own set of problematic connotations. Also, it does not allow one to 
distinguish am 0 r as a passion from caritas as a quality enlivening all one's 
activities. So, following Leslie Dewart's suggestion (1969: 371 ftn 20), I will usually 
speak of 'self-giving.' Although this term does not catch every nuance of caritas, 
it brings out well how caritas flows from and reaches to the depths of a person. It 
avoids the impression that 'acts of charity' are simply one kind of activity on a 
par with others. Self-giving, instead, can suffuse, enliven and giving a lasting 
depth to all kinds of well-directed activities. This is why Thomas speaks of it as 
the fulfilment of the law (per caritatem tota lex impletur, Iallae 65 3sc). It 
enlivens the virtues (forma aliarum virtutem ... effective, IIaIIae 23, 8 ad 1; see 
also 8.4 above), so their exercise is other-directed. 
It is impossible to wrap caritas up in a neat definition, because both the demands 
it makes and the benefits it brings continually open out as a person grows in self-
giving. Nevertheless, as far as relations with our fellow human beings are 
concerned, it may be characterized as that self-giving which enables the other-
whether a person, partnership, group, community or society - to grow in their 
own life and being. This view is in line with Paul's view of aymtll as upbuilding 
(Romans 14:19; 15:2). Though it must be added that the capacity to give ourselves 
depends upon our first having received from others' self-giving: a Johannine 
teaching (I John 4:10) borne out by Kohut. 
Opposed to self-giving is sin, which thwarts the creative budding forth of life and 
so distorts human development. To use an electrical metaphor, the effect of sin 
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is not like switching the current off, but leaving the wiring intact. It is mo~e like 
a power surge that half-burns out the wiring to leave a live but malfunctioning 
circuit. This is much more dangerous and difficult to handle than a dead circuit. 
In a similar fashion, sin does not just halt human growth or turn social develop-
ment off; instead of these forces being creative and life-enhancing, they become 
destructive. All the concern, energy, attention, application that would otherwise 
go into bringing the best out of oneself, others and one's situation is now directed 
to selfish pursuits at others' expense, even their deliberate suffering and destruc-
tion. 
18.5 Structures that Thwart Self-giving 
Thomas likens the effect within a person of committing deadly sin to that of 
drawing the blinds so that sunlight is instantly excluded. In the same way the 
sinner is immediately cut off from the welling forth of God's love (caritas statim 
deficit esse in anima per hoc quod obstaculum ponitur influentia caritatis a Deo 
in animam, IIaIIae 24, 12). God's love does not cease, but the deliberate sinner 
refuses to respond to it. Either by locking on to a 'lesser good, or exalting the 
spontaneity of the self as something to be pursued for its own sake (see Ernst, 
1954: 68f), he or she rejects the divine self-giving. It should be added, to distin-
guish this view from situation ethics, that although the core of deadly sin is 
found in the refusal to respond to God's love, other moral criteria are needed for 
determining which actions are (or are not) actually sinful. 
I 
The effect within a person of social sin might be likened to being only able to see 
through opaque class. It lets some light through, but distorts the images. Due to 
social sin, none of the requirements of God's love can be either seen clearly or 
handled correctly. Yet darkness is not total. Consequently, there is an inability _ 
though not a refusal - to give oneself in such a way that others are built up in 
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their lives and among themselves. Presuming that a person does not co~nive 
with social sin but acts in good will, social sin nevertheless weakens that person's 
action from within. His or her actions are debilitated by their having to draw 
upon defective structures in order to produce them. Their defectiveness is over 
and above the ordinary limitations of human ability; for example, that no one 
knows everything or can acquire every skill. Instead, it stems from wounds and 
distortions introduced by past sins, whether of neglect, weakness or malice. 
Consequently, insofar as the self is wounded or its ability to give twisted, it 
cannot but reproduce defective structures for others singularly and collectively. 
This accords with the principle that no one can give what he does not have 
(nemo dat quod non habet, see IaIIae 81, 3 arg 2), but in the case of self-giving it 
refers not to an external possession like money for alms, but to the wholesome 
communication of self. 
To make this more concrete, attention will be given to the ways in which the 
various kinds of structural defects are likely to undermine from within people's 
ability to be self-giving. Defects already noted on an institutional level could be 
traced back to distorted rules and deficient resources. These might be linked and 
compounded by misleading social images, which both result from and encourage 
an archaic identification of self with society. In addition, fragmentation within 
the self is partly a result of the very complexity and vastness of modern society, 
and contributes to its incomprehensibility. All of these structural defects, which 
are drawn upon and reproduced as people interact with one another, can 
weaken, thwart or misdirect people's ability to give of themselves so that others 
may develop as full human beings called to show forth the image of God. 
The following sections dealing with how social sin thwarts love thus provide a 
resume of its manifestations. These, as it were, can be arranged across a spectrum 
ranging from institutional factors that are more social and external to the 
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individual to personal factors more internal to the self. But just as all bands in 
the spectrum combine to produce white light, so all these factors are combined 
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18.5.1 Inadequacies over Social Resources 
The maldistribution of allocative resources - whether land, housing, raw 
materials, equipment or produced goods - is usually the most evident and 
immediately felt manifestation of social sin. The lack of sufficient resources 
curtails self-giving in two ways. The first is obvious in that you cannot support 
others effectively, if you do not have the wherewithal to do it. The very obvious-
ness of this truism can easily obscure a deeper problem. Although shortages 
occur due to harsh conditions, floods, fires, drought and various accidents, 
persistent mass poverty is mainly due or certainly heightened by social injustice. 
This is why the poor often rightly demand, "Justice, not charity!" when it comes 
to providing the necessities of life. But that is not the whole story, because the 
insatiable demand for goods and possessions may arise from a more fundamen-
tal breakdown in people's sense of self and solidarity with others. This is not 
always averted to. Widespread consumerism can foreshorten the perspective of 
both rich and poor, so that increased production and wider distribution appear to 
be the answer to all social problems. Without denying the need in many 
instances for more goods, concentrating upon them alone can be a way of 
escaping the patient self-giving required to build up identity, creativity, participa-
tion and affection among people. Unlike allocative resources, these resources are 
increased by use and sharing. That, however, is more demanding on the self. 
Many examples of injustice are evident in the systematic abuse of authoritative 
resources, in which power over people is exercised to their detriment. This may 
be backed at a high level by the system of government or locally by prejudice and 
malicious gossip. Addressing this evil is certainly but not only a matter of justice. 
If justice alone is sought, then one is for ever taking action against the other who 
has infringed one's rights, countering threat by further threat. Oneself ' and the 
other forever remain at loggerheads with little scope for the self-giving that 
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offers to accept the other. The prevailing social set-up lacks the resour~es -
avenues in which self-giving may be recognized and reciprocated - for breaking 
out of this double-bind. Usually only an outside party, or occasionally a highly 
exceptional individual, can overcome the mutual antagonism and enable each 
side to begin to trust the other. 
While the just distribution and interchange of resources, both allocative and 
authoritative ones, between members of society is necessary for it to function 
properly, that is not enough. It lacks that underlying acceptance of each other that 
provides a suitable setting for trading in a free market, making contracts and 
defending one's own rights. It overlooks the sociability (amicitia) that must 
temper competition, the striking of deals and litigation, if society is not going to 
be torn apart by individualism. Account also has to be taken of the rules and 
images that bind society. 
18.5.2 Distorted Understanding Leads to Misguided Love 
For self-giving really to benefit and not undermine others, actions must be 
guided by insight and understanding; good will and fine intentions by them-
selves are insufficient. 1£ the generative rules that give rise to meaning are 
socially distorted (see 12.5.2 and 14.6.1 above), then people cannot reliably 
communicate, understand one another correctly or plan effectively. An instance 
of this is when people rush in to alleviate others' distress with the wrong kinds 
of help; by throwing money at social problems, or by supplying arms, they 
usually aggravate instead of tackle the underlying issues. This approach is the 
opposite of the 'intelligent love' that Lebret says is required if people are to be 
helped to develop their own lives and society. Denis Goulet explains Louis-
Joseph Lebret's view that 
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.. .intelligence without love can only breed a brutalizing technocracy which c~ushes 
men, whereas love without disciplined intelligence is inefficient, leading to amateur-
ism, well-intentioned bungling, and, ultimately, catastrophe. The reason is that 
chronic structural evils cannot be corrected by subjective good will, but only by a 
concerted transformation of structures, a task which presupposes a rigorous and 
detailed understanding of how structures work. Lebret refused to accept the 
simplistic choice: either efficiency or humanization. He understood that efficiency 
was indispensable; but he also knew that it had to be redefined so as to serve human 
values. (1974: 33) 
Centuries earlier Thomas had brought out the strong connection between 
practical wisdom (prudentia) and self-giving. The notion that love is a blind and 
rather arbitrary surge of affection is far from his view of self-giving. He empha-
sizes the strong link between self-giving, by which we attune ourselves to God as 
our ultimate end, and practical · wisdom, which gives direction to all moral 
activity (Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod 
homo se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios 
fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, Iallae 65, 2). Thomas, however, does grant 
that even without the self-giving that directs us towards God, a person can still 
strive for good but limited ends, such as maintaining civic wellbeing (5i vero 
iLlud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid 
huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et 
perfectum bonum, IIaIIae 23, 7). Undertaking this even when no special diffi-
culties arise will still require practical wisdom. When, however, great difficulties 
do arise and times are not normal - if they ever are! - then each citizen and 
especially those in positions of authority will need to be guided and sustained by 
more than their humanly acquired abilities. In dark times they will need to be 
continually drawn onwards step by step by a sense of the community and sel£-
giving that God's love makes possible. Their generosity and concern for others 
will lead them to analyze the situation and seek out what can best within the 
given circumstances be undertaken. 
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Genuine self-giving that has others' good at heart and practical wisdom c<?ntin-
ually build upon each other. The first leads one to inquire what will really 
benefit others, while the more their situation is understood the more complete 
and effective can one's self-giving become. The interplay between the two need 
not always be fully conscious; at times it may be worked out discursively, but it 
may result from a more or less unconscious deepening of one's motivation (see 
12.4.1 above). Empathy is both developed and put at the service of others (see 13.2 
above). Furthermore, the more a person has the ontological security that she is 
supported by the self-bestowal of God and neighbour, the further she will dare go 
in both inquiry and action (see 12.4.2 above). 
In human affairs, no situation is ever so clear that when action is undertaken no 
unforeseen and undesirable consequences can arise. Self-giving requires that one 
be on the watch for them, ready to revise one's understanding and generous 
enough to correct one's action instead of carrying on regardless. If, however, 
people have no inkling that the socially accepted ways of understanding they rely 
upon might be distorted or deficient, then even their best efforts to do good for 
others will still not bear much good fruit. One is obliged not simply to be sincere 
and do one's best, but also bound to search for the truth about one's situation. 
Finding it may be disturbing as it breaks open the protective cocoon that one has 
spun in order to screen out too much reality. Prophets are unpopular as they 
bring into focus aspects of reality, that society has over time carefully screened 
out. 
18.5.3 Pervasive Moral Blindness 
Much the same can be said about socially induced misperceptions of good and 
evil (see 14.6.2 above). If the generative rules that people draw upon to conduct 
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themselves in ways society approves are confused or misleading, then even. with 
good will they are likely to result in their harming one another. So long as 
someone takes on the outlook of a society that sets no great store on honesty in 
speech or over possessions, or does not encourage respect for the life, sexuality 
and good name of others, then he or she is unlikely to acquire any sense of caring 
for others. Without the elements of justice and respect, self-giving is impossible. 
Even though a society may not be morally bankrupt or verging on anarchy, it is 
likely to have number of blindspots. In course of carrying out their usual 
activities, its members draw upon and reproduce rules that exploit sections of the 
population or generally demean certain areas of life generally. The poor stake 
that many rural workers have in the economy would be an example of the 
former, or the inability to stick to any commitment an instance of the latter. If 
this the condition that everyone routinely experiences, it is unlikely to occur to \ 
anyone that their society could draw upon different examples and follow another 
routine. Although a useful distinction can be made between the interpretive and 
normative defects in the rules that structure society, the two actually go hand in 
hand. A society has blind spots when people are unaware both of what they 
might do and the good effect it could have. These may even be enshrined in 
inept and/ or morally perverse legislation. 
18.5.4 Social Selfobjects that Paralyze 
Since society, or at least some of its dominant cultural aspects, comes to form a 
selfobject for many of its members, it helps shape a people's I group self', their 
particular combination of ideals, ambitions, skills and talents (see 13.6 above). 
This is not to say that being a member of a society is for everyone like being a pea 
in a pod. There is usually plenty of personal variation due to the influence of 
significant individuals - initially parents, teachers, siblings, and later friends, 
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spouses and social leaders. Nevertheless, all these individuals themselves .draw 
upon and portray aspects of their society which extend beyond their own 
personalities. In expressing themselves, the mediate their culture in its actual 
richness or poverty, its health or pathology, its human values or dearth of them, 
its sensitivity or crassness. Whether the former or latter of these alternatives 
predominate in a society depends upon whether or not its artists, interpreters 
and political leaders are in empathic contact with the experiences, needs and 
strivings of its members (see 13.6.6 above). 
Even relatively stable cultures, quite apart from those breaking down, have their 
weak spots in that the possible selfobject they offer is inadequate for building up a 
firm, cohesive and well-rounded self. This puts a constraint within the self upon 
people's ability to be self-giving. For instance, male and female members of a 
society whose culture exalts a machismo image for men and spiteful bitch one 
for women will have difficulty relating to one another. There are no channels or 
cultural forms that would allow them to get in contact with and cultivate within 
themselves, or appreciate in others, anything but an exploitative relationship. 
Some of Kohut's followers have used self psychology to examine how socio-
cultural factors lead to an impoverishment of the self. Marvin Zonis looks at 
"certain patterns of childrearing in the Arab world that might be expected to 
result in an array of narcissistic imbalances among Arab males" (1980: 443). Mark 
Gehrie (1980) touches on the difficult position of Japanese women and how they 
cannot always give phase-appropriate mirroring for their children. Kohut 
himself mentions (55 IV: 572) the impossible ideal, fostered by Western individ-
ualism and backed by Freudian theory, of the self attaining complete indepen-
dence so it ceases to rely upon any nurturing support from others (see also 
Olthuis, 1989). To do each of these cultures justice would require m~ch more 
investigation, but the overall point holds: culture as it is actually portrayed in 
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any given society is not always a fully satisfactory selfobject for the development 
of the self. In those areas in which a society is deficient, there will also occur 
weaknesses in the self. These weaknesses will in turn make it difficult for a 
person to be in empathic contact with others and their needs, and hence inhibit 
the ability to be self-giving in a way that would enhance others' lives. 
18.5.5 Screening out the Other 
Self-giving in which one supports another requires that one has something in 
common (mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliquam communicationem, 
IIaIIae 23, 1), that one recognizes others to be present as human beings. Not only 
might they be perceived as having needs, but also appreciated as a potential gift 
to oneself; not just as beggars, but possible cooperators, friends and fellow 
celebrants in life. However, in order to cope with life amid all the conflicting 
messages, cries, appeals, rumours, information that might impinge upon one, 
certain concerns must be screened out (see 16.3 above); one along with others in a 
similar social position spins a protective cocoon. One cannot take on all the risks 
and burdens that people may experience. To attempt that would be counter-
productive. This means that one's self-giving to others must be selective, but 
therein lies the danger of screening out people who really need one's help and 
support. 
Thomas, speaking of almsgiving in his much more circumscribed society, 
recognizes that one cannot be expected to provide for the needs of everyone, but 
that we should attend to those who would go without aid if we did not help 
them (ilia sola sine qua is qui necessitatem patitur sustenari non potest,IIaIIae 
32, 5). This poses a challenge today to look out for those who would otherwise be 
overlooked by social welfare and aid agencies. 
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18.5.6 The Fragmentation of Self-giving 
As has been mentioned, splits in the self may be of three kinds: vertical splits in 
which some activity is carried on but disavowed, horizontal ones that lead to the 
repression of guilt feelings, and that between wanting or seeking an outcome 
while refusing to take moral responsibility for it (16.6.1). When extreme, these 
splits will lead respectively to what are classified as 'behavioral disorders,' 
'personality disorders' and 'sociopathic personalities.' They may be so pathologi-
cal that the individual is either cut off from or a recognized danger to the regular 
running of society; these instances can be left aside here. What is of concern here, 
however, are not the extreme cases, but that large number of people with a 
somewhat fragmented self who for the most part function normally in society. 
Through their regular interactions, they both help shape society and are in turn 
shaped by it. The overall result in society of any splitting in the self is the 
sequestration of experience or the systematic overlooking of areas of moral 
concern. This in turn, particularly when an area of experience appears too 
threatening, may reinforce and appear to normalize splits in the self. 
As far as self-giving is concerned, the overall effect of any split within the self can 
be fairly easily delineated in general terms, though when it comes to particular 
instances the effects will be infinitely varied. Splitting affects both a person's 
ability to bestow self and relate to others. Within the self, a split both leads to a 
person having an unreal image of self and prevents the drawing together of all 
his or her potential in concerted action. In relation to others, a split can screen 
out some categories of people or aspects of their lives so they are neither appreci-
ated nor treated as others in their own right. The biblical injunction that one 
must love with all one's heart, soul, strength and mind (Luke 10:27 and parallels) 
underlines the importance of striving to overcome any splitting within the self. 
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18.5.7 Regression into Self 
The complete contrary of self-giving is evident in archaic narcissism (see 16.7 
above), where a person ceases to have any respect for others and treats them with 
pervasive suspicion and inflexibility. In this condition, any genuine self-love is 
lost as the person is emptied of self-esteem. Regression to this state is not simply 
due to difficult social conditions, which a resilient self - sustained by a suitable 
selfobject matrix - could fight against. Regression is also due to narcissistic 
wounds that have already undermined a group sense of self-worth. 
18.6 Social sin: A Limitation on and Spur to Self-giving 
In human affairs, no single action will make a person's life - let alone a whole 
society's - come completely right or go totally wrong all at once. Reorienting all 
one's attitudes, abilities and activities takes place gradually and cumulatively. 
Each action both draws upon the existing social structure and reproduces it. 
Though each action in reproducing the social structure may also modify it for 
better or worse, making it more or less easy to be self-giving so that others' lives, 
selves and relations are built up. So, although someone may spontaneously 
decide to be self-giving instead of exalting himself or pampering herself at others' 
expense, he or she cannot accomplish this fully and effectively through one 
decision. 
Thomas points out that the acquisition of a strength (or weakness) in one's 
character comes not through one, but many repeated actions (habitus virtutis 
non potest causari per unum actu7n, sed per 7nuitos, IaIlae 51, 3). Though the gift 
of charity, the disposition towards self-giving, may be acquired in a moment of 
conversion, it still has to grow in intensity and effectiveness. Those who love let 
themselves increasingly come under its influence and are drawn more and more 
to express it through their actions and (subjectum magis et magis participat 
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caritatem, idest secundum quod magls reducitur in actum illius ac magls 
subditur illi, IIaIIae 24, 5). This will entail struggling with all one's tendencies, 
whether dangerous passing emotions (passiones) or deeply rooted weaknesses of 
character (vitia), that incline one against self-giving. On the other hand, one 
deadly sin, though it does not take away all ability to do good, is an action that 
marks a halt in the personal attuning of all one's life and abilities with God's 
love. All in all, human character strengths - the ready ability to act sensibly 
(prudentia), treat others fairly (justitia), tackle difficult tasks (jortitudo) and keep 
one's balance (temperentia) - are built up or lost gradually. Which will occur, 
largely depends upon whether or not a person is self-giving enough to persevere 
through many seemingly inconsequential activities in self-giving. 
A similar interplay occurs in relation to social structures. Although people may 
each personally endeavour to give of themselves for others' benefit, they are all 
likely to be somewhat hampered in their efforts due to the sin embedded in the 
social structures that they have to draw upon in order to act at all. The condition 
of their society, of which they are also part, lets them neither perceive fully nor 
express completely in action the state of mutual self-giving they might aspire to. 
In this respect, social sin distorts and even blocks the expression of genuine self-
giving. As it is patterned into the way one as a person must relate to others, it is 
to a certain extent inescapable. Nevertheless, seeds of social change are present 
even within seemingly insignificant actions. No one action can alter everything, 
but since any action does involve the exercise of power, however minimal, it can 
be carried out in such a way that it may slightly alter the conditions under which 
subsequent action - one's own as well as that of others - will take place. For 
instance, a lone protest against authoritarianism or entrenched exploitation may 
effect nothing immediately, yet still inspire others, now or later, to combine 
against it. 
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Still, challenging a situation of social sin requires considerable courag~, an 
understanding of how the system works and its weaknesses, and a willingness to 
accept suffering. But that is only enough to defy it, not transform it. If its underly-
ing rules, resources and empowering images (selfobjects) that people draw on to 
produce their actions and reproduce social institutions are not changed for the 
better, then social sin will remain. Overcoming social sin will involve bringing 
about a more equitable distribution of resources, living by rules that are less 
deceptive, and putting forth new images of personal worth and social cohesion. 
Participating in such a 'redemptive' endeavour will require both intense and 
persevering self-giving. Examining how one might in this way share in God's 
work of transforming society must be left to a later study, but enough has been 
said to indicate that social sin may not merely thwart self-giving but also be a 
spur or challenge to its ever-renewed expression. 
lB.7 A Lock on Self-giving 
Another way of depicting the effect of social sin on self-giving is to regard it as a 
bind that locks the variant movement of freely and responsively directed activity 
into an inflexible pattern. In this vein David Bohm has observed that: "if any 
pattern of movement is established and starts to become repetitive, then that is a 
kind of disharmony. ... [unlike electrons] it's not part of the harmony of human 
beings to continually repeat a pattern" (1985: 57). Charity or self-giving requires 
that at times one must repeat what one has done before, but at other times 
innovation is required; social sin demands either deadly conformity or mindless 
innovation. Self-giving requires a respect for otherness to be balanced against 
treasuring similarity amongst people; the social sin of apartheid was to exclude 
otherness, while that of treating people only as 'masses' imposes a conformity 
that rules out genuine difference. Forgiving and asking forgiveness are part of 
self-giving on a social as well as collective scale; the attitude of denying that the 
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latter are necessary, because past wrongs were simply miscalculations or c~rying 
out one's duty, is a manifestation of social sin. Another instance of where social 
sin locks people into almost compulsive behaviour is consumerism; the cycle of 
production-distribution-consumption becomes so accelerated, not in order to 
benefit people but for the sake of accelerating the cycle still further. The double 
binds that stereotyping along lines of age, sex, class, race, or nation bring about 
are other instances. In each case, people are locked into a bind that precludes 
responding creatively, for the development of their own and the enhancement 
of others' lives, to their circumstances. 
18.8 Self-giving and Culpability 
One question has dogged this whole study, namely: how blameworthy or 
culpable are individual persons in relation to the sinful structures of their 
society? How can this be judged? Dealing with these questions has been delayed 
until now, because it is only in the context of self-giving that one can begin to 
offer an adequate answer. Here it is necessary to distinguish whether one is 
judging a person as a whole, or only their involvement in some specifiable 
wrong. 
18.8.1 The Unique Story of Each Person 
Although many people's stories of their lives may share a common social 
background, without which they would not make sense, still each person has her 
or his own story to tell different from those of others. Each story, however 
cowardly or heroic, is unique; it is never just another instance of the same 
collective tale. Each person with varying degrees of insight and freedom can 
relate his or her own self to society in different ways. Not realizing this was the 
mistake d'Harcourt (1946; see 3.2.1 above) made in branding the average German 
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_ that is more or less everyone - with the 'collective guilt' of the Nazi crimes. 
There is no one formula for settling everyone's degree of · guilt in relation to 
apartheid, Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing, Rwandan genocide, or complicity in 
economic exploitation. Each person has his or her own story, mixed with stories 
of their families, neighbours, fellow workers, colleagues, with the tales of their 
relations with superiors, subordinates, leaders, teachers and dependents. Each 
story is likely to recount moments of awareness or of blindness, of a willingness 
to face uncomfortable realities or attempts to evade them. Probably it will tell of 
escapism and procrastination as well as definite efforts - for a longer or shorter 
period - to find out and do the truth. Each story will thus begin to reveal how 
and to what extent a person was involved in social sin, as a willing or unwilling 
collaborator, or as an innocent or not-so-innocent victim. 
The words "begin to reveal" are used, because no one is likely to be able to tell 
their full story with complete accuracy. As mentioned earlier (7.5) each person 
can only construct a self-narrative out of the rules, resources and enabling 
images or selfobjects that their society provides. If these are deficient, a person 
will not have the language, insight or confidence to grapple with all that is at 
issue. Furthermore, each story is still unfinished in a double sense. First, the 
individual through this exercise of reflexivity is actually recasting his or her self, 
with varying degrees of ability and honesty. Second, the repercussions of one's 
actions in others' lives are not yet complete. As Thomas points out when 
speaking of the necessity of a general judgment at the end of time, even though a 
person's life ends in death, his or her memory, reputation (sometimes a false 
one), descendants, example, teaching, possessions and artifacts continue to affect 
others. All this is to pass under divine judgment, but that can happen on the last 
day when whatever pertains in any way to each person will be clearly and 
completely revealed (finale judicium in novissimo die, in quo perfecte id quod 
ad unumquemque hominem pertinet quocumque modo, perfecte et manifeste 
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diiudicetur, IlIa 59, 5). At this judgment - however it might be envisaged -. it is 
not collectivities as such, but individual persons in all their manifold relations 
to others, and with all their hidden thoughts and emotions, that will be judged. 
At present, however, no final verdict can be given about any individual as a 
whole. Certainly, people may not rightly all be branded or exonerated en masse, 
because of their belonging to a sinful society. 
18.8.2 Judging Particular Actions and Omissions 
It is sometimes necessary for a society to come to grips with its past, to recognize 
where it went wrong, find out who - if anyone - is blameworthy, learn from 
its mistakes, and heal the wounds where possible. Courts and commissions of 
inquiry, including the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in South 
Africa, are set up for this. As long as they do not attempt too much, they can 
serve a useful purpose. They can neither discover the whole truth in all its 
ramifications nor render a judgment on any person as a whole. They might, 
however, be able to make a judgment on a person's behaviour during a particu-
lar incident. Once it is established what a person did, or omitted to do, then as far 
as social sin in concerned, it must be asked whether he could reasonably have 
been expected to do otherwise. Or did the deficiencies embedded in the rules, 
resources and enabling images of society, together with any weakness in self 
structure, rule this out. Account here has to be taken of a person's upbringing, 
education, training, experience, position and background, to assess whether she 
could have used her power to act in any morally significantly different way. 
Inquiry also has to be made into whether or not a person took the trouble to try 
to find out what he was involved in; maybe he was kept in ignorance by others 
or maybe he kept himself ignorant. Consideration too is needed of how much 
she was emotionally swept along by events, or could have risen above her 
feelings. On these points there are no indisputable tests, but how a person 
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manages in other areas of life would give an indication of her or his per~onal 
abilities and freedom in relation to society. 
In judging whether someone personally engaged himself in perpetuating a social 
evil, or was merely a victim caught up in it, two pieces of advice might well be 
heeded. In the first, Thomas stresses that anyone accused should be given the 
benefit of the doubt whenever hard evidence is lacking. It is better to be frequent-
ly mistaken in having good opinions of bad people than to be occasionally 
mistaken in forming a bad opinion of a good person. In the second instance 
injury is done to someone, not in the first (Sed melius est quod aliquis 
frequenter fallatur habens bonam opznlOnem de aliquo malo homine, quam 
quod rarius fallatur habens malam opznwnem de aliquo bono, quia ex hoc fit 
iniuria alicui, non autem ex primo (IIaIIae 60, 4 ad 1). 
The second piece of advice comes from an observation of Giddens. 
As a leading theorem of the theory of structuration, I advance the following: every 
social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which 
he or she is a member. . .. But it is one that needs to be carefully elucidated. There are 
various modes in which such knowledge may figure in practical social conduct. One 
is in unconscious sources of cognition: ... [since] the mobilisation of unconscious 
desire normally involves unconscious cognitive elements. [Of significance too] ... are 
the differences between practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which 
actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and what I call/discursive 
consciousness', involving knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of 
discourse. All actors have some degree of discursive penetration of the social systems 
to which constitution they contribute. (CPST: 5) 
Here Giddens challenges the easy excusing or explaining away of the harmful 
actions people do as being due to impersonal social structures. This leaves us, 
and the judges or commission members, with the question as to how far should 
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a person reflect on their tacit stocks of knowledge. How much ought a p~rson 
look into the moral implications of their routine activities, which they easily and 
regularly carry out without having to stop to think about them? This question, 
however, can only be tackled -if not fully answered - with a context of self-
giving. 
18.8.3 Altruism not Meant to be the Whole Story 
In order not to misunderstand the relation of culpability to self-giving, a word 
must be said about 'altruism.' Several times in his works, Kohut mentions that 
"the deeply ingrained value system of the Occident (pervading the religion, the 
philosophy, the social utopias of Western man) extols altruism and concern for 
others and disparages egotism and concern for one's self" (SS II: 619). He asks 
whether in neglecting, or even condemning, all narcissism or concern for the 
self, too high a demand is being put upon people. liThe psychological demands 
which Christian ethics have made upon Western man may very well be 
considered as excessive, or at least as traumatically premature" (SS III: 124£). He 
then quotes Jesus' Sermon on the Mount and Paul's first letter to the Corinthians 
as evidence that "Christianity insists on the complete neutralization of the 
grandiose self and of the egotistical purposes of the personality" (SS ill: 125). 
Undoubtedly, some Christian writers and preachers have given this impression, 
particularly when their words are quoted without regard for the audience. 
Telling those who are well-off, have the benefit of education, are in reasonable 
health and with a secure social position, to serve others and not be preoccupied 
with themselves is one thing. It is another to take that exhortation as a reason for 
persistently neglecting to strive for greater psychological maturity, educational 
advancement, cultural accomplishment and healthy living conditions. In times 
of crisis, admittedly, these benefits may have to be foregone for a while, but that 
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should not be taken as the norm. 
It is surprising that Kohut can say that "for nearly 2000 years we have lived in a 
culture, particularly Western culture, in which altruism is the height of all 
virtue" (KS: 9). After all, the word I altruism' was coined only in the nineteenth 
century by Auguste Comte to mean lithe discipline and eradication of self-
centered desire, and a life devoted to the good of others" (quoted in Lutz and Lux, 
1988: 109). Its late naming does not mean that the idea was entirely absent before, 
though it is likely that Kohut is reading a recent notion back into earlier writings, 
particularly in view of his repeated insistence that narcissism has its own valid 
line of development and is not meant to turn into object love. 
Thomas, for instance, does not say that one kind of love should banish another, 
but that loves should be ordered to the final goal of all people, namely their 
attaining beatitude with God. In this way God is to be loved as the source of 
beatitude, oneself as a sharer in it, one's neighbour as a fellow participant in it, 
and one's own body in that it will be taken up in glory (QD de Caritate, 7). This 
view sets out priorities for love in view of a fullness of life - for oneself and 
others - still to be granted. The basic criterion for a true exercise of love is not 
whether it is directed towards oneself or others, but whether it leads the loved 
one towards beatitude (see also 7.9 above). This will include recognizing in 
myself, in others and in my relations to others - including any clash of inter-
ests, enmity or antagonism - whatever might block our coming to a greater 
fullness of life. 
As with any journey, it is no use ignoring blocks out of anger or frustration and 
driving on regardless. Even if they ought not to be there, one disregards them at 
one's and often others' peril. Once their reality is recognized and accepted, one 
can then find ways of avoiding, overcoming, or eventually removing them. That 
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in the end is more vital than seeking out the person who caused the blo~kage 
and cursing him. This, however, requires some patient self-giving. 
18.9 Accepting Responsibility and Seeking Forgiveness 
Dealing with the long-standing social injustices and antagonisms that manifest 
social sin is more demanding than negotiating any blocks on a road. In this case, 
the obstacles are not entirely outside oneself, nor just found in others, but are 
part of one's society and one's own self too. All that one considers oneself and 
one's own - one's cultural inheritance, the historical accomplishments of one's 
people, social position and family upbringing - are to some degree marked by 
distorted rules, deficient resources and disenabling social images. Unless one 
takes on a preparedness to recognize, accept and do one's best to overcome these 
obstacles, they will persistently undermine one's self-giving and be perpetuated 
in society. It is not that all social sin can be eradicated or all obstacles cleared away 
in a single clean sweep. But that as and when blocks become manifest in particu-
lar misunderstandings, suspicions, antagonisms, arrangements or institutions, 
they can each be dealt with. This will entail naming the evil plainly, admitting 
where it has had a grip on oneself and one's society, asking forgiveness of those 
harmed by it, and working out how to change the conditions that give rise to it. 
When that is achieved, probably other evils will become evident and so can now 
be dealt with. What is required is a general attitude of preparedness to admit and 
not evade evils when and wherever they might be found so that one can help 
build up the lives of others as well as oneself. 
The necessity of asking forgiveness is often questioned. Why should I ask 
forgiveness for an action I personally did not do? If we as human beings were 
entirely separate individuals that objection would stand. However, besides being 
personal agents, we are also representatives of one another. In various ways we 
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belong to each other, and so can speak on others' behalf. A family descendant can 
apologize for the atrocities committed by long dead ancestors. A new leader of a 
nation may ask pardon for his or her country's attacking another, even though 
he or she was not yet born, only a child or in exile at the time. 30 In these 
instances, the person asking forgiveness is not admitting personal culpability; 
that would distort the whole notion of personal accountability for one's own 
actions. Nevertheless, when there is social animosity of longstanding if someone 
could but fails to render an apology, then he or she also become guilty of 
perpetuating the animosity. Though you are not the originator of an evil, you 
still have some obligation to avoid perpetuating its effects. After all, if you 
inadvertently walk into somebody as you both come around a blind corner, you 
normally apologize; not doing so would be taken as an affront. How much more 
important it is to make some gesture towards reconciliation when one has 
inherited a situation of suspicion and antagonism? 'This is not an obligation that 
can be weighed in terms of justice, but one that arising from charity or sociability. 
In most instances exactly where personal culpability lies is not very clear cut. At 
one extreme, structural evils may have resulted from a deliberate intent to set up 
an organization in which people seek to assert themselves at others' expense. At 
the other extreme, rapid changes may have brought about the many "imbalances 
and contradictions" that the Vatican Council (G&S, 8) spoke of. In the first case, 
one can still ask why were people so embittered, or narcissistically injured, that 
they organized themselves to act out their hatred and malice. In the second, one 
may inquiry into whether in introducing changes people were culpably negli-
gent. Were they simply taken by surprise, or could and should they have 
inquired further into the conditions of action that brought about the undesirable 
and unforeseen consequences? Did they act too precipitously and without 
30 There are problems here about who is entitled, officially or unofficially, to represent what group, and 
how much there needs to be prior or subsequen.t group consent. To purport to represent a group to which one did 
not belong, <;>f on w~ose b.eha/f o!,e was not entItled t<;> speak, would be resarded as an impertinence. These 
problems mIght be InvestIgated In a study that looks mto the transfonnatlOn of sodal structures. 
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sufficient forethought? 
In between these two extreme cases, many other questions about culpability 
might be asked. Was there inadvertence in an particular instance? Did someone 
or a group only think of their exclusive advantage? Did a key person fear to 
inquire further, or having inquired lacked the courage to challenge what was 
going on? Was people's thinking too restricted and consequently their capacity 
for action too confined to grasp what was taking place? Was that due to their not 
bothering to find out or their inability to sense the problem because of earlier 
negligence in their upbringing, education or training? When they did find out 
that previously unbeknown to themselves they were caught in perpetuating 
harm to others, what did they do about it? Did they still go along with injustice, 
even though they did not initiate it, as it brought them advantages? What, 
considering their own psychological resilience, were they capable of? Such 
questions could be pursued without end. To every answer further questions 
could be raised about either a person's freedom or ability to do otherwise - or 
the ability of those who influenced that person. But in practice the whole tangled 
skein cannot be unwound; we cannot reveal the precise degree of guilt of each 
participant throughout history. 
Even with one's own self, we can seldom judge exactly where psychological 
incapacity shades into moral weakness. The dividing line between being a victim 
and a perpetrator of social sin is frequently blurred. Nevertheless, both states 
perpetuate harm to others as well as oneself, and so need to be recognized and 
struggled against.31 What is important is not discerning the precise degree of 
personal guilt or innocence, but that one owns or avows that one has done evil. 
By facing that as an obstacle from within oneself, one has a chance of circum-
31 Caruso <,1%4) spoke of ~eurosis as material guilt. The person is not formally guilty, as she would be if 
she freely and dehb~ratery corrurutted the wrong, but is suffering and causing others to suffer the repercussions of a 
wrong not freely WIlled. 
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venting and eventually nullifying its influence. Disavowal, on the other ~and, 
prevents healing from psychopathology, forgiveness of sin and blocks recovery 
from social evils. 
There are times when it is important to separate the effects of psychopathology, 
personal and social sin, and other times - as outlined above - when trying to 
do so would be counterproductive. Concerning the former, but without going 
into a whole strategy for transforming people and society, one still has to make 
allowance for three types of failure. Even if social institutions were flawless - an 
enormous 'if' admittedly - each person still has the freedom to decide sponta-
neously to sin. She may without an provocation or excuse take unfair advantage 
of others, or he out of a lust for power and personal exaltation do others down. 
No institutional arrangement or modalities of structuration, such as the Garden 
of Eden, can obviate this eventuality entirely. Conversely, with no personal sin 
or ill will as a lingering effect - again an enormous 'if' - people may fail to 
cooperate and find themselves at loggerheads due to institutional or psychologi-
cal deficiencies. In this case, social reconstruction or psychological counselling is 
called for rather than preaching conversion. Although all three might be linked, 
they cannot be collapsed into each other. 
In this perspective, in which one seeks the ultimate wellbeing of both self and 
others, along with all that leads to it, culpability and past failures take on a 
different hue. Instead of trying either to establish one's own guilt or maintain 
one's innocence - or that of others - one accepts the past with all its faults as 
one's own in order to work on and help redeem it. This could not be done, if one 
held oneself apart from past faults and failures as "nothing to do with me." Nor 
does simply wallowing in guilt help, because that is often a form of self-pity that 
precludes effective action. Justification, in Thomas' view, involves a turning to 
God and - it should be made clear - all that leads towards God as well as the 
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detesting of sin (motus liberi arbitrii in Deum ... in peccatum, propter hoc enim 
ille qui justificatur, destestatur peccatwn, quia est contra Deum, IaIIae 113, 8). If 
one only goes on condemning or lamenting a past evil, and does not take on 
accomplishing whatever good one could do, one still remains tied down by it. 
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Chapter Nineteen 
Pride in a Godless World 
"The form of this world is passing away" (I Cor 7:31). 
This chapter is different from previous ones as it is not primarily concerned with 
moral failure, with sins of injustice and a lack of compassion for others. It looks 
instead at how weak or defective faith in God will lead to too close an attachment 
to society. This may be society as it is presently constituted, or a putative future 
society. The Vatican Council mentions the latter when it says: 
Thinking that they have found serenity in an interpretation of reality everywhere 
proposed these days, many look forward to a genuine and total emancipation of 
humanity wrought solely by human effort. They are convinced that the future rule of 
man over the earth will satisfy every desire of his heart. (G&S: 10) 
At the time of writing (1965), this statement would have applied preeminently to 
communism. Thirty years later, however, it is more applicable to those who with 
religious zeal advocate capitalism as the solution to all the world's problems. 
19.1 A Deeper Sense of Sin: Beyond Morality 
The discussion of pride, especially of even good actions being interiorly cor-
rupted by it, raises the question of whether the self is not implicated in sin in a 
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deeper way than through perpetrating evil actions. If even a sound characte: and 
good actions can be at least the occasion for pride (superbia non oritur ex 
virtutibus sicut ex causa per se, sed sicut ex causa per accidens, IIaIIae 162,5 ad 3), 
there must be a more fundamental possibility of wrong in human affairs than 
the various sins people commit. Sebastian Moore, a contemporary Benedictine 
monk, gives a sense of this when he writes: 
There is an ambiguity in the concept of sin that creates untold confusion. The two 
senses in the word 'sin' are: a defect that is predicted afthe human condition; and a 
defect observed within the human condition, by some people in others, by some 
people in themselves, taking an enormous number of forms. The first sense has for its 
point of reference some order embracing the whole of reality and equated by the 
believer with the mind of God: in relation to this order it makes sense to say that 
'man' fails, resists, refuses. The second sense has for its point of reference the human 
order as expressed in this or that culture, with the possibility that we may find a few 
offenses recognised as such by all cultures: in this order all offenses are judged in 
relation to the world of meaning constituted by man. (Moore, 1981: 32, italics in 
original) 
In this passage Moore, admittedly, has personal rather than social sin in mind, 
but his point also applies to social sin. In distinguishing two senses of 'sin', he is 
not speaking about distinct types of actions, but two different horizons of 
meaning against which an action can be seen as sinful. He gives the following 
example: 
On the one horizon of meaning, rape is the action of a man choosing his own 
gratification in despite of the dignity of another, of himself, and of the whole social 
order. On the other horizon, it is the action of a man choosing himself as he 
immediately experiences himself, against all possible and conceivable reality, against 
God. (1981: 33) 
The first horizon of meaning depicts a world in which humanity is the centre; 
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each and every person is expected to uphold human values. Murder, ~ape, 
robbery and other such crimes are offenses against the world of meaningful 
relations that human beings have historically brought about. This world rightly 
centres upon humanity. 
The second or ultimate horizon of meaning, however, depicts a world of which 
God, not humanity is the centre. Sin, in this sense, lies in the attempt to make 
humanity and even oneself the centre of everything, of all creation. Sin here is 
"the unreality of God" for the sinner. It is "the unreality of life other than the 
small portion of it that one calls one's own and builds into immobility." The 
sinner shows "a monumental indifference to the totality [of creation] of which 
one is a part" (Moore, 1981: 33). 
In some cases these two horizons coincide, as in such socially condemned sins as 
murder, rape and robbery; these are quite evidently, though with some cultural 
variations, offenses against one's fellow humans and transgressions of God's 
whole purpose. Moore observes of such cases: 
The human sense of self-centrality [over against God] is more clearly recognisable in 
some attitudes and actions than in others -- that is to say, in those attitudes and 
actions that society recognises as bad. It being always understood that society has 
some huge blind spots. (1981: 32f; italics his) 
Moore's distinction between two senses of 'sin' can be used, however, to throw 
light on those attitudes and actions that society does not recognize as bad. 
Society's huge blind spots lead to and are maintained by social sin. All the 
instances of social sin outlined in previous chapters are of persistent failures to 
bring about a satisfactory human order in the modern world. They are thus 
defects within the human condition, but that is not the whole story as their 
persistence stems from people hanging on to a world of their own making, and a 
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very imperfect one at that, in preference to the world that God is bringing ab?ut. 
Social sin involves a doubly sinful self-centrality: a failure both in morality and 
in faith. A system of economic exploitation or a culture of machismo, for 
instance, is within one horizon of meaning a moral failure; it degrades both rich 
and poor, males and females as human beings. Sin in this sense is the failure to 
strive for a world that benefits humanity as a whole. Instead, it brings about a 
world variously divided against itself. In going along with such social sins people 
are giving their support, with admittedly varying degrees of awareness and 
consent, to a social order that upholds their immediate sense of who they are. 
They are not letting their sense of self, derived from the prevailing social order, 
be disturbed by any consideration of the purpose of God. This second failing is 
one of faith; they take the prevailing society for granted, not daring to question 
its demands on them. They become captive to, what Moore terms, "the objects of 
our [their] expectations" (1981: 87), unable to come to terms with the 
transitoriness of both their own lives and their society. 
To complete the picture, it must be pointed out that people can also fail in faith 
by totally identifying themselves with the best of their culture and civilization. 
While identification with a culture and civilization is necessary for human 
development, total merger with it becomes a way of not having to face the 
transitoriness of life and their own impending death. Their taking so much pride 
in human achievements, all of which might in their own right be commendable, 
becomes a way of psychologically denying their own creaturehood and contin-
gency. By concentrating all attention on the conscious world of which humanity 
is the centre, they avoid facing up to that larger reality of creation in which 
humanity is not the centre. The most telling sign for a human being that 
humanity is not the centre is his or her impending death. This, like the involve-
ment of human life in the ecological life process, can neither be fully understand 
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nor brought under human control. Faced with this prospect, "our egoistic .self-
importance leads us to see death, which is in reality simply part of the life 
process, as the end of what we consider as alone significant, the works of the ego" 
(Moore 1981: xi-xii). By "works of the ego" Moore is referring to any idolatrous 
attachment to the cultural products of society: the arts, law, politics, technology 
and even religion. 
For this insight Moore draws on the work of the Ernest Becker. He recounts the 
effect on him of reading Becker's book, The Denial af Death: 
Becker showed me that the root [of all human evil] is in the very constitution of man 
as that evoluntionarily bizarre phenomenon, the conscious animal: the animal who, 
knowing his total contingency, turns from it in fear and builds the idolatrous image of 
himself .... Here was the validation ... of that sense of the human as less than human, 
of that subhumanity of culture, that has fascinated me for a decade. (Moore, 1981: xi) 
Once the cultural products of a society are accepted and held on to as though they 
offered all meaning to life, they draw people down to a less than human level. 
They become a point of resistance to the love of God, which embraces death as 
well as life, failure as well as achievement, change as well as continuity, sacrifice 
as well as possession. On this horizon of meaning, sin lies in substituting the 
current world centred upon humanity for the world centred upon God. This is 
another instance of pride, the temptation for human beings to elevate them-
selves into gods. Pride in this way, not only manifests itself in moral evil, but 
corrupts good deeds and genuine cultural achievements. In presenting his view, 
Moore is echoing Augustine's contrast between the humility of the City of God 
in which the love of God is predominant, and · the pride of the earthly city where 
love of self dominates (City af Gad, XIV, 13). 
Another manifestation of human self-sufficiency was the theological pos'tulate of 
'a state of pure nature.' According to this theory, in an unfallen world because 
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humans were created with the capacity of seeing God, then - quite apart .from 
divine grace - God in a strict sense owed them this fulfilment. 
In the 'purely natural world' where this creature lives, all idea of God's free gift is 
lost. ... Is there any real difference between such a hypothesis and the ideal of 
'rational sufficiency' against which, when it first reared its head clearly in a Christian 
society, about the beginning of the thirteenth century, [Chenu declared] 'the Christian 
soul felt an immediate shock of horror, as faced with the concupiscence of the mind 
which was the completion of original sin'? (de Lubac, 1967: 62) 
This was the issue facing Thomas Aquinas. He, speaking of this actual economy 
in which real people are situated, not just of a hypothetical pure state of nature, 
said that the vision of God, bestowed as God's gift, was not something arising 
from within human nature, but a completion given to nature (Non est aliquid 
naturae, sed naturae finis, Ia 62, 1). 
Before proceeding with Moore's account of sin and its consequences, some 
suggestions in this line from Kohut need to be examined. 
19.2 'Guilty Man' and 'Tragic man' in Kohut 
A parallel to Moore's distinction between sin as a defect within the human 
condition and as a defect observed of the human condition is Kohut's differenti-
ation between Guilty Man and Tragic Man. In moving beyond Freud's account of 
human life "in terms of forces (drives), counter-forces (defenses), and interaction 
of forces (compromise formations, such as the symptoms of the psychoneuroses) 
within a hypothetical space (the psychic apparatus)" (RESS: 223), Kohut brings 
out the other problems people face, besides those arising from seeking for 
pleasurable satisfaction amid moral censure and inhibition . 
... these theories [Freud's] fail to do justice to the experiences that relate to the 
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crucially important task of building and maintaining a cohesive nuclear self (wi.th the 
correlated joy of achieving this goal and the correlated nameless mortification of not 
achieving it) and, secondarily, to the experiences that relate to the crucially 
important striving of the nuclear self, once it is laid down, to express its basic 
patterns (with the correlated triumph and rejection at having succeeded or failed in 
this end). . .. drive theory and its developments explain Guilty Man, but they do not 
explain Tragic Man. (RESS: 224) 
Kohut explains that the tensions people experience in managing, and very often 
mismanaging, their drives towards pleasure in the face of external pressure from 
others and their own inner conflicts led him to speak of Guilty Man (see RESS: 
132). liThe (sexual and destructive) id and the (inhibiting-prohibiting) superego 
are constituents of the mental apparatus of Guilty Man" (RESS 243). In classical 
Freudian theory, the Oedipus complex with all its repercussions is central to the 
life of Guilty Man. Kohut does not dismiss this, but says it is not the whole story. 
Attention must also be given to 
Tragic Man ... [who] seeks to express the pattern of his nuclear self; his endeavors lie 
beyond the pleasure principle. Here, too, the undeniable fact that man's failures 
overshadow his successes prompted me to designate this aspect of man negatively 
as Tragic Man rather than "self-expressive" or "creative man." (RESS: 133) 
The special contribution of self psychology lies in its drawing attention to a 
person's seeking to attain the ambitions and fulfil the ideals laid down in the 
nuclear self. Between these two poles "stretches the tension arc that forms the 
center of the pursuits of Tragic Man" (RESS: 243). 
The similarity between the Christian view of faith and hope and Kohut's Tragic 
Man is that both stress the importance of living in relationship to some source of 
power outside of themselves. Greenlee (1986) has examined the pattern of 
"relatedness-fall-restoration" common to both self psychology and Christian 
theology. Likewise, Olthuis states: "Self psychology's concern with the relational-
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communal nature of the fragmented human self fits well with faith' s co~cern 
with love, community, wholeness and healing of brokenness" (1989:315). It is not 
too difficult to see in the following passage echoes of faith, hope and love. In one 
of his last papers, Kohut describes Tragic Man as 
an abiding self in need of nutriment for its establishment and maintenance and 
endangered by the flawed responses of selfobjects throughout life, a self falling ill 
(the fragmented, enfeebled, or disharmonious self) when the gap between the need 
for sustenance from selfobjects and the actual performance with which they respond 
becomes too great, or able to maintain itself courageously, despite selfobject failure, 
on the basis of sustaining responses it has experienced in the past and the confident 
expectation of renewed selfobject availability in the future. (55 IV: 521) 
When the self is inadequately sustained through the lack of response and self-
giving from others (failure in love), a living memory of sustenance received 
(faith) can offer the confident expectation of renewed relatedness (hope of life 
restored) in the future. It is not that faith, hope and love as gifts of God are no 
more than psychological states, but that while transcending the dynamism of 
human psychology they still operate within it. 
19.3 Security rather than Faith 
Both the descriptions of people remaining within a protective cocoon so as to 
avoid risks and of a person not pressing forward to realize the aspirations, ideals 
and abilities laid down in the nuclear self are akin to a failure in faith. Taking a 
very general view, Raymond Panikkar speaks of faith as 
this aspect of man which moves man toward his fullness, this dimension, as a result 
of which man is not closed up in his present state, but open to perfection, to his goal 
or destiny ... it is manifest as a fundamental act which opens us to the pos~ibility of 
perfection, permitting us to attain to what we are not yet (1971: 239) 
615 
In this view of faith, one that rather includes hope too, it is seen as orthop!axis, 
neither simply as belief in correct doctrine (orthodoxy) nor moral deportment 
(orthopoiesis). While both assent to well formulated teaching and moral 
integrity are necessary, they are not enough. A person can also fail by not going 
forward, by not welcoming and responding to what he or she is called to be, by 
not venturing beyond what has already been acquired. How much of such 
timidity or despondency may be due to sheer inability for which the individual 
cannot be blamed, or results from previous action and especially inaction will 
vary in each case. But even if no or little blame attaches to the individual, in 
many instances those responsible for his upbringing or for inflicting psychologi-
cal damage will be blameworthy. Ordinarily, however, it is through faith that a 
person is both called and enabled to move beyond his present state and reach out 
towards greater wholeness. 
This is made more explicit in Johann Baptist Metz's political theology. He says it 
is essential to Christian faith that believers challenge and move beyond the very 
individualized definition of self that Western society imposes upon its members. 
In his view: "The faith of Christians is a praxis in history and society that is to be 
understood as hope in solidarity in the God of Jesus as a God of the living and 
the dead who calls all people to be subjects in his presence" (Metz, 1980: 73). Faith 
calls believers to seek and realize through both action and reflection a new 
identity for themselves; no longer purely individually but in support of one 
another; no longer to be categorized solely by their function in society but as part 
of a wider movement embracing the dead (and - we might add - future 
generations) as well; no longer content with the role and value society assigns 
them but discovering each other and hence themselves as a new people before 
God. This kind of faith, as distinct from purely notional assent, offers a basis for 
making a critique of society and working effectively to overcome its short-
comings. 
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One of society's central shortcomings, its being too confining for the full £l<?wer-
ing of human life and society, is pin-pointed by Panikkar when he says: 
Modern culture is too accustomed to manipulating with ideas, parameters, people, ... 
and feels an understandable resistance to accept that there are absolutely non-
negotiable, non-manipulable factors in life, because the very intention at somehow 
handling them destroys their very nature. The principle of property is not the 
supreme principle. There are things which we cannot 'have' because the having 
would amount to their radical annihilation. Faith belongs to those factors. We Calmot 
have faith, as we have anything which we can have. (Panikkar, 1971: 254) 
Faith is not a possession and does not offer the kind of security that possessions 
are expected in Western society to provide. Yet, out of fear of what the future will 
bring, many cling to possessions as they appear to offer some security against the 
unknown. 
19.4 When Adam meets Narcissus 
This century's discovery of social sin, together with the weakening of cultural 
assumptions under the impact of pluralism, has led to people questioning their 
culture and not going along automatically with the prevailing social arrange-
ments. This has made possible a new perception of sin in the modern world: 
With the cumulative loosening of cultural assumptions it is becoming possible to see 
the whole human project from the outside as a necessary denial of an equally 
undeniable contingency, and so to see our whole history as characterised by this 
denial. ... Evil is operative in us as the denial of our contingency through fear, and as 
the cognate fascination with ourselves. It is the inescapable narcissism of conscious-
ness. (Moore 1981: 35) 
This is evident in people wanting to make a name for themselves, as they did in 
building the tower of Babel (Gen 11: 4), a construction that was meant to put 
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them centre-stage. 
Thus the myth of Adam, out of which the Christian tradition of self-understanding 
has spun its yarn, becomes wedded to the myth of Narcissus, in which the psycho-
analytic tradition of self-understanding has seen the human trauma in its working-
out. As the narcissistic interpretation of man breaks ... onto the ontological level, it 
pairs with the myth of Adam: the myth of Adam showing the price of becoming 
conscious, the Narcissus myth showing how that price is paid. (Moore, 1981: 35f) 
In a world that is increasingly dominated by human effort and activity, in which 
most activity is reflexively organised, it is easy to humans to become self-
absorbed, to be preoccupied with their own autonomy and self-actualization. 
Everything else, including even (suitably privatized) religion, becomes an 
adjunct to our becoming as gods - the original temptation put to Eve! 
19.5 Ego rather than Self-transcendence 
Another repercussion of a failure in faith is that a person refuses to move 
forwards to any greater perfection, but remains self-absorbed or closed up within 
himself. This is in line with Luther's description of sin as becoming turned in on 
oneself (incurvatus in se). Moore describes this condition and its frightening 
consequence: 
The will-not-to-be desires to undo the order of being that represent this power [that 
calls man to being, to identity, to personhood, to himself], to make it not the case 
that man is called to an ever-greater intensity of selfhood .... The most passionately 
protected thing in us is our mediocrity, our fundamental indecision in respect of life. 
Its protection will require, and will not stop at, murder. (Moore, 1981: 13) 
This is one reason why people can be so fanatical and violent, when any person 
or programme threatens to expose the mediocrity and shortcomings of a society 
or social system with which they strongly identify. 
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19.6 The Inability to Forgive and Accept Forgiveness 
Another reason why people identify with, hold on to and defend - both 
verbally and violently - a structurally deficient social order is due to the 
difficulty they experience in forgiving. They find it difficult to forgive not only 
others but themselves too, nor do they want to accept forgiveness from others. 
Forgiving is difficult because it breaks into one's self-esteem, it ruptures the 
protective cocoon of social expectations that have come to protect a person 
against too much reality. 
This appears to be an underlying fear in those opposing a truth commission that 
will bring into the open the crimes committed in the struggle of defending and 
opposing apartheid. The issue is further complicated by fears about prosecution 
and revenge. But having to admit to oneself and acknowledge to others, not 
simply that one lost a battle, but that the whole social system upon which one 
relied to uphold one's identity and self-esteem was an inhuman sham, is a tough 
demand. Moore lays his finger on this when he states: "the deepest, most obscure 
and most unavowed obstacle to a total surrender to God's forgiveness lies in the 
way I look at other people, lies in the system, built up over the years, of expecta-
tions and evaluations and projections" (Moore 1981: 83). 
A corresponding difficulty faces those who have been wronged, by either side, in 
the struggle. Their self-esteem as wronged persons or as victims may have come 
to depend upon regarding their attackers as people who could be nothing but 
attackers. It is crucial then to their own sense of self to immobilize the others. 
Whether it is a case of apartheid, industrial or national conflict, or sexism, we 
find that 
the captive self imprisons others in the categories of 'objects of our eXl?ectation'. 
Even before they are judged unforgivable, they are extensions of my system of self-
esteem. And this system, which totally breaks down when I receive the grace to 
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forgive an enemy, already is trembling in the balance when I understand that my 
expectations of others are stemming from what I am doing to myself. (Moore 1981: 
87f) 
What the person is doing to himself is trying to immobilize and secure his own 
self; trying to put himself in a position where he does not have to change. He 
either seeks a position where he is beyond criticism and so does not need to 
change, or abases himself as so evil and hopeless that he is incapable of change. 
An aggressor might readily adopt the latter option, as then he does not have to 
admit the good in himself that he is suppressing, whether deliberately or as an 
accomplice of the system, in harming others. It can be even harder to face and 
admit the injury to others that one has been involved in unconsciously, through 
going along with unjust social practices, than the conscious, deliberate injuries 
that one has oneself perpetrated. Conceding that one has been duped and 
neglected others, where one reveals evident deficiencies in the self, can be more 
disturbing than admitting self-assertive wrong-doing. But in either case, as 
Moore observes: "When you hurt another person, your true self, the lover in 
you, goes into hiding, and uses every possible ruse to stay in hiding. Even abject 
apology!" (1981: 98). 
Without going into the whole dynamic of forgiveness, the point of interest here 
is that forgiveness breaks through previous ways of viewing and relating oneself 
to others. This holds bot~ for those forgiving and those being forgiven. Forgive-
ness awakens both the offender and the one offended against, though not 
necessarily at the same time, to a person's true being that the offender rejected in 
committing his crime or even going along unknowingly with an unjust social 
system . 
... the opening of a person to God's forgiveness, and the yielding of that. person's 
basic stance in respect of others, may be experienced and understood as one same 
breaking-down of the normal system of self-esteem and self-denigration. To forgive 
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an enemy is to risk my whole system. To open myself to the forgiveness of GO? is to 
risk my whole system. It is the same risk. (Moore 1981: 88) 
Since, however, asking forgiveness and forgiving others entails letting go of a 
known and somewhat secure past, and opening themselves up to new demands, 
in their relations to one another, people are not always willing to risk it. They 
prefer to live within the prevailing system with all its attendant evils. Their 
failure has moral consequences but is at root a lack of hope, an unwillingness to 
go forward to the unknown future that God is preparing. 
19.7 Pride Distorts the Understanding of Social Sin 
The double hermeneutic, in which technical terminology becomes 
reincorporated into people's everyday and personal understanding of their own 
lives, can occur with theology as well as the social sciences. Speaking of 'social 
sin' may be very helpful in that it enables people to see what forces they are up 
against and how deeply rooted they may be. But it can also become a way of 
justifying oneself, of distancing the innocent self from sinful society. With sin 
and evil being regarded as located elsewhere, one then has an excuse for not 
doing anything about oneself. All problems are seen as social and so no effort is 
made to change oneself; the self remains unconverted. This is another instance 
of how pride corrupts even good deeds. Any recognition of social sin should be 
an occasion for revealing and examining the deficiencies of one's own self-
understanding, relationships and aspirations, so that one neither draws upon 
nor supports the sin embedded in the structures of one's society. Instances of this 
embedded sin are not limited to injustice and want of self-giving, but may also 
stem from a deficient faith leading to a misplaced hope (an issue to be discussed 
in Chapter Twenty). 
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19.8 Death and the Self 
A further reason why people do not question or challenge the structural 
inequities of society is their inability to cope with the fact of their impending 
death. This may be obvious enough, when people do not rebel against a harsh 
military occupation, a totalitarian regime or rule by drug lords out of a wish to 
survive. Even if people have few illusions about the inherent evil of the polity 
and economy imposed upon them, many will simply put up with it as best they 
can. Not everyone is ready to risk their lives or livelihood either in an violent 
attempt at overthrowing those in power or even in working politically at 
undermining the prevailing order and replacing it. 
Much more subtle, however, is the acquiescence given to the evils that are kept 
hidden below the surface in some affluent, consumer societies. Probing into their 
workings, asking about where and how it obtains its wealth, inquiring into how 
law and order are kept, often raises too many uncomfortable questions about the 
self. When the self is defined solely in terms of the predominant social order, 
when the construction of self-narratives is limited to what the prevailing 
consumer culture can offer, it is hardly in a position to question that society. 
Instead of facing the whole mystery of life which includes illness, suffering and 
eventually death, many people retreat into the protective cocoon that an affluent 
society offers. Moore describes what then takes place: 
This is what is meant by the scripture's description of man as 'under the shadow of 
death'. It does not mean 'man knowing he will die' but 'what man does and becomes 
under this knowledge.' It is not to our mortality, our animality, that scripture offers a 
remedy. It is to the death that we become in our self-absorption. It is to what we 
allow death to become in us by fleeing from it in the hopeless pride of man. (Moore 
1981: 70) 
This fleeing from death is structured into many modern, affluent societies; it is a 
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negative aspect of the social structure, which is continually reproduced tlu;ough 
the absence of resources to cope with it. The self has no · place for death or 
anything reminding one of it on its career path. Modern society, which has lost 
many rituals for coping with the approach of death, the event itself and mourn-
ing, relegates it to being a private event, confined to hospitals, old-age homes and 
other places for the old and sick. The mutually reinforced result is that both self 
and society are out of touch with death and all that is associated with it. 
A symptom of this is evident in the way modern culture centres upon the body 
as a symbol of the self, it places unprecedented value on "the youthful, sexual 
and trim body" (Mellor and Shilling, 1993: 413). A widespread expectation is that 
people will remain youthful, full of vitality and always capable of considerable 
achievement. Self-narratives are continually being rewritten to encompass past 
accomplishments (or to explain away failures) and to prepare for further 
achievements. But, as Mellor and Shilling remark: 
the presence of death appears especially disturbing in this context [described by 
Giddens] of reflexively constructed self-narratives which have at their centre a 
concern with the body. After all, what could more effectively signal to the body-
conscious individual the limitations of their reflexive ordering of self than the brute 
facts of their thickening waistlines, sagging breasts, ageing bodies and inevitable 
deaths? (1993: 413) 
Much of modern culture, which draws people into a preoccupation with their 
own bodily selves, makes it almost impossible to view the self as part of a greater 
mystery that also encompasses failure, declining health, suffering, aging and 
death. Moore using sightly different terms sees this kind of self-absorption as the 
flight from death. "Man's self-absorption is his choice of self-awareness as against 
his animality. It is the desperate and unavoidable choice of only one of the two 
poles of existence" (Moore 1981: 69). This choice - the exaltation of vitality at the 
cost of denying vulnerability - Moore adds, operates not only individually but 
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collectively. "The human race thinks it can go on with all its Narcissistic h~man 
normalities, of war, of politics, of religion, and that somehow the V?st other side 
of the picture will look after itself" (1981: 69f). On the other side of the picture is 
all that is beyond the socially spun protective cocoon which protects the infantile 
narcissism fostered by modern culture. 
The person graced with accepting that her self-worth and self-esteem does not 
derive solely from conforming to prevailing social expectations is free to 
question any shallowness in them. Their shallowness is cultural first of all as 
vitality is exalted but vulnerability shunned, independence exalted and depend-
ence denigrated, self-absorbtion promoted but not self-transcendence. But when 
this shallowness remains unchallenged, faith too is weakened in several 
respects. Metz (1980) has shown that if Christian faith is to be genuine it must 
challenge the prevailing assumptions and outlook o£.bourgeois society. Other-
wise society's presence to the subject (self) replaces God's presence; God becomes 
only a god of those currently living; without hope the striving for solidarity with 
others is lost. To put this another way, when the Reign of God provides the 
ambit for a person's self-understanding and is the source of her self-esteem, then 
she is not restricted to the role and self-understanding society offers her. This 
restriction may either be explicitly ordered and programmed, for instance in an 
educational system, or latent in the whole structuring of society. 
Living in hope of the coming Reign of God transforms the rules and enlarges the 
resources, so that not only vitality and accomplishment but also death and all 
that leads up to it can become of value. Only through faith can a person and 
community live out what Moore calls "the blazing contrast between God-made-
man and man-made man" (Moore 1981: 78). 
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Chapter Twenty 
The Deconstruction of an 
Idolatrous Trust in Providence 
"Come let us build a city and a tower with its top reaching heaven. 
Let us make a name for ourselves, 
so that we do not get scattered allover the world" (Gen 11:4). 
The quality of one's faith is shown in action, in particular in what one puts one's 
hopes in and strives to accomplish. Likewise, any deficiency in faith becomes 
evident in misplaced aims and ambitions; either - to use a Pauline image -
one holds back from stepping into the good works that God opens ahead of us or 
one reckons that salvation comes as the result of what one does oneself 
(Ephesians 2: 9f). The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the relation of faith 
and works, but to examine how hope becomes socially misplaced when it is based 
upon an excessive vision of human abilities alone. The misplacing of hope is 
due, not simply to pride within individuals (examined in the previous chapter), 
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it also has a social origin. It stems from the widely held hope of Western s~ciety 
that by our own human efforts within time paradise can be regained on earth. 
The origins and growth of this optimistic social hope, or 'providential outlook,' 
have been traced in detail by Bob Goudzwaard in his book,Capitalism and 
Progress: A Diagnosis of Western Society. This is a study of the root metaphors 
and hence enabling images from which Western society in general, and capital-
ism in particular, have drawn so much self-confidence, energy and direction. Yet, 
as Giddens indicates, this providential outlook is now collapsing as its own 
internal contradictions come to the fore; human effort and activity on a vast 
scale have not brought paradise within reach on earth. However, before dealing 
with these questions, some attention must be given to hope and how we might 
relate to. It should also be noted that the discussion here focuses on temporal 
hopes, and does not examine how all hope might be fulfilled in eternity when all 
sin is overcome. 
20.1 Imaging our Human Hopes 
When it comes to thinking about hope and the future, we are more dependent 
than ever upon images and metaphors. Thomas explains that while we are still 
pilgrims the human heart cannot rise to grasp fully what eternal beatitude will 
be, it can only gain an general idea of it (beatitudo aeterna perfecte quidem in cor 
hominis non ascendit, ut scilicet cognosci possit ab homin~ viatore quae et qualis 
sit, sed secundum communem rationem, IIaIIae 17, 2 ad 1). Even when one 
thinks about the future in time, let alone eternity, any final description about 
what is going to happen would be an imposition on freedom. If we could not 
change our minds and act differently after hearing a prediction about the future, 
we would not be free. But if we do behave differently, the prediction will not 
come true. Consequently, expressions of hope do not give detailed descriptions of 
what the future will be like. Instead, their purpose is to help us orientate 
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ourselves so we may freely and with confidence deal with present reali~ies in 
ways that respond to the brighter possibilities they hold out. 
Nonetheless, even though we may be imbued with hope we can still fail to 
respond at all or do so in an inappropriate fashion. If we do not attain eternal 
beatitude, that is due not to any failure in the power and mercy of God upon 
which our hope is based, but because our free decision to sin prevents that hope 
from being realized (aliqui habentes spem deficiant a consecutione beatitudinis, 
contingit ex defectu liberi arbitrii ponentis obstaculum peccati; non autem ex 
defectu divinae potentiae vel misericordiae, cui spes innititur, IIaIIae 18,4 ad 3). 
Images of hope, while enabling, do not depict eventual inevitabilities. 
In his treatment of hope, Thomas cautions against the extremes of both pre-
sumption and despair. Both derive from a wrong understanding of what we can 
expect and achieve. Presumption arises when someone pursues some good that 
is beyond his or her ability to attain (presumptio ex hoc quod aliquis tendit in 
aliquod bonum ut sibi possibile quod suam facultatem excedit, IIaIIae 21, 1). 
While total disbelief gives up all faith and hope in God, despair is more particu-
lar: it is the non-acceptance in a particular case that anything good can be brought 
about. It is a practical denial of the effectiveness both of God's saving power and 
of human effort. Between these extremes lies hope, by which a person has 
confidence in his or her own gifts and abilities (circa spem per quam aliquis de 
propria virtute confidit, IIaIIae 21, 1). 
These considerations provide a perspective in which to interpret any image of 
the future. Furthermore, since this final section compares and assesses several 
root metaphors that open or close off whole vistas for thought and action, it 
tends to be rather sweeping. It is not looking in detail at particular hopes and 
how they might or might not be realized. Instead, it tries to offer a valid frame-
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work in which hope and social sin, which to some degree counters the 
realization of hope, may be given due place. 
20.2 An Irenaean Perspective On Evil 
This study has largely adopted the view of Thomas Aquinas that evil is a lack of 
the good that ought to be present, but that no being is totally evil. Before him, 
Augustine forcibly expressed this view, especially because it had enabled him to 
refute the teaching of the Manichees. He took it over from the Neo-Platonists, 
who had in their turn refined the views of Plato and Aristotle. Seen in this 
perspective, Adam's sin led to the fall from original justice, so that he could pass 
on neither full human integrity nor the special gifts that God had endowed him 
with to his descendants. What he now lacked, he could not bequeath to others. 
The Augustinian view, mentioned above, does not exhaust the Christian 
tradition. It also maintains another view of Adam's fall and evil, that expressed 
by Irenaeus in the second century. John Hick sums up the contrast between the 
two views. 
Instead of the [Augustinian] doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then 
incomprehensibly destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and misery, 
Irenaeus suggests that man was created as an imperfect, immature creature who was 
to undergo moral development and growth and finally be brought to the perfection 
intended for him by his Maker. Instead of the fall of Adam being presented, as in the 
Augustinian tradition, as an utterly malignant and catastrophic event, completely 
disrupting God's plan, Irenaeus pictures it as something that occurred in the 
childhood of the race, an understandable lapse due to weakness and immaturity 
rather than an adult crime full of malice and pregnant with perpetual guilt. And 
instead of the Augustinian view of life's trials as a divine punishment for Adam's 
sin, Irenaeus sees our world of mingled good and evil as a divinely appointed 
environment for man's development towards the perfection that represents the 
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fulfilment of God's good purpose for him. (Hick, 1966: 220f) 
Due to the theologically dominant position of first Augustine and then Thomas 
in most of Western Christianity, this Irenaean perspective has not been explored 
extensively. However, Segundo's attempt (1974, see 4.8 above) to explain the 
origin and significance of evil in evolutionary terms does take on some features 
of this providential perspective. 
One striking difference between these two views lies in their adoption of 
different approaches to time and events. The Augustinian explanation of evil 
concentrates much more on the present, on what is now lacking and what more 
or less immediately should be done or not done. Irenaeus takes a much longer 
view and looks at what might grow out of the experience of past failings. His 
attitude is rather that of a grandparent who has already seen a generation of 
children making mistakes, getting hurt yet learning by the experience. The 
Augustinian attitude is more that of a parent warning his teenagers not to fall for 
the temptations now pressing upon them, as he once did: although they now 
appear alluring, you will soon discover their emptiness. Needless to say, both 
these approaches have their validity; neither makes the other redundant nor 
tells the whole story. 
An attribute of human existence is the ability to relate our selves to time in 
several ways; for instance, dealing with each event as it comes, as well as taking a 
long term view, or joining in the rhythm of creation - daily, weekly and yearly. 
It should be pointed out that neither Augustine nor Irenaeus thought in 
Newtonian terms of time as an indefinitely extended but empty dimension 
within which events took place, but which itself remains unaffected by those 
same events. Irenaeus's calmer and more detached approach allows him to be 
more optimistic about human development and spiritual growth than 
Augustine. So for instance, Irenaeus can write: 
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By this arrangement, therefore, and these harmonies, and a sequence of this n~ture, 
man, a created and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness of the 
uncreated God - the Father platming everything well and giving His commands, The 
Son carrying these into execution and performing the work of creating, and the Spirit 
nourishing and increasing [what is made], but man making progress day by day, and 
ascending towards the perfect, that is, approximating to the uncreated One .... No! it 
was necessary that man should in the first instance be created; and having been 
created, should receive growth; and having received growth, should be strengthened; 
and having been strengthened, should abound; and having abounded, should recover 
[from the disease of sin]; and having recovered, should be glorified; and being 
glorified, should see his Lord. (Against Heresies, IV, 38, 3 quoted by Hick 1966: 219) 
Although Augustine is confident that the City of God will finally supersede the 
earthly city, he would never simply subsume sin and recovery from it into a 
process of growth. Irenaeus' perspective, however, is only plausible as long as 
one is not too close to the immediate degradation, despair and pain that sin 
engenders. 
20.2.1 Situating Ourselves within Irenaeus' Picture 
Without dealing with the whole theology of history, of how time emerges from 
and is taken up into eternity, or how both human achievements and pains are 
finally transformed, some attention will be given to how social sin appears 
within an Irenaean perspective. Is it a stage through which humanity must grow 
in the course of its development? Before answering I yes' to this question, some 
more basic and interrelated questions must be posed: How developed in fact are 
we? Are we innocent children, anxious parents or wise grandparents? Is it 
possible for us to view the course of human development as a whole from 
outside? Or do we now only have a partial view of it from inside, much -like that 
of a riverboat's crew watching out for snags in the water while admiring the ever 
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changing scenery along the banks? 
Concerning our stage of development, it is probably best to presume that we are 
like teenagers: full of great ideals, but easily disappointed when they are not 
quickly realized; eager to take on responsibility, but unaware of the growth and 
discipline still required. The experience after only a year of trying to initiate a 
programme for developing South Africa, as well as the tangle of unforeseen 
consequences that development efforts elsewhere have invariably run into, 
show that neither the concept of 'development' (Gutierrez, 1973) nor its imple-
mentation (Goulet, 1971) are straightforward. Nor is success inevitable. Many 
testimonies could be given of this sobering realization, but one must suffice. It 
comes from Immanuel Wallerstein, the chief exponent of world-system theory. 
Speaking at a conference on 1/ A Road to Development: Africa in the 21st Cen-
tury," he concluded his address with a warning-cum-encouraging challenge: 
I do not say Africa will inevitably succeed, as it tries. Africa has, we all have, at best 
a 50-50 chance of coming out of this transition with something better. History is not 
necessarily on our side, and if we think it is, this belief will work against us. But we 
are all very much an important and integral part of this process. And if we engage in 
it in the right way, we many indeed achieve the kind of world-system we want. It is 
around this realization that the road is hard, the outcome uncertain, but the struggle 
worth it, that we must organize our collective efforts. (in Olukoshi and Wohlgemuth, 
eds 1975: 84) 
Like all teenagers, we will only grow up to the degree that we learn from both 
our own experience and take note of what others have gone through. Even then, 
although the past may be used for guidance, it does not guarantee the future. 
This sobering experience, together with the realization that our view is partial _ 
both a limited, passing one and with our own interests in mind - undercuts any 
naive optimism we might have about human history. 
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It is impossible to resolve these problems conclusively, it is possible to sor:t out 
the grounds for our hope that sin and evil will not finally triumph. Since we are 
dealing not with calculation but hope, proofs cannot be offered. There is no way 
of proving with certainty that social evil will not increasingly engulf us so that 
the whole human project turns out to be an unmitigated catastrophe. There is no 
way of completely ruling that out as an impossibility, but the following reflec-
tions might help to show that it is not a necessity. 
20.3 The Deconstruction of Providential Outlooks 
The thoughts offered by Moore warn against a simplistic adoption of Irenaeus' 
view of sin or a too hasty conclusion that social sin is an almost necessary stage 
in the unfolding of divine providence within human history. This image of 
humanity growing up and learning by its mistakes, or Augustine's one of the 
City of God eventually triumphing over the earthly city ruled by pride, are 
examples of what Giddens terms "providential outlooks." He holds that since 
Nietzsche's break with foundationalism there has been "a significant divide in 
philosophical thought;" the providential unfolding of history has been 
deconstructed. He outlines what has taken place: 
Enlightenment thought, and Western culture in general, emerged from a religious 
context which emphasised teleology and the achievement of God's grace. Divine 
providence had long been a guiding idea of Christian thought. Without these 
preceding orientations, the Enlightenment would scarcely have been possible in the 
first place. It is in no way surprising that the advocacy of unfettered reason only 
reshaped the ideas of the providential, rather than replacing it. One type of certainty 
(divine law) was replaced by another (the certainty of the senses, of empirical 
observation), and divine providence was replaced by providential progress. 
Moreover, the providential idea of reason coincided with the rise of European 
dominance over the rest of the world. The growth of European power provided, as it 
were, the material support for the assumption that the new outlook on the world 
632 
was founded on a firm base which both provided security and offered emanciration 
from the dogma of tradition. (CMOD: 48) 
Now this outlook has largely collapsed. Giddens adds that not only philosophers, 
but many ordinary people too, sense that modernity is enigmatic at its core. "A 
general awareness of the phenomenon filters into anxieties which press in on 
everyone" (CMOD: 49). The most conspicuous features of this loss of a providen-
tial outlook lie in 
the dissolution of evolutionism, the disappearance of historical teleology, the recognition of 
thoroughgoing, constitutive reflexivity, together with the evaporating of the privileged 
position of the West - [all of which] move us into a new and disturbing universe of 
experience. (CMOD: 52f; author's italics) 
These considerations put many of our hopes in doubt. Has human progress 
come to a halt? Was it all along a delusion useful for justifying the activities of 
colonizers, technocrats and estate agents? The underside in terms of human 
degradation and suffering of so many achievements is now becoming apparent. 
How might we come to terms with, to adapt an image of Giddens, the jugger-
nauts -of modernity whose possible collision courses we cannot wholly predict; so 
our trying to avert a collision may actually cause one? 
20.3.1 A Failure of Nerve or a Challenge to Renew Hope 
A possible response is to assert that these rumblings of modernity are no more 
than a massive failure of nerve. On this view, it is claimed that people have 
simply lost confidence in themselves, in one another and their abilities. This 
crisis of confidence may also be traced back to a great apostasy from religious 
belief and practice. This was the kind of response Leo XIII initially mad~, in 1878 
just after he was made pope, to the evils of his society (see 2.1.1 above). It is also 
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the line taken today by fundamentalism, whether Christian or Islami~, by 
Marxists or members of the New Right. This 'back to basics' view in effect treats 
modernity, or some significant aspect of it, as the great sin from which all decline 
follows. 
This may be a possible response to those adopting a position of complete 
relativism, who are unable to find anything worth saying or cause worth taking 
up, and who are sunk into pervasive despair. This is the cynical position of 
'deconstructive post-modernism.' It rather takes the view that because the world 
is not as certain as Descartes demanded and not as rational as science predicted, 
then no credence can be placed in any statement or theory. This position is well 
summarized by Danah Zohar: 
Deconstructive post-modernity is a rejection of unity and reason in favour of 
disunity, fragmentation, the irrational and the unpredictable. Where modernity 
(Descartes and Newton and their followers) said there is only one objective point of 
view, only one truth, only one reason, the deconstructive post-modern writers and 
philosophers say there are many points of view, but all are subjective, many 'truths', 
but all are relative. They say that reason is a myth and that all the constructs of 
reason are mere fa~ades. At the centre of post-modernity is the fragmented self, 
fragmented consciousness. (1994: 111) 
Total dogmatism or complete relativism, fundamentalism or incoherence, are 
not in fact the only options. Between these extremes it is possible with a combi-
nation of rigorous investigation and disciplined imagination to work out 
standpoints that are relatively adequate. Both are necessary as "rigour alone is 
paralytic death, but imagination alone is insanity" (Bateson, 1980: 233). They 
together, without claiming to display the ultimate structure of reality, can be 
more or less sufficient for grasping reality and guiding action. Though, as new 
questions arise, any such standpoint will come to need revision. 
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Giddens distinguishes his own position, that of 'radicalised modernity' fro~ the 
'deconstructive post-modernism' exemplified by Fukuyama, Lyotard and 
Baudrillard (CMOO, 150££; MHO: 290). While they see only fragmentation, 
emptying, dissolution and dispersal, Giddens sees integration as well as fragmen-
tation, new appropriation as well as loss or emptying, the possibility of grasping 
why previous forms of knowledge are dissolved in favour of new understand- · 
ing, and the forces of integration working dialectically with those of dispersal. 
This list could be extended, but what is interesting is how Giddens' outlook 
coincides with that of Kohut. The latter speaks of the works of Picasso and Alban 
Berg "depicting the broken-up self and its artistic re-creation" (55 III: 331). Kohut 
himself made this - the taking apart and reassembling of the self - into an 
enabling image or selfobject for his own life and work as founder of self psychol-
ogy. 
Neither Giddens nor Kohut presume that all will inevitably come right, nor do 
they downplay 'the darkside of modernity.' On the other hand they do not think 
everything is so hopeless that it is not worth mobilizing in social movements 
(CMOD, 158ff) or through applied psychoanalysis (55 III: 275ff; HDAC, 38ff) to 
take up the challenges of modernity. However in doing so, it might be helpful to 
examine some of the reasons that Giddens advances for the dissolution of 
providential outlooks. 
20.4 The Position of the West 
Giddens's statement that the West no longer has a privileged position in the 
world needs to be taken dialectically. While the Western nations of Europe and 
North America have less of a dominant position, this is in part because other 
nations, particularly in 50uth East Asia, have taken on many Western ideas and 
practices adapting them in the process for their own use. The institutional 
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clusterings of modernity - capitalism, technology, surveillance and cont~ol of 
the means of violence - are now spread across the globe. Each clustering in a 
varied degree both brings benefits and inflicts deprivations; each embodies sound 
practices as well as structural evils. Today the main divisions in the world fall, 
not along geographical or national boundaries, but along time-space edges (see 
15.9 above). The great division is between those with power to stretch their 
influence over time-space and those lacking that power. 
Nevertheless, even those able to exercise the wide influence - economic, 
technical, military and supervisory - over space and time are still not in 
complete control. Risks cannot be excluded; as time-space is stretched so do the 
unacknowledged conditions of action increase; increased reflexivity enters in to 
alter the outcome of their plans. Wholesale social engineering, whether capitalist 
or socialist, has not worked out well (see 15.10 above). This has undermined the 
view that if one could understand how society works, one could then provide it 
with better structures - whether legal or educational - so that all social 
problems would be solved. That dream of reshaping humanity simply by 
improving the structures of society, which initially inspired much of the 
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sociological quest, has - especially when applied too strictly - turned into a 
nightmare. 
20.5 Evolutionism neither an Explanation nor a Justification 
Giddens' objection to evolutionary theories explaining all social change is 
twofold. First, by presuming that there is some inherent tendency within society 
by which it will necessarily develop from one form to the next, evolutionary 
theories do not give due weight to what actors know about their society or about 
world-history. "All causal connections in human social life are mediated in one 
way or another by agents' knowledgeability and agents' reasons" (STPPF: 206). He 
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points out that as part of the double hermeneutic "there is no mechani~m of 
social organization or social reproduction identified by social analysts which lay 
actors cannot also get to know about and actively incorporate into what they do" 
(CS: 284). As people find out where their society might be heading, they may 
deliberately attempt to check, reverse or encourage the process, though with 
varying degrees of success. 
Second, evolutionary theory tends to presume that what comes later is necessar-
ily better; modern societies are therefore ethically more advanced than primitive 
ones. Giddens, in what he terms his I critical critique' of Habermas, emphasizes 
instead the ambiguity of developments. 
Oral cultures are not made up of individuals who have not yet undergone the 
'learning processes' that bring enlightenment. On the contrary, the introduction of 
writing and the other paraphernalia of civilization is an unlearning process - a 
process of cultural destruction. The division we make between nature and culture is 
one that dissolves the intimacy with nature which is one of the richest forms of 
human experience. Finally, norms which are founded upon debate and discussion, it 
might be argued, are not just new forms of tradition. They mark the undermining of 
tradition - the security of time-honoured practice as such. (STMS: 249). 
In each case the human costs and benefits, as well as the likely ethical value, of 
any I development' needs to be assessed on its own merits. Evolutionism or 
developmentalism as an overall theory is too sweeping; it can be used to justify 
any change in society or condemn any lack of change. This lack of precision is 
evident in the statement of the Vatican Council that: "The headlong develop-
ment of the world and a keener awareness of existing inequalities beget and 
aggravate contradictions and imbalances" on a personal, a family and a social 
level (G&S, 8; see 2.2.2 above). The Council here is drawing upon the theory of 
uneven development, and appears to presume that if development was more 
balanced then problems would be overcome. This statement, however, is really 
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no more than a truism. 
20.6 The Teleology of History 
Whether or not human history has a finality or inner directedness running 
through it is a key issue for the grounding of hope. If history has no attainable 
goal, why should we hope that anything worthwhile or lasting can ever be 
achieved? Does the course of human life and society draw to a climax, and if so 
of what kind? Or, as Giddens muses, once "all residues of tradition and dogma 
[are stripped away] from rational thought ... modernity turns out to be enigmatic 
at its core, and there seems no way in which this enigma can be 'overcome' " 
(CMOD: 49). Here Giddens has put his finger on, though not thoroughly exam-
ined, an issue central to self-doubt and self-confidence. 
This dilemma may be expressed in another way. Once it was wondered how 
human freedom could fit into the planning of divine providence. The architec-
tonic structure of Thomas' theology seemed, especially when a conservative or 
narrow interpretation of his works (see 8.6 above) was taken, to leave too little 
room for human initiative. He had to clarify how the working out (gubernatio) 
of divine providence left room for free decisions, or for people themselves to 
choose between good and evil (Ia 103). In Thomas' theology there is a tension 
between his fitting humanity into the cosmic pattern of creation and his stress on 
how humans are unique in their calling. 
Today in view of the range of human freedom and the surprising developments 
in history, providence is now more put in question. Its questioning, however, is 
double edged as not only is the scope of human freedom vastly increased, but its 
outcome is less predictable than ever. In a complex and highly reflexive world, 
the unforeseen consequences of human activities are much greater than in 
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traditional societies. It is much less evident today than when Augustit;e or 
Thomas were writing whether God has anything that we might call a plan for 
human history. 
In order to tackle this question, even briefly, it is important to distinguish 
between the teleology inherent within normal human activities, that exhibited 
by a particular organization, that underlying society as a whole, and the overall 
directness of history. Giddens analyses help show that these four postulated 
instances of teleology are not part of a seamless fabric. 
20.6.1 Thomas' teleology 
Teleology, the directedness of action towards a goal, runs as a consistent theme 
throughout Thomas' works. One of his recurrent images is that of the arrow 
flying towards the target exhibiting the directedness that the archer has imparted 
to it. Non-human creatures act for the specific ends inherent in their respective 
natures, whereas it is central to human nature to act knowingly and freely. 
Human beings objectify the ends to which they are drawn, adopting them as 
their own aims, and choose the means to attain them. Accomplishing this 
successfully requires training and discipline, otherwise one may substitute 
something inferior for the good that one is actually drawn to or choose unsuit-
able means to attain it. The picture Thomas has at the back of his mind is not 
that of an individual in isolation, not merely an isolated specimen of humanity, 
but that of a mature person participating in - by our standards - a not very 
large society. He or she would be first a recipient from and then a contributor to 
the ongoing and life-sustaining activities of the society. Both its size and the scale 
of public administration would have been much less than in a modern nation-
state. Within this context, Thomas can plausibly say that the wise ruler could 
direct society towards a definite and worthwhile end (see 10.1.1 above). 
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Both Kohut and Giddens have explained how matters are not all that sirpple. 
Kohut has shown that people act not only because they are drawn by ideals or 
values, but also because they are pushed by ambitions or identify with others 
through exercising similar skills. Giddens has brought out how the outcome of 
an action often differs from what was intended due to its prior unacknowledged 
conditions. This gap between intention and outcome is heightened by the high 
reflexivity of modernity; people respond not just to laws and directives coming 
from government but also to what they estimate - maybe with the help of the 
social sciences - will be their effect. Consequently, although the shaping of 
society results from human interactions, the resultant shape is often one that 
nobody exactly intended or could predict. 
This is not to say that it is useless for individual persons and social movements 
to clarify their aims, set goals, sort out their motivations, work out tactics, plan 
activities and then review their outcome. Doing this today is more important 
than ever; unless it is continually carried out by many organizations, both 
governmental and non-governmental, modern society would not be sustained. 
It must however be recognized that the teleology inherent in the whole process 
of reproducing society through social interaction is much looser than Thomas 
supposed. He spoke of all the activities of people in society being directed to a 
single end (D'Entreves 1965: 188; see 11.3 above). The need for this was not due to 
sin, as - even in the innocence of paradise prior to all sin - social life embrac-
ing many people would be impossible without someone presiding and guiding 
everything towards the common good (Social is autem vita multorum esse non 
posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet, Ia 96, 1). 
Giddens brings out how there is a gap between the aims of an individual, even a 
powerful ruler, and the order resulting in society. Although the ordering of 
society does result from people's action, not just the ruler's, it is in part an 
unintended consequence, which no one could completely foresee due to the 
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unacknowledged conditions under which action takes place. The furthe~ one 
moves away from individual human actions taking place within limited 
circumstances, to encompass interactions within organizations, societies and 
global society as a whole, the more tenuous becomes a purely teleological 
explanation. Social sin can be maintained by a multiplicity of interactions 
undertaken by individuals, none of whom either might foresee or have 
intended the overall result. 
Unlike Augustine, Thomas does not adopt any scheme setting out the stages of 
history. He rejects as emptiness (vanitas) the view of Joachim of Fiore (t 1202) 
that the present age will give way to a third age of the Holy Spirit when spiritual 
men will reign (status tertius Spiritus Sancti, in quo spirituales viri princip-
abuntur, Iallae 106, 4 obj 3 et ad 3). Instead, he affirms that human life now on 
earth is on the way (in via), having not yet attained the beatitude held out for it 
as a gift of God (in patria). The working out of divine providence does not 
exclude contingency or chance; nor does it rule out all evil. What Thomas 
emphasizes is how each decision for good or ill relates its agent now - not just 
at the end of time - to the overall purpose of alL Thus he explains that any evil 
due to affliction (malum poenae) or a defect in nature (defectus naturalis) occurs 
because one part of the universe is directed against or clashes with another part. 
The evil of guilt, however, runs counter to the ordering of the whole universe 
towards its ultimate end; this is because the will, in which fault or guilt resides, 
ceases through its committing evil to take its orientation from the very ultimate 
purpose of the universe (sed malum culpae est contra ordinem totius universi 
ad finem ultimum, eo quod voluntas, in qua est malum culpae, ab ipso ultimo 
fine universi deordinatur per culpam, QD de Potentia 6, 1 ad 8). Thomas does not 
presuppose that each person contributes remotely to the ultimate purpose of all 
creation through his or her actions being linked with others, so that either 
cumulatively or gradually throughout history the overall purpose of the 
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universe is accomplished. Instead the overall purpose is a given, which w!ll be 
accomplished by the power of God, but it is not remote from anyone. Each person 
must at some definite point - amid the to and fro of life with others - freely 
decide whether or not to align her- or himself personally with God's law or 
purpose. The fact that divine law is particular, addressed to individuals in their 
particular circumstances, underlines the equal dignity of each person; he or she 
does not derive importance from the role he or she plays in human society. Yet 
does this view not play down the possibility of their making their own limited 
but yet unique and valuable contributions to the working out of God's plan for 
humanity? Does it not in the final analysis simply reduce all human decision-
making to consent to a foregone conclusion? 
20.6.2 The Ambiguity of Providence 
The origins of this dilemma are not new; they can be traced back to the Greek 
understanding of 'providence.' Leslie Dewart sums up centuries of thought: 
The very name Providence is derived from npOVOLU, a Greek term meaning literally 
pre-intellection, that is, pre-vision or foresight . ... according to most Greek thinkers 
whatever happens happens necessarily. Events are intelligible only in the light of 
their necessary causes. Fate rules over all cosmic and human events. 
Though any part of the cosmic process might not make sense by itself, the cosmic 
process as a whole must be supposed to be meaningful and to fulfill a purpose 
immanent in its very reality. Human wisdom is but the application of our finite 
reason to our finite decisions, so that our life will accommodate itself to the 
otherwise inscrutable purposes of an infinitely wise nature. For if we struggle against 
fate we cannot but reap utter unhappiness .... reconciliation to Fate is the only road 
to happiness. (Dewart, 1970: 134£) 
This baSically was the notion that Thomas was trying to square with the Judaeo-
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Christian notion of God making a covenant with humankind, of God's co~cern 
about human activities, interests and feelings, and who comes to save humanity 
from its sinful plight. 
... the Stoic doctrine of cosmic providence [was transformed] into the Christian 
doctrine of Divine Providence ... [by holding] that the ,,-oyos, or intrinsic rationality 
of the world, was not created, but divine ... . God benevolently orders all things 
wisely, co-ordinating the natural finality of all things into the finality of creation as a 
whole. In this manner he fosters and infallibly achieves the good of the whole world, 
and in particular the good of man. (Dewart, 1970: 136) 
Explaining in comprehensive detail how these Greek and Judaeo-Christian 
conceptions came together in one synthesis was Thomas' great achievement. His 
explanation is based on the view that whatever has being (esse) - not just kinds 
of things but each particular one - derives its being from the causality of God, 
which imprints its directedness to it. Since divine providence is nothing other 
than the plan directing things to their end, then everything to the extent that it 
participates in being is to that extent subject to divine providence (omnia quae 
habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem ... necesse est omnia, 
inquantum participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae, Ia 22, 2). 
Divine providence extends to human activity too, as our very action of making 
a free decision itself derives from God's causality; our planning our activities 
likewise falls within God's plan. 
Despite the extreme care and subtle balance with which Thomas explains the 
relation of human freedom to divine providence, the question still remains 
whether human life and history are ordered according to a pre-conceived divine 
plan. If they are, then genuine originality would be ruled out. Dealing with this 
question sends us back to look at the different root metaphors used for grasping 
how human life, action and society relate to God and his creation. 
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20.6.3 Fateful and Hopeful Metaphors 
The organismic, mechanistic and artistic conceptions each hold out their own 
distinctive prospects. When the organismic metaphor is applied to human 
society, it does not really allow for anything really new or original to occur as the 
basic pattern for human relations is laid down in advance. Variations will occur 
due to circumstances, different emphases or chance, but the underlying pattern 
by which parts are related to the whole remains. In many respects the mechanis-
tic model of society is even more rigid, as each part must interlock closely with 
the next so the running of the whole will not break down. 
Much the same applies when the organismic and mechanistic models are used to 
explain change over time. With the former metaphor society evolves, while 
with the latter its mechanism becomes more advanced and complicated. The 
difficulties of envisaging social evolution have already been mentioned (20.5). 
Alternatively, if a mechanistic model is adopted, then all hope for the future 
tends to be placed in the advance and spread of technology. The more society 
comes to resemble a huge computer, a spacecraft or perhaps an oilrig, the more 
advanced and hence better it must be. This model selects one of the institutional 
clusterings of modernity, namely technology, as the norm for the other three -
capitalism, surveillance and control of violence (see Chapter 15). It ends by 
evaluating all human activities in terms, not of the benefit they bring to all 
dimensions of people's lives and relations, but of how they promote the efficient 
running of society. 
A mechanistic . model of development offers no way of balancing economic 
efficiency, tight surveillance and the effective control of violence, against human 
rights and people's need for meaning, identity, spontaneity and participation. 
Although this criticism when stated so baldly may appear far-fetched, it is a 
fundamental issue in the very conception, design, running and assessment of 
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development programmes. The reason so much development fails to mee~ real 
human needs is because - somewhere along the line - people are thought of 
and treated as little more than cogs in a machine. As Peter Berger (1974) has 
argued, it makes little difference whether the machine has a capitalist or socialist 
design. A related problem is at the heart of South Africa's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. It aims at being people-centred and people-driven, 
but is expected to run as a power-driven machine and deliver benefits efficiently 
to people. 
Some instances have already been given (1.5) of how the post-modern artistic 
metaphor allows people, personally and in various groupings, to develop their 
own lives, relations and surroundings. This approach was adopted in the 
Council's call for people today "with the needed help of divine grace [to become] 
" : truly new and artisans of a new humanity" (G&S, 30) and "witnesses of the 
birth of a new humanism, one in which humanity is characterized first of all by 
people taking responsibility for their fellow human beings and towards history" 
(G&S, 55). Instead of viewing the divine plan for humanity as a kind of 
Christianized Fate, the Council stressed that it is a mystery (G&S, 10), signs of 
which may through faith be deciphered in the happenings, needs and desires of 
the world today (G&S, 11). "Manifested at the begilming of time, the divine plan 
is that humanity should subdue the earth, bring creation to perfection, and 
develop itself" (G&S, 57). As people gain insight into truth, goodness and beauty 
and their judgments embody universal values, they are "more clearly 
enlightened by that marvellous Wisdom which was with God from all eternity" 
(G&S, 57). Accomplishing all this requires breaking "the stranglehold of person-
ified Evil, so that this world might be fashioned anew according to God's design 
and reach its fulfillment" (G&S, 2). 
All this is in keeping with the artistic root-metaphor, as long as it is remembered 
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that throughout the whole process human beings are both helping to shap~ one 
another and coming to find themselves. We are artwork as well as artists. As yet, 
however, the artwork - particularly that of fashioning and refashioning a self-
narrative (see 7.5 above) - is still unfinished. On this Giddens' view echoes the 
Johannine insight that "we are already God's children, but what we shall be in 
the future has not yet been revealed" (I John 3: 2). 
Exploring this metaphor further: in carrying out any original work of art, one 
needs space, scope to explore various portrayals, latitude to experiment with 
different renderings, until one both discovers and creates the one appropriate for 
both self and circumstances. However it is not an empty or indifferent space that 
is required, but a setting that provides encouragement, that draws the best out of 
oneself, that evokes hope. Mistakes can still be made within such a setting, but 
when recognized and accepted for what they are, not hidden or denied, they can 
then be incorporated into the whole artistic process. Accomplishing this success-
fully places new demands, but can enrich the whole process in novel ways. 
Thinking in this vein brings us close to 1renaeus' hopeful view of human 
history and development. 
20.7 Grandiose Expectations 
While this elaboration of 1renaeus' outlook may sound wonderful as an image, 
to what extent can sin be overcome in practice? What can be accomplished 
within human history? Can human beings, with or without divine assistance, 
restructure the world so that within time it becomes a paradise again? Or are all 
our efforts at restructuring ultimately futile? 
By transposing Thomas' warning against presumption on to a collective level, 
we might sort out our expectations of what can be accomplished in human 
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history. The idea that the world and humanity too may in time be compl.etely 
restructured through knowledge, ingenuity and hard work to eliminate all evils, 
personal and social, physical and moral, is too presumptuous. The rise of this 
expectation of progress has been explored by Goudzwaard (1979). He traces its 
origin to the Renaissance. Pico della Mirandola, writing in 1486 in his dialogue 
between the Creator and Adam, has the Creator say: 
I created thee a being neither heavenly nor earthly ... that thou mightest be free to 
shape and to overcome thyself .... To thee alone is given a growth and development 
depending upon thine own free will. Thou bearest in thee the germs of a universal 
life. (Quoted in Goudzward, 1979: 14) 
Leonardo da Vinci, around the same time, II declared that experimental research 
alone would be the proper interpreter between man and nature, and linked this 
to the Renaissance prayer: 'Thou, 0 God, does sell us all things at the price of 
labour' II (Goudzwaard, 1979: 12). This optimistic outlook spread northwards, so 
by 1671 John Milton was suggesting that the paradise lost by Adam's fall might 
now be regained. 
A fairer Paradise is founded now 
For Adam and his chosen sons, whom thou, 
A Saviour, art come down to reins tal, 
Where they shall dwell secure, when time shall be, 
Of tempter and temptation without fear. Paradise Regained, IV: 613-17 
By dint of insight into nature and applying their knowledge people might now 
regain on earth what they had lost. This outlook, Goudzwaard shows, drew 
together ideas from the Renaissance, deism, · competition in a free market and 
utilitarianism. It provided the motivating force for technical development and 
the capitalist pursuit of profit. Once this outlook is adopted it becomes self-
justifying, as whatever can be classed as maximizing utility - abov~ all the 
increasing acquisition of goods - cannot but be a development and therefore 
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justified. The purpose of law and morality is not to assess developmen.ts or 
criticize competition, but to keep them going. When Western man (particularly 
the male) no longer considered himself held back by the barrier of paradise on 
earth having been irredeemably lost, then belief in progress became a secular 
faith. The resulting transformation in outlook is summed up by Goudzwaard: 
The motif of progress becomes a program for progress! That is the deeper significance 
of these new and striking paradise images. Consciousness of progress has matured 
into a faith which, for the sake of the future of mankind, can summon ... man to 
deeds; and the breathtaking 'splendor' of these deeds parallels the moving of 
mountains, including the mountains of the western social order. Faith in progress has 
become a faith capable of transforming its adherents into revolutionaries of the first 
order, for who would not follow the direction of an infallible guide which resolutely 
points the way to paradise regained? (1979: 41£) 
It is this basic image and conviction of providential progress that, according to 
Giddens, has been dissolved. As no knowledge is completely reliable, there is no 
point from which one can indubitably measure progress. 
20.7.1 IMakers of our own History' 
These considerations also put in question the aspiration voiced by some liber-
ation theologians that people should become "makers of their own history" or 
even "masters of their own destiny" (see for instance Gutierrez, 1969, 1973 and 
Hugo Assmann, 1975 and Paulo Freire, 1970). These sayings may be taken in a 
relative sense, as assertions that people should try to counter defects within the 
human condition. In particular, that the vulnerable should not be so dominated 
by the powerful that they become mere objects in their power games. These 
sayings, however, may also be given an absolute sense, in that people should 
endeavour to overcome the defects of the human condition. This disti~ction is 
derived from Sebastian Moore (1981: 32, quoted in 19.1 above). 
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Speaking relatively, no problem occurs, if the saying "makers of our own 
history" simply means that no people should be so economically dependent 
upon, politically dominated by or psychologically in thrall to others that they are 
allowed no effective say in the shaping of their own lives and society. This occurs 
not only when people are formally enslaved, but also when they are so 
instrumentalized that they cannot regard themselves as more than cogs in 
someone else's wheel. Struggling against such conditions of injustice and 
degradation within human history, ones brought about by human fault and 
failure, is called for as an expression of faith and self-giving. Part of this struggle 
is the attempt to change the structures that people draw on to act and interact, so 
that they can, yet are not forced to, live in a way that reflects their dignity as 
creatures made in the image of God. This is a matter of acting oneself in such a 
way that the underlying rules, resources and enabling images of one's society 
come to be transformed. 
If, however, becoming "makers of our own history" is taken in an absolute sense, 
then one is endeavouring to overstep the limitations of the human condition; 
one then aspires to be as gods. Here one endeavours not just to do one's limited 
best for others within the given circumstances, but to banish the limitations of 
human finitude altogether. This was the grandiose vision of some 
Enlightenment thinkers; William Godwin, for instance, writes: 
There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice, as it is called, and no 
government. Besides this, there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, nor 
resentment. Every man will seek, with ineffable ardour, the good of all. Mind will be 
active and eager, and yet never disappointed. (quoted in Goudzwaard, 1979: 41) 
As Goudzwaard shows at length, thinking of regaining paradise was not meant 
as a utopian dream, but as a historically realizable project. The eliminati9n of all 
suffering would be attained by the advance of science bringing man complete 
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technical control over nature. Social problems would be overcome thr~)Ugh 
instituting proper systems of law and education. Once the right social structures 
were in place all human life and relations would take on a new form devoid of 
all imperfection; a 'new man' would emerge. Though there has been immense 
disagreement over what 'the right social structures' would be; communists and 
capitalists have each had their own views, but both have shared a belief in 
human progress and perfectibility. This belief in progress - certainly when 
expressed in terms comparable to Godwin's - departs from Christianity, at the 
point where it rejects human finitude, the inherent limitations of the human 
condition. 
A crucial point where thinkers like Godwin overlook, or even deny, human 
finitude is their non-recognition that people may commit faults which require 
forgiveness. They want to alter structures so innocence may be regained without 
having to admit any sinfulness. Kerans contrasts this striving to return to 
paradise with the Christian view of the gravity of sin: "The Enlightenment 
sought innocence; Christianity began with belief in God's promise of pardon" 
(1974: 25), pardon even for the sin and evil which human efforts could not 
remedy. Kerans continues: 
Grandeur and courage were required to adopt this ethical vision [of trying to 
understand freedom and evil in relation to each other]: it is to insist that man and 
man alone is responsible for the evils of society and of history. It is to insist on man's 
moral autonomy, on his responsible adulthood. We are all heirs to this vision; upon 
it is based our historical-mindedness. (1974: 25) 
It is not my contention that Gutierrez, Cos mao and other liberation theologians 
have understand 'taking charge of human destiny' in an absolute sense. Though 
Goulet warns: "some theologians of liberation seem to fall into a simplistic 
Rousseauism as they preach the merits of new institutions" (1974: 118). Even 
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Paul VI's encyclical Populorum Progressio speaks of "building a world ~here 
every man .. , can live a fully human life, freedom from servitude imposed on 
him by other men or by natural forces over which he has not sufficient control" 
(PP, 47). These statements cannot rightly be treated as equivalent to those made 
by the philosophes of the Enlightenment, but they are open to misinterpretation 
when taken on their own or used as slogans. 
Viewed in this light, the SODEP AX Consultation on the theology of develop-
ment held at Cartigny, Switzerland in November 1969 could have benefitted 
from Moore's distinction. Development within the human condition, that is, 
improving socio-economic relationships among peoples, and between them and 
nature, would not have been confused with the idea of development of the 
human condition in relation to God. The limitations of human finitude would 
still have been respected. 
A quarter of a century later, during which the world has not developed as 
expected nor come right politically, there are fewer doubts about finitude and 
human limitations. Though they cannot be demarcated exactly, no amount of 
progress has come near to banishing the disease, anguish, melancholy, and 
resentment spoken about by Godwin. It might even be argued that in some cases 
efforts to eradicate these have only made matters worse. While some dangers to 
life and limb have been reduced, since Godwin wrote, we now live much more 
in a 'risk society,' in which we have to be open to both positive and negative 
possibilities (MSI: 28, and 10.6 above). Disappointments have not been overcome; 
magnificent plans have turned out disastrously. The effects of industrial growth 
have shown us that the environment is not infinitely resilient. Additionally, 
instead of thinking in terms of a universal 'man,' we now are brought face to face 
with sexual difference, social marginalization and the otherness of cultures (see 
2.8.4 for the mention of this at Santo Domingo). Above all, death remains 
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inevitable. Although modern conditions may in some areas have pushed .back 
the boundaries of human finitude, its presence is felt more keenly in others. 
Giddens warns that 
On the other side of modernity, as virtually no one on earth can any longer fail to be 
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conscious, there could be nothing but a 'republic of insects and grass/ or a cluster of 
damaged and traumatised human social communities. No providential forces will 
inevitably intervene to save us, and no historical teleology guarantees that this 
second version of post-modernity will not oust the first [a world of multilayered 
democracy, demilitarisation, post"':scarcity economics and the humanisation of 
technology]. Apocalypse has become trite, ... like all parameters of risk, it can 
become real. (CMOD: 173) 
Current experience throughout the world, whether expressed in post-modernist 
thinking or in Giddens' views about radicalised modernity, has undercut the 
temptation to historical presumption. The mobilizing vision of remaking 
paradise and regaining innocence has been deconstructed. 
Our human finitude, however, is not limited to a lack of knowledge and 
strength, even to our having to face otherness - both personal and cultural -
and eventually death. As mentioned earlier, it crucially manifests itself in the 
propensity to sin. Here, as Moore points out (see 19.1 on p 600 above), there is a 
fusion of horizons against which an act is seen as sinful. In sin we both endeav-
our to overstep the limitations of our human condition (the ultimate horizon) 
and wreck relations within the human condition (the nearer horizon). 
Most societies make clear - on the nearer horizon - the sinfulness of rape, and 
other crimes such as murder and theft. "The human sense of self-centrality is 
more clearly recognisable in some attitudes and actions than in others ... in those 
... that society recognises as bad" (Moore, 1981: 33). There is, however, also sinful 
self-centrality when a person, or more likely a group, turn their own work and 
652 
historical effort into an absolute idol. Though their project may be well i~ten­
tioned on the nearer horizon, it is sinful on the ultimate horizon, as it asserts 
human striving and effort to the exclusion or even against God. Goulet, dealing 
with the question of how Christians can be 'makers of history,' warns that for 
mankind "to erect its own historical efforts as an absolute idol constitutes 
collective hubris analogous to Adam's personal sin" (1974: 119). 
20.8 The Sin of Despairing of all Providence 
The previous sections have shown how certain providential outlooks, particu-
larly those associated with evolution, historical teleology and the dominant 
position of the West, had dissolved. The deconstruction of these outlooks, 
particularly the association of progress with our eventually regaining a lost 
innocence in a humanly constructed paradise, is in the main a dethroning of 
idols. This is more a boost to Christian hope than a threat. Yet in rejecting the 
optimism of rational modernity, one does not have go to the other extreme of 
non-rationality, throw out all discourse and embrace h~pelessness. Finding that 
we are unable to understand, plan and control everything and bring absolutely 
all reality into one comprehensive scheme does not mean that all understanding 
and provision for the future is absurd. Danah Zohar warns against this despair-
ing attitude: 
Deconstructive post-modernity is a style of thinking in which there are no winners or 
losers but only unrooted conventions, all equally valid (or invalid) and all equally 
devoid of meaning .... Supposedly objective criteria [in science] for deciding what is 
real and what is not are temporary resting places constructed for utilitarian ends .... 
we can have religious' feeling' though we believe nothing .... the historical [is reduced] 
to a collection of mere nostalgias .... All things post-modern in this deconstructive 
sense share a sense of the 'used-upness' of past form with a sense that not?ing new 
can ever happen. (1994: 113, see also 20.3.1 above) 
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This kind of mood is not entirely new. Thomas, drawing on expen~nces 
recounted by the Desert Fathers, speaks of torpor or apathy (acedia) as the vice 
opposed to the joy God grants to the person who gives of him- or herself. It is a 
kind of extra heaviness or depression that undermines the human spirit 
preventing it from freely engaging in anything worthwhile (quaedam tristitia 
aggravans .,. deprimit animum hominis ut nihil ei agere libeat ... torpor mentis 
bona negligentis inchoare, IIaIIae 35, 1). While Thomas saw giving in to this 
feeling as a temptation each individual might face, its appearance may now be 
more pervasive. It goes deeper than the 'noonday devil' (Ps 91: 6), mentioned by 
the desert monks. Whole peoples can be sunk in depression. Kohut mentions 
the depression Native Americans suffer from because they have lost the 
continuity of their culture. "The children grow up with fathers who have no 
means and no strength worthy of idealization .... You kill people when you take 
[away] their culture" (SPHU: 255f). Another tragic example of a nation, a society 
and its members falling apart is given in Poewe's study (1985) of the Herero of 
Namibia. In both these instances, the individual may not be able to break out of 
the prevailing socio-cultural despondency, because there are no cultural 
resources available as selfobjects. Their political leaders, religious figures and 
artists have been unable to sustain a healthy group self (see 13.6.6 and 14.7 
above). This kind of malaise, since it blocks the exercise of joyful self-giving so 
that others may grow and benefit in their lives, is another instance of social sin. 
The prevailing malaise is both the source and outcome of the deficient interac-
tions among these peoples. 
A somewhat similar malaise is felt in some areas of the previously optimistic 
and expansionist society of the West. The culture of totally deconstructive post-
modernism, at least as depicted by Zohar, is another instance of the failure 
among its artists, thinkers and cultural leaders to foster a healthy group self. 
When human limitations are harped upon too frequently, people become 
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dismissive of others and their efforts. They then show no appreciation for o~hers' 
limited but genuine contributions. Without going into details, mention' can be 
made here of two articles, both published in The Tablet, that reveal aspects of this 
prevailing malaise. These two are chosen from many others, because - judging 
from the widespread response they evoked - they have obviously struck a 
chord. 
In the first, Donald Nicholl tells of his reply to a Palestinian liberation theolo-
gian, who asked if Britain needed a theology of liberation. "Yes", he said. When 
pressed further about what Britain needed to be liberated from, Nicholl said the 
answer came spontaneously to him, in one word "Contempt." He describes it as a 
rot that spread from the head to all levels of British society. 
Margaret Thatcher, the head of the British government, held her ministers in 
contempt. They in their turn behaved with contempt towards those below them. So 
over the years we have witnessed the extraordinary state of affairs in which virtually 
all the ministers in charge of the departments of state have displayed contempt for 
the very people upon whom they and we depend for the well-being or our society. 
(1993: 1422) 
The root cause of this corruption in that "our society no longer holds to the 
tradition that every human being, simply by being human, has to be accorded 
dignity," Nicholl points out. "A further aspect of such dignity... [is that each 
person] is under judgement - indeed [he or she] has a right to be judged - and, 
if necessary, to be punished for moral failure" (1993: 1444). He suspects that 
"many in Western society no longer believe nowadays in a world beyond death 
is precisely because that relieves them of a fear of a judgement at which all will 
be revealed." Overcoming these misconceptions people have of themselves, 
Nicholl concludes, will call for "an even more arduous struggle than that of any 
other liberation movement" (1993: 1444). 
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In the second article, Timothy Radcliffe contrasts the story of the film Ju~assic 
Park, in which humans can only reply to violence with further violence, with 
the story of the Last Supper. There, instead of struggling for the survival of the 
fittest, "we build communion and heal wounds ... by using words that create 
communion, that welcome the stranger, that overthrow distance" (1994: 762). 
Although there is much grunting and roaring among the dinosaurs, "words are 
not so very important in Jurassic Park" (1994: 761). Radcliffe explains: 
The dominant model of arriving at truth [in our culture] is that of exposure, of 
showing up someone's sins .... one must ask: What is really exposed? What is 
discovered and revealed? The truth of another human being - the virtue and vice, 
. the goodness and badness - can be attained only through patient attentiveness. 
One must listen carefully, and let the other disclose himself. The truth is given not 
through exposure but in a moment of revelation. It needs tenderness and not 
denunciation. The truthful eye is always the compassionate eye, even the loving eye, 
for as St Thomas taught us, the truth and the good are the same. (1994: 762) 
Merciless exposure is one aspect of contemporary culture, but another is concern 
for the other. This concern runs through all Kohut's attempts to bring people to a 
mature narcissism that does not attempt to make the other person merely an 
adjunct of the self (see 9.2 above). It was also voiced explicitly in church circles at 
Santo Domingo in 1992 (see 2.8.4 above), when attention was paid to the plight of 
women and native peoples. Central to the works of Levinas is the contrast 
between the same, our own schemes and plans, and the other, who does not fit 
into them (see 16.7.1). Many doubts and fears arise in approaching those who are 
other, due to sex and gender, to race and nationality, to religion and culture, to 
age and ability, to wealth and class, to power and status. Even if all these differ-
ences could be bridged, there is still the irreducible otherness of each individual 
person; no one is entirely alike another. 
These various considerations point to, what might be termed, the cultural sin 
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inherent in deconstructive post-modernity. This overall outlook arises from the 
frustration of being unable to comprehend and so control everything. It displays 
an impatience with limited human beings, substituting contempt for appreci-
ation, and exposing them for understanding. When taken to the limit, violence 
against others banishes any attempt to build communion by dialogue; even the 
ability to listen to the other is lost. What is at stake here is not the securing of 
human rights in the face of one or other injustice, but the presence of a culture 
or social atmosphere in which respect for human dignity and the rights that flow 
from it could make sense at all. 
The sinfulness of going along with this outlook lies in its deflating any attempt 
to give of oneself perseveringly so that the other may benefit and grow in her or 
his life. It says that because one's effort and sacrifice will not solve all problems, 
nothing is worth attempting. Perseverance in charity or self-giving requires faith 
and hope: the faith to continue even though one does not know just how or 
when one's action might benefit others; the hope to put oneself at risk and 
sustain one's action through disappointments and pain. The non-acceptance of 
uncertainty and risk involved in supporting the other - the stranger who 
differs in race or gender, in wealth or power - leaves one deflated, and cuts one 
off from any rejoicing over God's love b~coming manifest among us (quando 
contristatur in his quae ei imminent facienda propter Deum, llaIIae 35, 3 ad 2). 
20.9 The Providential Character of Structuring 
It is possible to hold a third position between the two extremes of seeking to 
regain a lost innocence in a humanly constructed paradise and rejecting all 
human plans and effort as ultimately valueless. This is what Giddens does in 
opting for a radical engagement, which mobilizes social movements to reduce 
the impact of the inherent dangers of modernity or to transcend them. This 
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practical attitude is distinct both from the sustained optimism associated wi~h the 
Enlightenment and from the cynical pessimism that may lead either to a 
humorous or a world-weary response to the high-consequence dangers of 
modernity (CMOD: 136£). Radical engagement does not put any reliance upon the 
former providential outlooks, that have been deconstructed through a thorough-
going acceptance of modernity. Nevertheless, that does not mean that all talk of 
providence in any form is absent. 
If there was no providence, no providing for what is to come, no connection of 
past with future, everything would be subjected to pure caprice or blind chance. 
There would be no reason why people would expect anything definite from one 
day or hour to the next. Making promises, entering into contracts, holding 
ambitions or planning for the future would be absurdity. This, however, is not 
the outlook we generally adopt; we usually have some measure of confidence 
that there is something worth striving for, even if we are not sure what. Though 
having that confidence does itself depend in large part on our having experi-
enced reliable support from others; the self has acquired sufficient self-object 
support to deal with the future as it comes, taking what it provides and not being 
overwrought by its unexpected demands. If, on the contrary, sufficient self-
esteem and confidence have not been built up, then one has a fragmented self 
faced by an incoherent world. 
My point is that the language of structure, whether describing the structuring of 
self (Kohut) or of societies and social systems (Giddens), is at base a 'providential' 
one. It describes the construction and maintenance of a world that more or less 
provides, that draws a reasonably coherent future out of the past. Since structures 
are potentials that can be actualized in different ways, they never completely 
determine outcomes but they do set limits to what they might be. For instance, 
the self structure of a growing child will in large part be derived from what 
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parents provide, but there is no predicting exactly how the child will devel~p. If 
there was no building of structure, the child would not develop at all. Likewise 
on a social level, people in producing actions may freely adapt the structures -
the resources and generative rules - they draw upon, but not to such an extent 
that their actions are totally unlike what has be done before. Structures both 
maintain continuity in daily actions and allow for change. 
The sounder the structures of both self and society are, the more change they 
make possible, as they give the assurance that a different future can be dealt with 
smoothly enough. The weaker structures are, the less capability there is for 
coping with any change; a clump of traumatised individuals, who have not 
come together as a coherent group, will not be able to cope with changing 
conditions and are liable to produce all kinds of bizarre and inappropriate 
reactions. 
Although there is a time lag, people through their action gradually come to 
shape the structures - the rules, resources and enabling images - they and 
their successors will draw upon to live by. The shaping is rarely direct, as the 
outcome of any action - including the structure it reproduces - depends upon 
various unacknowledged conditions of action. Also, people are liable to take up, 
again with varying degrees of insight, whatever one does in ways that suit their 
own aims and purposes. There is no way of telling exactly what will be the 
repercussions of one's action or even a consistent policy. Often, in fact, the way 
an action is engaged in will have a more lasting personal and social effect than its 
stated aim. Nevertheless, even though the process is neither directly linear nor 
fully under anyone's control, we do by a process of feedback come to shape for 
better or worse the structures we and others live by. We cannot avoid structuring 
both society and selves, but whether or not we do so in ways that will provide a 
reasonable chance for ourselves and others to enjoy a fully human life depends 
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in large part upon the many choices and responses we make from day to day. The 
quality of our decisions will come to bear upon the structures that remain after 
our actions are completed. 
So, without speaking of taking charge of history or being makers of our own 
destiny, it is still possible to claim that human beings share in the shaping of 
providence. Each action may (or may not) help build up or at least conserve 
resources for future action. By exemplifying rules, both of intelligence and 
morality, it may open up clear and worthwhile opportunities for other actions to 
follow. Alternatively, it may only serve to increase confusion. By drawing upon 
and expressing enabling imagery, it can catch others' imagination and stir them 
into action. Much however depends upon the integrity of that imagery, whether 
it helps people to face reality creatively or to flee from it by regression. Taken 
together all these aspects of structure - resources, rules, and enabling images -
give a shape to what life offers; to the extent that they are defective they thwart or 
delay a person from gaining what life might provide. In this modest sense, then, 
we help shape and so have to take responsibility for the unfolding of providence, 
the providing of a hopeful future from out of the past. 
This leads us to inquire into what quality of events, and particularly what kind of 
human actions, are consonant with God's loving purpose; even though we do 
not know how it will work out, through hope we can trust that it will. In this 
vein, John Paul II in his follow up to the African Synod of 1994 sets Christians 
the task of bringing "to bear upon the social fabric an influence aimed at chang-
ing not only ways of thinking but also the very structures of society, so that they 
will better reflect God's plan for the human family" (EIA, 54). What we have to 
look out for is the real yet necessarily limited contribution we can make through 
radical engagement, but not to presume we can unravel the whole pla~ of God. 
After all, it is one thing to put one's faith in the One whose plan guides all 
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events (see Ephesians 1: 9-12), and quite another to identify various histQrical 
happenings - many favourable to oneself and one's nation - with that plan. 
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A Provisional Conclusion 
The point of delineating how evil is structured, and whether it deserves the term 
'social sin', is ultimately to offer a way of combatting it more effectively. To 
accomplish that with any chance of success would require three further kinds of 
contributions than that presented in this study. The first would be an acceptance 
of responsibility for the state of one's society and the consequent obligation to 
struggle against whatever longstanding faults one can. This is the opposite of 
disavowing one's involvement, or of even overlooking the existence of dehu-
manizing social conditions. One accepts responsibility, not because one has 
brought dehumanizing conditions about, but out of concern for others and one's 
own integrity. The second contribution would be a socio-historical analysis of the 
particular situation or recurring-problem that has to be deal with. The third 
would be a far more extensive treatment of the ethical issues involved. The 
ethical treatment would to a considerable extent be intertwined with the socio-
historical analysis, as the latter's purpose and terminology would be evaluative 
as well as descriptive. In this study, however, only a mention has been made of 
the ethical problems that are raised, for instance, by modern technology, gender 
or division between societies. No actual instance of 'structural evil' has been 
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examined in any depth. This is why this conclusion must be termed 'provisional' 
rather than 'final'; yet in another sense it brings some 'provisions' or 'provides' 
some clues as to how structural evil may be combatted. These may be briefly 
outlined up in relation to the four main issues isolated from previous literature 
(Chapter Six), namely: 
* the theological problem of speaking about sin in social terms; 
* the interrelation of self and society and how structure explains this; 
* the persisting effect of evil in society; 
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* whether and how one might as a member of society be implicated ~ 
its evils. 
Although the investigations into these issues cannot be completely distin-
guished from one another, we will see what each provides as a guide to action 
(addressing them, however, in a different order). 
1. 'Structure', a Heavy Duty Term 
This study brings out how the term 'structure' is made to do heavy duty; it is 
used both in relation to society and to the self to explain how the present 
emerges from the past and our expectations for the future are shaped. It shows 
how human potentialities are shaped through social history and personal 
biography. As a 'duality', it is also both the medium and outcome of human 
agency, accounting for the production of human action and the reproduction of 
society. It also helps explain the loose complementarity between self and society. 
Every activity and interaction involves them both, but not in equal degrees. Only 
some relationships of self with others or with society at large have a lasting 
impact on the self, providing or sustaining it with selfobject support. Other 
interactions are not always so consequential for the self, though they are still part 
of the reproduction of society. 
Speaking about 'structure' also becomes necessary as society becomes more 
complex and globalized. Only when the differentiation between social integra-
tion (in a given situation) and system integration (across a society as a whole or 
even the world) widens extensively does one have to take into account both the 
obvious and hidden structures that widespread social systems draw upon for 
their continued organization. When sorting out a problematic issue in modern 
society, it is not usually enough to find a capable person with the right human 
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qualities to deal with it fairly; one also has to put right whatever in the sy'stem 
caused it. Thomas in his time could easily enough speak of a judge dispensing 
justice to others, because having the virtue of justice informed by charity, he 
could with the others' wellbeing in mind discern and award what was due to 
them. Today, when addressing questions about employment, trade, technological 
innovation, or race relations, one has to think of what features a just system 
would embody and what structures should compose it. 
To some extent structures are evident, as people have a fair idea of what is 
happening in one another's lives and in society, all of which they with varying 
degrees of attention take account of in their interactions. Yet unacknowledged 
conditions of action will result in unintended consequences. Greater knowledge 
does not resolve this problem as it also complicates the action. The more the 
ramifications of any action are uncovered, the more its outcome is seen to rest 
upon other as yet unspecified factors. Psychological and social insight can shift 
the boundaries of awareness, but insight brings further (still hidden) structures 
into operation. 
In short, human 'structure' is a very complicated notion; only partly obvious and 
never entirely isolatable. Unlike an anatomical or building structure it cannot be 
separated from process. Through our activities and interactions we inescapably 
both take part in structuring our society and one another. The overall result of 
any naive attempt to change structures would be akin to tilting against wind-
mills! 
Fortunately, both Giddens and Kohut analyze structures. The former speaks 
about social structures being analyzable into generative rules for understanding 
and evaluation, and into authoritative and allocative resources. The latter shows 
how the self is basically built around a pole of ambitions and another of ideals 
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joined by a tension arc of skills and talents. In any individual, however~ this 
structure may be weakened; one element may more developed than others, parts 
may be split off with an unacknowledged life of their own. 
By using their analyses as tools, one is able to investigate a little below the surface 
of both society and people's personalities. How for instance in a given society do 
its members depict their ambitions and ideals to themselves? Is there something 
going on that is unacknowledged? What are the generative rules they acknowl-
edge and how do these differ from those actually in operation? Is this a cover up 
for the way resources are distributed? Then one might go on to ask: If resources 
are to be more justly distributed and used, then how will ambitions have to be 
changed? The point is not that either Giddens' theory of structuration or Kohut's 
self psychology provides answers, but that they help one raise pertinent ques-
tions. 
2. The Persisting Character of Evil 
In his analysis of evil, Thomas distinguishes between faults and afflictions. 
While a fault may be committed at a particular moment, its repercussions may 
continue as afflictions for a long while. A fault is a wrong action (or omission) 
done by a free agent who knows what he or she is about. Even though the guilty 
person, the one who committed the fault, may be sorry and forgiven, its reper-
cussions in his, hers or others' lives may remain. What particularly Giddens but 
also Kohut have done is to show how extensive might be the circles of damaging 
afflictions that arise from faults. Self psychology has shown how the self does not 
emerge even potentially whole and entire in the young, but already bears to a 
considerable extent both the strengths and weaknesses of those early mirroring 
and idealizing transferences, and later the twinship ones, that came from parents 
and significant others. Although the self may long for wholeness, it easily 
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invests that longing in objects that cannot provide it; even to the extent of 
idolizing them. 
An evil is structural because it is continuously replicated. When people only 
have defective structures to draw upon, they inevitably produce defective actions 
and reproduce defective structures. If as members of society, they have no option 
but to rely upon its defective rules, both those governing communication and 
evaluation, consequently their outlook and actions are bound to be distorted. 
Harnessing defective or unjustly distributed resources, they cannot but poorly 
provide or insufficiently care for one another; usually in a manner that benefits 
some at others' expense. It should also be added, that if people only have and 
identify with misleading images of themselves, ones offered by those who want 
to play upon or exploit the weaknesses of the self, then acting them out will only 
compound their ruin. 
Why cannot people stop drawing upon and reproducing evil structures? Here it 
is important that evil structures are not hypostatized, that rhetoric - important 
as it is - be not mistaken for analysis. Evil as a defect is parasitic upon the good. 
Structures can only perpetuate evil because basically they sustain some good; 
without that they would collapse entirely. A practical implication of this is that 
one cannot simply 'dismantle' apartheid, economic exploitation, colonialism, 
sexism or ageism en bloc. Instead one has to watch out for and pinpoint where 
particular images disable, accepted rules actually distort, resources are deficient or 
wrongly apportioned. Having done that, then one has to imagine better images, 
to seek for improved rules, to build up human and material resources as well as 
reapportioning them. This will involve reshaping the whole society, not merely 
a little area within it. 
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3. The Sinfulness of 'Social Sin' 
At first sight the argument over whether structural evil should bear the term 
'social sin' appears to be a semantic quibble of the sort that has given theology a 
bad name. There is, however, more to it than that. If structural evils were like 
tornadoes, lightening strikes or chance accidents, over which no one had any 
control, then the only sensible course of action would be to protect oneself as best 
one could. This would in fact equate them with what the law and insurance 
companies call' acts of God.' No one is expected to stand up against them. 
Naming structural or social evil(s) as 'sinful' casts them in a very different light. 
Social sin is analogous to deliberate personal sin, not because society as such 
(instead of an individual person) actually commits it. The analogy holds for 
three main reasons: 1) like concupiscence, it derives from and leads to personal 
sin; 2) it thwarts, though never completely, the effective exercise of charity or 
that self-giving which builds up the other person or group in their lives; and 
consequently 3) it is a condition we need to be redeemed from. Treating struc-
tural evils as I acts of God', which we must just humbly or fatefully accept, only 
compounds the problem. 
The practical implication is that as far as social sin is concerned one cannot 
remain neutral or a spectator. Since no place, occupation, culture or social 
position can entirely escape its influence, each person will at some point have to 
make a choice. Either one allies oneself with efforts to overcome the damaging 
effects of social evil in both one's own and others' lives, or one goes along with 
it. Each person either endeavours to find how he or she can best share in the 
redemption of the world from its persisting evils and follow that· out personally, 
or he or she does not bother to go beyond a purely individual form of life. 
Finding out how 'he or she can best share' is not a once-for-all task, as it will 
involve assessing and at a later date reassessing the qualities of one's self, one's 
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abilities, social position and influence, as well as discerning one's sense of cqlling, 
mission and witness. 
4. Working With and Within the Metaphor 
Finally, it is important to be guided by a suitable root metaphor that depicts a 
relatively adequate view of reality, in particular of how self is in society and 
society in self. Both Kohut and Giddens found that conceiving of people in terms 
of forces being mechanically checked or channelled did not allow them to 
account for the subtleties of human life and relations. In particular, it did not 
account for how a person might reflexively take stock of his or her own self or 
position in society, and incorporate any insights gained thereby in the re-
orientation of his or her aims. For instance, having seen where acceptance of 
conformity might lead, he or she can decide to object, rebel, break away or simply 
conform anyway. This process may take place, not just once but continually, as a 
person proceeds in ever varying ways to draw upon selfobject support, derived 
from past and current experience, and reconstrue his or her own self-narrative in 
response to changing perceptions and circumstances. Doing this, furthermore, is 
not a prerogative limited to one group of persons: the elite, leaders, experts, 
social engineers, or religious personnel. 
The organismic metaphor brought out the value of interdependence and showed 
that one had a particular task as a member of the social body to uphold in 
relation to the whole. It held in a past age when no one conceived of redesigning 
the human body and few of reshaping society. The mechanistic metaphor was 
more ambivalent as it tried to combine freedom for individuals in an overall 
social order. It gave rise to a search for the social laws, analogous to the laws of 
mechanics, that governed the workings of society. If these could be found and 
applied, then a suitably redesigned social structure could be imposed - whether 
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by law or through education - so that people would turn out differentLy. As 
long as the right structure was put in place people could then exercise their 
individual rights and freedoms, particularly those centred upon the acquisition 
and use of property, without doing harm to one another. Other freedoms and 
even basic needs - ones that could not easily be quantified - took a secondary 
place, so those without property had in practice little freedom. In view of the 
resulting economic oppression of the poor, the Church initially reacted by trying 
to restore a more corporate vision of society. 
The mechanistic root metaphor, like any other, has its blindspots. It really only 
depicts structure as a constraint upon individual freedom, or at best a channel for 
its expression. It overlooks how the exercise of human rights, the workings of 
democracy and the mechanisms of exchange draw for their operation upon an 
underlying sense of solidarity, of belonging to a united social body. But if each 
individual only thinks of his or her self-interest, without ever adverting to or 
caring for the social conditions that promote it, then their consequent neglect 
will steadily erode the social foundations upon which individual freedom rests. 
Another shortcoming is that those designing new structures for society may 
easily assume that they are positioned outside society like mechanics repairing 
an engine. They do not grasp how their efforts to redesign and re-engineer 
society do take place within society. Without the opportunities that society 
provided them, they would be unable undertake any social engineering at alL 
Failure to identify their own position and its implications, or even their spin-
ning a protective cocoon so they would not be too disturbed, easily prevents 
them from having to face how their activities are in fact contributing to the 
social problems they are endeavouring to solve. For instance, one person's 
relentless quest for security increases insecurity for alL 
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The artistic root metaphor differs from its predecessors in being more concerned 
with process than product, with appropriate action now than with the final 
artwork still to be completed. It does not depict any finished artwork, any model 
of an ideal society, but brings out how people should endeavour through their 
interactions to bring out the best in each other, much as the ever varied shapes, 
colours and tones in a painting enhance one another. While artwork can learn 
from its past mistakes, it is not tied by its conventions, but must experiment. 
Depending upon the sensitivity and discipline with which this process is carried 
out at each stage of the way, and upon how the emerging whole is continually 
weighed in relation to its parts and vice versa, so will a fine or dreadful artwork 
result. 
In a sense this metaphor breaks down as members of society are never separate 
from the society they constitute, unlike artists who can stand back from and let 
their works go . Each participant in society is both helping to shape and being 
shaped by the whole social process; no one is outside society, nor does anyone 
have a purely spectator's view of all that is going on. This, however, does not 
mean that because a person cannot grasp everything or foretell the final out-
come, there is nothing worthwhile he or she can usefully contribute. 
Whether or not one accepts this last statement, especially when social evils 
appear to be overwhelming, is not at root a matter of sociology or social planning 
but offaith. Whether or not one lives it out, especially when social evils threaten 
one's livelihood and even life, is not basically a psychological issue but one of 
hope. Actually putting it into effect - especially in threatening times -
expresses not only one's own self-giving, but above all the love of God at work 
among us. After all, as Paul - reversing the artistic paradigm - reminds us: 
"we are God's work of art, created in Christ Jesus for the good works which God 
has already designated to make up our way of life" (Eph 2: 10). 
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Appendix 
Heinz Kohut: The Man and His Work 
In view of Heinz Kohut being relatively unknown outside the circles of psychol-
ogy and psychiatry, a short account of his life, work and outlook will be given. 
This, it is hoped, will be useful to theological readers to follow his preoccupa-
tions and understand his views. 
1 The Life of Heinz Kohut (1913-1981) 
Born just before World War I in Vienna, Heinz was an only child. With his 
father away on the Russian front during his early years, and taken up with social 
functions during his later years, his childhood was rather sad and lonely. 
Nevertheless, he did well at school in both studies and athletics. Graduating 
from the gymnasium in 1932, he went to study medicine at the University of 
Vienna. In the midst of his course, he went off to Paris to experience French 
medicine from the inside of their hospitals. 
After completing his degree, Kohut was attracted to psychoanalysis and under-
went an analysis with August Aichorn, who besides being a close collaborator of 
Sigmund Freud is considered a giant in his own right. Kohut's single glimpse of 
Freud took place at the railway station, when Freud was leaving Nazi occupied 
Austria. As the train pulled out Freud looked out the window, the young Kohut 
raised his hat; Freud did so in return. Soon Kohut was himself a refuge~, going 
first to England and then in 1940 on a wartime convoy to the United States. 
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Kohut settled in Chicago. After completing his internship, he took a residency in 
neurology. But by 1947, he had - like Freud his model - moved over 
exclusively to psychiatry. He underwent a second analysis with Ruth Eissler. The 
impression given by Strozier (1985, upon which this section is mainly based) is of 
someone with a definite sense of purpose, neat and meticulous, cultured but 
with a mischievous streak. An indication of his excellence is apparent in his 
becoming a member of the faculty of the Institute for Psychoanalysis immediate-
ly after graduating there. He kept his university appointment only until 1950, but 
remained on the faculty of the Institute for the rest of his life. 
What made Kohut outstanding as an analyst was not just his competence, but 
his ability to grasp what something meant to the analysand. For him "the 
analyst's job [is] to listen and to comprehend the patient's feeling state and the 
meaning of that state empathically" (Miller, 1985: 30). He stressed the importance 
of gaining an empathic understanding of the patient, before offering any 
interpretation. Even if the latter were correct, but were given prior to establishing 
a bond of empathy with the patient, it would still be unacceptable and so not 
helpful. Without asking a lot of questions, Kohut took the analysand's presenta-
tion 'straight,' assuming first of all that it meant what it seemed to mean. He "felt 
the tendency of analysts to look first for a hidden meaning and to ignore the 
simple and more manifest meaning was a mistake" (Miller, 1985: 15). Also, 
instead of fastening on details, such as slips of the tongue, unless their import-
ance became apparent for some special reason, he sought a broad understanding 
of the self of his patients. Questioning them about little details might easily 
rekindle the distrust that had contributed to their pathology. 
Both as a teacher and as an active member and office bearer in the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, Kohut sought to influence the development of the 
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psychoanalytic movement. "Before 1965 Kohut was Mr Psychoanalysis, the. most 
eminent spokesman for classical Freudian thought, conservative and widely 
respected" (Strozier, 1985: 10). But, much to the disdain of many of his colleagues, 
the development of his thought could not be contained within the prevailing 
orthodoxy. The removal of an emotional obstacle enabled him to express clearly 
and opening what he had previously only alluded to (III: 228f). His investigations 
into narcissism and its growth into empathy led him to formulate what has 
come to be known as 'self psychology' . 
Both Kohut and his new ideas were viciously attacked. Famous is his contro-
versy with Otto Kernberg during the 1970s over the analyzability of certain 
patients with narcissistic personality disorders. Kohut took a much more 
optimistic line than Kernberg (see III: 303). 
For Kohut narcissism is a developmental thread running through everyone's life. This 
thread can develop in either a healthy or pathological direction. For Kernberg, on the 
other hand, narcissism is per se a pathological concept. (Alt, 1988: 64) 
Kernberg gave much more emphasis "to the dangerous level of destructiveness, 
both to themselves and others, which lurks in the more pathological people" 
(Alt, 1988: 91) . In making any assessment of this controversy, attention would 
have to be given to whether they were each treating patients with a similar 
degree of pathology. Also, since Kohut was working out a new theory of his own 
while using traditional words, it is questionable how much they were speaking 
about the same set of conditions. 
Many former colleagues looked upon Kohut's 'revisionist' ideas with bewilder-
ment and rejected them. Psychoanalysts, no less than other professionals, are 
quite capable of - in lay language - rubbing one another up the wrong way. 
Westen relates an incident at a case presentation where he suggested to a senior 
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psychoanalyst that Kohut's theory might provide an insight into the dynamics of 
a unwanted child, tossed from relative to relative. liTo this he replied, with the 
manner of a bishop gently reminding an errant priest of his duty to the church, 
'You know, we don't believe in Kohut here.' " (1985: 370) 
It is evident that from the 1960s onwards, Kohut's circle of friends changed as 
younger colleagues grouped themselves around him to learn from him and 
support him in his work. This circle went over the material for his books prior to 
their publication. It has also organized the annual Self Conferences, which have 
continued after Kohut's death. At the end of the first conference, Kohut gave his 
reflections on the papers, and spoke of his hopes and fears for the future of self 
psychology . 
... our findings and theories have found many supporters who praise the usefulness 
of our ideas ... [But they have also] aroused a good deal of antagonism, directed not 
only toward our experience-distant formulation but at our clinical practice. (1980: 
546 & III: 350) 
Kohut goes on to ask: 
What then can we expect from the future? Will our discoveries be accepted for the 
benefit of the patients who undergo treatment, whether in the form of psychotherapy 
or in the form of analysis? Will our ideas take hold? (1980: 549 & III: 353) 
Although confident that they will gradually take hold, Kohut suspects that 
appropriate credit is not so likely to be awarded to their originators. But, com-
pared with other explanatory systems, Kohut claimed 
they supply vastly more significant explanations of the phenomena that are actually 
encountered by the psychoanalyst, both inside and outside his office, i.e., as regards 
our patients in therapy and as regards man in vivo. (1980: 549 & III: 353) 
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This is a bold claim. But then, as Arnold Goldberg, one of Kohut's closest 
collaborators, said of him: 
Like him or dislike him, you just don't often find that kind of person ... And he knew 
he was special. Most of his critics weren't playing the same game he was playing .... 
There was just no one in his league. (reported in Strozier, 1985: 12). 
However Kohut's contribution to psychology might finally be judged, his 
importance lies in his having first mastered and then breaking out of a narrow 
Freudian orthodoxy. Strozier, who interviewed Kohut on various topics going 
beyond purely clinical concerns, says of him: 
No great thinker is humble; and it took real courage and fortitude to move away 
from a tradition - at least as perceived by those responsible for orthodoxy ''''ithin 
that tradition - that was so completely a part of Kohut's soul. (1985: 11) 
In his last years, Kohut struggled despite increasing illness to sketch out his 
paradigm of self psychology. As Paul Ornstein reports: "He would often say to 
me, in the midst of physical pain: 'But I still have ideas! As long as I can think 
and have ideas, it's worth it' to live." (III: 2) 
So, just days before he died (October 8, 1981), he travelled to San Francisco and 
addressed a large audience on empathy at the annual 'Self Conference.' These 
conferences have continued to develop his line of thought and investigation. 
2 Kohut's View on Religious/Christian Belief 
There are three possible ways of assessing the relationship of a writer such as 
Kohut to religion and hence to theology: in his life, in his treatment of religious 
themes, and in the affinity between his thought and a theological understanding 
of humanity. 
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2.1 Kohut's own 'Religion' 
The first is to look into any formal religious adherence and belief. Seemingly, 
there was none during Kohut's adult life. At one point he was hostile to what he 
called "dogmatic religion," to those who have become serious as "defenders of 
the truth" because they consider their joyful search for it has ended (RESS: 207). 
The nearest one comes to understanding Kohut's own position is when he 
speaks of Dag Hammarskjold as an instance "of heroic men of constructive 
political action who have achieved a transformation of their narcissism into a 
contentless, inspiring personal religion" (SPHU: 71). Though, in the absence of 
further documentation, one cannot be sure how much Kohut would identify 
with this position himself. 
2.2 The Treatment of Religious Themes in Kohut's Writings 
One can examine his few explicit statements on religion or allusions to religious 
beliefs made in the course of his psychological studies. A few references are 
worth following up in Kohut's case. 
In his earlier writings, Kohut remarks how in certain personality disorders, 
instead of someone having a healthy admiration for others and an enthusiasm 
for life, the self becomes fragmented and regresses. This "may manifest itself 
through the expression of vague and mystical religious preoccupations with 
isolated awe-inspiring qualities which no longer emanate from a clearly 
delimited, unitary admired figure" (SAPT: 85). Kohut sees an analogue, but not 
identity, between the relationship in adulthood of a true believer wanting to 
merge with his omnipotent God and the idealized parent imago formed in 
childhood (SAPT: 106 n1). These observations bring out how easy it is-at first 
sight to confuse certain aspects of a disintegrating human self with real faith. Not 
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everything that appears religious is always sound; instead people should be .judge 
by the fruits they produce (see Mt 7: 15-20 & Lk 6: 43-45). 
Kohut does grant that in certain instances religious experiences do produce good 
fruit. Even what for him are hallucinations - religious or otherwise - may in 
times of enormous stress playa very positive role. 
One striking characteristic of unusually courageous individuals is that at certain 
critical moments or stages of their lives they create imagery concerning an all-
powerful figure on whom to lean for support. This idealized figure may be a 
personified god or a prototypical historical figure or a charismatic person who is 
living in the present. (SPHU: 6 & see HDAC: 76) 
As instances of the former, Kohut cites in his study "On Courage" the examples 
of Franz Jagerstatter, and of Hans and Sophie Scholl, Germans who were 
executed by the Nazis for their resistance to the regime. In their cases, there was 
the hallucinatory conjuring of the presence of the idealized Godhead which enables 
certain individuals to carry out acts of supreme courage not only without the aid of a 
supportative group, but even in the face of near-total social disapproval. (HDAC: 76) 
Similar experiences have protected people in solitary confinement from being 
permanently damaged psychologically. Kohut is at pains to point out how 
different these martyr heroes were from psychologically disturbed persons. In the 
former there is a total blending of the personality with the values of the nuclear 
self. 
. .. the martyr hero has a sense of profound inner peace (narcissistic equilibrium) and 
even the experience of conscious pleasure that his ideals and his total personality 
have now become one .... We see neither the fuzzy mysticism which characterizes 
certain regressive swings in narcissistic personality disturbances nor, or course, the 
anxious and bizarre mental state surrounding the delusional contacts with a bizarre 
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god and with other distorted omnipotent figures which we encounter jn the 
psychotic. (SPHU: 20) 
In total contrast is the calm and peace of the martyr heroes, who were each living 
out the pattern of the nuclear self and loyal to it in death. "He will die without a 
trace of fear, dies as a matter of fact proudly. He knows that he has supported his 
real self, which lives on." (SPHU: 263) 
There is a kind of functional equivalence between Kohut's pattern of the nuclear 
self and the calling a Christian fulfils in faith. Still, it is difficult to work out fully 
what Kohut understands by the nuclear self and how it arises, as he himself 
admits (SPHU: 26). He does not explain "how a self self-organizes itself out of 
simpler components" (Corbett and Kugler, 1989: 202) or whatever. What is 
important for grasping Kohut's view of religion is his linking the fulfilment of 
the deepest pattern of the nuclear self with an explicit religious motif. ''It is 
indeed my conviction that the tragedy of man forms the very center of the stories 
told by the evangelists" (SPHU: 45) In psychological terms, "seeming defeat is 
actually a narcissistic triumph" (SPHU: 44). This allows Kohut to interpret the 
Jesus' death as follows: 
The Mary's faint and cry; the Pharisees, the men of work and love and everyday 
morality, sneer at the hero; Pilate, the wielder of worldly power, will not interfere 
with the unrolling of the predestined life, despite his wife's dreams. The hero's 
friends detach themselves one by one in order to survive as death approaches. And 
then, after one last weakness and doubt, as in all great tragedy, there comes the final 
fulfilment and the ultimate consummation of the nuclear self of the hero. The rest-
the mythological details of the moment of death, the empty tomb, the reappearances 
- is symbolism. These are secondary additions, yet they remain in meaningful 
symbolic contact with the essence of the story, for they tell in various ways of the 
hero's narcissistic triumph, of his immortal divinity. (SPHU: 45) 
In speaking about the Pharisees as "the men of work and love and everyday 
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morality," Kohut is echoing Freud's description of psychological health as the 
ability to love and work. In this view, people are called to live by everyday 
morality; they fail and so bear the burden of guilt. Whereas, Jesus and other 
heroes have another life curve to follow, one that goes "beyond the pleasure 
principle" and is not constrained by fear and guilt. Although they meet opposi-
tion and death, the tragic hero can die without regret as the aims of his nuclear 
self are realized. Kohut's insight here hinges upon the distinction he brings out 
between Guilty Man and Tragic Man. 
One might sum up Kohut's attitude to religion, specifically Christian belief, as 
being an important contribution to psychology, but hardly vice versa. What a 
believer would speak about as one's calling and destiny in faith, Kohut would 
call the fulfilment of the pattern and ideals given in the nuclear self. Unlike 
Freud, Kohut does not dismiss religion as merely irrational dogma, but he agrees 
with Freud in saying: 
2.3 
It is poor science. But if it's good, it may be outstanding psychology. In its best and 
central part, religion puts into words an awareness of what is in people. When you 
talk about paradise, the idea is that there is something greater than the individual 
life. Although some ideas become debased and vulgarized and popularized in terms 
of very specific concrete images, like hymn-singing angels, I think in the eyes of a 
deep searcher for religious truths these things fall by the wayside. (SPHU: 264) 
Affinities between the Self Psychology and Theology 
One may also work out the general affinity between his view of human exist-
ence, life, activity and destiny, and the views upheld in one or other theology. To 
what extent do they share common principles, use compatible images to portray 
the meaning of life, or draw on similar root metaphors? Any conclusions about 
this could only be advanced after a thorough study of Kohut's self psychology. 
This task of comparison has already been initiated, at least in part, by Kill (1986), 
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Browning (1987), and Olthuis (1989). 
Browning (1987: 6) notices "most affinity" between Christian thought and the 
culture of care evident in Kohut's self psychology and also in Erikson's approach 
to identity, than the culture of detachment (Freud), of control (Skinner), or of joy 
(Rogers, Maslow, Perls and Jung) that characterizes other psychologies. In the 
field of pastoral psychology, both Mason and Scharfenberg (in Goldberg, 1980) 
relate how helpful they have found the theory and approaches of self psychology 
in their pastoral practice. 
On a more theological level, Olthuis suggests that 
'covenanting' as a depth metaphor of the Christian faith comports well with 'being-
with' as a depth metaphor of [Kohut's] psychotherapy .... Self psychology's concern 
with the relational-communal nature of the human self and the restoration of the 
fragmented human self fits well with faith's concern with love, community, whole-
ness and healing of brokenness. (1989: 314£). 
The positive nature of these comparisons gives some assurance that drawing 
Kohut's thought into contact with Christian theology will not result in an 
impossible dialogue. 
Furthermore, Olthuis proposes that self psychology should widen its interest 
beyond the early years of human development, so as to show the dynamics of 
relational interdependence throughout life. So, in line with the concerns of this 
study, Olthuis suggests that 
Self psychology would enrich itself - and society as a whole - by developing its 
interrelational dynamic with reference to these wider social, institutional and 
environmental matrices of relations which make up the thick, heavily textured fabric 
of life .... Such an enrichment, demanded by the covenantal metaphor of faith, could 
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be aided and abetted by the abundant resources of liberation theology and all other 
movements aligned against racism, sexism and oppression of any kind. (1989: 324) 
3 Society and Kohut's Psychology of the Self 
For understanding the self, Kohut's works can hardly be passed over. But why is 
he chosen, rather than other psychologists, to contribute to understanding 
society? After all, he does not provide an elaborated theory of the relation 
between self and society, only a number of passing hints and asides (see 9.1.5 
below). Yet what Kohut offers is a sophisticated theory of the self, one that leaves 
space for investigating its linkage with society. There are several reasons for this. 
First, Kohut delineates the structures of the self that are built up very early in 
life, and so are basically common to everyone. These structures may be well 
developed and sound, or partially developed and weak. What exactly will be the 
repercussions for each individual of these strengths and weaknesses will vary 
enormously as they meet life's vicissitudes. But the extent to which a person is 
able to respond and contribute positively to others, and ultimately to society, 
depends mainly upon the basic strengths and weakness in her or his self 
structure. 
Second, because Kohut is dealing with very basic structures, his insights are less 
culture bound than those dealing with the later stages of development. For 
instance, the Oedipus/Electra complex that Freud treated so extensively occurs 
slightly later in life, and is tied more closely to the developmental problems of 
certain societies. Whereas Kohut's explanation allows for both cultural and 
personal differences to emerge as people shape their own ambitions, talents and 
ideals in response to others around them (also see Alt, 1988: 88). 
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Third, a psychology of severe mental disorders is not likely to have much 
bearing upon social issues. Highly pathological or psychotic persons are rather 
beyond the reach of society; in Greek Ilno)"tYls, people on their own cut off from 
society. Most of Kohut's analysands, at least the cases he draws on in his writings, 
exhibit a less severe pathology. He is dealing with people who in many respects 
can function normally, and so are generally accepted by others, but whose 
personality disorders contribute to the weakening of society. Kohut throws light 
on how weaknesses in the structure of the self, which to some degree everyone 
suffers from, are likely to have repercussions in personal relations and society as 
a whole. 
Four, leadership and the influence of a leader's personality are not prominent 
themes in sociological studies, such as those of Giddens. How much do certain 
figures shape society for good or will? Who rises to prominence and why? 
Kohut, as well as other psychologists, do address these issues. He shows why 
certain pathological figures attain leadership positions, and hence enormous 
power, because they present an illusory solution to the social ills and problems 
that people are facing (see Chapter Seventeen). 
Finally, many of Kohut's investigations deal with narcissism, or - put simply -
the quality of a person's self-regard; depending upon the quality it attains, a 
person may either open out to others in genuine empathy or remain touchy and 
boastful. The latter both needs others to bolster her self-esteem, yet at the same 
time is threatened by them. A healthy society cannot be formed if the latter 
predominates over the former. As Kohut observes: 
The years that I devoted to organizational tasks in psychoanalysis have made me 
more keenly aware of the role of narcissism in the public realm: as a spur for 
constructive planning and collaborative action, if integrated with and subordinated 
to social and cultural purposes; and as a source of sterile dissension and destructive 
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conflict, if in the service of unneutralized ambition or of rationalized rage. (SPIiU: 51) 
Admittedly the term 'narcissism' has been applied, usually in a negative sense, 
too freely to individuals and societies, so it becomes evacuated of meaning. But 
Kohut's careful delineation of its origin and development as well as its positive 
and negative qualities, allows one to make a more discriminating assessment of 
its effects in society. 
4 Stages of Kohut's Thought 
As might be expected from the outline of Kohut's life, his thought changed and 
developed steadily. This has been carefully charted by Ornstein in his introduc-
tions to Kohut's selected writings (I: 1-106 & III: 1-82). He distinguishes four 
periods in the development of Kohut's thought from 1950 to 1981; the details 
need not detain us here. But two points are of interest for this study, namely, his 
abiding interest in issues that go beyond a purely clinical setting (see 9.1.5 below), 
and his continual coming back to clarify points of theory. His writing thus 
exhibits a sustained effort to forge a new set of psychoanalytic concepts, ones that 
maintain continuity with the classical Freudian vocabulary but will also embody 
his new insights. 
His first book, The Analysis of the Self in 1971, attempted within the limits of 
classical theory to express his newly emerging conception of the self. Kohut later 
described it as an attempt to "pour new wine into old bottles" (Stororow in 
Goldberg, 1988: 63). But his divergence from classical theory only became fully 
evident with the publication of The Restoration of the Self in 1977 and the first 
two volumes of collected papers, The Search for the Self, in 1978. There his 
vocabulary becomes less cumbersome and more direct, as he has grown into his 
own terminology. His last book, How does Analysis Cure? which he had finished 
just before he died in 1981, and the second two volumes of collected papers 
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(published posthumously in 1990 and 1991), show him revising his terminology 
and correcting misconceptions that had arisen from his earlier works. As he was 
now more sure what he wanted to say, and was no longer dependent upon 
classical theory, he could state his own views much more clearly. In short, to 
grasp his central ideas it is best to read his later works first. 
So throughout this study greater use has been made of Kohut's later writings. 
Not only are they easier to read, but they present a more coherent theory of the 
self. Though at times earlier works have also been drawn upon as the examples 
and case studies there throw light upon the relation of self to society. In any case, 
the purpose of this study is to draw out from his writings the ideas and sugges-
tions most helpful for understanding social evil, rather than examining the 
intricacies of Kohut's thought in its different formulations for their own sake. 
Many of Kohut's ideas, especially those dealing with strictly clinical issues, have 
not been touched upon in this study. Though his followers' works, especially 
their contributions to the Self Conferences, have also been used occasionally to 
fill out our understanding. 
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